This thesis is a pilot analysis of five Afghan physicians who recently evacuated Afghanistan and are hoping to reenter the medical field in the United States. To this investigator’s knowledge, there has not been a study focusing on physicians who were part of the 2021 evacuation from Afghanistan. Through participant interviews, this thesis aims to illuminate the opportunities and challenges facing these physicians. Additionally, a board member of the Afghan Medical Professionals Association of America was interviewed to better understand the resources provided to newly arrived Afghan physicians. We found that socioeconomic status, lack of social support and guidance, United States Medical Licensing Exams, and limited English proficiency were barriers to reentering the medical field for these physicians. Policy recommendations include allotting residency spots for forcibly displaced physicians and enabling opportunities for physicians to work in other positions in the medical field. / Urban Bioethics

The purpose of this study is to attempt to solve why the Taliban have been successful in Afghanistan. In an attempt to solve why, I develop and test a theory on the Taliban's success against the U.S. in Afghanistan. My theory claims that the Taliban have been successful due to U.S. forces committing wrongdoings towards Afghan civilians. These wrongdoings, in turn, pushed civilian support away from the U.S. and its allies in this war. Afghan civilians would side with the Taliban, as they sought protection from the invading forces in their country. As a result of this gain in support, the Taliban were able to bolster the preexisting social ties they had, which allowed them to garner more fighters and resources; the bolstering of their social networks made their success more achievable. I test my theory qualitatively through interviews with American veterans who served in the War in Afghanistan. Through the process of interviews, no evidence that indicates that U.S. forces mistreating Afghans is conditional for Afghans choosing the Taliban. Interviews instead indicate that Afghans chose the Taliban due to pressure and coercion. Despite the introduction of pressure, coercion, and other new potential factors I ultimately have determined my study to be inconclusive due to limitations that prevented the ability to conduct deeper research; those limitations will be explained in the Conclusion section.

This study aims to highlight the consequences on outposts in Afghanistan in the context of COIN and ISAF during 2003-2012. Previous research in this area is more oriented towards the perspective of COIN at the strategic and operational level and not at the tactical and local level. For example, previous research has written about how important military presence and adaptation are, but not what consequences the company that is deployed to an area and conducts the COIN operation receives. The study was designed with Kilcullen’s theory about COIN and his 28 articles as a basis, and the study was conducted with in-depth interviews as the main empirical material, with officers who served in the Swedish Armed Forces, and the British Army during 2005-2012 in Afghanistan. The study finds that one consequence at one of the outposts was from the terrain, which was that the local infrastructure couldn’t support heavy military vehicles that came to the outpost, which resulted in the roads and irrigation ditches being destroyed by the vehicles' weight. The study also found interesting patterns amongst the informants that had the same consequences, which was that the roads leading towards the outposts were often very few, which led to a predictability for the enemy to use against the units stationed at the outpost. Another interesting find in this study is that there was a difference in how open each outpost was. For example, the British Army’s outposts were more open to civilians than the Swedish outposts, although the British Army had more fighting in their area than their Swedish counterpart.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / This research project evaluated four reading projects and their authentic materials. The projects were used in a U.S. university ESP program for post-bachelor Afghan students. By utilizing field-related American biographies, online academic articles, various news articles, field-specific article databases, and short fiction for in-depth reading and writing projects, the Afghan students’ reading performances proved and disproved the relevance and importance of these authentic materials as ways to improve their IBT TOEFL reading scores and academic reading proficiencies related to their future work at a U.S. graduate school. Data were collected and evaluated from three TOEFL scores and an in-depth, post program survey.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / The widespread use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has caused a dramatic increase in shockwave-induced mild Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI), leading mTBI to be dubbed the 'signature injury' of modern warfare. Currently, the pathology of shockwave-induced mTBI is unknown , and it is diagnosis is based on self-reported symptoms and combat history. While the etiological mechanism has not yet been determined , it is becoming increasingly accepted that shockwaves themselves are the brain-damaging agent that emanate from IEDs. To assess how mild, sub-lethal shockwaves might damage brain tissue, we developed an in vitro assay to deliver shockwaves to neuronal cells in culture, and then assayed several properties of these cells that affect their function. This assay involved exposing rat cortical and hippocampal primary neuronal cultures to shockwaves of increasing magnitude generated with a biolistic Gene Gun. The Gene Gun produces shockwaves of sufficient overpressure to cause cognitive impairment in animal models of shockwave-induced mTBI. Our results show that overpressures of ~1.0 pound per square inch (psi) caused transient membrane permeability for molecules up to ~12 nanometers in diameter. This change in membrane permeability was accompanied by a transient decrease in cellular ATP levels and synaptic densities. This synaptic degeneration correlated with changes in the level and phosphorylation state of several synaptic proteins examined. Similar results were observed in dissected rat retinas suggesting that these shockwave-induced effects can occur in complex tissues, such as the brain. Based on these findings we propose that shockwaves damage cellular membranes, leading to a decrease in intracellular ATP, and ultimately to a reduced numbers of synapses, the part of neurons most important for learning, memory and behavior. Additional experiments in whole animals will be required to ascertain whether shockwave-induced cellular damage and synaptic degeneration plays an etiological role in shockwave-induced mTBI.

