O objetivo desta dissertação de mestrado é analisar a assimilação antropofágica (Utilizarei, nesta dissertação a metáfora da expressão Antropofagia realizada pelo Movimento Modernista brasileiro. Assim como os índios canibais devoravam seus inimigos, acreditando que assim assimilavam as suas qualidades, os artistas Modernistas propunham uma devoração simbólica da cultura estrangeira, aproveitando suas inovações artísticas sem perder a identidade cultural brasileira.) do debate jurídico norte-americano produzido em torno da questão social durante a Era Roosevelt por parte do pensamento jurídico brasileiro da Era Vargas. Desse modo, estudar-se-á a forma como os autores norte-americanos da Sociological Jurisprudence e do Realismo Jurídico foram utilizados pela doutrina jurídica brasileira do período entre guerras na formação de um pensamento jurídico antiliberal e anticonceitualista. No centro da crise do capitalismo mundial, as universidades (Roscoe Pound, 1870-1964, e Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, 1893-1962), a Suprema Corte (Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 1870-1938, e Louis Dembitz Brandeis, 1856-1941) e o corpo burocrático do governo (1933-1945) Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) (James MacCauley Landis, 1899-1964) produziam alternativas ao mecanicismo judicial e ao modelo liberal. Na periferia do capitalismo mundial, o corpo burocrático de Vargas (Oliveira Vianna, Francisco Campos e Francisco Sá Filho) e as revistas e debates jurídicos (João Mangabeira e Alípio Silveira) questionavam o liberalismo da República Velha (1889-1930) e buscavam, no mercado global de idéias, modelos institucionais que pudessem ser antropofagizados, substituindo as idéias fora do lugar implantadas pelo bacharelismo utópico da República Velha. Era o momento de explicar o Brasil, encontrar o desenho institucional mais adequado à realidade nacional, construir uma opinião pública e descobrir as soluções para converter o atraso em modernização. Assim, nos principais palcos do debate jurídico dos dois países e, em especial, na Suprema Corte norte-americana e na doutrina jurídica brasileira, percebia-se essa tentativa de revisão do método jurídico, como uma forma de se adequar o direito a um novo quadro de relações do capitalismo industrial. Desse modo, não só se via a necessidade de implantação de um aparato jurídico apto a tratar a questão social (como a regulação das relações do trabalho), como também se observava a necessidade de se reconstruir a forma como se aplicava o direito. O modelo formalista e conceitualista que havia se consolidado sob uma perspectiva privatista e liberal durante o século XIX, mostrava-se ineficiente para atender as novas demandas da sociedade. Esse aspecto de integração entre a questão social e o antiformalismo é essencial para compreender o paralelo entre o pensamento jurídico norte-americano e brasileiro durante o período entre guerras, uma vez que é por meio desse eixo comum que se estabeleceram os principais canais de leitura antropofágica do pensamento jurídico norte-americano pelo pensamento jurídico brasileiro. / The objective of this Master\'s Degree dissertation is to analyze the \"anthropophagical\" (I will use, in this dissertation, the metaphor of the word Anthropophagy made by the Brazilian Modernist Movement. Like the cannibal Indians used to devour their enemies, with the belief that, as such, they would assimilate their qualities, the Modernist artists used to propose a symbolic devouring of the foreign culture, taking advantage of their artistic innovations without losing the Brazilian cultural identity) assimilation of the North-American legal debate, arising from the social issue during the Age of Roosevelt, by the Brazilian legal thought of the Age of Vargas. Therefore, one will study the way how the North-American authors of the Sociological Jurisprudence and of the Legal Realism have been used by the Brazilian legal doctrine of the interwar period, in the formation of an anti-liberal and anti-conceptualist legal thought. In the core crisis of the worldwide capitalism, Universities (Roscoe Pound, 1870-1964, and Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, 1893-1962), Supreme Court (Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 1870-1938, and Louis Dembitz Brandeis, 1856-1941) and bureaucratic body of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) government (1933-1945) (James MacCauley Landis, 1899-1964) produced alternatives to the legal mechanicism and to the liberal model. At the periphery of the world capitalism, the bureaucratic body of Vargas (Oliveira Vianna, Francisco Campos and Francisco