台灣科技及電子產業的發展，與創造台灣經濟佳績，股票分紅制度具有極高之影響力，但2008年開始「員工分紅費用化」的新制度將開始實施，對企業﹑員工﹑政府﹑股東都產生影響，而最大的衝擊，莫過於是科技或電子企業與員工。 贊成員工分紅費用化的論點：過去之員工分紅配股制度，無法明確顯現企業成本，也嚴重稀釋了股東權益，長期以來備受爭議的不公平性，遭受到外資及投資法人機構的詬病，因此堅持此一論點者，認為員工分紅費用化是順應國際趨勢，不僅可提高財報的透明度，而且讓股東看到沒有虛增的淨利，也是企業社會責任的實踐。 但持反對意見的一方認為，員工分紅費用化制度實施後，會使許多企業的每股獲利相對減少，股價相對下跌。而另一個令企業界憂心的就是員工分紅價值的減少，將引發人才的流失與吸引的困難，對企業競爭力與前景，將面臨極大的挑戰。 本研究應用文獻資料之收集、專家訪談及德菲法，希望達到以下之研究目的： 一、瞭解各種分紅制度之依據與特性。 二、員工分紅費用化對目前企業員工之影響與衝擊。 三、企業目前計畫採取之因應措施。 研究結果發現： 一、對於員工分紅費用化後的薪酬減少，除心理因素之影響外，對於工作的選擇是往成長獲利性較佳的企業流動，或是一般雖無股票分紅，但薪資福利通常較本土產業較優之外商企業。 二、企業可以採取之因應措施項目中，雖其中有九項加權平均數在3.0以上，但這九項中，就有七項都與薪酬相關，只有二項為心理調適項目。而且依分數排名前五項都為經濟補償措施。 研究結論： 一、 薪資競爭力不等同於人才競爭力，也不等於企業競爭力 二、 內部人才培育與外部人才吸引之平衡 三、 股價高者與低者同樣面臨挑戰 四、 企業需全面檢視薪酬制度 / Hi-technology and electronic industry can be with development and excellent performance in Taiwan, one of the key factors is “employee stock bonus”. But from 2008, employee stock bonus must debt expense according to national law and policy. The corporations, employees, shareholders and government are all influenced by the new practice. Particularly, it will be a huge impact to the hi-tech or electronic corporations and their employees. “Whether employee stock bonus debts expense? The points of agree side are: 1. If employee stock bonus does not debt expense, the financial statement can’t show real cost then will dilute the shareholder equity. 2. All the foreign investors and institutional investors argue the unfair issue for a long time. 3. “Employee stock bonus debts expense” is global practice and can match international trend. It can enhance the currency of financial statement to show the operation actual status to all shareholders. It also a corporate governance responsibility to society. The points of disagree this accounting method side are: 1. If employee stock bonus debts expense, technologic firms have negative affect on net income, even makes them unprofitable. Their stocks prices will become lower. 2. The less of value of bonus stock will make it hard to retain and attract good talents. 3. The loss of talents will be a huge challenge for corporation competition and future development. The research is via literary reviews and applies “In-depth interview Method” and “Delphi Method” to reach the following goals: 1. To understand the profit sharing policy and properties. 2. To know what the impacts of employee stock bonus debts expense to employees are. 3. To survey the solutions that corporation will take for the accounting policy revision. The research findings are: 1. The employee stock bonus debts expense will decrease the employee’s total income. The impact is also on mentality. And the employees will search a new job that offer from firms that can make more profit or foreign company even without stock bonus sharing practice. 2. There are 9 solutions in the survey get weighted mean above 3.0. Top 5 are compensation related, and only 2 of them are mentality related. The research conclusions are: 1. The competition of compensation doesn’t mean competition of talents or business. 2. Internal talents development is as important as outside candidates approaching. 3. No matter how much the price of corporation stocks are, they all face the challenge of employee stock bonus debt expense. 4. All corporations should review and redesign their compensation program and practice.

