L’avion de combat Rafale est l’aboutissement du programme d’armement le plus important jamais engagé par l’armée de l’air puisqu’il sera, à terme, l’unique avion de chasse en service dans les armées françaises. Par conséquent, il structurera les forces aériennes françaises au moins jusqu’en 2040. Le programme Rafale conjugue des enjeux opérationnels, politiques, industriels et financiers majeurs et constitue à ce titre la quintessence d’un programme d’armement majeur. Cette caractéristique fondamentale nécessite d’adopter une approche transverse afin d’appréhender le plus largement possible les différents enjeux relatifs à sa conduite. Le programme Rafale connaît une trajectoire singulière. Après une première phase de définition s’effectuant dans le cadre d’une coopération européenne, le besoin opérationnel est finalement revu et affiné dans un cadre uniquement national. Cette phase de maturation débouche sur le lancement d’un programme conjoint à l’armée de l’air et à la marine nationale dont la réalisation dans les années 1990 se heurte aux ajustements budgétaires post-guerre froide. Suite à sa mise en service opérationnel au milieu des années 2000, le Rafale est employé avec succès dans les opérations en Afghanistan et en Libye auxquelles la France participe. Parallèlement, l’avion français débute sa campagne d’exportation dont les enjeux sont particulièrement importants pour la politique de défense française. Celui-ci connaît une première consécration avec la décision indienne en janvier 2012 d’engager des négociations exclusives en vue d’acquérir le chasseur français. / The Rafale fighter is the outcome of the most ambitious armament program ever engaged by the French Air Force. Projected to be the only fighter serving in the French military in the coming decades, it will shape the French Air Forces until 2040. The Rafale program intertwines military, political, industrial and financial interests at the highest levels of the French government and represents the essence of a French major armament program. This essential feature requires a comprehensive approach in order to meet this broad array of interests. The Rafale program has had a specific trajectory. After an initial definition stage which took place in the context of European cooperation, the operational need was finally reviewed on a national basis. This phase resulted in the official launch of the Rafale program both for the French Air Force and the French Navy. During the 1990s, it faced a severe budget constraint which hampered development and production. Following its initial operating capability in the mid-2000s, the Rafale fighter was successfully employed in operations in Afghanistan and Libya. Simultaneously, the Rafale began its marketing campaign to win international bids. The Rafale realized its first achievement with India’s decision, in January 2012, to purchase the French fighter.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) regarding the operation of aircraft from ships of the RAN and from RAAF shore bases. The effects of the separate intellectual development of maritime doctrine in the RAAF and RAN, and the efforts of the two Australian services to transfer theory into practice will be considered in the pre- (and post) World War II period, with due consideration of the experience of the services in both wars. The thesis will also discuss the problems that were faced by the RAAF and RAN to develop mutually acceptable operational procedures to enable the efficient use of aircraft in a maritime setting. The influence and effect on RAAF and RAN doctrine and equipment procurement, as a result of the special relationships that developed between the Air Force and Navy of Australia and Britain will be critically examined. A similar approach to the post war US/Australian relationship, and its effect on the Australian services, will also be critically examined. The thesis being propounded is that the development of a unique Australian maritime policy was retarded due to a combination of the relationship with Britain and the United States, lack of suitable equipment, lack of clear operational concepts in both the RAAF and RAN and the parochial attitude of the most senior commanders of both Services. The study has been based on Department of Navy, Department of Air and Department of Defence documents held in the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and Melbourne. In addition, relevant documents from the Admiralty and Air Ministry related to the development of naval aviation on RAN vessels during World War I, the attitude of the RAF toward the deployment of RAAF units to Singapore, and the negotiations that resulted in the procurement of HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne, have been perused. Wartime operational records of the RAAF have been examined to obtain data to enable a critical study to be made of the RAAF anti-submarine campaign, torpedo bomber operations and the maritime campaign undertaken from bases in North Western Area during World War II. The influence of the commander of the United States 5th Air Force has also been incorporated in the discussion. The research uncovered procedural and operational variations between the two Services, the diversion of key elements from Australian command and the priority given to the American line of advance that resulted in Australian operations being given a secondary, supportive, status. A conclusion reached as a result of this research has been that the development of a unique Australian maritime aerial capability was restricted by the requirement of Britain to deploy flying units to Singapore in 1940. Similarly, the pressure exerted on the RAN by the Admiralty to purchase the Light Fleet Carriers in the late 1940s was more in the interests of the RN and British foreign policy than that of the RAN. Overall, the relationship with the Britain and the United States masked the real weakness in Australia???s maritime operations and retarded its development.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) regarding the operation of aircraft from ships of the RAN and from RAAF shore bases. The effects of the separate intellectual development of maritime doctrine in the RAAF and RAN, and the efforts of the two Australian services to transfer theory into practice will be considered in the pre- (and post) World War II period, with due consideration of the experience of the services in both wars. The thesis will also discuss the problems that were faced by the RAAF and RAN to develop mutually acceptable operational procedures to enable the efficient use of aircraft in a maritime setting. The influence and effect on RAAF and RAN doctrine and equipment procurement, as a result of the special relationships that developed between the Air Force and Navy of Australia and Britain will be critically examined. A similar approach to the post war US/Australian relationship, and its effect on the Australian services, will also be critically examined. The thesis being propounded is that the development of a unique Australian maritime policy was retarded due to a combination of the relationship with Britain and the United States, lack of suitable equipment, lack of clear operational concepts in both the RAAF and RAN and the parochial attitude of the most senior commanders of both Services. The study has been based on Department of Navy, Department of Air and Department of Defence documents held in the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and Melbourne. In addition, relevant documents from the Admiralty and Air Ministry related to the development of naval aviation on RAN vessels during World War I, the attitude of the RAF toward the deployment of RAAF units to Singapore, and the negotiations that resulted in the procurement of HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne, have been perused. Wartime operational records of the RAAF have been examined to obtain data to enable a critical study to be made of the RAAF anti-submarine campaign, torpedo bomber operations and the maritime campaign undertaken from bases in North Western Area during World War II. The influence of the commander of the United States 5th Air Force has also been incorporated in the discussion. The research uncovered procedural and operational variations between the two Services, the diversion of key elements from Australian command and the priority given to the American line of advance that resulted in Australian operations being given a secondary, supportive, status. A conclusion reached as a result of this research has been that the development of a unique Australian maritime aerial capability was restricted by the requirement of Britain to deploy flying units to Singapore in 1940. Similarly, the pressure exerted on the RAN by the Admiralty to purchase the Light Fleet Carriers in the late 1940s was more in the interests of the RN and British foreign policy than that of the RAN. Overall, the relationship with the Britain and the United States masked the real weakness in Australia???s maritime operations and retarded its development.

