Dans ce travail, nous proposons d’interroger la notion d’innéité des facultés de l’esprit, dans l’histoire de la philosophie et dans le débat contemporain. Nous commençons par montrer que toute hypothèse concernant l’innéité des facultés de l’esprit – qu’elle soit innéiste ou empiriste – pose un problème explicatif que nous nommons le « problème de la tautologie ». C’est en dévoilant les présupposés épistémologiques de chaque hypothèse que nous révélons la présence de ce problème au sein du débat classique sur les idées innées, mais aussi au cœur du débat contemporain amorcé par les travaux en linguistique de Noam Chomsky. L’identification d’une faculté innée spécifique ou d’une capacité générale semble toujours découler de choix métaphysiques ou épistémologiques a priori. En ce sens elle n’est jamais justifiée de façon satisfaisante. C’est pourquoi, une position intermédiaire (constructiviste) apparaît plus convaincante. En outre, l’analyse des différentes définitions de l’innéité souligne la nécessité de renoncer non pas à la notion même d’innéité certains philosophes contemporains le pensent, mais à l’attribution d’un contenu a priori à l’innéité. Nous pensons que l’innéité est un terme épistémique auquel il est seulement possible d’attribuer de façon a priori un statut formel. L’innéité doit donc être redéfinie comme une condition du développement. Le terme condition permet en effet, d’une part, de souligner le statut épistémique de l’innéité qui est un terme relatif à une explication, celle du développement ; d’autre part, d’insister sur le fait que l’innéité n’est pas dénuée de consistance ontologique. Le développement cognitif n’aurait tout simplement pas lieu sans elle. Nous défendons ainsi l’idée qu’il est possible de minimiser le « problème de la tautologie » par une redéfinition de la notion d’innéité et par l’élaboration d’une méthodologie propre à établir l’innéité de certaines facultés de l’esprit sans la présupposer et qui prend en compte le développement cognitif. Pour finir, nous appliquons la méthodologie proposée à l’exemple de la faculté de langage et nous essayons de défendre une hypothèse précise concernant son innéité. / In this work, we examine the notion of innateness of faculties of mind, in the history of philosophy as well as in the contemporary debate. Firstly, we show that any hypothesis on innateness of faculties of mind – whether innatist or empiricist – raises an explanatory problem that we called “the tautology problem”. Identifying epistemological presuppositions of each hypothesis leads us to reveal the presence of this problem within both the classical debate on innate ideas and the contemporary debate on innate mind structure initiated by Chomsky’s linguistic work. Assumptions on domain-specific innate faculty or general capacity always seem to follow from a priori metaphysical or epistemological options. If so, they are not satisfactory justified. The constructivist position appears to be an intermediary relevant way, with conditions to be defined. Furthermore, analysis of different definitions of innateness reveals the necessity to renounce to attribute an a priori content to innateness (and not to renounce to the concept of innateness as some contemporary philosophers argue). We think that innateness is an epistemic term to which it is only possible to attribute a priori a formal status. We claim then that innateness must be redefined as condition of development because the term condition underlines on the one side the epistemic status of innateness, which is an explanatory-dependent term; on the other side its propensity to have an ontological plausibility: cognitive development does not occur without something innate. Thus, we advance that it is possible to minimize “the tautology problem” by redefining innateness and by elaborating a methodology capable of establishing innateness of some faculties of mind without presupposing, taking into account cognitive development. To conclude, we apply the advanced methodology to the example of the faculty of language and try to defend an assumption about its innateness.

