This diploma theses focuses on the possibility of federalization of Ukraine or autonomy of Donbas in order to ensure the stability of Ukrainian political system and societal cohesion. The bases for this is the analysis of the cleavages in both, Ukrainian society and its political space. The analysis is bases on definition of ideological dimensions presented by Arend Lijphart with some modifications with respect to is applicability on Ukrainian situation. This part of the theses therefore analyzes the language and religion questions, issue of foreign policy orientation, democratization and deoligarchization of Ukraine, the support for Ukrainian independence and territorial cohesion or the socioeconomic differences. On the bases of this analysis and the discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of such solutions for divided countries, the final part of the theses discusses the suitability of federalization of Ukraine and the autonomy for Donbas. Attention will be paid also to the question of the conditions for the stable functioning of unitary model in Ukraine. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

Measures of human development, no matter their specific methodology, have always placed Costa Rica substantially higher than its neighbor, Nicaragua, but no apparent governmental, resource, or historical discrepancy can account for this gap. This thesis uses two case studies to examine this phenomenon from three different theoretical perspectives, and conclude which has the greatest explanatory power to account for the disparity between these two particular governments. Political scientists have noted that parliamentary systems lend themselves to better governance when compared with their presidential countersystems. Shugart and Carey (1992) cite peculiarities within some presidential models which may account for lower rates of human development. Another approach, offered by Tsebelis (2002) produces a more generalized explanation of this phenomenon, while Lawrence Harrison (1985) offers an entirely different, culture-based explanation. This thesis seeks to examine the validity of these claims, using Costa Rica and Nicaragua as case studies. Limiting the thesis to these two presidential governments will highlight the variation that exists within the presidential model, and possibly shed light on the most significant variables.

The topic of my study is presidential system. I have chosen this topic because I am interested in situation of Latin America countries. These countries have decided to follow establishment of The United States. Many authors affirm that presidentialism is occasion of instability in these countries. The thesis is composed of ten chapters, which are divided into subsection or other parts. At the beginning I introduce political systems in our society. And I chose one of them, presidential system, to analyze in details. Chapter Two is about history of creation Constitution of The United States. This part of history is important because this Constitution is model for countries, which have decided for presidentialism. In this stage I explain the term presidential system and its particular signs. Without knowledge about it we don't understand how this system function. And we can't confront it with other political systems. Chapter Three describes presidentialism and its different forms. In my work I describe presidentialism in Latin America and in The United States. In Europe, there are many countries, which after year 1991 have decided for presidentionalism. But there always are relics of communism. There absent elements of democracy. In some of this countries govern strong presidents and we mark them like...