The air campaign conducted by the RAAF in the North-Western Area during the Second World War has been largely ignored by historians yet it contributed significantly to the outcome of the Pacific war. This thesis sets out to discuss the campaign by considering various factors that impacted on the RAAF in the lead up to and during the course of the Pacific war and their relevance to the campaign. It looks at the way air operations were conducted in the North-Western Area between 1942 and 1945 and describes the role played by the flying squadrons based in the area. Using primary sources such as operational record books, documents and files at archives and libraries and interviews with veterans and experts the thesis found that the campaign was conducted in several phases. It started with the defence of Darwin. In keeping with overall allied strategy the RAAF then went on an offensive into what was then the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) using medium and heavy bombers and mine laying sea planes flying from bases in Australia???s north west. The NEI was vital to the Japanese war effort as a source of essential raw materials such as oil, timber, and rubber. To defend this part of their new empire the Japanese had amassed large military garrisons on the islands. The vessels used to transport troops and materials became the most important targets for the RAAF???s bomber squadrons. As General MacArthur???s forces advanced along the north coast of New Guinea the North-Western Area based units conducted raids into the NEI to deceive the Japanese into thinking an invasion would be launched from Darwin. As the New Guinea campaign gained momentum the RAAF???s task was to protect its western flank, to prevent the Japanese from moving troops and aircraft east to the Philippines. The thesis concludes the campaign was successful because Darwin was defended, it denied the Japanese vital materials for the conduct of the war and it kept hundreds of aircraft and tens of thousands of troops away from the allied advance.

