The thesis examines European legitimacy and regulatory governance. The research analyzes the link between regulatory governance and legitimacy in EU regulation and evaluates whether governance tools in the form of qualitative administrative criteria can contribute to European regulatory legitimacy. Governance here refers to the exercise of delegated regulatory powers by the European Commission. The question of whether the adoption of qualitative regulatory governance practices can enhance the supranational regulatory legitimacy of the European Commission has been underexamined in the literature typically without distinguishing the analysis from the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU. Using a case study from the telecommunications sector, the thesis conducts such an examination using a documentary method. To create the analytical context, the thesis distinguishes the theoretical concept of legitimacy for a transnational regulator from that of a national regulator of a sovereign state. The choice is made to use a form of normative regulatory legitimacy drawn from the scholarship on regulatory governance theory. An analytical model is constructed that reflects criteria and values that bear upon legitimacy so as to constitute a meaningful alternative to democratic forms of regulatory accountability. Regulation was defined in the research to cover policy instruments, in the form of measures of positive and negative integration, adopted for the EU single market under Article 106(3) and Article 114 TFEU. The analysis evaluates the regulatory governance used by the European Commission over a twenty-three year time period in which the telecommunications sector was entirely liberalized and harmonized. Analysis revealed that, while the Commission has improved the quality of its regulatory governance in principle, its use of normative regulatory governance in practice requires further attention, notably in respect of improving the evidence base for policy proposals and in creating a meaningful form of empirical feedback in evaluating regulatory outcomes, corresponding to an ex post accountability mechanism. On the other hand, the research validated the premise that a transnational regulator could purposively use regulatory governance as a tool with which to construct a defensible form of regulatory legitimacy.

The principal aim of the Lisbon Treaty is to address the pre-Lisbon concerns about the coherence of EU action. In this regard, coherence is the simple litmus test for EU external action in the post-Lisbon era. This thesis investigates the coherence of EU external action towards Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in the post-Lisbon era in light of the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law and the introduction of the HR/VP and the EEAS in her service with the aim of enhancing coherence in EU external action. The principle of coherence governs the interaction between various policy strands of EU external action (horizontal coherence). The importance of coherence is linked to visibility and efficiency based on the effective use of EU resources, as well as to the credibility of the Union. This thesis concentrates on coherence in the interaction between EU policies towards SSA using the key EU policies towards the region namely development policy, trade policy, the CFSP and the CSDP. The regional context facilitates the analysis of the different strands of external action policies where, despite of or perhaps due to the Treaty of Lisbon, the different instruments of EU foreign policy and lines of competence demarcation between their institutions are still mired in complexity. Although the focus is on coherence, the specialised regional focus of the thesis also facilitates a broader understanding of the nuances in the implementation of EU external relations law and EU external policies in different contexts especially in the post-Lisbon era. Using Mali as a case study, the thesis submits that while it can be argued that policy coherence for development (which is a key requirement in EU external action towards SSA) cannot be certainly determined, Mali clearly illustrates incoherence vis-à-vis synergy in the sequencing of available policy options in EU external action towards SSA. The thesis also discussed the limits and prospects of coherence in EU external action despite the changes made at Lisbon.

Le droit joue un rôle majeur dans l’élaboration d’une nouvelle politique de l’Union européenne : la sécurité intérieure. Il lui confère toute sa substance, mais surtout il est, au regard du principe de légalité, la condition et la limite de l’édification de cette politique intervenant dans un domaine sensible pour les États. En retour, le droit subit des fluctuations, conséquences des rapports interinstitutionnels. L’opérationnalité, comme forme de normativité spécifique, est une caractéristique essentielle de cette politique de nature très étatique. Intimement liée au succès de la nouvelle gouvernance dans la construction européenne, elle est la manifestation de nouvelles formes de régulations atypiques qui tendent à pénétrer le droit européen. La méthode communautaire ne disparaît pas pour autant, mais elle est repensée, tout comme le droit de l’Union dit « classique ». Sa rationalité change au fil de son évolution en direction d’un « droit néo-moderne » (C.-A. De Morand). / Law plays a major role in the development of a new policy of the European Union, named the internal security policy. It gives it all its substance, but, in the light of the legality principle, it is the condition and the limit to building this policy in a sensitive area for States. In return, law undergoes fluctuations, consequences of the interinstitutional relations. The operationality, as a form of « light » normativity, is an essential characteristic of this very nature of this state policy. Intimately linked to the success of the new governance in the European construction, the operationality is the manifestation of new forms of atypical regulations that tend to penetrate the European law. The Community method does not disappear, but it is redesigned, as well as the EU « classical » law. Rationality changes throughout its evolution towards a « neo-modern right » (C.-A. De Morand).