Sá Filho) and the legal magazines and debates (João Mangabeira e Alípio Silveira) questioned the liberalism of the Old Republic (1889-1930) and searched, in the global market of ideas, for institutional models that could be anthropophagized, replacing the out-of-place ideas implemented by the utopic bachelorism of the Old Republic. That was the time of explaining Brazil, finding the institutional drawing that is the most proper to the national reality, building a public opinion and discovering the solutions to convert the delay into modernization. Thus, in the main background legal debate of the two countries legal debate, and especially in the United States Supreme Court and in the Brazilian legal doctrine could be perceive such attempt of review of the legal method, as a way of fitting the law to a new picture of relations of the industrial capitalism. Therefore, it would be seen not only the need of implementation of a legal apparatus proper to treat the social issue (such as the regulation of the work relations), as well as one would observe the need of rebuilding the way how the law was applied. The formalist and conceptualist model that would be consolidated under a privativistic and liberal perspective during the 19th Century showed to be ineffective to deal with the new demands of the society. This aspect of integration between the social issue and the anti-formalism is essential to understand the parallel between the North-American and Brazilian legal thought during the interwar period, since the main channels of anthropophagic reading of the North-American legal thought by the Brazilian one have been established by means of this common axis.

O objetivo desta dissertação de mestrado é analisar a assimilação antropofágica (Utilizarei, nesta dissertação a metáfora da expressão Antropofagia realizada pelo Movimento Modernista brasileiro. Assim como os índios canibais devoravam seus inimigos, acreditando que assim assimilavam as suas qualidades, os artistas Modernistas propunham uma devoração simbólica da cultura estrangeira, aproveitando suas inovações artísticas sem perder a identidade cultural brasileira.) do debate jurídico norte-americano produzido em torno da questão social durante a Era Roosevelt por parte do pensamento jurídico brasileiro da Era Vargas. Desse modo, estudar-se-á a forma como os autores norte-americanos da Sociological Jurisprudence e do Realismo Jurídico foram utilizados pela doutrina jurídica brasileira do período entre guerras na formação de um pensamento jurídico antiliberal e anticonceitualista. No centro da crise do capitalismo mundial, as universidades (Roscoe Pound, 1870-1964, e Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, 1893-1962), a Suprema Corte (Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 1870-1938, e Louis Dembitz Brandeis, 1856-1941) e o corpo burocrático do governo (1933-1945) Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) (James MacCauley Landis, 1899-1964) produziam alternativas ao mecanicismo judicial e ao modelo liberal. Na periferia do capitalismo mundial, o corpo burocrático de Vargas (Oliveira Vianna, Francisco Campos e Francisco Sá Filho) e as revistas e debates jurídicos (João Mangabeira e Alípio Silveira) questionavam o liberalismo da República Velha (1889-1930) e buscavam, no mercado global de idéias, modelos institucionais que pudessem ser antropofagizados, substituindo as idéias fora do lugar implantadas pelo bacharelismo utópico da República Velha. Era o momento de explicar o Brasil, encontrar o desenho institucional mais adequado à realidade nacional, construir uma opinião pública e descobrir as soluções para converter o atraso em modernização. Assim, nos principais palcos do debate jurídico dos dois países e, em especial, na Suprema Corte norte-americana e na doutrina jurídica brasileira, percebia-se essa tentativa de revisão do método jurídico, como uma forma de se adequar o direito a um novo quadro de relações do capitalismo industrial. Desse modo, não só se via a necessidade de implantação de um aparato jurídico apto a tratar a questão social (como a regulação das relações do trabalho), como também se observava a necessidade de se reconstruir a forma como se aplicava o direito. O modelo formalista e conceitualista que havia se consolidado sob uma perspectiva privatista e liberal durante o século XIX, mostrava-se ineficiente para atender as novas demandas da sociedade. Esse aspecto de integração entre a questão social e o antiformalismo é essencial para compreender o paralelo entre o pensamento jurídico norte-americano e brasileiro durante o período entre guerras, uma vez que é por meio desse eixo comum que se