O objetivo deste trabalho é examinar como os principais veículos de cobertura política da imprensa dos Estados Unidos se posicionaram a respeito da estratégia do governo do presidente Barack Obama para combater o Estado Islâmico no Iraque e na Síria, lançada em setembro de 2014. Referido plano estratégico é relevante, uma vez que representou inflexão na posição até então adotada pela administração Obama de não intervir militarmente no conflito armado em curso na Síria, ao mesmo tempo em que visou manter-se fiel à promessa eleitoral do então mandatário de retirada das tropas norte-americanas das guerras no Iraque e no Afeganistão. Faz-se um breve resumo das circunstâncias em que o plano de combate ao Estado Islâmico foi lançado, bem como dos antecedentes de intervenções militares estadunidenses recentes na região, para então se analisar a estratégia em si e o debate travado em três periódicos (The New York Times, Washington Post e The Wall Street Journal) e de duas redes de televisão (CNN e Fox News), no período compreendido entre janeiro de 2014 e dezembro de 2014. / The goal of this work is to review how the main news outlets with political coverage in the United States of America viewed the strategy to counter the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria launched by president Barack Obama in September 2014. Such strategy is a landmark as it represents a turning point in Obama administration\'s policy not to militarily intervene in the armed conflict in Syria, while also aiming at sustaining the president\'s electoral promise to withdraw American troops from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. After a summary of the circumstances in which the strategy was launched and of the recent US military interventions in the region, this article presents the strategy\'s main components and analyzes the public debate held on three daily papers (The New York Times, Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal) and two television networks (CNN and Fox News) in the period from January 2014 to December 2014.

Desde o fim da Guerra Fria, os Estados Unidos promoveram a noção da existência de \"Rogue States\", denominando-os \"novos inimigos\". No entanto, o termo confere muitas controvérsias em torno de sua definição, principalmente dos critérios que conferem o rótulo a tais atores. A irracionalidade na tomada de decisões e a busca pela aquisição de armas nucleares se apresentam como características fundamentais. Através da análise dos discursos americanos sobre rogue states, e sob a perspectiva construtivista, podemos depreender que o discurso foi utilizado como forma de corroborar as ações norte-americanas em relação a estes países, ao mesmo tempo em que moldavam as próprias estratégias americanas, uma vez que os atos de fala conferem uma ação em si. As ações tomadas diante de uma situação são definidas a partir da percepção deste fato e do significado que o ator dará a ele. Assim, o apontamento de certos países como sendo Rogue States pelos Estados Unidos serviu para distinguir entre os países do Sistema Internacional \"aqueles que deveriam ser combatidos\". Alguns críticos do termo afirmam que o critério de racionalidade aplicado a estados como Coreia do Norte e Irã é muito mais rigoroso que aquele aplicado aos demais estados, mesmo a USSR durante a Guerra Fria. O presente trabalho pretende avaliar o surgimento do termo rogue state e sua utilização pelo governo norte-americano como política oficial. Através de dois artigos, busca-se entender a construção do conceito de rogue state, levando-se em consideração as teorias construtivistas, principalmente dos teóricos da chamada virada linguística. Uma vez que o debate da irracionalidade está diretamente ligado a busca pela obtenção de armas nucleares - critério-chave para o apontamento como rogue-, pretende-se também avaliar as suposições para tal classificação através da investigação dos programas nucleares dos dois países na atualidade que estão no centro do debate nuclear- Irã e Coreia do Norte. / Since the end of the Cold War, the United States promoted the notion of the existence of \"Rogue States\", designating them as \"new enemies\". However, the term presents many controversies surrounding its definition, especially about the criteria that confer the label to such actors. The irrationality in decision-making and the pursuit of nuclear weapons are presented as the core characteristics of the concept. Through the analysis of American discourses on rogue states, and under the constructivist perspective, one can infer that the speech was used as a way of corroborating the U.S. actions towards these countries, while that shaped the American strategies themselves, once the speech acts are an action itself. Actions taken towards a situation are defined according to the perceptions and meaning the actor will give to it. Thus, the indication of certain countries as Rogue States by the United States served to distinguish among the countries of International System \"those who should be fought\". Some critics of the term argue that the criterion of rationality applied to states like North Korea and Iran is much more rigorous than the one applied to other states, even the USSR during the Cold War. This work intends to evaluate the emergence of the term rogue state and its use by the U.S. government as an official policy. Through two articles, we seek to understand the construction of the rogue state concept, taking into account the constructivist theories, especially the theory of so-called linguistic turn. Since the discussion of irrationality is directly linked to the search for acquiring nuclear weapons - key characteristic of a rogue-, it also intends to evaluate the assumptions for such classification by investigating the nuclear programs of both countries currently at the center of the nuclear debate -Iran and North Korea.