員工分紅制度在台灣的經濟發展上佔有重要的地位，對於我國高科技產業的蓬勃發展具有關鍵性的影響。關於員工分紅應否費用化的問題，為我國長久以來所存在的爭議。立法院於95年4月28日三讀通過商業會計法第64條修正案，確定員工分紅費用化。金融監督管理委員會配合商會法第64條修正通過，於95年8月28日發布「員工分紅費用化之相關會計處理及配套措施」，建議員工分紅費用化自97年1月1日起開始實施，並規定員工分紅配發股數之計算基礎應改以公平價值評價，不再以面額認定。員工分紅費用化對於過去普遍採行員工分紅入股制度的電子產業而言，勢必產生重大影響。費用化對於產業特性不同的非電子產業而言，其影響為何，亦是投資人想要瞭解的議題。 本研究在探討員工分紅費用化對於電子業以及非電子業股價的影響，以瞭解費用化對於電子業、非電子業的影響。研究結果指出，電子業確實具有高股價及高配股的特性，與非電子業迥然不同。在員工分紅費用化下，電子業及非電子業的股價反應呈現顯著差異。電子業在員工分紅費用化通過時，其員工分紅的激勵效果受損，因此股價有負的累積異常報酬率；非電子業則因為股東權益的稀釋可以獲得改善，因此股價有正的累積異常報酬率。當金管會發布「員工分紅費用化之相關會計處理及配套措施」，規定員工分紅配發股數之計算基礎應改以公平價值評價，不再以面額認定時，受到該事件影響，電子業可以改善股東權益的稀釋，因此股價有正的累積異常報酬率；非電子業則因為員工分紅的激勵效果受損，因此股價有負的累積異常報酬率。

我國員工分紅之會計處理，依據修訂前商業會計法第64條規定：「商業盈餘之分配，如股息、紅利等不得作為費用或損失。」此一異於國際主流會計原則，讓國內企業以往慣於使用員工分紅作為激勵優秀人才向心力的籌碼，也常選擇以員工分紅時不須支付對價之無償配股增資，藉以發揮吸引及安定員工一舉數得之效用。民國95年5月24日立法院三讀通過商業會計法第64條修正案，將原條文修正為「商業對業主分配之盈餘，不得作為費用或損失。但具負債性質之特別股，其股利應認列為費用。」經濟部嗣於民國96年1月24日以經商字第09600500940號令進一步函釋：「商業會計法第64條規定：『商業對業主分配之盈餘，不得作為費用或損失。』係將盈餘分配不得作為費用或損失之規定限縮在業主部分；有關員工分紅之會計處理，參考國際財務會計準則之規定，應列為費用，並自民國97年1月1日起生效。」 員工分紅費用化新制將會增加企業營運費用，減少企業盈餘，企業也將重新思考吸引、留任及激勵優秀人才的因應措施。本研究探討各項有關員工分紅費用化新制對上市櫃公司損益報導影響相關議題，發現下列情況： (一)因員工股票紅利計算有不同之依據，「以股東會前一日之收盤價」為計算基礎之員工分紅費用化調整金額大於「以上一會計年度最後交易日之收盤價」為計算基礎之員工分紅費用化調整金額。此一結果可能與證券主管機關近幾年對上市櫃公司員工紅利發放之「限制」與「揭露」規定有關。 (二)比較IC設計業公司、通信網路業公司及製造業公司發放員工股票紅利或現金紅利之喜好，由於受到企業規模較大之影響，製造業公司發放員工現金及股票紅利之絕對金額最高；若以發放員工股票紅利占淨利比例而言，以IC設計業公司最高、通信網路業公司居次、製造業公司殿後。(三)以員工分紅費用化調整金額占當期淨利比例而言，無論是模擬追溯計算民國93年度、94年度及95年度三年度員工分紅費用化調整金額，或是員工分紅費用化新制後97年上半年度估列之員工分紅費用金額，都可以顯示員工分紅費用化新制對IC設計業公司、通信網路業公司之損益報導衝擊，比製造業公司相對嚴重；IC設計業公司及通信網路業公司適用員工分紅費用化新制後，調整降低員工分紅比例之幅度也大於製造業公司。 根據以上探討發現，本研究建議，政府主管機關應儘速修法，提供員工分紅費用化新制實施配套法律環境，例如：修法引進限制型股票；修改公司法第235條，將員工分紅入股調整為非盈餘分配項目等。此外，公司管理階層於員工分紅費用化新制實施後，應正面思考相關因應措施，例如：修改公司章程，放寬員工分紅比例彈性；適度搭配發放現金及股票紅利；適時買回庫藏股，以備轉讓激勵員工；適時發行員工認股權憑證等。讓員工獎酬制度更透明，並於合理回饋員工貢獻時，兼顧企業營運績效與股東權益。

自2008年實施員工分紅費用化政策以來，分紅政策仍在不同產業中持續對組織績效有重要之影響，本研究以2000年至2015年期間台灣上市上櫃公司資料為樣本，以實證研究方法探討分析各產業之分紅制度與組織績效間的相關性，以及在分紅費用化政策實施前後，其分紅制度與組織績效間的關係是否有所改變，並檢視是否存在最適員工分紅率。 研究結果顯示：較多產業之員工分紅率與組織績效指標都呈現顯著的正相關，顯示企業確實利用員工分紅制度創造組織高績效表現，或當組織績效表現良好時，企業亦願意以利潤分享方式激勵員工；較多產業之員工分紅費用化前後與績效之正向相關性並未改變，顯示員工分紅制度依然被這些企業持續採用作為爭取優秀員工，提升競爭力之有效工具。較多產業之員工分紅與公司績效表現有非線性關係存在，可推論存在有最適分紅率，顯示這些企業會採取適當之分紅比例，建立兼具企業獲利及員工激勵效果適度的分紅制度。尤其是電子工業顯著存在有最適分紅率，顯示高技術人力密集度產業，為吸引優秀員工，同時提升產業競爭力，可能已熟知如何運用員工分紅制度，以創造雙贏。

在過去，我們認為有形資產是公司最重要的資產，然而到了現今知識密集產業當道的時代，取而代之的是無形資產：專利，品牌，商業秘密等成為決定公司存亡與進步與否的關鍵，因此研究無形資產的價值成為主流之一。本研究第一部份使用因素分析法捕捉專利四大指標：前引證數、後引證數、專利家族數與請求項個數共同影響專利的因素，我們稱之為「專利品質」，並用此方法來建構台灣上市上櫃電子業公司於2003年至2012年各公司各年度的創新力指標。 本研究第二部分探討員工薪酬對於公司創新力的影響，並且以2008年員工分紅費用化政策作為一工具變數，試看該政策對於公司研發創新的影響。本研究結果顯示，分紅費用化政策對於公司研發創新並無顯著影響。整體來看，費用化後高、低股價公司間的薪酬差距縮小，然而創新研發能力差距卻擴大；若分產業來看，台灣電子業發展有往技術密集產業之高股價公司集中的現象，例如：半導體業、電腦及週邊設備業、通信網路業、其他電子業在費用化後研發產出增加最多，即使該產業亦為費用化後總薪酬下降最多之產業。

