Dynamic assessment, as manner of alternative process-based assessment, is currently at a cross-roads chiefly characterised by, at times, vague conceptualisation of terminology, blurred demarcation as to its model and theory status and at times ill-defined fundamental philosophy. As a movement in modern psychological assessment within the broader field of intelligence, dynamic assessment does not present with a coherent unifying theory as such and due to its lack of clarity in a number of key areas its eventual disuse might well be the final outcome of this method and its unique history and methodology. In pursuit of this study’s main goal, dynamic assessment models and theories are critically explored by means of a meta-theory largely inspired by the work K.B. Madsen, a Danish meta-theorist and pioneer in theoretical psychology. Madsen’s meta-theory is attenuated in order to suit the nature and purposes of this study; so as to better analyse dynamic assessment within intelligence research and assessment. In its primary aim, this study builds on a foundation of epistemological and ontological considerations within science in general, the social sciences and psychology in particular. In keeping with Madsen’s method of meta-theory analysis, the author’s predilections are stated at the outset in order to place the progression of analyses of the various models and theories within dynamic assessment. Dynamic assessment and intelligence are discussed and a brief digression into the history of Soviet psychology is offered as it is pertinent to the work of Lev Vygotsky and its subsequent influence within process-based assessment. Theory and model development within science and the social sciences are described from a philosophy-of-science vantage point. Psychological assessment’s prime considerations are critically explored and the discussion highlights the role played by the philosophical aspects of mathematics and statistical foundations as leveraging measurement within assessment. Particular attention is paid to the perennial controversy surrounding null hypothesis significance testing and the possible future directions that can be explored by and within dynamic assessment which lends itself to approaches less restrictive than those offered by mainstream statistics. The obvious and not so obvious aspects within the mathematical, statistical and measurement foundations are critically explored in terms of how best dynamic assessment can manoeuvre within the current mainstream psychological assessment system and how new models of item response theory suited to change-based assessment can be explored as possible manner of handling the gain score issue; itself a paradoxical state of affairs within classical and modern test theory. Dynamic assessment’s past has in large part been dictated by mainstream considerations in the areas mentioned and in order to place itself on an alternative path these considerations are critically assessed in terms of dynamic assessment’s future path. Dynamic assessment and its place within the broader intelligence assessment field is then investigated by means of the meta-theory developed. It is envisaged that the intuitive appeal of dynamic assessment will continue to garner support from practitioners across the globe, specifically those trained in countries outside the traditional stronghold of Western psychological theory. However, the position taken in this argument is that in order to ensure its survival it will need to make a decision in terms of its future progress: either to branch off from mainstream assessment altogether or to become fused within mainstream assessment. The “best of both worlds” scenario has obviously not worked out as it was originally hoped. The study concludes with the meta-theoretical exploration of dynamic assessment within intelligence by utilising a small selection of current models. The application of the attenuated Madsenian framework seeks to explore, place and ascertain the nature of each model regarding the ontological and philosophical status of the approach; the nature of the hypothetical terminology, scientific hypotheses and hypothesis system utilised and lastly the nature of the abstract data, concrete data and prime considerations as implicit concerns within the varied approaches. An HQ score is calculated for each such model and is a partial indicator of the testability (verifiability or falsifiability) of the model in question. The models are thus couched in meta, hypothetical and data strata and can be positioned on a continuum of sorts according to which tentative claims can be made regarding the veracity of the approach behind each model. The study concludes with two appendices; a meta-analysis which was conducted on South African research in the field of dynamic assessment (1961-2002) and which cumulated in a significant effect size evidencing an overall positive effect that dynamic assessment has had as an alternative intervention technique in comparison to conventional or static based assessment models. In order to encourage replication of this study, all details pertaining to the studies included for consideration in the meta-analyses are attached in section 2 of this appendix. Secondly, an informal content analysis was conducted on eleven responses to questionnaires that were originally delivered to one hundred dynamic assessment practitioners and researchers across the globe. The purpose of the questionnaire was to ascertain information on core issues within dynamic assessment, as these fundamental issues were considered as pivotal in the future of this approaches’ eventual development or stagnation. The analysis concluded that dynamic assessment is indeed perceived to be at a crossroads of sorts and thus supported the initial hypothesis stated above. It is hoped that this theoretical study will aid in aligning dynamic assessment in a manner such that its eventual place in psychological assessment will be solidly grounded, theoretically defensible and viable as alternative manner of assessment. / Thesis (PhD (Psychology))--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Psychology / PhD / PhD / unrestricted