The air campaign conducted by the RAAF in the North-Western Area during the Second World War has been largely ignored by historians yet it contributed significantly to the outcome of the Pacific war. This thesis sets out to discuss the campaign by considering various factors that impacted on the RAAF in the lead up to and during the course of the Pacific war and their relevance to the campaign. It looks at the way air operations were conducted in the North-Western Area between 1942 and 1945 and describes the role played by the flying squadrons based in the area. Using primary sources such as operational record books, documents and files at archives and libraries and interviews with veterans and experts the thesis found that the campaign was conducted in several phases. It started with the defence of Darwin. In keeping with overall allied strategy the RAAF then went on an offensive into what was then the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) using medium and heavy bombers and mine laying sea planes flying from bases in Australia???s north west. The NEI was vital to the Japanese war effort as a source of essential raw materials such as oil, timber, and rubber. To defend this part of their new empire the Japanese had amassed large military garrisons on the islands. The vessels used to transport troops and materials became the most important targets for the RAAF???s bomber squadrons. As General MacArthur???s forces advanced along the north coast of New Guinea the North-Western Area based units conducted raids into the NEI to deceive the Japanese into thinking an invasion would be launched from Darwin. As the New Guinea campaign gained momentum the RAAF???s task was to protect its western flank, to prevent the Japanese from moving troops and aircraft east to the Philippines. The thesis concludes the campaign was successful because Darwin was defended, it denied the Japanese vital materials for the conduct of the war and it kept hundreds of aircraft and tens of thousands of troops away from the allied advance.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 2, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

As outer space becomes more commercialized, humans have invested more time and efforts into the use and exploration of the outer space domain. Captured by the display of opportunities, space is becoming increasingly overcrowded. Currently, the only framework fully embracing the exploration and use of outer space is the Outer Space Treaty (OST), put forward by the United Nations in 1967. While the OST is detailing how space faring nations ought to peacefully use outer space as a joint arena for technological development, the discourse on outer space governance still experience some serious definitional limitations. This paper examines two interconnected deficiencies in the literature on outer space; first, the insufficient research and development of a space power theory and; second, the absence of, and the challenges in constructing and all- encompassing definition and/or delimitation of outer space. To support the discussion and to reach some definitive conclusions of the current status of these issues, a selection of historical theories and contemporary cases have been applied to enrich the debate. By identifying gaps in the literature, this paper strives to highlight some of the controversies in the outer space discourse.

Starting in August 1942 the United States and United Kingdom started waging a strategic bombing offensive against Germany. Throughout the course of the 1942 and 1943 campaigns, American and British air forces struggled to gain the upper hand in the European air war. By November 1943 American and British defeats at the hands of the German Air Force, or Luftwaffe, had placed the air war in doubt. By February 1944, the air war had turned around in favor of the Allies. This dramatic turn of events has been explained by historians in a number of ways. The most popular narrative is that the introduction of the long range escort fighter, the P-51 "Mustang," turned the tide in the air war. Another narrative is that there was a change in the fighter tactics. Starting in January 1944, American fighters stopped defending the bombers and started aggressively pursuing German fighters. Yet, these analyses do not include a major command changes that took place from November to January 1944. After his appointment to command of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, General Dwight D. Eisenhower used his position centralize all of the major air commands in Europe under his control. By unifying the air commands, the Allies were able to better coordinate and concentrate their air against Germany. In February 1944 the Allies focused their air forces against the Luftwaffe ultimately wearing down German fighter strength. After finally removing a major obstacle impending the strategic air war against Germany, the Allies concentrated their air forces against transportation and oil targets. The destruction of these two major economic systems crippled Germany's ability to fight the Allies in 1944 and 1945. By changing the command structure, Eisenhower was able to use his air forces in successful coordinated strategic air offensives that the Allies had previously been incapable of accomplishing.

My research provides a historical and archaeological context for this thesis, in which I argue the JB-2 missile is historically significant as a unique example of the rapid duplication of enemy technology for both physical and psychological retaliation, as a crucial link in the chain of development for America’s cruise missile program, and for its role in early Cold War deterrence. Jet Bomb model number 2 (JB-2), America’s first operationally successful, mass produced cruise missile, developed as a direct copy of the German V-1, with slight variation in manufacture due to differences between German and American components, machinery and tooling. Continuing modifications of the JB-2 during its service life led to improvements in performance, control, and accuracy. From 1944 to 1953, the JB-2 transitioned from a weapon quickly prepared for wartime deployment to an essential test vehicle for the United States Army, Air Force and Navy while supporting the U.S. policy of containment during the early Cold War.