estabeleceram os principais canais de leitura antropofágica do pensamento jurídico norte-americano pelo pensamento jurídico brasileiro. / The objective of this Master\'s Degree dissertation is to analyze the \"anthropophagical\" (I will use, in this dissertation, the metaphor of the word Anthropophagy made by the Brazilian Modernist Movement. Like the cannibal Indians used to devour their enemies, with the belief that, as such, they would assimilate their qualities, the Modernist artists used to propose a symbolic devouring of the foreign culture, taking advantage of their artistic innovations without losing the Brazilian cultural identity) assimilation of the North-American legal debate, arising from the social issue during the Age of Roosevelt, by the Brazilian legal thought of the Age of Vargas. Therefore, one will study the way how the North-American authors of the Sociological Jurisprudence and of the Legal Realism have been used by the Brazilian legal doctrine of the interwar period, in the formation of an anti-liberal and anti-conceptualist legal thought. In the core crisis of the worldwide capitalism, Universities (Roscoe Pound, 1870-1964, and Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, 1893-1962), Supreme Court (Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 1870-1938, and Louis Dembitz Brandeis, 1856-1941) and bureaucratic body of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) government (1933-1945) (James MacCauley Landis, 1899-1964) produced alternatives to the legal mechanicism and to the liberal model. At the periphery of the world capitalism, the bureaucratic body of Vargas (Oliveira Vianna, Francisco Campos and Francisco Sá Filho) and the legal magazines and debates (João Mangabeira e Alípio Silveira) questioned the liberalism of the Old Republic (1889-1930) and searched, in the global market of ideas, for institutional models that could be anthropophagized, replacing the out-of-place ideas implemented by the utopic bachelorism of the Old Republic. That was the time of explaining Brazil, finding the institutional drawing that is the most proper to the national reality, building a public opinion and discovering the solutions to convert the delay into modernization. Thus, in the main background legal debate of the two countries legal debate, and especially in the United States Supreme Court and in the Brazilian legal doctrine could be perceive such attempt of review of the legal method, as a way of fitting the law to a new picture of relations of the industrial capitalism. Therefore, it would be seen not only the need of implementation of a legal apparatus proper to treat the social issue (such as the regulation of the work relations), as well as one would observe the need of rebuilding the way how the law was applied. The formalist and conceptualist model that would be consolidated under a privativistic and liberal perspective during the 19th Century showed to be ineffective to deal with the new demands of the society. This aspect of integration between the social issue and the anti-formalism is essential to understand the parallel between the North-American and Brazilian legal thought during the interwar period, since the main channels of anthropophagic reading of the North-American legal thought by the Brazilian one have been established by means of this common axis.

The theme of this thesis is "formalism in law" as a concept that permeates an essential part of modern legal thinking. This work shows that it is usually perceived as a critical concept, but without a clear and steady meaning. In recent times, however, the discussion involving this concept changed so that it now includes individuals positively acknowledging themselves as formalists. An overview of this debate (only marginally concerning the Czech environment yet, however) forms the bulk of the thesis. The second essential part of it is a separate rethinking of the place of formalism in law, in all its aspects - in interpretation and application of law, in the creation of law, even in legal education and legal scholarship. This thesis consists of three unequal parts, the first of which is further divided into three sections. The first part deals with the formalism as a topic of discussion in legal philosophy during the entire 20th century, and the intention is to present this debate to Czech readers. Its first section is devoted to a topic typically linked to criticism of formalism in law in Western legal scholarship, as it presents the American legal realism of the interwar period. It shows it as a strong and visible culmination of earlier critical efforts visible on both sides of the Atlantic...