The thesis deals with significant moments in the relationship between methodology of economics and implications of the financial crisis culminating in 2008 and 2009. Its key insight rests upon the claim that some theoretical concepts developed within mainstream economics do not tackle the reality adequately and contributed in a significant way to the sequence of events leading to the financial crisis. Most of those concepts were introduced in the second half of the 20th century, during a "high tide" of positivistic ideas in the domain of methodology of mainstream economics. Though the same ideas had been already discredited to a large extent by the philosophy of science at the time, mainstream economists did not reflect it satisfactorily. Aside from a historical expose the thesis consists also of an outline of a possible future development of the prevailing form of economic theory; four scenarios of future potential development are presented. In the final parts of the thesis, which are focused more specifically, the author appraises negatively options of the Austrian School as well as post-Keynesianism to influence in a more significant manner the mainstream economics during the post-crisis era.

A análise do distanciamento entre as orientações teóricas das instâncias decisórias (ID) sobre a inclusão da abordagem dos aspectos da História e Filosofia da Ciência no Ensino de Ciências Naturais (HFCECN) constitui o nosso objetivo de investigação, cujo problema foi identificar as ID e saber em que elas se distanciavam entre si em relação à HFCECN. Para tal, delimitamos o estudo de caso único qualitativo, tendo o Brasil como unidade caso sob o aspecto da HFCECN, cujas múltiplas unidades de análise foram as ID. Para coleta e análise de dados utilizamos a entrevista semiestruturada com especialistas, a análise de conteúdo e a análise documental. Da investigação resultou a identificação de quatro ID em relação à HFCECN, das quais três foram analisadas e identificamos que elas apresentam desconexão/discrepância metodológica e epistemológica de perspectivas diferentes, portanto, a convergência entre as ID está longe de ocorrer na realidade material do sistema educacional, o que pode inviabilizar a efetiva HFCECN. Os regulamentos oficiais apontam para a contextualização externa (sociocultural) e as pesquisas parecem assumir a HFC como conteúdo no ensino de ciências naturais, porém, dos 72 trabalhos de pesquisa analisados, 34 apontam para contextualização interna; 16, criticidade; 9, motivação; 8, contextualização externa. Na formação docente, a maioria das disciplinas aponta para contextualização interna (7); as percepções dos docentes formadores apontam para instrumentação didática e criticidade e uma abordagem da HFC enquanto perspectiva de reflexão crítica. As três ID constituem seus próprios cenários ontológico, político e decisório, formam uma constelação bicondicional com rupturas de sequência comunicativa e tomada de decisões. A realidade escolar não tem sido considerada enquanto instância decisória e nem consultada o suficiente para tomada de decisões e prescrições das três ID. Finalmente, apresentamos algumas reflexões e perspectivas propositivas sobre o tema. / Our research goal is to analyze the detachment of the theoretical orientations from the decision-making institutions (DMIs) with regards to the inclusion of aspects of the approach of History and Philosophy of Science in the Teaching of Natural Sciences (HPSTNS), in order to identify the decision-making institutions and learn where they distanced themselves from each other regarding HPSTNS. Thus, a single qualitative case was delimited, using Brazil as a study unit under the HPSTNS aspect and the DMIs as multiple analyses units. To collect and examine the data, semi-structured interviews with experts, content and documentation analysis were used. The outcome of the research was the identification of four decision makers related to HPSTNS, of which three were analyzed. We concluded that they exhibit methodological and epistemological disconnection/discrepancy with different perspectives, therefore, the convergence between the DMIs is far from occurring in the educational systems actual material, rendering unfeasible the effective HPSTNS. The official rules point to an external contextualization (social-cultural) and the research appears to assume the HPS as the natural science teaching content. However from the 72 research papers analyzed: 34 showed internal contextualization; 16, criticisms; 9, motivations; and 8, external contextualization. In teacher education, most of the courses point to the internal context (7), the teachers perceptions indicate didactic instrumentation, and criticism is an HPS approach as a perspective of critical reflection. The three DMIs constitute their own ontological, political and decision-making scenario, they form a bi-conditional constellation with communicative sequence and decision making disruptions. The school reality has not been considered as a Decision-Making Institution nor sufficiently consulted for the recommendations of decisions and directives of those three (DMIs). Finally, we offer some reflections and proactive perspectives on the subject.