Desde o fim da Guerra Fria, os Estados Unidos promoveram a noção da existência de \"Rogue States\", denominando-os \"novos inimigos\". No entanto, o termo confere muitas controvérsias em torno de sua definição, principalmente dos critérios que conferem o rótulo a tais atores. A irracionalidade na tomada de decisões e a busca pela aquisição de armas nucleares se apresentam como características fundamentais. Através da análise dos discursos americanos sobre rogue states, e sob a perspectiva construtivista, podemos depreender que o discurso foi utilizado como forma de corroborar as ações norte-americanas em relação a estes países, ao mesmo tempo em que moldavam as próprias estratégias americanas, uma vez que os atos de fala conferem uma ação em si. As ações tomadas diante de uma situação são definidas a partir da percepção deste fato e do significado que o ator dará a ele. Assim, o apontamento de certos países como sendo Rogue States pelos Estados Unidos serviu para distinguir entre os países do Sistema Internacional \"aqueles que deveriam ser combatidos\". Alguns críticos do termo afirmam que o critério de racionalidade aplicado a estados como Coreia do Norte e Irã é muito mais rigoroso que aquele aplicado aos demais estados, mesmo a USSR durante a Guerra Fria. O presente trabalho pretende avaliar o surgimento do termo rogue state e sua utilização pelo governo norte-americano como política oficial. Através de dois artigos, busca-se entender a construção do conceito de rogue state, levando-se em consideração as teorias construtivistas, principalmente dos teóricos da chamada virada linguística. Uma vez que o debate da irracionalidade está diretamente ligado a busca pela obtenção de armas nucleares - critério-chave para o apontamento como rogue-, pretende-se também avaliar as suposições para tal classificação através da investigação dos programas nucleares dos dois países na atualidade que estão no centro do debate nuclear- Irã e Coreia do Norte. / Since the end of the Cold War, the United States promoted the notion of the existence of \"Rogue States\", designating them as \"new enemies\". However, the term presents many controversies surrounding its definition, especially about the criteria that confer the label to such actors. The irrationality in decision-making and the pursuit of nuclear weapons are presented as the core characteristics of the concept. Through the analysis of American discourses on rogue states, and under the constructivist perspective, one can infer that the speech was used as a way of corroborating the U.S. actions towards these countries, while that shaped the American strategies themselves, once the speech acts are an action itself. Actions taken towards a situation are defined according to the perceptions and meaning the actor will give to it. Thus, the indication of certain countries as Rogue States by the United States served to distinguish among the countries of International System \"those who should be fought\". Some critics of the term argue that the criterion of rationality applied to states like North Korea and Iran is much more rigorous than the one applied to other states, even the USSR during the Cold War. This work intends to evaluate the emergence of the term rogue state and its use by the U.S. government as an official policy. Through two articles, we seek to understand the construction of the rogue state concept, taking into account the constructivist theories, especially the theory of so-called linguistic turn. Since the discussion of irrationality is directly linked to the search for acquiring nuclear weapons - key characteristic of a rogue-, it also intends to evaluate the assumptions for such classification by investigating the nuclear programs of both countries currently at the center of the nuclear debate -Iran and North Korea.