L’« intérêt de l’enfant » est un concept fondamental en droit de la famille puisqu’il constitue le critère déterminant dans toute décision qui concerne l’enfant. Le Code civil du Québec énonce, au second alinéa de l’article 33, les facteurs qui doivent servir à le déterminer, soit « les besoins moraux, intellectuels, affectifs et physiques de l’enfant, son âge, sa santé, son caractère, son milieu familial et les autres aspects de sa situation ». Les auteurs qui s’y sont intéressés l’ont abordé sous différents angles. Certains se sont intéressés à ses origines et à son évolution. D’autres en ont proposé leur propre définition. En ce qui nous concerne, nous avons choisi d’explorer ledit concept en nous intéressant aux diverses interprétations qu’il reçoit de la part des tribunaux dans les décisions relatives à la garde des enfants dans un contexte post-rupture, et ce, à la lumière du genre et de l’âge du décideur. Le concept d’intérêt de l’enfant étant hautement indéterminé, son interprétation est laissée à l’appréciation du juge qui en précisera le contenu en référence à la loi et aux faits particuliers de chaque cas d’espèce. Or, dans les situations où, une fois considéré le contexte factuel et normatif, le juge se retrouve face à une situation « neutre », c’est-à-dire où la garde exclusive et la garde partagée sont tout aussi envisageables, peut-on prétendre que son l’inclinaison vers l’une ou l’autre de ces modalités de garde est influencée par des facteurs autres que le droit et les faits mis en preuve ? Telle est la question au cœur de notre étude. Reposant sur des théories reconnues et bien établies affirmant l’importance de tenir compte du contexte social et de l’expérience individuelle du décideur dans la démarche interprétative que le droit sous-tend, l’hypothèse que nous soumettons est qu’au-delà des faits mis en preuve et du droit, des éléments indissociables au processus d’interprétation, à savoir les valeurs, les idéologies et les traits caractéristiques dominants que sous-tendent le genre et la génération du décideur, influent sur la teneur des jugements qu’il prononce. Sans admettre que ces éléments suffisent, à eux seuls, pour expliquer le produit judiciaire, nous sommes d’avis qu’on ne peut qualifier d’improbable l’incidence qu’ils exercent sur celui-ci. Nous intéressant au processus cognitif qui préside à la réflexion des décideurs, notre thèse vise à cerner, à travers une analyse interdisciplinaire, les facteurs humains et les forces sociales qui structurent les expériences et qui sont susceptibles d’avoir un impact sur les décisions judiciaires. L’objectif de notre étude n’est pas d’établir un lien de causalité entre le genre et l’âge du juge et les décisions qu’il rend, mais plutôt de vérifier si des corrélations peuvent être établies entre ces paramètres. Désirant aller au-delà des perceptions traditionnelles véhiculées par la doctrine classique, nos travaux se veulent davantage une contribution au développement d’une conception non formaliste du droit plutôt qu’une démonstration que le profil identitaire des décideurs conditionne systématiquement et invariablement leurs décisions. Une étude de ce genre comporte certes des difficultés en ce qu’elle confronte le juriste à des concepts et des théories qui appartiennent à d’autres champs disciplinaires et qui, partant, ne lui sont pas familiers. La compréhension plus fine du processus interprétatif et des décisions qui en résultent en justifie cependant le bien-fondé. / The “best interest of the child” is a fundamental concept of family law as it is the decisive criterion in each decision concerning a child. The Civil Code of Québec enumerates, in art. 33 para. 2, the criteria that must be taken into consideration, which are “the moral, intellectual, emotional and physical needs of the child, [his] age, health, personality and family environment, and [the] other aspects of his situation”. Scholars have approached this concept from different angles. While some of them have expressed interest in its origin and evolution, others have articulated their own definition. In this thesis, I chose to explore the concept of the “best interest of the child” by examining the manner in which courts have interpreted this principle in cases related to child custody, and to what extent it is affected by the gender and the age of the decision-maker. Indeed, whenever a child is part of a conflict, regardless of whether it concerns custody or any other matter, his