Current literature on teaching research methodology in the social sciences points to the changing nature of our world in terms of its complexity and diversity and how this affects the way in which we search for answers to related problems. New ways of approaching research problems that relate to the demands of practice need to be explored, which is in contrast with the ‘either-or’ world we coach our students for, that is to be either qualitative or quantitative researchers. Also, educational policy reform in South Africa has sought to address the issue of real-life relevance of curricula, and specifically, reformists have turned to proponents of Mode 2 knowledge to inform initiatives for change. This means that tertiary institutions will have to adjust the way in which they deliver education to future generations of South Africans. The aim of this study was to map the content of undergraduate research methodology courses at South African universities and to explore the beliefs held by some academics that inform the way in which these courses are constructed. Critical theory allowed the researcher to search for unequal distributions of power and is defined in this study in its oppressive role, that is, its productive ability to bring about inequalities and human suffering. As some critical social theorists embrace specific, and at times divergent, methodologies, a pluralistic approach, based on Habermas’ idea of the relative legitimacy of all theories and methods, was used to. The study revealed that there is a heavy reliance on the methods that are traditionally linked to the positivist paradigm. It also revealed that alternate paradigms focusing on philosophies that dictate the use of qualitative methods are increasingly included in methodology courses and juxtaposed against or used to supplement positivist approaches to research. As academics may struggle to let go of traditional paradigms, they may find a compromise in presenting both. By acknowledging the limitations of past curricula, academics actively seek to change these discourses, but by doing so they may be instituting new hegemonies. One of the findings of this study is thus that distinctions about the content of research courses are being made on a methodological level instead of also acknowledging the epistemological and pragmatic grounds for making choices. Moreover, it is argued that the consensus achieved regarding the curriculum for a research course is the result of conversations held between academics in an ideal speech situation that excludes other significant voices. The lecturers' dominance over the students is maintained in the dialogical activities that they undertake with colleagues that confirm their position of authority in academic society. Students recognise this authority and consent to it. It is proposed that the way forward for curriculum construction lies in establishing academic communities of practice that should be viewed as the type of university that Habermas would advocate: where academics need to share power and be open to the challenges that they face such as negotiating what is accepted as knowledge. / Thesis (DPhil (Psychology))--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Psychology / unrestricted

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Many prominent scientists have pointed out that philosophy is of no benefit to science. Stephen Hawking asserts: Philosophy is dead! Sciences use conceptions like natural laws, matter, nature, theories, etc. But science is also confronted with questions such as: "What is a natural law?" "What is nature?" "What is matter?" and "What is a scientific theory?" These (metatheoretical) questions exceed the sphere of competence of science – they are items of the philosophy of science. Philosophy of science is a metatheory of science. The Philosophy of science overlaps epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics by exploring whether scientific results are true, or whether entities like quarks or electrons really