Expectations of how well the European Union (EU) performs in multilateral negotiations have often been premised upon the EU’s capabilities as a global actor and its ambition to ‘lead’. Considerable attention has subsequently been paid to the EU as an actor, and leader, within multilateral negotiations; with focus particularly given to multilateral trade and environmental negotiations where expectations of EU performance are highest. Within this discourse, highly disparate understandings of how well the EU performs have however emerged, with the EU lauded on the one hand for its improving actorness and leadership, yet lamented for its ineffectiveness and lack of influence on the other. Few efforts have however sought to move beyond questions of what the EU is, and what it wants as a negotiator, to engage instead with what the EU says, what it does, and what it achieves in a negotiation environment. Addressing these issues, the aim of this study is to evaluate EU performance in multilateral negotiations as a measure of both its negotiation behaviour and effectiveness. Conducting analysis over-time (from 1995 to 2011) and across policy-fields, including case studies covering the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); this study tests expectations of EU performance and offers explanation for why it varies. Challenging expectations in several ways, the study finds that EU performance in multilateral negotiations does not follow a pattern of being good in those fora where it is most ‘state-like’ and poor in those forum where it is least integrated, but is instead highly variable, not only between negotiation environments, but also within them. It thus finds that the EU performs neither as well as the leadership discourse suggests, nor as poorly as the effectiveness literature implies. Explanation for variation in the EU’s performance is moreover found not only in the EU’s institutional complexities and changes in structural conditions, but in how these conditions intersect to shape the EU’s level of ambition. Where the EU has high ambition, pursuing progressive goals with the EU as a distinctive preference outlier compared to its negotiation partners, the EU’s ability to persuade others to raise their ambition in support of EU preferences is limited. Instead, it is where the EU moderates its ambition; pursuing progressive objectives but maintaining some zone of agreement with negotiation partners that it performs well. The case is thus made that EU negotiation performance may be aided less by the normative distinctiveness of EU preferences and its endeavour to ‘lead’ the way, and much more by the EU’s pragmatism in finding commonality with the preference structures of its negotiation partners.

Les travaux sur la séparation des pouvoirs dans l'Union européenne ne manquent pas, mais rares sont les écrits qui s'interrogent sur l'identification de la nature du pouvoir dans l'Union européenne. Cette thèse s'inscrit dans cette voie. L'idée que le pouvoir dans l'Union pourrait ne pas être de même nature que celui d'un Etat souverain a guidé cette recherche. Dès lors, le schéma de séparation du pouvoir dans l'Union européenne devait se calquer sur la spécificité de l'Union et de son pouvoir.Afin de marquer cette différence, l'expression séparation des pouvoirs, propre aux fonctions étatiques, est délaissée au profit de séparation du pouvoir, laquelle rend davantage compte de la spécificité du pouvoir de l'Union tout en posant la nécessité de caractériser ce pouvoir avant de le séparer, de l'organiser.Dès lors, en tenant compte de la nature spécifique du pouvoir dans l'Union, cette thèse entend découvrir l'organisation du pouvoir permettant à l'Union d'atteindre les objectifs qu'elle s'est fixés. / The works on the division of powers in the European Union do not miss, but rare are the works which wonder about the identification of the nature of the power in the European Union. This thesis responds to this logic. The idea that the power in the Union could not be the same nature as the power of a sovereign State guided this research. Therefore, the pattern of separation of powers in the European Union should be modeled on the specificity of the EU and its power.To mark this difference, the expression division of powers, appropriate to the state functions, is abandoned for the benefit of separation of the power, which makes more account of the specificity of the power of the Union while posing the need to characterize the power before to separate, to organize it.

No description available.