具有競爭力的薪酬策略制定是企業留住優秀人才之手段，在2008年以前，我國電子產業之股票分紅對於招攬國內外菁英與留用人才效果驚人，帶動我國科技業經濟奇蹟，同時創造大批科技新貴。但，2008年我國實施員工分紅費用化，企業必須將員工分紅之發放從盈餘項下轉為企業費用，並規定股票分紅配發股數之計算基礎改以公平價值計算，不能再以面額（10元）認列。此舉將造成企業淨利及每股盈餘下降，於是企業不再使用股票分紅作為激勵員工之手段，使員工薪酬減少，電子產業相繼提出費用化制度造成留才之困難。本研究利用差異中之差異模型及兩階段迴歸模型，針對我國電子產業2003年至2012年之所有上市上櫃企業資料，探討薪酬對於員工流動率之影響。 本研究結果顯示員工薪酬多寡對於流動率有負向地影響，但是高階經理人之薪酬多寡對於流動率則沒有影響。在高研發費用率之企業，其投入之創新成本比例較高，人力資本相對重要，薪酬與流動率間是顯著且負向的關係。薪酬針對高大專以上員工比例及低大專以上員工比例兩者的影響程度沒有太大差異。低股價公司之員工總薪酬對於流動率之影響效果是顯著且負向的影響，但在高股價公司薪酬不是影響流動率之主因。

回顧台灣過去數十年科技業的蓬勃發展，大部分的科技公司透過優渥的員工分紅方式留住優秀人才，保持企業的競爭力，然而隨著中華民國員工分紅費用化的實施，科技公司紛紛遇到了分紅費用化後面臨的相關管理與經營的問題，尤其是台灣的IC設計產業，因為他們過去一直依賴以高報酬的條件吸引高知識人才的策略為主要的經營模式，今日不得不重新思考及定位公司未來的生存法則該如何的轉變。 　　有鑑於此，本研究主要針對台灣上市櫃IC設計公司，在員工分紅費用化之前後，以 Herzberg 的雙因子理論對員工在工作中的身心理行為進行深入探討，透過與員工面對面訪談執行研究和資料樣本之分析，拆解在受到員工分紅費用化之衝擊，企業在失去過去以高額紅利留住員工的法寶情況下，接下來可以透過何種員工激勵管理保持其競爭力，進而與企業本身的經營策略做緊密的連結。 　　本研究最後之結果建議，期望能受到產業界的參照，從新以不一樣的角度以公司經營策略與員工激勵管理來思考解決因員工分紅費用化所造成之衝擊，達到治本的目的而非透過其他讓員工取得更高報酬之取代方法所能做到治標的彌補。 / Reviewing Taiwan's booming technology industry in the past few decades, the majority of technology companies keep their competitiveness through paying fertile bonus to talented employees. With the implementation of bonus expense in the Republic of Taiwan, technology companies have encountered some managerial and operational problems regarding bonus expensing. Especially in Taiwan's IC design industry, companies have been relied on the offerings of high rewards to attract highly educated talents as their main operational strategy. These enterprises now have to re-think and position their survival rule in the future. With this in mind, this study focuses on employees’ physical and psychological behavior at work before and after the bonus is expensed within Taiwanese listed IC design companies, using Frederick Herzberg's two factor theory. To dismantle the impact of bonus expensing and loss of the magic attraction of high bonuses to retain employees in the past, this study implements face-to-face interviews with staff and analyzes the results. Finally this study discusses how to keep a company’s competitiveness with employee incentive management, which relates closely to its business strategy. The suggestion of the final results of this research is hopefully to be the reference of the industry. With a different point of view, this research tries to fundamentally solve the impact of bonus expensing through a company’s business strategy and employee motivation management methodology, rather than just providing high compensational bonus to employees in the past.

