China’s emergence as an economic powerhouse has often been portrayed as threatening to America’s economic strength and to its very identity as “the global hegemon.” The media’s alarmist response to an economic competitor is familiar to those who remember US-Japanese relations in the 1980s. In order to better understand the basis of American threat perception, this study explores the independent and interactive impact of three variables (perceptions of the Other’s capabilities, perceptions of the Other as a threat versus as an opportunity, and perceptions of the Other’s political culture) on attitudes toward two different economic competitors (Japan 1977-1995 and China 1985-2011). Utilizing four methods (historical process tracing, public polling data analysis, social scientific experimentation, and content analysis), this study demonstrates that increases in the Other’s economic capabilities have a much smaller impact on attitudes than is commonly believed. It further shows that while perceptions of threat/opportunity played a significant role in shaping attitudinal response toward Japan, perceptions of political culture are the most important factor driving attitudes toward China today. This study contributes to a better understanding of how states react to threats and construct negative images of their economic rivals. It also helps to explain the current Sino-American relationship and enables better predictions as to its potential future course. Finally, these findings contribute to cultural explanations of the democratic peace phenomenon and provide a boundary condition (political culture) for the liberal proposition that opportunity ameliorates conflict in the economic realm.

This thesis submits broader understanding of George W. Bush and Barack Obama presidencies in terms of their Middle Eastern policy, in particular the issue of Iranian nuclear policy. The main interest lies in an intention to conclude, which particular circumstances led the American governments to rethink their position towards the Iranian nuclear program, bearing in mind changes which took place in security, economic and foreign policy interests of the United States. The first chapter describes the theoretical framework upon which the entire thesis is based upon. The second chapter provides a short review on the MENA region, describing the most visible factors and issues form the very last years of the second administration of Barack Obama. The third chapter is based upon the research of the Iranian position in the MENA region, its potential, and what possibilities the U.S. government posses in order to contain Iran from spreading its influence. The next chapter deals with an issue of nuclear terrorism and its connections towards Iran, evaluation of possible nuclear terrorist menace and possibilities of so called "Dirty Bombs" usage. The fifth chapter is based upon the research of the first presidency of George W. Bush and the policies which were implemented after the terrorist attacks on 11...

During World War II, the United States had worked in a multilateral fashion with Great Britain and the Soviet Union to form the victorious "Big Three." The countries were optimistic that the peace they had achieved would be sustainable. However, after the Cold War began, the United States backed away from opportunities to work multilaterally; instead, working unilaterally to spread democracy and other principles around the globe. On many occasions, the United States has chosen to take action alone, leaving it isolated from other countries. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar system, the United States has sought superpower status and has sought to become a global hegemon on many fronts. Issues such as ideology and human rights have created tension in U.S. bilateral relations, notably with Russia, China, and France. While headway has been made to reduce tension since the Cold War, other issues have prevented the complete alleviation of tension in U.S. foreign relations with the three countries. The United States' pursuit of hegemonic status employing a unilateral approach and isolationist strategy has resulted in much of the tension seen today. While there are many examples, the most prominent example is that of the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. This and several other issues are addressed in the evolution of U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War with Russia, China, and France.

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / The role of Latin America in U.S. foreign policy has ebbed and flowed for over 100 years. Over the last 15 years, the relationship between the United States and Latin America has seen a precipitous drop in both cooperation and cordiality. The amicable relationships that the United States once enjoyed with Brazil and Venezuela specifically have become acrimonious. With the United States' increased interest in completing a Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement by January, relations with Brazil are vital. The United States' continued dependence on imported petroleum from Venezuela and America's concern over Venezuela's growing relationship with Cuba make this country also important to U.S. foreign policy. The thesis focuses on the United States' ability to use its cultural influence (soft power) to positively effect U.S. relations with Brazil and Venezuela. By analyzing past and present effects of U.S. cultural influence in these two countries, the U.S. can better understand and appreciate the influence it wields as the world's only remaining super power. This thesis finds that despite historic evidence, the U.S. has had and continues to have a propensity to use soft power influence tactically, diminishing the effectiveness of its innate power and influence as being the global leader in military, economic, cultural, and technological matters. Conversely, the U.S. attempts to use its hard power (military and economic) strategically, thereby only breeding anti-Americanism globally. / Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