best interest constitutes the central element. Yet the concept of the child's best interest is highly indeterminate: its interpretation is left to the discretion of the judge, who will specify its content according to the law and facts of each case. But once the judge has considered the factual and normative contexts, he can sometimes face a « neutral » situation, for which he could consider sole and shared custody as options. Would it therefore be accurate to assume that the judge’s inclination toward one or the other option of custody is governed by elements other than the law and facts of the case? This is the main question of this study. Based on recognized and well established theories asserting the importance of considering the social context and individual experience of the decision maker in the interpretative process, the proposed hypothesis is that beyond the facts and the law, there are other elements that have a crucial influence on the process of interpretation (and on the content of the decision that a judge renders), most notably the identity profile of the judge (i.e., gender and age, including their underlying values and ideologies). Indeed, and although the values, ideologies, and dominant social characteristics are not sufficient in themselves to explain the judicial outcomes, I nevertheless consider that the impact that the former has on the latter cannot be denied. By examining the cognitive process that governs the reasoning of the decision maker, this thesis aims to identify, through interdisciplinary analysis, human factors and social forces that shape individual experiences and are likely to have an impact on judicial decisions. The objective of this research is not to establish a causal link between the profile of the judge and his/her decisions, but rather to determine whether a correlation can be established between these parameters. Wishing to go beyond traditional perceptions conveyed by the traditional doctrine, this thesis is a contribution to the development of a non-formalist conception of law, as a way of demonstrating the idea that the profile of the judge systematically and consistently frames his decisions. A study of this kind certainly faces difficulties, in that it confronts the lawyer with concepts and theories that belong to other disciplines, and which therefore may not be familiar. However, the deep understanding of the interpretive process and resulting decisions justify the importance of this kind of research.

Esta tese busca analisar a viabilidade do projeto de naturalização da teoria do direito defendido por Brian Leiter. No primeiro capítulo, apresenta-se o esforço da filosofia desde o fundacionismo de Descartes até Carnap para a solução da dúvida cética sobre o que é conhecimento e que conduziram ao que foi denominado fisicalismo, evidenciado nas obras de Kelsen e dos Realistas Escandinavos e Norte-Americanos. A virada linguística foi determinante para a reconstrução dos parâmetros cartesianos, sendo notável a influência de Wittgenstein e Quine. Com Quine, a proposta de naturalização da epistemologia ganhou corpo, tendo conduzido, entretanto, ao abandono do desafio cético e ao cientismo. O behaviorismo já apresentava sinais no Realismo Jurídico Norte-Americano e foi criticado por H.L.A. Hart. Hart se apropriou de elementos do naturalismo quineano e de Wittgenstein, estabelecendo uma nova objetividade para o direito. O projeto de Leiter, apresentado no segundo capítulo, nasce da discordância dessa crítica hartiana. Dois são seus objetivos: (i) resgatar o Realismo Norte-Americano, reconstruindo-o à luz do pragmatismo e do naturalismo quineano, ancorado no antifundacionismo e na substituição das teorias normativas por descrições causais-nomológicas das decisões judiciais para fins de previsibilidade do direito. Cabe ao dogma do positivismo estabelecer o critério de legalidade, excluindo a moral como parte do que é juridicamente objetivo; (ii) adotar uma postura cética externa, numa tentativa de minar o interpretativismo de Ronald Dworkin. É no terceiro capítulo discute a viabilidade do projeto de Leiter propriamente. É possível verificar que Leiter não consegue mostrar o naturalismo na teoria do direito sob sua melhor luz, uma vez que é incapaz de lidar com as questões normativas inerentes ao direito e, por conseguinte, de justificar as decisões judiciais sem recorrer a uma teoria substantiva, algo que Dworkin consegue realizar com maior proveito, especialmente