Pendant plus de quarante cinq ans l’atout maître de la diplomatie publique américaine a été l’Agence d’information des Etats-Unis (l’USIA, United States Information Agency), établie en 1953 à l’apogée de la guerre froide pour répondre à la propagande soviétique anti-américaine et coordonner les programmes culturels et d’information à l’étranger. En privilégiant une approche comparative, notre thèse se propose d’apporter un éclairage sur le rôle longtemps ignoré de la diplomatie publique au sein de la machine de la politique étrangère américaine en se concentrant sur trois Administrations présidentielles, Eisenhower, Kennedy et Reagan qui se distinguent comme des périodes charnières. Dans ce cadre, notre étude tente de déterminer le rôle qu’ont pu jouer les stratégies de la diplomatie publique américaine élaborées depuis Washington telles qu’elles furent pratiquées par les agents des services d’information (USIS) dans les pays de « la zone cruciale » (France, Italie et Allemagne) en Europe de l’Ouest, ou dans les nations captives. Notre thèse démontre que des premières campagnes de propagande des combattants de la guerre psychologique, dans les années 1950, aux émissions high-tech des champions de l’information et de la désinformation des années 1980, l’USIA fut au cœur des stratégies de persuasion de la puissance américaine en Europe. Au regard des succès et des échecs des activités officielles et officieuses pour lesquelles l’USIA a œuvré, nous abordons la délicate question de la réception des programmes d’information officiels et de l’efficacité des stratégies d’influence américaines dans les batailles européennes pour la liberté. / For 46 years, the centrepiece of U.S. public diplomacy was the United States Information Agency (USIA) established in 1953 at the height of the Cold War to counter anti-American propaganda from the Soviet Union and coordinate foreign information dissemination programs. The purpose of my dissertation - a comparative study - is to try to shed a new light on the too long neglected role of public diplomacy in the American foreign policy process over the course of three key presidential Administrations- Eisenhower, Kennedy and Reagan. Therefore in the course of my dissertation, through field centered case studies, I investigate the strategies set up by the USIA in Washington and by the USIS [United States Information Services] in the field for “the crucial zone” (defined as France, Italy and Germany), and for key “captive nations” (such as Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary). In my dissertation I argue that since the first propag! anda campaigns of the cold warriors to the high-tech broadcastings of the champions of information and disinformation, USIA was at the core of the American strategies of persuasion and power in Europe. Indeed, in the field, between 1953 and 1991 the psychological warfare between the US and the USSR turned into a cultural Cold War and a war of information in which both public and private networks were involved. Considering the success and failures of the covert and overt activities of the USIA I may tackle the tricky issue of the effectiveness of American strategies of influence in the European battle for freedom.

Despite historians describing the 1970s as a time of détente, both National Security Advisors that dominated America’s foreign policy pursued harsh stances against the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski sabotaged peace talks in order help the United States keep its edge against the other world superpower. Most historians point to the similarities between these two men, but what is most often left out of the narrative is that both men witnessed persecution at the hands of totalitarian governments: Kissinger by the Nazis and Brzezinski by both the Nazis and the Soviets. This influence is strong in their first works written at Harvard University, where they met Dr. Carl J. Friedrich and Hannah Arendt, both German émigrés. This paper will explore how European intellectuals, as well as their own European heritage, predisposed both Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski in their hawkish stances against the Soviet Union.

Given the contradictory reality of a well-developed human rights and humanitarian regime alongside extensive human rights abuses committed in the “Global War on Terror,” the dissertation asks how and why law has shaped contemporary security policy. Focusing on the American case over time, I examine this problem empirically by tracing the changing impact of both international and domestic legal and normative constraints on torture and interrogation, detention and trial, and surveillance practices, culminating in post-9/11 counterterrorism doctrine. I find that policy makers have increasingly violated rules with the adoption of controversial security and intelligence policies, but have simultaneously employed legalistic arguments to evade responsibility for human rights abuses. Using contrasting realist, decisionist, liberal, and constructivist accounts of the nature of state compliance with norms and law found in International Relations and legal scholarship, the dissertation theoretically explains this outcome and with it, law’s ability to moderate national security practice. In so doing, I propose an original reading of law as a permissive constraint, which challenges us to rethink paradigmatic assumptions in a way that accommodates both strategic and normative factors and recognizes the role of practice in giving content to rules.

Given the contradictory reality of a well-developed human rights and humanitarian regime alongside extensive human rights abuses committed in the “Global War on Terror,” the dissertation asks how and why law has shaped contemporary security policy. Focusing on the American case over time, I examine this problem empirically by tracing the changing impact of both international and domestic legal and normative constraints on torture and interrogation, detention and trial, and surveillance practices, culminating in post-9/11 counterterrorism doctrine. I find that policy makers have increasingly violated rules with the adoption of controversial security and intelligence policies, but have simultaneously employed legalistic arguments to evade responsibility for human rights abuses. Using contrasting realist, decisionist, liberal, and constructivist accounts of the nature of state compliance with norms and law found in International Relations and legal scholarship, the dissertation theoretically explains this outcome and with it, law’s ability to moderate national security practice. In so doing, I propose an original reading of law as a permissive constraint, which challenges us to rethink paradigmatic assumptions in a way that accommodates both strategic and normative factors and recognizes the role of practice in giving content to rules.