Researchers and policy experts point to key issues and groups such as the Palestinian/Arab Israeli Conflict, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Saudi exported Wahhabism, and, in more recent times, the Iraq wars as being the source of militant Islam in this day in age. However, this perspective ignores key issues and ideals in to how this new form of Islam has emerged in recent decades. For instance, with all the conflicts that have occurred in recent decades, except for the 1979 Revolution in Iran, why have they not yielded Shari'a inspired Islamic states in Yemen, Lebanon, the Occupied Territories and Iraq? Currently the only Islamic states in the Arab world are ones that lay on the Persian Gulf that were established during their independence from colonial rule. One only has to look further east and to the north of the Middle East to see militant Islam taking hold in places like Chechnya, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Waziristan and a host of other areas which do not get the attention from many people in the West. After the demise of the Soviet Union and the years directly after, a political vacuum was formed that received almost no attention from the outside world except for states with historical and cultural similarities. Here Islam has and is being used as a military and political doctrine to accomplish goals and as an ideological base for launching new attacks against its proclaimed enemies. Indeed many of the key theologians and figures have come from the Arab world, but the rise of militant Islam could not have formed with this alone. Many of the fighters on the ground in alQaeda and its direct affiliated groups are indeed not Arabs but come from a wide range of different ethnic groups such as Afghans, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Uyghurs and Pakistanis who have answered bin Laden's call of lesser jihad against the West. Rather than examining militant Islam through a Middle Eastern perspective, this author wishes to give an alternate view that the current rise of militant Islam in the world is directly associated with the internal political situation of the Greater Caspian Sea Basin and not the Middle East as so many people have proposed in the past. To examine this idea, this author will look extensively at the internal conditions of states that have allowed militant Islam to arise and mature in such a short time span in this often forgotten region. The primary purpose of the proposed paper is to examine the rise of militant Islam through a Caspian Sea region lens rather than a Middle Eastern one. This study will also examine violent groups in various states to understand how groups are able to form and how they differ from each other. Countries ranging from as far as Turkey to the Xinxiang Province in China and from the southern reaches of the Russian Federation to Pakistan will be the primary focus.

The international political landscape of the 21st century is strewn with terrorist groups that choose to act violently in order for their political messages to be heard. Around the world groups have been formed to defend their ideologies and fulfill their political agendas through acts of terrorism. The Baader-Meinhof Gang [also known as the Red Army Faction], the Weather Underground, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, HAMAS, and the Irish Republican Army have existed for many decades. They represent only a small handful of terrorist groups that have kidnapped, targeted public institutions with bombs, and employed suicide terrorism. More often than not innocent civilians become involved in the carnage of an act of terrorism when they are caught off guard as unassuming bystanders. On September 11th, 2001 both the American public and US government officials bore the weight of that horrific day. Since 9-11, Americans were robbed of their sense of safety, and the American dream of tranquility was shattered. A general unease spread from the wreckage of the World Trade Centers, and with the passing of time a keen sense of awareness about terrorism took its place. The events of 9/11 have made US citizens fully cognizant that there are many actors actively plotting the destruction of the US. Now, eight years later, Americans live with the daily realization that such a heinous act could happen again, in some other unimaginable form. For the US government, the past eight years have been marked with as many successes as failures. The consequences of the inability of the US intelligence community to foresee the international plot unfolding, within and outside of the homeland, resulted in a major reorganization within the US government. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established on November 25, 2002, and was created solely to address US vulnerabilities highlighted by the actions of nineteen al-Qaeda suicide terrorists. The DHS' main responsibility is to improve communication and information sharing among various intelligence-gathering agencies, so another attempt to plan an attack like 9/11 on US soil would be foiled before it materialized. The US government would no longer be noncommittal in the face of terrorism, as it had before 9/11. Clear messages to terrorists were sent on October 7th, 2001, through the US invasion of Afghanistan, and subsequently on March 20th, 2003 through the US invasion of Iraq. Thus, the US' stance on the War on Terrorism was effectively and clearly communicated to al-Qaeda and throughout the rest of the world. The US might once have been labeled a paper tiger, but hitting the US at the core of their financial and military symbols struck a nerve. The terrorist attacks of 2001 taught the US government a vital lesson, but the military campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq would demonstrate that the US had even more to learn about the newest military tactics and techniques employed by the enemy, and how these tactics impacted on US military operations, strategies, and policies.