Partant de la prémisse de la nature flexible et complexe du principe de précaution en droit européen, le but de cette étude a été d'en donner une interprétation polycentrique, fondée sur la diversité plutôt que sur l’uniformité. Pour atteindre un tel objectif, une méthode issue du pluralisme méthodologique a été employée. Celle-ci nous a permis de rechercher la uniras multiplex parmi les différentes définitions et applications de ce principe. La thèse ici soutenue a consisté à démontrer que l'interprétation polycentrique du principe de précaution peut être construite à partir de deux concepts : l'anticipation et l'action. Dans la première partie de cette étude, il a été montré comment le principe de précaution permet d'anticiper le temps de l'action publique au stade de l'incertitude scientifique. Nous avons à cet égard expliqué que l'anticipation suppose la qualification par le droit et l'évaluation par la science des risques incertains. La seconde partie de cette étude a été finalisée à démontrer comment, une fois le temps de l'action anticipé, les décideurs doivent agir sur le fondement du principe de précaution. Nous avons soutenu, à cet égard, que l'action sur la base de ce principe a une portée et des conséquences distinctes sur le plan procédural et substantiel. Les décideurs ont, en effet à la fois une obligation de prise en compte et une faculté de mise en œuvre du principe de précaution. / By acknowledging the flexible and complex nature of the precautionary principle in EU law, the purpose of this work is to provide a polycentric interpretation of this principle based on diversity rather than uniformity. To achieve this objective, a methodology derived from the methodological pluralism is employed. This allows for the “unitas multiplex” between the different definitions and applications of the precautionary principle to be researched. The core claim is that the polycentric interpretation of the precautionary principle can be built on two concepts: anticipation and action. In the first part of this study, I argue that anticipation implies the qualification by law and the evaluation by science of uncertain risks. In the second part, I consider that, after having anticipated the time of action, decision-makers should act on the basis of the precautionary principle. However, the action undertaken has different meanings and consequences from the procedural and substantive perspective. From the procedural side, the decision-makers have the obligation to take into account this principle, white they remain free on the substantive side, to adopt a precautionary measure.

Lorsqu’il devient membre de l’Union, l’État accepte de se soumettre à un ensemble de règles venant limiter son autonomie extérieure. Si cet ensemble peut être analysé en termes d’effets juridiques-types agissant d’une manière unilatérale sur cet État membre, notre travail a tenté d’examiner ce que nous croyons être une chaîne dynamique d’actions, de réactions et de rétroactions qui est, à ce titre, complexe. En effet, au cours de nos travaux, nous nous sommes rendus compte que loin d’être unilatérale, la manière dont le droit de l’Union marque les compétences externes des États membres prend en réalité la forme d’interactions permanentes entre l’État membre intégré et l’Union, entre l’Union et l’État membre global, ou encore entre l’État membre intégré et l’État global. Si l’État intégré s’efface pour laisser l’Union agir à sa place ou s’il agit conjointement avec elle, cet effacement ne concerne pas son aspect global, son alter ego, qui revient ou simplement reste sur la scène afin de compléter et concurrencer l’action de l’Union, ou encore pour rechercher l’appui de cette dernière dans sa relation avec les tiers. L’État membre qui apparaissait initialement passif, s’érige alors en contributeur actif de ce dynamisme tissé dans les rapports juridiques entre l’ensemble européen et les tiers, par la rétroaction de ses compétences souveraines ou par l’exercice concurrent de ces dernières. Ceci montre qu’une étude des relations extérieures de l’Union ne peut pas être complète sans une étude simultanée des effets que le droit de l’Union produits sur les États membres intégrés et que ce dernier subit à son tour par les États membres globaux. Elle ne peut pas être non plus être complète sans un examen des effets que le droit international produit sur les États membres globaux et que ce dernier subit, à son tour, du fait des États membres intégrés. / In its capacity of a member of the European Union, the State agrees to submit to a set of rules framing its autonomy in the field of external relations. While this set of rules can be assessed in terms of categories of legal effects acting unilaterally upon the EU Member State, the present study attempts to go further by examining what we believe to be a dynamic chain of complexity, composed of actions, reactions, and retroactions of the actors involved. During our research, we indeed found that the manner in which the Union affects the EU Member States’ external relations is far from being a one-way process, but rather constitutes permanent and circular dynamics of interaction between what we shall call an integrated Member State and the Union, between the Union and what we shall call a global Member State, and between the respective Member State’s global and integrated faces. The integrated Member State may step aside to let the Union act in its stead, or act in conjunction with the Union, but ʽtaking the back seatʼ in this manner does not engage its global face, its alter ego, which will return to take center stage (if it did not simply stay there to begin with) to complete (or to compete with) the actions of the Union, or even to solicit the Unionʼs support with respect to the relations it established vis-à-vis third parties. As we proceed, we find that the Member State, who initially appeared to be a mere passive object of our research, is in fact an active agent, contributing, whether through retroaction or through the competing exercise of its sovereign competencies, to the face of the Unionʼs external relations. Accordingly, no research into the external relations of the EU can be complete without taking into account the impact of EU law on the integrated Member States, and the impact felt in turn by the EU as the result of the Member Statesʼ global actions. In the same way, such research should consider the impact of international law on the global Member States and the impact felt in turn by international law as a result of the actions of the integrated face of these same Member States.

