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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

如何以知識系統改進建廠報價之研究-以興建電子廠無塵室為例

張庭嘉 Unknown Date (has links)
過去二十多年來,建廠業務的蓬勃發展,台灣在興建電子廠的技術儼然成熟,如今隨著市場東移,建廠的工程公司也跟進。業務隨然日漸增長,但因著資訊科技產品的產品周期越加的縮短,電子廠為了提高投資效益,建廠的時程也跟著縮短。建廠工程金額龐大,工程範疇複雜且專業,在報價過程中,建廠的構材與設計的搭配是緊密的,在千一髮動全身的報價項目結構下,利用資訊科技及建廠報價項目建構一個富有知識價值的報價系統及跨領土應用的系統架構,是為提高建廠工程公司利潤及經驗傳承的重要知識系統。
2

強制性利益仲裁之博奕理論分析 / A Game Theoretic Analysis of Compulsory Interest Arbitration

辜柏宏, Ku, Po-Hung Unknown Date (has links)
從個體決策制定(decision-making)的角度觀之,參與談判、創造合約,是一種既可學習處世又可瞭解「人性」的雙贏作為。個體在歷經集體談判的互動(interaction)過程後,所獲得的償值(payoffs),也許會超越前述的期望效益;然而,對於「急需達成協議卻失敗者」或「被迫達成協議者」而言,因為無法如願以償,付出與耗損的心力,往住令人無法說服自己──這樣的結果符合吾人之期望(expectancy)──於是,個體理性(individual rationality)與集體理性(collective rationality)間的弔詭(paradox)又乍然若現。 仲裁人以中立第三者的角色,受理談判參與者的爭議,裁決爭議各造的償值,是聯結個體與集體理性的制度設計之一。然而,不同的仲裁制度所依循的特定仲裁程序,及其所隱含的偏差(bias),對交付仲裁的爭議各造及仲裁人決策模式所產生的影響,著實不容忽略。 本文的旨趣在於對仲裁制度及程序所隱含的偏差進行實驗比較,以博奕理論(game theory)為分析工具,來檢視下列三個變項所形成的二種關係: 一、在最終報價仲裁(final-offer arbitration)制度之下,仲裁人的特定偏好(preferences)對爭議兩造的影響,觀察的指標為爭議率及各造的報價策略; 二、不同仲裁制度及程序對仲裁人從事仲裁判斷之影響,觀察的指標為仲裁判斷分布(distribution of arbitration awards)。 本文的結論將藉由前述二種關係的檢證結果,來觀察「爭議兩造」、「仲裁人」及「仲裁制度」三個變項的交集點──仲裁判斷(arbitration awards)──對爭議兩造在重複競局(repeated game)中報價策略的影響,並試圖探究如何縮短個體理性與集體理性之間的落差,冀能透過制度設計來提供爭議各造誠實報價的誘因,並進一步促使仲裁人在從事判斷時能秉公處理,藉以回歸仲裁公平與專業的本質。 Ashenfelter, Orley, Currie, Janet, Farber, Henry S., and Matthew Spiegel. 1992. An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems. Econometrica 60(6):1407-1433. Ashenfelter, Orley. 1987. Arbitrator Behavior. American Economic Review 77(2):342-346. Ashenfelter, Orley, and David E.Bloom. 1984. Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence. American Economic Review 74(1):111-124. Ashenfelter, Orley, and George E. Johnson. 1969. Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity. American Economic Review 59:35-49. Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press. Berk, Jonathan B., Hughson, Eric, and Kirk Vandezande. 1996. The Price Is Right, But Are the Bids? An Investigation of Rational Decision Theory. American Economic Review 86(4):954-970. Bloom, David E., and Christopher L. Cavanagh. 1987. Negotiator Behavior under Arbitraion. American Economic Review 77(2):353-358. Bloom, David E., and Christopher L. Cavanagh. 1986. A Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators. American Economic Review 76(3):408-422. Bogdanor, Vernon. (Ed.). 1987. The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions. London: Basil Blackwell Ltd. Bolton, Gary E., and Elena Katok. 1998. Reinterpreting Arbitration’s Nacotic Effect: An Experimental Study of Learning in Repeated Bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior 25:1-33. Brams, Steven J. 1990. Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration. New York: Routledge, Chapman, and Hall, Inc. Brams, Steven J., and Alan D.Taylor. 1996. Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brams, Steven J., Kilgour, D. Marc, and Samuel Merrill III. 1991. Arbitration Procedures. In Negotiation Analysis, ed. H. Peyton Young. Michigan: Michigan University Press. Bruce, Christopher J., and Jo Carby-Hall. 1991. Rethinking Labour-Management Relations: the Case for Arbitration. New York: Routledge, Chapman, and Hall, Inc. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Newman, David, and Alvin Rabushka. 1985. Forecasting Political Events: The future of Hong Kong. New Haven: Yale University Press. Campa, Jose Manuel, and P. H. Kevin Chang. 1996. Arbitrage-Based Tests of Target-Zone Credibility: Evidence from ERM Cross-Rate Options. American Economic Review 86(4):726-740. Coase, Ronald H. 1988. The Firm, the Market, and the Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Coleman, James S. 1990. The Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Dunlop, John T. 1984. Dispute Resolution: Negotiation and Consensus Building. New York: Auburn House. Erev, Ido, and Alvin E. Roth. 1998. Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria. American Economic Review 88(4):849-881. Farber, Henry S. 1980b. Does Final-Offer Arbitration Encourage Bargaining? Proceeding of the Thirty-third Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association, Madison, Wisconsin, pp. 219-226. Farber, Henry S., and Max H. Bazerman. 1986.The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration. Econometrica 54(6): 1503-1528. Farber, Henry S., and Max H. Bazerman. 1987. Why is there Disagreement in Bargaining? American Economic Review 77(2):347-352. Farber, Henry S., and Max H. Bazerman. 1989. Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes. Quartely Journal of Economics 104:99-120. Feuille, Peter, Delaney, John Thomas, and Wallace Hendricks. 1985. The Impact of Interest Arbitration on Police Contracts. Industrial Relations 24(2):161-181. Fizel, John. 1996. Bias in Salary Arbitration: The Case of Major League Baseball. Applied Economics 28(2):255-265. Flanagan, Robert J. 1991. Socrates Confronts Final-Offer Selection. Industrial Relations 30(1):163-167. Frederick, David M., Kaempfer, William H., Ross, Martin T., and Richard L. Wobbekind. 1998. Arbitration versus Negotiation: The Risk Aversion of Players. Applied Economics Letters 5(3):187-190. Friedman, Clara H. 1995. Between Management and Labour: Oral Histories of Arbitration. New York: Twayne Publishers. Gallagher, Daniel G., and M. D. Chaubey. 1982. Impasse Behavior and Tri-Offer Arbitration in Iowa. Industrial Relations 21(2): 129-148. Gardner, Roy. 1995. Games for Business and Economics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Gibbons, Robert. 1988. Learning in Equilibrium Models of Arbitration. American Economic Review 78(5):896-912. Goodin, Robert E. 1996. The Theory of Institutional Design. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hall, Lavinia.Ed. 1993. Negotiation: Strategies for Mutual Gain. California: Sage Publications. Hebdon, Robert P., and Robert N. Stern. 1998. Tradeoffs among Expressions of Industrial Conflict: Public Sector Strike Bans and Grievance Arbitration. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 51(2):204-221. Hammond III, John S, Keeney, Ralph L., and Howard Raiffa. 1998. Smart Choices: a practical guide to making better decision. Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press. Kanowitz, Leo. 1986. Alternative Dispute Resolution: Cases and Materials. Minnesota: West Publishing Co. Kellor, Frances. 1972. American Arbitration: It’s History, Functions and Achievements. New York: Kennikat. Kressel, Kenneth, Pruitt, Dean G., and Associations. 1989. Mediation Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party Intervention. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Kichan, Thomas A., Mironi, Mordehai, Ehrenberg, Ronald G., Baderschneider, Jean, and Todd Jick. 1979. Dispute Resolution under Fact-finding and Arbitration: An Empirical Evaluation. New York: American Arbitration Association. Kremenyuk, Victor A. Ed. International Negotiation: Analysis, Approach, Issues. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Lester, Richard. 1984. Labor Arbitration in State and Local Government. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Long, Gary, and Peter Feuille. 1974. Final-Offer Arbitration: “Sudden Death”in Eugene. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 27(2):186-203. McCall, Brian P. 1990. Interest Arbitration and the Incentive to Bargain. Journal of Conflict Resolution 34(1):151-167. Morrow, James D. 1994. Game Theory for Political Scientist. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nicholson, Micheal. 1991. Negotiation, Agreement and Conflict Resolution: The Role of Rational Approaches and their Criticism. In New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, ed. Raimo Vayrynen. London: Sage. Olson, Carig A. 1980. The Impact of Arbitration on the Wages of Firefighters. Industrial Relations 19(3):325-337. Olson, Carig A., and Barbara L. Rau. 1997. Learning from Interest Arbitraion: the Next Round. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 50(2):237-215. Olson, Carig A., Dell’omo, Gregory G., and Paul Jarley. 1992. A Comparison of Interest Arbitrator Decision-Making in Experimental and Field Setting. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 45(4):711-723. Olson, Mancur Jr. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ordeshook, Peter C. 1986. Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Osborne Martin J., and Ariel Rubinstein. 1998. Games with procedurally Rational Players. American Economic Review 88(4):835-847. Ostrom, Vincent., Feeny, David., and Hartmut Picht 1988. Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives, and Choices. San Francisco: International Center for Economics Growth. Powell, W. W., and P. J. DiMaggio. (Ed.). 1991. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Raiffa, Howard. 1996. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge: Havard University Press. Raiffa, Howard. 1995. Analytical Barriers. In Barriers to Conflict Resolution, ed. Kenneth J. Arrow et al. California: The Stanford Center on Conflict & Negotiation. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: The Balknap Press of Harvard University Press. Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. Schellenberg, James A. 1996. Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice. New York: State University of New York Press. Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1976(1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row. Simpson, Patricia A., and Joseph J Martocchio. 1997. The Influence of Work History Factors on Arbitraion Outcomes. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 50(2):252-267. Speight, Alan E. H., and Dennis A. Thomas. 1997a. Conventional Arbitration in the Professional Footballer’s Labour Market: an Assessment of the FLAC Experience. Industrial Relations Journal 28(3):221-235. Speight, Alan E. H., and Dennis A. Thomas. 1997b. Football League Transfers: A Comparison of Negotiated Fees with Arbitration Settlements. Applied Economics Letters 4:41-44. Stone, I. F. 1988. The Trial of Socrates. Boston: Brown & Co. Thornton, Robert J., and Perry A. Zirkel. 1990. The Consistency and Predictability of Grievance Arbitration Awards. Industrial and Labor Relation Review 43(2):294-307. Vickerey, William. 1960. Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 74(4):507-511. Weimer, David L. 1995. Institutional Design. Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publisher. Zigarelli, Michael A. 1996. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Teacher Bargaining Outcomes. Journal of Labor Research 17(1):135-148. 毛慶生等合著 民88年 《經濟學》,二版,台北:華泰文化事業公司。 王躍生 民86年 《新制度主義》,台北:揚智文化。 吳秀光 民86年b 〈理性抉擇途徑與兩岸關係研究〉,中國大陸研究,第38卷,第3期,頁58-65。 吳秀光 民87年 《政府談判之博奕理論分析》,台北:時英出版社。 沈清松 民79年 《人我交融:自我成熟與人際關係》,台北:時英出版社。 林添貴譯;Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr.著 民84年 《談判桌上的中國人》,台北:新新聞文化事業股份有限公司。 胡國才譯;Henry A. Kissinger著 民71年 《核子武器與外交政策》,台北:黎明文化事業股份有限公司。 徐仁輝 民88年 《當代預算改革的制度性研究》,台北:智勝文化。 陳坤銘、李華夏譯;Coase, Ronald. H. 著 民84年 《廠商、市場與法律》,台北:遠流出版公司。 陳煥文 民88年 《仲裁法逐條釋義》,台北:自刊。 陳煥文 民83年 《國際仲裁法專論》,台北:五南圖書出版公司。 陳順發譯;Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff著 民85年 《大謀略:遊戲理論的全方位運用》,台北:牛頓出版股份有限公司。 陳欽春 民87年 國土規劃期未報告,台北:國立台北大學。 黃宏義譯;Roger Fisher and William Ury著 民75年 《哈佛談判術》,台北:長河出版社。 詹中原 民86年 《危機管理上課講義》。 孫本初譯;Brody, Richard A., and Adand C. N. Brownstein著 民72年 《實驗方法與模擬》,台北:幼獅文化事業公司。 新新聞編輯小組譯;Nancy B. Tucker著 民84年 《不確定的友情:台灣、香港與美國,1945至1992》,台北:新新聞文化事業股份有限公司。 楊崇森等合著 民88年 《仲裁法新論》,台北:中華民國仲裁協會。 賓靜蓀譯;Max H. Bazerman and Margart A. Neale著 民82年 《樂在談判》(Negotiation Rationally, 1992),台北:天下遠見出版股份有限公司。 謝復生 民79年 《民意、制衡與效率──論民主的價值》,台北:敦煌書局。 謝瑤玲譯;Herb Cohen著 民80年 《談判的技巧》,台北:桂冠圖書股份有限公司。 劉瑞華譯;North, Douglass C. 著 民83年 《制度、制度變遷與經濟成就》,台北:時報文化。 鄧方譯;Kreps, D. M. 著 民85年 《賽局理論與經濟模型》,台北:五南圖書出版公司。 鄧東濱等編著 民80年 《個體經濟學理論》,台北:三民書局。 董安琪譯;Olson, Mancur著 民78年 《集體行動的邏輯》,台北:遠流出版公司。 薛密譯;Simon Singh著 民87年 《費瑪的最後定理》,台北:臺灣商務。 蕭全政 民86年 〈組織與制度的政治經濟分析〉,《暨大學報》,第一卷,第一期,頁1-16。 藍瀛芳 民87年 〈從德國新仲裁法看我國新仲裁法〉,《商務仲裁》,第51期,頁1-23。
3