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo discutir a viabilidade de governos minoritários no presidencialismo brasileiro. Seu objeto de estudo é a formação do governo Collor, momento em que se compôs um gabinete minoritário, e hipótese aqui advogada é a de que o presidente agiu racionalmente ao realizar a opção minoritária. Essa noção é contra-intuitiva porque vai de encontro à tradicional concepção de presidencialismo de coalizão que informa a literatura política nacional. Todavia, uma breve apreciação do estado-da-arte sobre o sistema político brasileiro evidencia uma dinâmica específica das relações Executivo-Legislativo que não impede a existência e viabilidade de governos minoritários. A partir dessa percepção, constrói-se um modelo analítico cujas variáveis nos permitem desvendar o cálculo presidencial que levou Fernando Collor de Mello a constituir seu governo com ministérios apartidários. Por fim, retomam-se as relações entre aquele governo e o PMDB, na votação do Plano Collor, para demonstrar que governos sem base nominal majoritária conseguem lograr êxito parlamentar, dada a conjuntura anteriormente exposta. / This paper aims at discussing the survival of minority governments under Brazilian presidentialism, with its focus on the formation of the Collor government, when a minority cabinet was assembled. The hypothesis put forth in this study is that the president acted rationally in picking the minority option, however counter-intuitive it might seem, given that it is not supported by the traditional concept of coalition presidentialism around which most of our political literature was built. We thus need to shed light on the state-of-the-art of the Brazilian political system, which evidences some specific dynamics of Executive-Legislative relations permissible to the existence and viability of minority coalition governments. Following this notion, we built an analytical model whose variables allow us to unveil the presidential calculus that led President Collor de Mello into forming his cabinet with nonpartisan portfolio-holders. In the end, the relationship between that government and the PMDB during the voting of the Collor Plan is brought to light, in order to demonstrate that governments lacking nominal majoritarian support are able to enjoy legislative success, given a particular juncture.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T20:19:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernando Ribeiro Leite Neto.pdf: 967360 bytes, checksum: 0e0c0fb29d5b79780b3fd0cb61568723 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-10-20 / The study intends to identify the institutional relationships among between the executive and legislative branches in the Brazilian coalition presidentialism. The analysis lays its focus on the economic agenda carried on by Fernando Henrique Cardoso in his two mandates (1995-2002) and Lula s first mandate (2003-2006). It is understood that economic agenda can be addressed by Ordinary and Complementary Bills claimed by the executive and approved in the Chamber of Deputies. First of all, the thesis deals with the generic institutional relations among executive and legislative branches within presidential governments (Chapters 1 and 2). After analyzing the institutional and political framework of Brazilian coalition presidentialism (Chapter 3), the study presents the institutional and political dynamics related to the process of executive bills at the Chamber of Deputies. The intention is to address economic agenda s political and institutional features (Chapter 4) / O estudo busca identificar as relações institucionais entre o Poder Executivo e o Poder Legislativo no contexto do presidencialismo de coalizão brasileiro. A análise foca-se na tramitação da agenda econômica dos dois mandatos de Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) e do primeiro mandato de Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2006). A compreensão do desempenho legislativo presidencial foi apreendida pela tramitação dos projetos de lei ordinária de temática econômica encaminhados pelo Executivo à Câmara dos Deputados. As especificidades institucionais do trâmite da agenda econômica encaminhada pelo Executivo são identificadas em relação aos traços gerais que caracterizam os processos legislativos de outras agendas (projetos de lei ordinária com temáticas social, administrativa, política etc.). Inicialmente, o trabalho trata da dinâmica das relações entre os poderes no âmbito do presidencialismo em geral (Capítulos 1 e 2). Segue-se, após a discussão sobre as especificidades institucionais do presidencialismo de coalizão brasileiro (Capítulo 3), para a documentação e análise das dinâmicas institucionais e políticas pelas quais passam, no interior da Câmara dos Deputados, as peças legislativas da agenda econômica do Executivo. Busca-se, dessa forma, identificar a ocorrência ou não de especificidades no trâmite institucional e político das proposições de tema econômico (Capítulo 4)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T14:52:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernando Ribeiro Leite Neto.pdf: 967360 bytes, checksum: 0e0c0fb29d5b79780b3fd0cb61568723 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-10-20 / The study intends to identify the institutional relationships among between the executive and legislative branches in the Brazilian coalition presidentialism. The analysis lays its focus on the economic agenda carried on by Fernando Henrique Cardoso in his two mandates (1995-2002) and Lula s first mandate (2003-2006). It is understood that economic agenda can be addressed by Ordinary and Complementary Bills claimed by the executive and approved in the Chamber of Deputies. First of all, the thesis deals with the generic institutional relations among executive and legislative branches within presidential governments (Chapters 1 and 2). After analyzing the institutional and political framework of Brazilian coalition presidentialism (Chapter 3), the study presents the institutional and political dynamics related to the process of executive bills at the Chamber of Deputies. The intention is to address economic agenda s political and institutional features (Chapter 4) / O estudo busca identificar as relações institucionais entre o Poder Executivo e o Poder Legislativo no contexto do presidencialismo de coalizão brasileiro. A análise foca-se na tramitação da agenda econômica dos dois mandatos de Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) e do primeiro mandato de Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2006). A compreensão do desempenho legislativo presidencial foi apreendida pela tramitação dos projetos de lei ordinária de temática econômica encaminhados pelo Executivo à Câmara dos Deputados. As especificidades institucionais do trâmite da agenda econômica encaminhada pelo Executivo são identificadas em relação aos traços gerais que caracterizam os processos legislativos de outras agendas (projetos de lei ordinária com temáticas social, administrativa, política etc.). Inicialmente, o trabalho trata da dinâmica das relações entre os poderes no âmbito do presidencialismo em geral (Capítulos 1 e 2). Segue-se, após a discussão sobre as especificidades institucionais do presidencialismo de coalizão brasileiro (Capítulo 3), para a documentação e análise das dinâmicas institucionais e políticas pelas quais passam, no interior da Câmara dos Deputados, as peças legislativas da agenda econômica do Executivo. Busca-se, dessa forma, identificar a ocorrência ou não de especificidades no trâmite institucional e político das proposições de tema econômico (Capítulo 4)

