Orientador: Martha Rosa Pisani Destro / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Educação / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-11T13:38:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Batista_GustavoAraujo_D.pdf: 1579436 bytes, checksum: cddc80f045bbe9d4440dbf238f7eff50 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo : Este trabalho é uma síntese feita a partir de uma pesquisa bibliográfica de filosofia comparada da educação, desenvolvida sobre dois tipos de pensamento pedagógico, elaborados, respectivamente, por John Locke (1632-1704) e por Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778); nessa pesquisa faz-se uma leitura de suas propostas pedagógicas à luz teórico-metodológica do materialismo histórico-dialético. Procurou-se contextualizar historicamente os dois autores abordados, com o intuito de demonstrar em que medida as rupturas e as permanências geradas pelas contradições nas infraestruturas econômicas das sociedades de suas respectivas épocas interferiram nas superestruturas políticas, filosóficas, intelectuais, religiosas e pedagógicas e, conseqüentemente, em suas trajetórias existenciais e em suas obras. Dividindo-se em três capítulos, no primeiro discorre-se sobre a contextualização histórica dos dois filósofos estudados, passando-se em revista os Séculos XVII e XVIII em seus vários aspectos, assim como nele se faz uma descrição acerca das biografias e das personalidades desses autores; no segundo incumbe-se de abordar os pensamentos lockeano e rousseauniano como um todo, ressaltando-se as principais categorias pelas quais seus autores estruturam e articulam as suas idéias acerca do conhecimento, da política, da religião e da tolerância; no terceiro aborda-se algumas categorias pedagógicas desses pensamentos, as quais, comparadas entre si, têm o intuito de aclarar as convergências entre os seus dois autores, ao mesmo tempo em que se procura ressaltar a influência que este recebe daquele em se tratando de constituir o seu pensamento pedagógico; também nesse capítulo são explicitadas as visões de mundo e de homem nas quais esses autores enquadrar-se-iam, assim como são tratadas outras categorias que permitem vincular os seus pensamentos não apenas entre si, mas sim às classes sociais para as quais suas obras constituem significado / Abstract : This work is a synthesis done from a bibliographical research of compared philosophy of education, developed about two kinds of pedagogical thinking, done, respectively, by John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778); in that research one does a reading of their pedagogical proposals by the theoretical-methodological light of the historical-dialectical materialism. One looked for doing historically a context about the two authors approached, with the aim of showing in what measure the ruptures and the permanencies produced by the contradictions in the economical infrastructure of the societies of their respective eras interfered into the political, philosophical, intellectual, religious and pedagogical superstructures and, consequently, into their existential trajectories and into their works. Being divided into three chapters, in the first one discusses about the historical context of the two philosophers studied, passing on review the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries in their several aspects, as well as in this it is done a description concerning the biographies and personalities of those authors; in the second one undertakes to approach the lockean and rousseaunian thoughts at all, standing out the main categories by which their authors structure and articulate their ideas concerning knowledge, politics, religion and toleration; in the third one approaches some pedagogical categories of those thoughts, that, compared to one another, have the aim of clearing the convergences between their two authors, at the same time on which one looks for standing out the influence that this receives from that in regarding of constructing his pedagogical thinking; also in this chapter are made explicit the visions of world and man into which those two authors would be fitted, as well as are treated others categories that permit to link their thoughts not only each other, but so to the social classes to which their works make meaning / Doutorado / Historia, Filosofia e Educação / Doutor em Educação