exist. More detailed investigations bring various questions into consideration such as: "How do we define the boundaries between different scientific disciplines?" "Is there a relation between the beauty and the truth of a scientific theory?" and "How do we distinguish between science and pseudoscience?" Additionally, the philosophy of science is concerned with ethical problems of modern technology, with the methodological questions, with the reconstruction of the structure and the development of scientific theories, and with revealing of any indoctrination of science. The optimistic conclusion of this paper is: Philosophy is still alive – but the philosopher has to participate in round-table discussions with scientists. We just want philosophers talking to scientists!:I. Über die Kompetenz und Inkompetenz von Philosophie 09 II. Philosophie und Wissenschaft 12 III. Philosophische Rückverweise in den Naturwissenschaften 15 IV. Kompass wissenschaftsphilosophischer Kompetenz 26 01. Ontologische Kompetenz 28 02. Epistemologische Kompetenz 28 03. (Meta-)Methodenkompetenz 29 04. Kompetenz der logisch-begrifflichen Analysen 30 05. Metaphysische Kompetenz 30 06. Begründungskompetenz 31 07. Kompetenz der philosophisch motivierten Antizipation 33 08. Rekonstruktionskompetenz (historisch und systematisch) 34 09. Die Abgrenzungskompetenz 38 10. Grenzziehungskompetenz 38 11. Antinomien- und Krisenmanagement-Kompetenz 39 12. Kooperationskompetenz 42 13. Ethische Kompetenz 42 14. Deideologisierungskompetenz 45 15. Ästhetische Kompetenz 46 16. Inkompetenzdestruktionskompetenz 51 Ausblick 53 Abkürzungen 55 Literatur 55

Many prominent scientists have pointed out that philosophy is of no benefit to science. Stephen Hawking asserts: Philosophy is dead! Sciences use conceptions like natural laws, matter, nature, theories, etc. But science is also confronted with questions such as: "What is a natural law?" "What is nature?" "What is matter?" and "What is a scientific theory?" These (metatheoretical) questions exceed the sphere of competence of science – they are items of the philosophy of science. Philosophy of science is a metatheory of science. The Philosophy of science overlaps epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics by exploring whether scientific results are true, or whether entities like quarks or electrons really exist. More detailed investigations bring various questions into consideration such as: "How do we define the boundaries between different scientific disciplines?" "Is there a relation between the beauty and the truth of a scientific theory?" and "How do we distinguish between science and pseudoscience?" Additionally, the philosophy of science is concerned with ethical problems of modern technology, with the methodological questions, with the reconstruction of the structure and the development of scientific theories, and with revealing of any indoctrination of science. The optimistic conclusion of this paper is: Philosophy is still alive – but the philosopher has to participate in round-table discussions with scientists. We just want philosophers talking to scientists!:I. Über die Kompetenz und Inkompetenz von Philosophie 09 II. Philosophie und Wissenschaft 12 III. Philosophische Rückverweise in den Naturwissenschaften 15 IV. Kompass wissenschaftsphilosophischer Kompetenz 26 01. Ontologische Kompetenz 28 02. Epistemologische Kompetenz 28 03. (Meta-)Methodenkompetenz 29 04. Kompetenz der logisch-begrifflichen Analysen 30 05. Metaphysische Kompetenz 30 06. Begründungskompetenz 31 07. Kompetenz der philosophisch motivierten Antizipation 33 08. Rekonstruktionskompetenz (historisch und systematisch) 34 09. Die Abgrenzungskompetenz 38 10. Grenzziehungskompetenz 38 11. Antinomien- und Krisenmanagement-Kompetenz 39 12. Kooperationskompetenz 42 13. Ethische Kompetenz 42 14. Deideologisierungskompetenz 45 15. Ästhetische Kompetenz 46 16. Inkompetenzdestruktionskompetenz 51 Ausblick 53 Abkürzungen 55 Literatur 55

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