Este trabalho se propõe a traçar o cenário em que se desdobraram os acontecimentos que instigaram o gênio de Montesquieu a buscar um padrão cientifico para os fenômenos sociais e políticos que tão argutamente observava. Combinando as nuances doutrinárias de Montesquieu, pretende o estudo abordar as premissas conceituais básicas de federação e a ideia clássica da separação de poderes para, em seguida, examinar as atribuições da chefia de Estado numa república que adote o modelo federativo e a separação de poderes como seus nortes estruturais, no contexto de um sistema presidencialista de governo. Com base nas premissas deduzidas examina-se o alinhamento do modelo brasileiro àquelas premissas institucionais que o inspiraram. / The purpose of this research is to depict the events that unfolded within the scenario that provoked Montesquieu to search for a scientific pattern in order to explain the social and political phenomena that he carefully observed in his time. Drawing on the variations of Montesquieu’s doctrines, The work aims to explore the basic conceptual argument of federation as well as the classic idea of separation of powers. Thereafter, It intends to examine the roles of state leadership in a republic whose foundation lies upon the federative model and the separation of powers in a presidentialist system of government. Based on this, the study is going to consider the alignment of the Brazilian model to those institutional propositions that initially provoked Montesquieu’s mind.

As attention of scholars shift from perils of presidentialism to perils of semipresidentialism in the recent decades, French style of cohabitation power sharing mode in the executive merits our endeavor to understand the micro-dynamics that is embedded in it. It includes how it emerged, how it was practiced and what consequences it produced. Such effort, if wisely applied, can probably be helpful in slowing down the rate of political system breakdown in many of the newly emerged democratic systems that emulate the French model. After an introduction to the blackbox of French cohabitation, the remainder of the dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 2 briefly reviews the existing literature on French cohabitation. Chapter 3 introduces the interpretive paradigm of qualitative research that is employed to analyze data and to facilitate theory building. In the 4th theoretical discussion chapter, three elements of practice theory approach ¡V temporality, duality of structure and unanticipated consequences are elaborated respectively. The three elements correspond to answer three research questions comprising how cohabitation emerged, how it was practiced and what kinds of consequences it produced. Chapter 5 to 8 display findings to the questions. They unravel for us other faces of French cohabitation which can be an active outcome of rationalization, a dynamic generator and a collective inevitable self-deception. Chapter 9 concludes by delineating theoretical and practical contribution of the dissertation.