The Congo Crisis of the early 1960s served as a satellite conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Scholars have argued about U.S. motivations and interests involved in the Congo Crisis. The major division between scholars is between those who contend the United States acted for national security reasons and those scholars who argue the United States desired to establish a neocolonial regime to protect economic interests pertaining to vast Congolese mineral wealth. The argument of this thesis is that the United States policy in the Congo between 1960 and 1965 focused on installing a friendly regime in the Congo in order to protect its national security interests. This argument lends to the introduction of a new term to classify U.S. actions: pseudocolonialism. The previous term, neocolonialism, denotes a negative connotation based on economic greed and does not satisfactorily explain the motivations of the United States. By examining the value to the United States of Congolese uranium and cobalt as well as Congolese geographic location, the singular explanation of economic greed is weakened.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:29:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2011-03-11Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:59:28Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 moreirajunior_h_me_mar.pdf: 691747 bytes, checksum: 20d9d8b1288eba2b3854524f2c68a130 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Principal economia mundial, líder político das principais instituições multilaterais e superpotência militar de alcance global, os Estados Unidos neste início de século XXI reúne todas as características para ser considerado o principal ator do sistema internacional. Nesse sentido, a compreensão das relações internacionais contemporâneas depende de uma compreensão das principais ações dos Estados Unidos no cenário internacional. Desde os anos do pós II Guerra, a política externa norte-americana adotou uma estratégia de construir a ordem internacional a partir da projeção de seus interesses nacionais. O objetivo dessa pesquisa foi identificar se a estratégia de segurança nacional do governo George W. Bush, focada na guerra contra o terrorismo, representa uma continuidade no projeto hegemônico norte-americano de construção da ordem internacional, ou se representa uma ruptura do mesmo, por desarticular o consenso da comunidade internacional existente em torno do projeto iniciado na segunda metade do século XX. A partir da revisão bibliográfica sobre o tema, da análise dos documentos dos neoconservadores e formuladores da estratégia de segurança do governo W. Bush, e do estudo de sua estratégia de segurança nacional, conhecida como Doutrina Bush, percebe-se que, por meios distintos, a política externa neoconservadora dos republicanos possui o mesmo objetivo da Grande Estratégia dos Estados Unidos prevalecente ao longo do século XX: o de modelar a ordem internacional de acordo com os interesses norte-americanos e assim consolidar sua primazia no cenário internacional / Greatest global economy, political leader of multilateral institutions and global military superpower, during the XXI century America has had all the characteristics to be considered the main actor of international system. Therefore, the understanding of contemporary international relations depends on understanding US world actions. Since Post War II, American foreign policy has developed a strategy to shape world order through America’s national interest. This research aims to investigate if the national security strategy of W. Bush’s administration, focused on war on terror, represents a continuity or a break in the American hegemonic project. The Bibliography revision, as well as the analysis of neoconservative documents for foreign policy and national defense, added by a study of the national security strategy, shows that Bush Doctrine has the same objectives of US Grand Strategy: to shape world order and support American primacy

The main aim of the final thesis is to assess American foreign and security policy during 2001 -- 2008 using concepts of security and strategic culture. Security and strategic culture (SSC) are rather new concepts in IR, but always more attention is paid to them. Poststructuralist conception was chosen as to be the main approach towards these concepts, since it enables to work with discursive actions of strategic and security elites. On the theoretical plane, concepts of SSC are elaborated and theoretically separated. The practical level scrutinizes how the SSC influenced the key decisions within examined period and what impact strategic and security elites had on changes of SSC. The last, assessing level, analyzes how the changes of the SSC identified on practical level, influenced American foreign and security policy and also main doctrinal documents. The main focus is on the attacks of 9/11 which had a great impact on such turbulent times, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which were fought in response to the above mentioned attacks, and changes of the foreign and security policy of the USA in the light of the unsuccessful Global War on Terror.