台灣NDF及DF交易案例探討兼論即期遠期外匯市場相關性分析

翁翠苓 Unknown Date (has links)
2003年8月7日工商時報以頭版刊出「境外金融-人民幣避險准辦,協助台商因應升值壓力,即起開放無本金交割的遠匯與選擇權業務」。緣於中國大陸近年來貿易鉅額出超,國際資金持續流入,人民幣承受升值之壓力,為協助大陸台商解決人民幣匯率波動區間擴大的風險問題,中央銀行與財政部決定開放銀行的國際金融業務分行(Offshore Banking Unit)辦理「無本金交割之美元對人民幣遠期外匯交易」和「無本金交割之美元對人民幣匯率選擇權」。此一開放人民幣DF、NDF的訊息,遠期外匯及無本金交割遠期外匯又勾起人們對它的注意 由於亞洲經濟區塊已然成型,並對全球經濟之影響日益重要,除了全球矚目之人民幣以及早為國際貨幣之日圓外,不論是我國之新台幣或東北亞的韓圜、東南亞的泰銖,其幣值之變動或多或少均影響亞洲金融市場之穩定,也牽動全球金融市場,因而吾人不能不多瞭解相關之議題。 本文主要係討論銀行間新台幣DF、NDF交易之相關議題,包括如何利用市場限制之情況下從事套利、投機交易,以及銀行對遠期匯率報價問題之探討;此外,與台灣競爭激烈之韓國、泰國,其NDF及DF與即期匯率間之關係,和台灣是否如同一轍?另比較台灣、韓國及泰國NDF及DF與即期匯率間不同期別之相關性,以及是否符合效率性市場假說,最後則就新台幣NDF與即期匯率之相關性,在中央銀行關閉國內法人承作新台幣NDF前後之變化作一簡單之比較。
4