Orientador: Yara Adario Frateschi / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-23T02:07:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_HelioAlexandreda_D.pdf: 2204274 bytes, checksum: 8aa4eb84e6477f8a45ae03d47e363579 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: O trabalho que aqui se apresenta se coloca no campo da relação entre filosofia moderna e filosofia contemporânea. O objetivo mais amplo é tentar recuperar, do ponto de vista da história da filosofia, algumas complexidades e tensões presentes na filosofia moderna que invariavelmente são marginalizadas quando apropriadas pela filosofia contemporânea. Dito de um modo mais específico, este trabalho parte de breves considerações sobre o pensamento de Axel Honneth e Jürgen Habermas acerca da apropriação que ambos fazem da filosofia moderna, especialmente do pensamento de Thomas Hobbes e de Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Tais considerações visam situar a obra dos dois autores modernos no interior dos projetos teóricos de Honneth e Habermas, especialmente no que se refere à esfera pública e aos conflitos sociais. A partir dessas considerações é que emerge o objetivo central, qual seja: defender a hipótese (tendo como pano de fundo a apropriação de Honneth e Habermas) de que Hobbes e Rousseau possuem uma relação sui generis com a modernidade e com o Iluminismo, respectivamente. Essa relação de Hobbes e Rousseau com seus contextos históricos e com o pensamento filosófico que surge desses contextos é o que me permite caracterizar o pensamento de Hobbes como um modernismo relutante e o pensamento de Rousseau como um iluminismo relutante. Em ambos os casos, me utilizo do espírito da expressão "modernismo relutante" cunhada por Seyla Benhabib para se referir à obra de Hannah Arendt. Desse modo, tendo como ponto de partida duas vertentes da Teoria Crítica da sociedade, penso ser possível retroceder até a modernidade para tentar investigar tanto seu potencial teórico passível de ser atualizado, quanto às dificuldades, complexidades e tensões que essas atualizações podem gerar, notadamente no campo da estruturação política e da organização social / Abstract: This work is in the field of the relationship between modern and contemporary philosophy. The broader goal is trying to recover, from the standpoint of the history of philosophy, some complexities and tensions existing in modern philosophy that are invariably marginalized when appropriated by contemporary philosophy. More specifically: This thesis begins with brief considerations on Jürgen Habermas' and Axel Honneth's appropriations of modern philosophy, specifically the thought of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Such considerations aim to situate the work of these two modern authors within the theoretical projects of Habermas and Honneth, especially with regard to the public sphere and social conflicts. From these considerations, it emerges the main objective of this work, which is to defend the hypothesis (having as a background Habermas' and Honneth's appropriations), of Hobbes and Rousseau having a sui generis relationship with modernity and the Enlightenment, respectively. The relationships of Hobbes and Rousseau with their historical contexts and their relationships with the philosophical thought which emerges from these contexts is what allows me to characterize the thought of Hobbes as a reluctant modernism and the thought of Rousseau as a reluctant Enlightenment. In both cases I use the spirit of the term "reluctant modernism" forged by Seyla Benhabib to refer to the work of Hannah Arendt. Thus, taking as its starting point two theories of current Critical Theory of society, I think it is possible to go back until modernity in order to investigate both its theoretical potential susceptible to be updated, as well as the difficulties, complexities and tensions that these updates can generate, specifically in the fields of political structuration and social organization / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

Submitted by Reginaldo Soares de Freitas (reginaldo.freitas@ufv.br) on 2018-06-05T13:36:29Z No. of bitstreams: 1 texto completo.pdf: 1076953 bytes, checksum: 265ba8ed1641df5086b81afbe3daaac9 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Reginaldo Soares de Freitas (reginaldo.freitas@ufv.br) on 2018-06-05T13:36:44Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 texto completo.pdf: 1076953 bytes, checksum: 265ba8ed1641df5086b81afbe3daaac9 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Reginaldo Soares de Freitas (reginaldo.freitas@ufv.br) on 2018-06-05T13:37:09Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 texto completo.pdf: 1076953 bytes, checksum: 265ba8ed1641df5086b81afbe3daaac9 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-06-05T13:37:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 texto completo.pdf: 1076953 bytes, checksum: 265ba8ed1641df5086b81afbe3daaac9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017 / Propõe-se, nesta investigação de natureza bibliográfica, uma leitura da obra Emílio, de Rousseau. Trata-se de examinar a relação entre os princípios educativos da autonomia e da sociabilidade na concepção de educação de Rousseau e as duas noções de conhecimentos úteis - as coisas e a prática das virtudes. Na aprendizagem, tais noções consistem em objetos de conhecimentos úteis para o educando desenvolver sua autonomia e a sua sociabilidade e, por conseguinte, harmonizar na sua formação a ordem moral e a ordem natural. A concepção de educação do filósofo se constitui como uma crítica ao ensino moral da educação convencional, cuja aprendizagem acontecia por meio da imposição de regras de condutas e pelas representações da realidade. Essa educação moral forma o homem civil que em sociedade vive em contradição: não sabe se age conforme suas inclinações naturais ou de acordo com os deveres exigidos no meio social. O ponto-chave da pesquisa é demonstrar que os objetos de conhecimento (os objetos físicos e a prática do bem) são instrumentos úteis na aprendizagem de Emílio para desenvolver a sua autonomia e a sua sociabilidade. É por meio da educação e da interferência do educador que esses dois princípios (autonomia e sociabilidade) são desenvolvidos e vinculados na formação do discípulo. Assim é possível formar o “homem raro”, que é o selvagem que vive em sociedade, justamente porque conserva sua liberdade e desenvolve sua consciência moral. A lição que Rousseau ensina e a de pensar o contexto do ensino verdadeiro (no sentido real), conciliado com a natureza humana e com a construção de uma educação para a autonomia e para a sociabilidade. / This bibliographical investigation offers a reading of Rousseauºs Emile. The research examines the relationship between the educational principles of autonomy and sociability in Rousseauºs thought and the two ideas of useful knowledge - the things and the practice of virtues. In relation to learning, these ideas consist in objects of knowledge that are useful for learners to develop their autonomy and their sociability and, consequently, to harmonize, in their formations, the moral and the natural orders. The philosopherºs concept of education constitutes itself as a criticism to the moral teaching of conventional education, in which learning happened by the imposing of rules of conduct and by the representations of reality. This moral education forms the civic man who, in society, lives in contradiction: he does not know if he acts according to his natural inclinations, or according to the duties demanded in the social context. This research aims at demonstrating that the objects of knowledge (the physical objects and the practice of good) are useful instruments in Emileºs learning for developing his autonomy and his sociability. It is through education and the interference of the educator that these two principles (autonomy and sociability) are developed and associated in the formation of the leamer. Thus, a “rare man” can be formed, a savage that lives in society, precisely because he preserves his freedom and develops his moral consciousness. Therefore, Rousseau proposes thinking about the context of true learning (in the real sense) reconciled with human nature and with the construction of an education directed towards autonomy and sociability.