The thesis examines the principal works of Charles Darwin to determine whether there is any evidence of Romantic concepts in his writings and whether, therefore, he owes a debt to the Romantics such as Alexander von Humboldt and Goethe. The first two chapters of the thesis trace the influence of Alexander von Humboldt (1769 – 1859) on Charles Darwin (1809-1882). There are frequent references to Humboldt in Darwin’s works. Humboldt’s Romantic concepts of Nature, expressed in his Personal Narrative [1807 – 1834] and in his later Cosmos [1845], are compared to Darwin’s concepts of Nature in his On the Origin of Species [1859, first edition]. An analysis of Humboldt shows him firmly within the German Romantic school of thought with influences from Schelling and Goethe, especially concerning the concept of Mind. Humboldt’s method of analysing Nature aesthetically had a profound effect on Darwin’s own imaginative view of Nature. Further analysis of this method, coupled with Goethe’s ‘Genetic Method’ of moving between the particular and the infinite when seeing the ‘leaf’ and ‘vertebrae’ archetypes, shows strong evidence of the influence of the German Romantics on the development of Darwin’s theory of natural selection. In analysing the Romantic concept of a ‘One Reality Nature’, the thesis shows that Darwin’s evidence of a common progenitor provides a moral imperative for treating all races as equal in terms of their origins and their potential for development. In Chapter Three the origins of morality are seen by Darwin as having been generated by natural instincts rather than having come from a Creator. This is examined with reference to Darwin’s The Descent of Man [1871; 1879, second edition] within the moral and cultural context of the Victorian era in which he lived. The final Chapter Four compares The Voyage of the Beagle [1839, first edition] to Darwin’s later works to see if there are differences between his earlier and later forms of Romanticism and how easily they sit alongside Darwin the Victorian. The thesis concludes that essentially Darwin’s Romantic theme of wonder and enchantment is the same for both his early and later years. However, Darwin’s Romanticism has moved from an anthropocentric view with Man as its centre to an anthropomorphic view in which Man is seen as part of Nature but not at its centre. Darwin’s self-expression in his writing has also moved from a subjective form of poetry developed through his personal experience of Nature, to a more objective form of poetic science in which Darwin is able to step back from the science he creates. Finally, the Conclusion suggests that there is sufficient evidence in Darwin’s works to claim that he can be regarded as a Romantic materialist. This is evidenced by his view that Mind and Man’s morality have been developed by Nature’s laws out of matter. It is also evidenced by Darwin’s own mental methods of discovery through his own form of imagination and poetry, sharing some of the themes of the English Romantic poets such as Wordsworth and Tennyson.

Many scientific disciplines rely on the construction and use of models: biomedical sciences are no exception. This PhD thesis addresses several aspects of the practice of scientific modeling. First, I discuss the nature of modeling as such, proposing a novel, complementary account of scientific modeling which I term the experimentation-driven modeling account and which drives the construction of mechanistic models in many fields of biological and biomedical research, such as cancer immunology. Second, I scrutinize an objection to the mechanistic account of explanation according to which the account fails to accommodate the common practice of idealizing difference-making factors. I argue that this objection ultimately fails because it is riddled with a number of conceptual inconsistencies. Third, I analyze the roles of similarity judgments in some fields of cancer research which employ a variety of mouse models to learn about the disease mechanisms, arguing that by appreciating the epistemic complexities it is possible to shed new light on more general philosophical debates regarding scientific representation. Fourth, mechanisms can also be studied using more theoretical apparatus in the form of simulations. I investigate an example of an agent-based model used to model the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2...

(in English): The aim of the work is to reconstruct and interpret the method of historicized analysis and its employment to examine the phenomenon of "making up people". The concept is Hacking's description for the impact scientific classifications can have on classified people. The point of departure for the examination in the work is the thesis that historicized analysis employs the elements of philosophical conceptual analysis together with historical tools philosophy of science corroborates and whose strategies are often in opposition to the analytical tradition. As a follow-up of the main thesis the work also examines whether the historicized analysis can be understood as a history of the present. Moreover, it asks questions that come up in connection with the project of "making up people" such as: "What are the conditions for a scientific category to emerge? When categories emerge do new kinds of people emerge as well? What is the specific structure that enables the mutual interaction and effect scientific categories and classified people make? One of the aims will therefore be to elucidate to what extend the historicized analysis is able to answer those questions. Last but not least the work looks into the critical implications and usefulness of the method of historicized analysis.

Wissen, Wissenssammlungen und Wissensordnungen haben sich im Laufe der Jahre verändert, ebenso wie die Wissensproduktion, die Schaffung neuen Wissens, die Wissenschaft selbst. Der Baum des Wissens, arbor porphyriana oder auch arbor scientiae war seit der Antike eine gültige Metapher und das Klassifikationsschema für die Struktur des Wissens, die epistemologische Ordnung. So lehnte auch Denis Diderot die Ordnung seiner berühmten Enzyklopädie an die Baumstruktur des Wissens von Francis Bacon an. (...)

Subjekt ist die folgenreiche Selbstbeschreibung des modernen Menschen, mit der sich dieser als Grundlage von Erkenntnis und als Ursache von Handlungen setzt. Die historischen Ursprünge dieses selbstreferenziellen Verständnisses gehen nicht zuletzt auf Descartes'' Verankerung der Selbstgewissheit des 'Ich' im eigenen Denken zurück und finden in Kants Verortung der Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von Erkenntnis im apriorischen Denkapparat eine paradigmatische Begründung. Seit der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts erfährt der emphatische Subjektbegriff eine Kritik und wird dezentriert. Insbesondere feministische und postkoloniale Kritiken verweisen auf die inhärente Gewaltsamkeit von Subjektivierungsweisen und deren Begründungen in sexistischen und rassistischen Klassifikationen.

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