no que tange ao tema da objetividade. Leiter aponta para um futuro em que a investigação empírica pode aumentar a confiança no direito, mas seu projeto teórico limitado à descrição causal-nomológica das decisões é inviável para os fins propostos por uma teoria do direito de sucesso. / This thesis aims to analyze the viability of the project of naturalization of jurisprudence championed by Brian Leiter. The first chapter presents the effort of philosophy from Descartes foundationalism to Carnap for the solution of skeptical doubt about what is knowledge and that led to what was called physicalism, evidenced in the works of Kelsen and Scandinavian and Americans Legal Realists. The linguistic turn was decisive for the reconstruction of Cartesian parameters, being remarkable the influence of Wittgenstein and Quine. With Quine, the naturalization of epistemology proposal gained momentum and led, however, to abandon the skeptical challenge and scientism. Behaviorism already showed signs in american legal realism and was criticized by H.L.A. Hart. Hart appropriated elements of Quinean naturalism and Wittgenstein, establishing a new objectivity to law. Leiters project, presented in the second chapter, was born of the disagreement with hartian criticism. Two are his goals: (i) redeem American Legal Realism, reconstructing it in the light of pragmatism and Quinean naturalism, supported by antifoundationalism and replacement of normative theories by causal-nomological descriptions of judicial decisions for predictability purposes. The dogma of positivism will establish the criteria of legality, excluding the moral as part of what is legally objective; (ii) adopt an external skeptical position in an attempt to undermine the interpretativismo of Ronald Dworkin. The third chapter discusses the feasibility of Leiters project properly. Leiter cannot show the naturalism in theory of law in its best light, since it is incapable of dealing with normative questions related to law and, therefore, to justify judicial decisions without resorting to a substantive theory, something that Dworkin can make more profit, especially with regard to the issue of objectivity. Leiters project points to a future in which empirical research can increase laws confidence, but its limitation to a theoretical project of causal-nomological description of decisions is not feasible for the purposes proposed by a successful theory of law.

Esta tese busca analisar a viabilidade do projeto de naturalização da teoria do direito defendido por Brian Leiter. No primeiro capítulo, apresenta-se o esforço da filosofia desde o fundacionismo de Descartes até Carnap para a solução da dúvida cética sobre o que é conhecimento e que conduziram ao que foi denominado fisicalismo, evidenciado nas obras de Kelsen e dos Realistas Escandinavos e Norte-Americanos. A virada linguística foi determinante para a reconstrução dos parâmetros cartesianos, sendo notável a influência de Wittgenstein e Quine. Com Quine, a proposta de naturalização da epistemologia ganhou corpo, tendo conduzido, entretanto, ao abandono do desafio cético e ao cientismo. O behaviorismo já apresentava sinais no Realismo Jurídico Norte-Americano e foi criticado por H.L.A. Hart. Hart se apropriou de elementos do naturalismo quineano e de Wittgenstein, estabelecendo uma nova objetividade para o direito. O projeto de Leiter, apresentado no segundo capítulo, nasce da discordância dessa crítica hartiana. Dois são seus objetivos: (i) resgatar o Realismo Norte-Americano, reconstruindo-o à luz do pragmatismo e do naturalismo quineano, ancorado no antifundacionismo e na substituição das teorias normativas por descrições causais-nomológicas das decisões judiciais para fins de previsibilidade do direito. Cabe ao dogma do positivismo estabelecer o critério de legalidade, excluindo a moral como parte do que é juridicamente objetivo; (ii) adotar uma postura cética externa, numa tentativa de minar o interpretativismo de Ronald Dworkin. É no terceiro capítulo discute a viabilidade do projeto de Leiter propriamente. É possível verificar que Leiter não consegue mostrar o naturalismo na teoria do direito sob sua melhor luz, uma vez que é incapaz de lidar com as questões normativas inerentes ao direito e, por conseguinte, de justificar as decisões judiciais sem recorrer a uma teoria substantiva, algo que Dworkin consegue realizar com maior proveito, especialmente no que tange ao tema da objetividade. Leiter aponta para