The current president of the United States, Donald Trump, has been identified as the reason for a large shift in American foreign policy towards a doctrine closer to that of political realism. This claim has led us to examine if this transformation could be detected and described if we analyzed and compared Trump’s foreign policy doctrine with his predecessor, Barack Obama, through the lens Thomas Hobbes, whose ideas are at the core of the three modern schools of political realism. Accordingly, in this thesis, we deduce an analytical framework from the original corpus of Hobbes, where anarchy is divided into moral and empirical variables, identified as the primary factors for behavior in international settings. This is then applied inductively via a comparative qualitative content analysis to two primary documents, the National Security Strategies of 2010 containing the foreign policy doctrine of Obama, and the National Security Strategy of 2017 containing the doctrine of Trump. Our thesis shows a large shift in how the Presidents view the world in moral terms, or how they see it fit for the American executive to act on the international stage. And a relatively minor shift in empirical terms, or their perception of the foundational reality of the world system which they both consider to be of an anarchical nature closely connected to the theoretical model presented by our interpretation of Hobbes

Esta pesquisa investiga os fatores de política doméstica que motivam os Estados a delegar determinados temas a organizações internacionais. Com base na abordagem de principal-agente aplicada à delegação internacional, o estudo de caso sustenta que a dinâmica da política doméstica norte-americana foi um determinante importante da delegação da crise da dívida dos anos 80 para o Fundo Monetário Internacional. A hipótese se baseia no argumento teórico segundo o qual a delegação de um tema para uma organização internacional oferece ao ator que delega (em geral o Poder Executivo) uma oportunidade de aumentar sua influência sobre aquele tema em detrimento dos outros atores políticos domésticos. Nesta visão, a delegação pode aumentar a influência do Poder Executivo ao deslocar o poder de agenda sobre o tema para a organização internacional, reduzir o número de pontos de decisão doméstica, criar assimetrias de informação e prover fontes adicionais de legitimidade para as posições do Executivo. Quanto mais agudo for o conflito doméstico sobre um tema, maior será o incentivo para o Poder Executivo delegá-lo a uma organização internacional. Este estudo sustenta que a crise da dívida dos anos 80 foi essencialmente uma crise bancária, e como tal poderia ter sido tratada exclusivamente no nível doméstico norte-americano. A pesquisa apresenta evidências de que, ao enquadrar a crise como um problema de política internacional e delegá-la ao FMI, o Departamento do Tesouro dos EUA aumentou seu controle sobre o tema e reduziu a influência do Congresso, cujas visões e prioridades eram diferentes das do governo. O Executivo norte-americano, a despeito da desconfiança que inicialmente nutria com relação às instituições financeiras multilaterais, decidiu delegar o gerenciamento da crise para o FMI porque suas preferências estavam mais alinhadas com as preferências do Fundo do que com as preferências do Congresso e, portanto, as perdas de agências eram pequenas em comparação com o ganho obtido por impedir o Congresso de adquirir um papel ativo sobre a questão. / This research examines the domestic factors that contribute to certain political issues being delegated by states to international organizations. Based upon principal-agent theory, the case study argues that American domestic politics played a major role in the delegation of the 1980s debt crisis of developing countries to the International Monetary Fund. The hypothesis is based on the theoretical argument that delegation of an issue to an international organization offers the delegating actor (usually the executive branch) an opportunity to increase its influence on that issue vis-à-vis other domestic political actors. As such, delegating an issue to an international organization can increase the influence of the executive branch by shifting control of the agenda on the issue in favor of the delegating actor, decreasing the number of domestic decision points, creating information asymmetries and providing additional sources of legitimacy for the positions of the executive. The more intense the domestic conflict on an issue, the bigger the incentive for the executive branch to delegate the issue to an international organization. This study contends that the LDC debt crisis of the 1980s was essentially a banking crisis, and that as such could have been handled domestically by the US government. The research provides evidence that, by framing the crisis as an international problem and delegating it to the IMF, the US Department of the Treasury increased its control of the issue and reduced the influence of Congress, whose views and priorities were different from those of the Administration. The US Treasury, despite its initial mistrust of international financial institutions, chose to delegate the management of the crisis to the IMF because US Treasury preferences were more aligned with the preferences of the Fund than with the preferences of Congress, and thus agency losses were small in comparison with what was gained by preventing Congress from having an active role on the issue.