自2001年以來，美國爆發安隆、世界通訊等一連串的弊案後，國際性投資機構法人不斷對財務會計報表是否能真實、允當的表達一家公司經營的面貌產生未有的質疑，其中包括國內實施多年的員工分紅配股制度，在此期間，國內主管機關、產業界及學術界針對此制度所衍伸的問題有相當多的討論與交換意見。 本研究觀察2004~2006年國內員工分紅配股現況；探討員工分紅配股屬盈餘分配情況下，在目前會計處理所衍伸的公司治理及會計原則適用問題；並參考馬秀如教授於會計研究月刊所舉的例子，加以延伸，加入更多參數及假設條件，探討員工分紅配股依面額或依市價計算、股價高或股價低、盈餘是否全數轉增資、除權後是否填權情況下，對股東權益產生何種不同程度的影響；再針對目前產業界，針對員工分紅費用化後，員工產生的實質所得減少，所回應的因應配套措施，探討其各項配套措施對員工權益、股東權益甚至產業界長久以往的影響。 經本研究觀察及探討，有以下發現，提供主管機關、投資人、企業及員工做為參考： 一、2006年員工分紅配股稀釋股東權益仍極嚴重，且2004年至2006年員工分紅配股稀釋股東權益情況並無往改善方向進行。 二、現行員工紅利屬盈餘分配的會計處理，無法真實反應公司盈餘、有違公司治理精神且無法與國際會計準則接軌。 三、在相關的簡化假設條件下，員工分紅配股對股東權益造成下列之影響： 1. 高股價、員工分紅配股依面額計算、盈餘全數轉增資情況下，填權與否不影響期末股權稀釋比率。 2. 低股價、員工分紅配股依面額計算、盈餘全數轉增資情況下，填權與否仍不影響期末股權稀釋比率。 3.員工分紅配股依面額計算、盈餘不全數轉增資情況下，不論股價高低、填權與否，均可使期末股權稀釋比率大幅降低。 4. 高股價、員工分紅配股依市價計算、盈餘全數轉增資、填權情況下，期末股權稀釋比率大幅降低。 5. 低股價、員工分紅配股依市價計算、盈餘全數轉增資、填權情況下，期末股權稀釋比率較高股價高。 四、現行員工紅利屬盈餘分配的會計處理下，大多數的公司選擇員工分紅配股的員工激勵制度。 五、員工分紅費用化後，使股東權益稀釋程度鎖住一固定比率、盈餘真實性提高、公司間可在同一基礎上相互比較、財務透明度提高並與國際接軌。 六、員工分紅費用化後，企業因應的員工激勵制度配套措施將呈現多樣化。 七、員工分紅費用化，對員工實質所得有相當大的影響；對股東為鎖住一固定比率的稀釋程度；對公司而言，可用的員工激勵措施資源減少；對產業，將形成好公司更好，壞公司更壞的循環。 / Following the outbreak of a series of scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, in the U.S. as from 2001, international institutional investors have been suspicious about whether financial statements can truly and adequately represent a company’s operating status, including the employee stock bonus system that had been carried out domestically for many years. As a matter or fact, while applying the system, local competent authorities, industries and academic circles have had a lot of concerns about the resulting problems, which triggers plenty of discussions and opinion exchanges. By observing the domestic employee stock bonus distribution for 2004 through 2006, this study aimed to investigate the issues of corporate governance and accounting principle applicability derived from current accounting process under the circumstance where employee stock bonuses fall in retained earnings. Also, by referring to examples given by Professor Sheree S. Ma in Accounting Research Monthly, the study added more parameters and hypothetic assumptions to explore the degree of the influence of employee stock bonus calculation (according to the face value or market price), the stock price (high or low), earnings recapitalization and price recovery status subsequent to the ex-right date on shareholders’ equity, followed by investigating the influence of the countermeasures taken in the industry to cope with the reduction of employee’s real income caused by treating employee stock bonuses as expenses on shareholders’ equity, employees’ real income, and even the industry for a long run. The following findings of the study hope to serve as a reference for competent authorities, investors, enterprises and employees: 1. Given that the dilution status of shareholders’ equity from 2004 to 2006 had not improved, the distribution of employee stock bonuses in 2006 was still severely diluting shareholders’ equity. 2. The current accounting process of combing employee stock bonuses in retained earnings cannot truly reflect a company’s earnings, which is not only against the spirit of corporate governance, but has also deviated from international accounting standards. 