um futuro em que a investigação empírica pode aumentar a confiança no direito, mas seu projeto teórico limitado à descrição causal-nomológica das decisões é inviável para os fins propostos por uma teoria do direito de sucesso. / This thesis aims to analyze the viability of the project of naturalization of jurisprudence championed by Brian Leiter. The first chapter presents the effort of philosophy from Descartes foundationalism to Carnap for the solution of skeptical doubt about what is knowledge and that led to what was called physicalism, evidenced in the works of Kelsen and Scandinavian and Americans Legal Realists. The linguistic turn was decisive for the reconstruction of Cartesian parameters, being remarkable the influence of Wittgenstein and Quine. With Quine, the naturalization of epistemology proposal gained momentum and led, however, to abandon the skeptical challenge and scientism. Behaviorism already showed signs in american legal realism and was criticized by H.L.A. Hart. Hart appropriated elements of Quinean naturalism and Wittgenstein, establishing a new objectivity to law. Leiters project, presented in the second chapter, was born of the disagreement with hartian criticism. Two are his goals: (i) redeem American Legal Realism, reconstructing it in the light of pragmatism and Quinean naturalism, supported by antifoundationalism and replacement of normative theories by causal-nomological descriptions of judicial decisions for predictability purposes. The dogma of positivism will establish the criteria of legality, excluding the moral as part of what is legally objective; (ii) adopt an external skeptical position in an attempt to undermine the interpretativismo of Ronald Dworkin. The third chapter discusses the feasibility of Leiters project properly. Leiter cannot show the naturalism in theory of law in its best light, since it is incapable of dealing with normative questions related to law and, therefore, to justify judicial decisions without resorting to a substantive theory, something that Dworkin can make more profit, especially with regard to the issue of objectivity. Leiters project points to a future in which empirical research can increase laws confidence, but its limitation to a theoretical project of causal-nomological description of decisions is not feasible for the purposes proposed by a successful theory of law.

Law and development mainstream conceptions of labour market policies, while still marked by long-dominant views of contract law as economically superior to any labour regulation, have recently incorporated certain specific labour (human) rights. Core labour rights are thus accepted by global policy-makers, on the basis of their radical distinction from non-core labour standards and their rationalization according to certain foundational principles. This thesis criticizes the prevailing dichotomies between core labour rights and non-core standards, on the one hand, and contract law and regulation, on the other, bringing to bear the post-legal realist idea of legal indeterminacy. It argues that the organizing legal concepts that justify these dichotomies contain gaps and ambiguities that often lead to contradictory and indeterminate outcomes. It thus suggests that the core/non-core labour standards and contract/regulation distinctions are unproductive and should be rejected if a better conception of labour governance is to come to fruition.

Law and development mainstream conceptions of labour market policies, while still marked by long-dominant views of contract law as economically superior to any labour regulation, have recently incorporated certain specific labour (human) rights. Core labour rights are thus accepted by global policy-makers, on the basis of their radical distinction from non-core labour standards and their rationalization according to certain foundational principles. This thesis criticizes the prevailing dichotomies between core labour rights and non-core standards, on the one hand, and contract law and regulation, on the other, bringing to bear the post-legal realist idea of legal indeterminacy. It argues that the organizing legal concepts that justify these dichotomies contain gaps and ambiguities that often lead to contradictory and indeterminate outcomes. It thus suggests that the core/non-core labour standards and contract/regulation distinctions are unproductive and should be rejected if a better conception of labour governance is to come to fruition.