La présente étude vise à appréhender en trois temps la public diplomacy des Etats-Unis, objet civilisationnel protéiforme. Notre premier chapitre a pour objectif la constitution d’un appareil théorique permettant de comprendre le fonctionnement de la projection d’une image extraterritoriale des Etats-Unis. La multiplicité d’acteurs, d’auteurs et de prescripteurs façonnant la public diplomacy américaine nécessite d’en dresser une taxonomie. Par ailleurs, les nombreux prismes disciplinaires par lesquels la public diplomacy est décrite font amplement varier son signifié. Pour donner du sens à cet ensemble hétérogène, nous choisissons d’étudier la public diplomacy des Etats-Unis sous l’angle de la propagande. Notre second chapitre est une étude pratique. Celle-ci révèle que la littérature consacrée à la public diplomacy est de nature quasi hagiographique. Présentée comme vertueuse par ses acteurs, la réalité est tout autre. Quatre cas d’étude – la « campagne de vérité » sous Truman, la « guerre du Vietnam » sous Johnson, l’Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean sous Reagan, ainsi que la « guerre contre la terreur » sous Bush fils – montrent que sa praxis est en contradiction avec sa rhétorique. Lors de l’ultime chapitre, on s’interrogera sur les différences entre effets annoncés et effets constatés. Le phénomène le plus notable est la constitution d’un maillage international de personnes influentes au sein d’instituts servant de relais au message américain. Cet effet fait-il des chercheurs en Etudes américaines des propagandistes à leur insu ? / This three-part dissertation considers U.S. public diplomacy as a protean American Studies object. Part one is the creation of a theoretical apparatus to assist readers in their comprehension of how America projects its image abroad. The (too) many actors, authors and policy-makers involved in the shaping of American public diplomacy require the creation of a taxonomy. What is more, depending on academic focus, the meaning of public diplomacy varies. To make sense of this heterogeneous set, we choose to use propaganda as the master signifier tying together the different facets of public diplomacy. Part two is a practical study. Quasi hagiographic literature massages the reader into believing public diplomacy is of a virtuous nature. Yet four case studies (Truman’s Campaign of truth, Johnson’s Vietnam War, Reagan’s Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean and Bush 43’s so-called “War on Terror”) reveal the width of the gap that separates rhetoric from practice. Part three ponders the difference between supposed and real effects of American public diplomacy. Its most tangible achievement being the creation of a network of influential people and institutions to relay the American message abroad, one may wonder whether American Studies specialists unknowingly become propagandists themselves.

Orientador: Marcelo Fernandes de Oliveira / Banca: Virgílio Caixeta Arraes / Banca: Marcos Cordeiro Pires / Resumo: Principal economia mundial, líder político das principais instituições multilaterais e superpotência militar de alcance global, os Estados Unidos neste início de século XXI reúne todas as características para ser considerado o principal ator do sistema internacional. Nesse sentido, a compreensão das relações internacionais contemporâneas depende de uma compreensão das principais ações dos Estados Unidos no cenário internacional. Desde os anos do pós II Guerra, a política externa norte-americana adotou uma estratégia de construir a ordem internacional a partir da projeção de seus interesses nacionais. O objetivo dessa pesquisa foi identificar se a estratégia de segurança nacional do governo George W. Bush, focada na guerra contra o terrorismo, representa uma continuidade no projeto hegemônico norte-americano de construção da ordem internacional, ou se representa uma ruptura do mesmo, por desarticular o consenso da comunidade internacional existente em torno do projeto iniciado na segunda metade do século XX. A partir da revisão bibliográfica sobre o tema, da análise dos documentos dos neoconservadores e formuladores da estratégia de segurança do governo W. Bush, e do estudo de sua estratégia de segurança nacional, conhecida como Doutrina Bush, percebe-se que, por meios distintos, a política externa neoconservadora dos republicanos possui o mesmo objetivo da Grande Estratégia dos Estados Unidos prevalecente ao longo do século XX: o de modelar a ordem internacional de acordo com os interesses norte-americanos e assim consolidar sua primazia no cenário internacional / Abstract: Greatest global economy, political leader of multilateral institutions and global military superpower, during the XXI century America has had all the characteristics to be considered the main actor of international system. Therefore, the understanding of contemporary international relations depends on understanding US world actions. Since Post War II, American foreign policy has developed a strategy to shape world order through America's national interest. This research aims to investigate if the national security strategy of W. Bush's administration, focused on war on terror, represents a continuity or a break in the American hegemonic project. The Bibliography revision, as well as the analysis of neoconservative documents for foreign policy and national defense, added by a study of the national security strategy, shows that Bush Doctrine has the same objectives of US Grand Strategy: to shape world order and support American primacy / Mestre