3. Under simplified hypothetical assumptions, the employee stock bonus distribution has generated the following influences on shareholders’ equity: (1). Under circumstance where the stock price is high, employee stock bonuses are calculated according to the face value, and earnings are all recapitalized as increased capital, the status of price recovery subsequent to the ex-right date will not dilute the final equity ratio. (2.) Under circumstance where the stock price is low, employee stock bonuses are calculated according to the face value, and earnings are all recapitalized as increased capital, the status of price recovery subsequent to the ex-right date will not dilute the final equity ratio. (3). Under circumstance where employee stock bonuses are calculated according to the face value, and earnings are not all recapitalized as increased capital, final equity dilution ratio will be substantially reduced no matter how high or low of the stock price, or if the stock price can be recovered subsequent to the ex-right date. (4). Under circumstance where the stock price is high, employee bonuses are calculated according to the face value, earnings are partially recapitalized as increased capital, and the stock price is recovered subsequent to the ex-right date, final equity dilution ratio will be substantially reduced. (5). Under circumstance where the stock price is low, employee bonuses are calculated according to the face value, earnings are all recapitalized as increased capital, and the stock price is recovered subsequent to the ex-right date, final equity dilution ratio will be higher than that with high stock price. 4. Before 2008, the existing employee stock bonuses are processed as retained earnings distribution in accounting, a majority of companies choose employee stock ownership as an incentive to motivate their employees. 5. After employee stock bonuses are being treated as expenses, the dilution degree of shareholders’ equity is locked at a fixed ratio. As a result, the veracity of company earnings is higher, so different companies may compare with each other on a same basis, financial transparency can be strengthened, and in the end, these companies operating performance can link up with the world. 6. With employee stock bonuses being treated as expenses, the countermeasures taken by enterprises to motivate their employees show versatility. 7. By treating employee stock bonuses as expenses, employee’s real income will be considerably affected, the dilution degree of shareholders’ equity will be locked at a fixed rate, company’s available resources for motivating its employees will be reduced, and the whole industry will fall prey to the cycle that good companies get better while bad companies get worse.