Este trabalho se propõe a traçar o cenário em que se desdobraram os acontecimentos que instigaram o gênio de Montesquieu a buscar um padrão cientifico para os fenômenos sociais e políticos que tão argutamente observava. Combinando as nuances doutrinárias de Montesquieu, pretende o estudo abordar as premissas conceituais básicas de federação e a ideia clássica da separação de poderes para, em seguida, examinar as atribuições da chefia de Estado numa república que adote o modelo federativo e a separação de poderes como seus nortes estruturais, no contexto de um sistema presidencialista de governo. Com base nas premissas deduzidas examina-se o alinhamento do modelo brasileiro àquelas premissas institucionais que o inspiraram. / The purpose of this research is to depict the events that unfolded within the scenario that provoked Montesquieu to search for a scientific pattern in order to explain the social and political phenomena that he carefully observed in his time. Drawing on the variations of Montesquieu’s doctrines, The work aims to explore the basic conceptual argument of federation as well as the classic idea of separation of powers. Thereafter, It intends to examine the roles of state leadership in a republic whose foundation lies upon the federative model and the separation of powers in a presidentialist system of government. Based on this, the study is going to consider the alignment of the Brazilian model to those institutional propositions that initially provoked Montesquieu’s mind.

Le respect et l’application effective, voire même efficace du constitutionnalisme et de la démocratie en Afrique en générale et particulièrement en Afrique noire francophone ont toujours été des difficultés auxquelles les constitutionnalistes et hommes politiques de ce continent demeurent confrontés. En effet, le constitutionnalisme en Afrique noire francophone n’a pas toujours coïncidé avec la vague mondiale de démocratisation qui a suivi la chute du mur de Berlin. Toutefois, c’est à partir de 1990 que le mouvement va se généraliser. En effet, après l’accession à l’indépendance des anciennes colonies françaises, la culture politique et juridique des nouveaux dirigeants africains étant française, tout concourt à expliquer que les premières Constitutions africaines furent à quelques variantes près un décalque de la Constitution française du 4 octobre 1958. Très tôt, ces Constitutions furent mises en sommeil, quand les gouvernements civils ne sont pas tout simplement renversés par des coups d’États. Aussi, le parti unique s’est finalement imposé partout, y compris dans les pays qui comme la Côte d’Ivoire, avaient gardé le principe du pluralisme politique dans leur Constitution. Avec les nouvelles Constitutions, les régimes politiques se sont diversifiés et certains d’entre eux se sont éloignés du modèle français de 1958. Désormais, le nouveau constitutionnalisme africain s’incarne dans un double mouvement indissociable l’un de l’autre. Il s’agit d’une part de l’irruption du constitutionnalisme dans le débat démocratique et d’autre part de la consécration de la justice constitutionnelle. En somme, les résultats qui découlent des analyses démontrent que sur le terrain, le constitutionnalisme n’a pas produit et atteint les résultats escomptés en termes de démocratie, de bonne gouvernance, de respect et de sauvegarde des droits fondamentaux. Il faut tout de même reconnaître des succès qui se matérialisent par des acquis ponctuels, pour ne pas tomber dans une sorte de procès fait au constitutionnalisme et à la démocratie en Afrique. / It has always been a challenge for constitutionalists and politicians of the African continent to enforce and implement constitutionalism and democracy effectively, and even efficiently, in Africa as a whole, and more particularly in Francophone black Africa. Indeed, constitutionalism in Francophone black Africa has not always coincided with the global wave of democratization that took place after the collapse of the Berlin wall. As a matter of fact, when the former French colonies became independent, new African leaders’ political and legal culture remained French-oriented, and that was the reason why the new African Constitutions were more or less similar to the October 4th 1958 French Constitution. Very soon, these Constitutions ended up not being implemented and some civil governments were overthrown by military coups. A single party eventually imposed itself everywhere, even in countries such as Ivory Coast where the principle of political pluralism was written in the Constitution. However, a wave of democratization started to widespread in the 1990s. Political regimes diversified with the new Constitutions, and some of these Constitutions veered from the 1958 French model. From now on, the new African Constitutionalism is embodied by two inseparable trends. On the one hand, constitutionalism has forced its way into the democratic debate. On the other hand, constitutional justice has been recognized. In short, my analyses have proven that on the ground, constitutionalism has not produced and reached the expected goals in terms of democracy, good governance, respect, and safeguarding of fundamental rights. One must nonetheless acknowledge some of the achievements in order to avoid turning this into a trial against constitutionalism and democracy in Africa.