Orientador: Roberto Romano / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-24T07:42:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_GenildoFerreirada_M.pdf: 4319062 bytes, checksum: 536c87ca9d2984ab332faf57e150c44e (MD5) Previous issue date: 1998 / Resumo: Não informado / Abstract: Not informed. / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

No description available.

No description available.

The significance of this opera, Le Devin du Village, lies not in the fact that it is great music, but in the fact of its historical importance. Its appearance in 1752, with its revolutionary ideas, heralds the coming of what we consider today as native French comic opera; i. e., native in the sense that it is composed by Frenchmen, although adapted from the Italian style in many respects. Another claim of uniqueness that might be made for this work is that its composer was no recognized musician, but one of the greatest pre-Revolution philosophers. His open-minded ness and eagerness to break loose the bonds of the traditional French "Chauvinism" and musical isolationism, brought forth this musical effort on his part, clothed in native atmosphere, yet embodying the spirit of Italian music. From the private library of Isaac Lloyd Hibberd, the writer was fortunate in having access to a first edition of Le Devin du Village, which has added greatly to an appreciable understanding of the music of this work.

During the first half of the twentieth century the trumpet has gained its position as a solo instrument, even surpassing its esteemed position in the High Baroque Era. With the combined efforts of performers like Herbert L. Clark, Ernest S. Williams, and Joseph Arban, and the efforts of the French school of trumpet playing, notably those of Raymond Sabarich, the trumpet has risen from a mere accompanying instrument of the Classical Period and early Romantic Era to its present place as an expressive solo instrument. In this relatively new position the trumpeter is faced with one serious problem: that is one of limited literature. The trumpeter of today is almost compelled to perform either works of the Baroque Era or solos written within the last thirty years.

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

This study examines the role of not-knowing, particularly ignorance and irony, in our project of becoming persons. First, I draw upon Jean-Jacques Rousseau to articulate the concept of becoming a person. Considering Emile’s education as well as Sophie’s in Emile, I interpret becoming a person as cultivating the masculine (autonomy) and feminine (relationality), which enable us to live for ourselves and for others in a society. I then argue that ignorance and irony play a key role in our continuous project of becoming persons in childhood and adulthood, respectively. I draw upon Rousseau to discuss ignorance. Ignorance refers to the complete ignorance of things that do not originate from the child’s immediate experience. I focus on Rousseau’s notion that ignorance secures an open mind, which enables a child to begin a relationship with nature, things, and others. I draw upon Jonathan Lear to discuss irony. Irony refers to the loss of one’s routine understanding of her practical identity (social role), which inspires her aspirational understanding of the identity. I focus on Lear’s idea that irony allows an adult to keep an open mind, which enables her to be a subject in a social role, who continues to constitute herself via the role. Thus, I propose a model of becoming a person, in which ignorance and irony play the key role in forming and transforming a person, respectively, by securing an open mind as a person in childhood and adulthood, respectively. Lastly, I explore the application of this model to higher education today. I argue that ignorance and irony can be discussed not only as the two stages of life (childhood and adulthood) but also as the two phases of growth (formation and transformation) which can be concurrent in (young) adulthood. I then propose a pedagogy centered around ignorance and irony, which allows students to learn to become persons in formative and transformative ways. I suggest that this can be a model of moral education in higher education, which not only responds to the current mental health crisis but also revives the tradition of liberal education.