Over fifteen years since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States is still fighting the nebulous “War on Terror” – a conflict that includes ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as covert operations around the world (including the homeland). American cinema responded to the War on Terror in fits and starts, with many filmmakers wary of tackling such a controversial topic. For a War on Terror film to be financially successful, it would need to appeal to both supporters and detractors of the war effort. To do so, the War on Terror film genre builds on the narrative, characterization, and aesthetic frameworks of the war films of World War II and the Vietnam War to develop a set of conventions that recall the ideological projects of the films of those previous wars. By examining the combat film, espionage film, and returning soldier film subgenres, this thesis will demonstrate how the War on Terror film genre formally and ideologically represents the divisive ongoing war to appeal to both pro-war and anti-war viewers.

While recovering from decades of conflict and trying to adjust to an incipient free market economy, public higher education in Afghanistan is currently confronted with rapidly increasing enrollment and inadequate government financing. The imbalance between high demand for and insufficient supply of higher education has led to a decrease in the quality of education and an urgent need to develop non-state sources of funding. Using Johnstone’s (1986) diversified funding model as the conceptual framework, this exploratory case study reports actors’ attitudes and perceptions of the financing policy options for Afghan public higher education and the impediments to introduce this model in Afghanistan. Data were collected from documents and semistructured interviews with Afghan administrators, politicians, instructors and students during four months in Kabul in 2008. The findings show that: a) the state has most likely reached the maximum financial contribution to public higher education and that little more can be expected; b) that the existing funding for this sub-sector is not managed well; c) that the current legal framework does not support expansion of the entrepreneurial activities that are developing at the higher education institutions; c) that the legal system does not provide incentives to develop Afghan national donor support; d) that the introduction of user fees, though currently under consideration, is confronted with significant technical impediments, and e) that the introduction of tuition is not on the agenda because the higher education institutions have found the introduction of “night school” as an alternative means that allows the charging of tuition under the guise of “extra” services. In light of the aggregated actors’ attitudes towards these funding options, this study identifies considerable legal, technical and political blockages that hinder the creation of a functioning diversified funding model. The findings indicate that one significant pre-requisite for any development of these new funding sources will be increased institutional autonomy. Without devolution in power from the centralized ministry to the institutions, the necessary incentives and mechanisms will probably be missing for the development of these alternative sources of funding.

American Geopolitical Culture strongly rejects the concept of spheres of influence, but great power competition often dictates a tacit acceptance of rival powers' privileged zones of control. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union sought to maintain a sphere of influence along its border, and on multiple occasions resorted to the use of force to maintain control over foreign states. How did the United States react to the Soviet use of force in sovereign territory that fell within the Soviet privileged spheres of influence? This paper looks at three case studies, the Hungarian Revolution, the Prague Spring, and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and provides an analysis of the American foreign policy response, and the geopolitical and cultural values that informed policymakers' decision-making. Despite the limited interventions pursued by the United States, the United States constantly sought to undermine Soviet efforts to maintain a sphere of influence. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the United States prioritized long-term strategies on a global scale to weaken the Soviet Union in lieu of tactical interventions in opposition to the Soviet use of force. In Afghanistan, the United States continued to maintain its long-term strategies, while taking advantage of unique local factors to place additional strain on the Soviet Union. Across all three case studies the United States consistently pursued strategies that sought to weaken the Soviet Union as a whole, rather than just target individual spheres of influence. / Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation examines the American response to the Soviet use of force within its spheres of influence during the Cold War. American politicians have strongly rejected the validity of spheres of influence and consider them to be a form of imperialism that undermines a state's sovereign right to govern its own affairs. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union used military force to exert control over spheres of influence in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. The American response to each of these case studies varied. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the United States actively avoided intervening against the Soviet invasion, while in Afghanistan the United States provided extensive aid in the form of weapons, training, and intelligence. What explains the difference in the American approach to each of these case studies? This dissertation argues Soviet sphere of influence dynamics were stronger in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which acted as a deterrent to any American intervention. Rather than engaging the USSR in its established spheres of influence, the United States prioritized opposing Soviet expansion elsewhere while propagandizing Soviet brutality to sway world opinion away from the Soviet Block. In Afghanistan, Soviet influence was considerably weaker, allowing the United States greater opportunities to contest the Soviet invasion directly.