我國運動用品業國際訂價之研究

張雙洲, ZHANG, SHUANG-ZHOU Unknown Date (has links)
研究目的:主要在於瞭解當前我國運動用品業外銷訂價的方法與作業方式,及普遍面 臨的問題,以探討績優廠商的成功因素和今後應有的做法,希望對業界有所幫助。 文獻針對國際行銷中的訂價決策在理論上依次討論三個主畏的問題,分別是1,進入 國際市場,在訂價上必需考慮的因素和訂價的決策程序;2.訂價的方法與因應可能 發生的狀況而採取的各種價格調整對策;3.報價方式與客戶付款方式等方面的探討 。 研究方法:乃採個案公司訪問式的描述性研究。在資料蒐取上,選定合作意願較高的 運動用品廠商,事先將訪談大綱寄給他們參閱,再親自到各公司訪問業務經理級以上 的高級主管,依訪談架構逐項請教並記錄。至於分析方法則是根據理論,找出實務上 與理論的共同處,並深入瞭解各家公司的整體做法,和比較各公司的特色。 研究內容:本文共分六章:第一章-導論。包括研究動機及目的、研究對象及範湋、 資料蒐集與分析方法、研究架構、操作性定義、及研究限制。第二章-我國運動用品 業之楖況。包括廠商結構、外銷產品分析、外銷市場、競爭國之運動用品業概況及未 來我國運動用品業之發展趨勢。第三章-國際訂價決策程序。包括訂價決策的考慮汏 素、個案公司實際做法與比較分析。第四章-訂價的方法與價格調整對策。包括訂價 的方法、價格調整對策、個案公司實得做法與比較分析。第五章-報價方式與客戶付 款方式。包括報價方式、付款方式,其他議價協商上的問題、個案公司實際做法與比 較分析。第六章-綜合分析與結論。包括訂價上可能要注意的問題及結論。 研究結果:在國際市場上訂價除以成本為基礎,更應考慮各地市場的需求和競爭者的 價格變化;但避免陷入削價競爭;而和客戶建立良好的長期信用關係;致力於提昇產 品品質和生產技術和效率,使我方談判力更具優勢,維持良好企業信譽;更進一步開 創自我品牌,以更高的品質和價位在國際市場上擴大佔有率。
5

選擇權交易對於價格的影響:盤前、盤中與盤後有差異嗎?

陳麟隴 Unknown Date (has links)
本研究主要是探討選擇權成交量與期貨價格變動之關係,檢定Schlag and Stoll (2005) 的三個假說:完全效率市場假說(perfect market hypothesis)、資訊假說(information hypothesis)及流動性假說(liquidity hypothesis)。採用2005年一整年期貨與選擇權之日內資料,將同一日內樣本資料區分成盤前、盤中與盤後三個交易時段,另外亦將同一週內區分成不同交易日(週一至週五),藉由一般化自我相關條件異質變異模型(GARCH),得出下列三個實證結果: / 1. 日內未區分交易時段下,拒絕完全效率市場假說及資訊假說,淨買權或是正向選擇權成交量對於期貨價格有正向之影響,淨賣權或是負向選擇權成交量對於期貨價格則有負向之影響,且選擇權成交量對於期貨價格變動之同步價格效果在接下來的六分鐘內反轉。無法拒絕流動性假說。 / 2. 日內區分交易時段、但週內不區分不同交易日下,無論盤前、盤中及盤後,皆拒絕完全效率市場假說及資訊假說,而不拒絕流動性假說。 / 3. 日內區分交易時段、且週內區分不同交易日下,週內各交易日盤前與盤中時段,皆拒絕完全效率市場及資訊假說,而無法拒絕流動性假說;而週內盤後時段結果則相對複雜,值得進一步討論。
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興櫃股票適用我國證券交易法反市場操縱條款之研究 / A study of adapting the anti-manipulation provisions to taiwan emerging stock market