Esta pesquisa investiga os fatores de política doméstica que motivam os Estados a delegar determinados temas a organizações internacionais. Com base na abordagem de principal-agente aplicada à delegação internacional, o estudo de caso sustenta que a dinâmica da política doméstica norte-americana foi um determinante importante da delegação da crise da dívida dos anos 80 para o Fundo Monetário Internacional. A hipótese se baseia no argumento teórico segundo o qual a delegação de um tema para uma organização internacional oferece ao ator que delega (em geral o Poder Executivo) uma oportunidade de aumentar sua influência sobre aquele tema em detrimento dos outros atores políticos domésticos. Nesta visão, a delegação pode aumentar a influência do Poder Executivo ao deslocar o poder de agenda sobre o tema para a organização internacional, reduzir o número de pontos de decisão doméstica, criar assimetrias de informação e prover fontes adicionais de legitimidade para as posições do Executivo. Quanto mais agudo for o conflito doméstico sobre um tema, maior será o incentivo para o Poder Executivo delegá-lo a uma organização internacional. Este estudo sustenta que a crise da dívida dos anos 80 foi essencialmente uma crise bancária, e como tal poderia ter sido tratada exclusivamente no nível doméstico norte-americano. A pesquisa apresenta evidências de que, ao enquadrar a crise como um problema de política internacional e delegá-la ao FMI, o Departamento do Tesouro dos EUA aumentou seu controle sobre o tema e reduziu a influência do Congresso, cujas visões e prioridades eram diferentes das do governo. O Executivo norte-americano, a despeito da desconfiança que inicialmente nutria com relação às instituições financeiras multilaterais, decidiu delegar o gerenciamento da crise para o FMI porque suas preferências estavam mais alinhadas com as preferências do Fundo do que com as preferências do Congresso e, portanto, as perdas de agências eram pequenas em comparação com o ganho obtido por impedir o Congresso de adquirir um papel ativo sobre a questão. / This research examines the domestic factors that contribute to certain political issues being delegated by states to international organizations. Based upon principal-agent theory, the case study argues that American domestic politics played a major role in the delegation of the 1980s debt crisis of developing countries to the International Monetary Fund. The hypothesis is based on the theoretical argument that delegation of an issue to an international organization offers the delegating actor (usually the executive branch) an opportunity to increase its influence on that issue vis-à-vis other domestic political actors. As such, delegating an issue to an international organization can increase the influence of the executive branch by shifting control of the agenda on the issue in favor of the delegating actor, decreasing the number of domestic decision points, creating information asymmetries and providing additional sources of legitimacy for the positions of the executive. The more intense the domestic conflict on an issue, the bigger the incentive for the executive branch to delegate the issue to an international organization. This study contends that the LDC debt crisis of the 1980s was essentially a banking crisis, and that as such could have been handled domestically by the US government. The research provides evidence that, by framing the crisis as an international problem and delegating it to the IMF, the US Department of the Treasury increased its control of the issue and reduced the influence of Congress, whose views and priorities were different from those of the Administration. The US Treasury, despite its initial mistrust of international financial institutions, chose to delegate the management of the crisis to the IMF because US Treasury preferences were more aligned with the preferences of the Fund than with the preferences of Congress, and thus agency losses were small in comparison with what was gained by preventing Congress from having an active role on the issue.

Ce mémoire se penche sur les raisons ayant mené à l’isolement du secrétaire d’État Colin Powell au sein du processus décisionnel de politique étrangère de l’administration de George W. Bush entre 2000 et 2004. Plus précisément, cette recherche mobilise le concept de dynamiques de groupes afin d’expliquer l’isolement de Powell dans le processus décisionnel ayant mené aux interventions en Afghanistan (2001) et en Irak (2003). Ce mémoire se veut une contribution à la littérature sur le processus décisionnel de politique étrangère ayant mené à ces deux interventions militaires. Cette littérature est abondante et témoigne d’un consensus au sujet de l’isolement de Powell au sein de cette administration. Toutefois, aucune contribution, à notre connaissance, ne s’était concentrée jusqu’ici à fournir une explication concernant cet isolement. Dans un premier temps, ce mémoire démontre que l’isolement de Powell ne peut être simplement attribué à la nature de la fonction qu’il occupait au sein de l’administration Bush. Par la description des dynamiques de groupes au sein du cabinet de guerre, il établit qu’une série d’indicateurs cognitifs et bureaucratiques permettent plutôt d’expliquer, du moins en partie, cet isolement. La présence d’un sous-groupe décisionnel déterminé utilisant des manœuvres bureaucratiques afin de marginaliser Powell, l’omniprésence de l’idéologie néoconservatrice et l’importante polarisation au sein du cabinet de guerre ainsi que la distribution inégales des ressources bureaucratiques sont des facteurs explicatifs développés dans ce mémoire. / Abstract: This master thesis focuses on the factors that led to the marginalization of the Secretary of State Colin Powell inside the foreign policy decision-making process of the George W. Bush administration (2000-2004). More precisely, this research uses the concept of small group dynamics to explain Powell’s isolation in the decision-making process that led to military interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). This thesis is a contribution to the literature relating to the decision-making process that led to those military interventions. This literature is plenteous and testifies to the consensus about Powell’s marginalization inside this administration. So far, to our knowledge, no contribution has focused on providing an explanation for this marginalization. In the first place, this research reveals that Powell’s marginalization cannot be attributed to the function he occupied in the Bush administration. By describing the small group dynamics within the war cabinet, it establishes that a series of cognitive and bureaucratic indicators are more explanatory of this isolation. The presence of a determined subgroup using bureaucratic strategies to marginalize Powell, the omnipresence of neoconservative ideology that led to important polarization within the war cabinet, and the unequal distribution of bureaucratic resources are some explanatory factors developed in this research.