財務會計準則公報第39 號「股份基礎給付之會計處理準則」於2008 年起正 式實施，強制規定公司所發放之員工分紅必須認列為費用而非視為盈餘之分配，如此一來，公司管理階層是否會因此考量其盈餘報導之美觀性，導致減少發放員工分紅，以及員工分紅費用化後，是否仍會造成公司管理階層採行盈餘管理。此外，本研究以員工分紅費用化作為一重大事件，深入研究經理人對其分紅之行為模式是否會因而受到改變並趨向利益掠奪假說，並探討經理人持股與獎酬分紅兩者間之關係是否因公司治理程度不同以及發放對象為經理人與一般員工時是否有所不同。 實證結果發現，不論有無排除費用化前一年之影響，員工分紅費用化後公司 確實會考量其盈餘之美觀性而傾向減少發放員工紅利，另雖然過去研究指出，於費用化前，資本市場早已認知員工紅利為公司費用，但公司管理階層仍會考慮投資者間仍存在的功能固著現象，針對員工分紅費用化此一事件進行盈餘管理；然而，若以未預期盈餘將樣本公司加以劃分，則在未預期負盈餘之樣本公司中，無法證實其會利用負向之裁決性應計項目進行洗大澡；最後，在分紅費用化之後，經理人持股比例與分紅金額呈正比，顯示經理人在代理問題上從利益收斂趨向利益掠奪公司，並且在公司治理較差的公司中尤為明顯；此外，經理人會同時增加對於經理人與一般員工之分紅金額。 / Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No.39 has beening implemented since year 2008, and it is a mandatory requirement for the company to recognized employee bonus as an expense rather than as a surplus of assignment. Therefore, the management might consider company’s earnings performance and result in paying less employee bonus, as well as adopt the earnings management. In addition, this paper apply the employee bonus expense as a major event to study whether the patterns of managers’ behavior on their dividends will be affected and correspond to entrenchment hypothesis. Also, this paper investigates the relationship between manerger’s ownership and bouns under the different levels of corporate governance as well as different payment objectives (e.g. managers and staff). The empirical results indicate that whether excluding the effect of the previous non-expnsing year or not, the company did consider its earnings performance and tend to pay less employee bonus after expensing employee bonus. Although other studies point out the capital market has already seen employee bonus as an expense, the company will manage earnings due to functional fixation hypothesis. However, it can’t be verified that taking big bath would exist by using negative discretionary accruals. Finally, after expensing employee bonus, managers’ ownership is directly proportional to the amount of bonus and the companies with poor corporate governance is particularly significant. In addition, managers will also increase their own and staff’s dividend amount as well and it implies the angency problem towards entrenchment hypothesis from convergence of interest hypothesis.

公司的順利有效運作仰賴企業整體共同努力，透過發放以公司績效為計算基礎的酬勞及紅利，期望能增加董監與員工的工作動機，進而達到提升公司績效之目的。然而，我國於費用化制度實施前，董監酬勞與員工紅利之會計處理係作為盈餘分配項，而非列為薪資費用，此作法受到外資及投資法人的批評，認為台灣企業的財務報表無法允當表達其實質經營狀況。為消除相關人士的抨擊，並與國際會計準則接軌，我國陸續修訂法律、頒布公報及解釋函令，規定自2008年1月1日起，員工分紅及董監酬勞費用化制度正式開始實施。 本研究欲探討在費用化制度實施後，公司的酬勞及紅利制度將產生什麼變化，且該項制度的變動是否會改變對董監及員工的激勵誘因，進而影響公司績效。本研究實證結果顯示，員工分紅費用化制度實施後，公司發放的董監酬勞佔稅後淨利比例無顯著變化。在員工紅利部分，現金紅利比重提高，股票紅利比重則降低。無論於費用化制度實施前或後，給予員工現金或股票紅利，皆有助於公司提升經營績效；惟費用化後，現金紅利之激勵效果變差，股票紅利則變好。此外，若同時比較員工現金與股票紅利兩者，可發現無論是費用化實施前或實施後，現金紅利對於提升公司經營績效之效果皆較佳。 / The success of corporate operations relies on the efforts of all people in the firm. By distributing compensation and bonus which are based on corporate performance, it not only can enhance directors’ and employees’ work motivation, but also achieve the purpose of better corporate performance. The accounting treatment for director compensation or employee bonus used to be recognized as a part of corporate earnings distribution, not as an expense. This method was, however, criticized for its failure to present the true operating results of a company. In order to solve this problem and in accordance with the IFRS treatment, the government amended the related laws and required that both director compensation and employee bonus be recognized as salary expense after January 1, 2008. The purpose of this study is to investigate the changes in director compensation and employee bonus after the above new regulation took effect. This study also examines whether this change alters the incentives to directors and employees. The empirical results show that after the new accounting treatment, no significant changes in the percentage of director compensation to net income. When it comes to employee bonus, the percentage of cash bonus increased, but the stock bonus declined. In addition, employee cash and stock bonus, no matter being treated as an expense or not, did help the firms to enhance performance. However, cash bonus’ motivation effect became lesser, whereas stock bonus’ effect increased. Furthermore, cash bonus was more effective than stock bonus in improving corporate performance before and after the expense treatment for employee bonus.