陳永明, Chen, Yung Ming Unknown Date (has links)
我國興櫃股票之交易方式係由推薦證券商(即興櫃股票之造市商)之報價主導交易進行,屬於報價驅動(Quote-driven)之交易方式,與我國上櫃股票採取「等價交易」及上市股票採取「競價交易」等均屬委託單驅動(Order-driven)之交易方式迥然不同。 按我國證券交易法第155條第2項準用同條第1項規定之適用結果,「於證券商營業處所買賣有價證券」者,仍應有第1項所揭反市場操縱條款之適用。惟有關興櫃股票交易在成交對象之選擇、成交順序、成交價格決定,乃至於成交後之給付結算作業方式等,均與我國現行上市(櫃)股票之交易及交割方式具有明顯之差異,致應如何適用證券交易法反市場操縱條款之規定,乃成疑義。 本文鑒於興櫃股票市場規模已呈穩定成長之勢,不難想像興櫃股票交易與市場操縱行為之間終將有擦出爭議火花之時,故以比較法學研究之觀點,歸納並分析興櫃股票與上市(櫃)股票交易方式之差異及其癥結所在。另蒐集瀏覽世界各國主要證券市場之交易規制,包括美國OTCBB市場、歐陸Alternext市場及英國AIM市場,分析其他採用報價驅動交易模式之先進市場當中有關造市商義務之規範,以掌握造市商義務之核心意涵。進而以造市商義務範圍及報價驅動市場之交易特徵為基礎,逐一檢測興櫃股票適用我國證券交易法所揭「違約不交割」、「相對委託」、「連續交易」、「沖洗買賣」、「散布流言或不實資料」及「其他直接或間接操縱市場」等各款反市場操縱條款規定可能引發之爭議,並提出本文意見。 / The trading mechanism of Taiwan Emerging Stock is based on quote-driven model, which is very different from the order-driven model of the Taiwan OTC securities market and Taiwan Stock Exchange market. By the Taiwan Securities and Exchange Act Article 155 paragraph 2 permitted that paragraph 1, the anti-market manipulation provisions, shall apply mutatis mutandis to securities transactions conducted on the over-the-counter markets. However, lots of Taiwan Emerging stock trading rules such as allowing the participants to choose their counterparty, the matching sequence rules, the price decision rules, and even the rules of payment and settlement practices after transaction, all have significantly differences between those of Taiwan Emerging stock market and listed stock market. Therefore, how should Taiwan Emerging stock apply to the Securities Exchange Act under the terms of the anti-market manipulation is into doubt. Taiwan Emerging stock market has shown a steady growth trend, hence, it is easy to imagine that Taiwan Emerging stock trading and market manipulation issues will eventually rise to controversy. This thesis is to study from the point of view of comparative law, by means of analyzing the emerging stock markets of the advanced countries, including the U.S. OTCBB market, the European Alternext market and the UK AIM market, to conclude the crux of the difference between the quote-driven and order-driven market models. Then, to understand the characteristics and core obligation of the market maker under quote-driven market model, furthermore, to detect the disputes may lead for adapting the anti-manipulation provisions to Taiwan Emerging stock, including the terms of "breach of contract non-deliverable", "improper matched orders ", "continuous trading", "wash sale", "spreading rumors or false information" and other direct or indirect behavior of manipulation". And this thesis proposed its discovery at the end.

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