La présente thèse démontre l’existence d’un véritable contrôle juridictionnel du respect par les États membres des droits fondamentaux garantis par l’Union européenne. Elle repose principalement sur le raisonnement selon lequel le contrôle juridictionnel s’est renforcé, en lien avec le processus d’intégration caractérisant le système juridique de l’Union. Le droit français est étudié en tant que droit constitutif de ce système. Historiquement, la Cour de justice a commencé à produire les normes de référence du contrôle par le biais du renvoi préjudiciel. Ce contrôle a émergé progressivement, il a un champ d’application fondé sur celui du droit de l’Union. Ce dernier est, par principe, son périmètre d’exercice. Indissociable de ces bases jurisprudentielles, le contrôle juridictionnel connait un renforcement global qui a pour caractéristique d’être intégratif. Cette évolution s’engage par l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne et la force juridique contraignante qu’il confère à la Charte des droits fondamentaux. Il en résulte la consécration du contrôle juridictionnel dans le droit « dispositionnel ». Ce renforcement se poursuit par un élargissement du contrôle, initié par ce traité et produit par différents juges du système juridique de l’Union. Le contrôle opéré par les juges de droit commun se développe incontestablement, tandis que la Cour de justice a peu l’occasion d’intervenir dans le cadre du recours en manquement. De nouveaux organes de contrôle apparaissent avec leurs singularités. Il s’agit du juge constitutionnel et de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. / This thesis demonstrates the existence of a genuine judicial review of compliance by Member States regarding fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Union. It is based mainly on the reasoning that this control has been reinforced, in line with the integration process characterizing the Union's legal system; French law, as a constituent right of this system, is studied. Historically, the Court of Justice started to produce the reference standards for control by means of the reference for a preliminary ruling, allowing them to progressively emerge, adhering to the scope of EU law. This framework is, in principle, the scope of its exercise. The integrative strengthening of the review, inseparable from these legal bases, entails the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the binding legal force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.. The recognition of review in “dispositional” law is a strong illustration of this. It has continued with this expansion, initiated by this treaty, and also brought about by different judges within the Union’s legal system. This has weakened the principle of its exercise within the scope of the Union’s law. Furthermore, this strengthening has been amplified by an overall consolidation of the courts’ review function. Indeed, it’s common law judges – in principle, ordinary national judges – who operate as a review on developments, in particular; a contrario, the Court of Justice has not had much of a chance to do so within the framework of this action, failing to fulfil its obligations. Yet, - the demonstration continues – new review bodies emerge. These will be the constitutional judge, and in the longer term, the European Court of Human Rights.

On effectue une analyse de la langue du droit de l’Union européenne (UE), en comparant, dans une visée contrastive, les tournures et structures caractéristiques du français avec celles du BCMS, et on aborde certaines problématiques liées à la traduction des textes juridiques de l’UE dans cette langue autrefois dénommée serbo-croate, et aujourd’hui connue sous un sigle reprenant les initiales des dénominations : bosniaque, croate, monténégrin et serbe. Cette étude se fonde sur une approche analytique d’un corpus parallèle constitué de quatre versions linguistiques (anglaise, française, croate et monténégrine) de l’Accord de stabilisation et d’association entre les Communautés européennes et leurs États membres d’une part, et la République du Monténégro, d’autre part. Ce document se rattache au droit conventionnel de l’UE et constitue le pilier du processus de stabilisation et d’association dans le cadre duquel s’effectue l’intégration des pays des Balkans occidentaux au sein de l’UE. / We analyse EU legal language, compare and contrast French characteristic structures with those of BCMS and examine problems related to the translation of EU legal texts into this language, formerly named Serbo-Croatian and today known by the initials of the names: Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian. This research is based on an analytical approach to a parallel corpus consisting of four language versions (English, French, Croatian and Montenegrin) of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part. This document is part of the EU’s international agreements which is a pillar of the Stabilisation and Association process, the framework for the integration of Western Balkan countries into the EU.