Esta dissertação tem por escopo a questão das emoções - ?à ???? - na obra de Aristóteles, principalmente nos livros I e II da Retórica e da Ética Nicomaquéia. A definição aristotélica de como ????? \'emoção\' foi compreendida de diversas formas, porém sempre a partir dos seguintes elementos: como integrante da porção não-racional da alma, habituável à tutela da razão, como manifestação psicofísica, como causada por cognições. O problema é, portanto, reencontrar e reunir todos esses elementos na obra do Estagirita. / This thesis aims at the question of emotions - ?à ???? - in the works of Aristotle, mainly in the first and second books of Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics. The Aristotelian definition of ????? as \'emotion\' was understood in different ways, but always from the following elements: as part of the nonrational portion of the soul; as something that can grow accustomed to reason; as a psychophysic manifestation; as caused by cognitions. The problem is to find and gather all these elements from the works of Aristotle.

Esta tese investiga, em sua primeira parte, a invenção retórica apresentada no Do orador, de Marco Túlio Cícero, tendo como ponto de partida comentário do próprio autor, em Ad Familiares I, 9, 23, de que os libri De oratore afastam-se dos preceitos comuns e contemplam toda a doutrina oratória dos antigos, tanto a de Aristóteles como a de Isócrates. Para tal, compara-se a exposição de Antônio, protagonista do diálogo, em II, 99-216 aos tratamentos dados nas artes anteriores ao diálogo e na Retórica de Aristóteles. A segunda parte consiste na primeira tradução completa do Do orador em língua portuguesa. / The present thesis investigates, in its first part, rhetorical inventio as presented in Marcus Tullius Ciceros On the orator. Its starting point is Ciceros own comments in Ad Familiares I, 9, 23 that the libri De oratore shun the regular precepts and comprise the whole oratorical doctrine of the ancients, both the Aristotelian and the Isocratic ones. In order to achieve such goal, Antoniuss presentation (2.99-216) is compared to both the treatment given to the same issue in the artes, which predate the dialogue, and that of Aristotles Rhetoric. The second part presents De oratores first complete translation into Portuguese.

My thesis is an exposition and defence of Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics. The first part of my thesis is an exposition of Aristotle's cryptic and challenging view on mathematics and is based on remarks scattered all over the corpus aristotelicum. The thesis' central focus is on Aristotle's view on numbers rather than on geometrical figures. In particular, number is understood as a countable plurality and is always a number of something. I show that as a consequence the related concept of counting is based on units. In the second part of my thesis, I verify Aristotle's view on number by applying it to his account of time. Time presents itself as a perfect test case for this project because Aristotle defines time as a kind of number but also considers it as a continuum. Since numbers and continuous things are mutually exclusive this observation seems to lead to an apparent contradiction. I show why a contradiction does not arise when we understand Aristotle properly. In the third part, I argue that the ontological status of mathematical objects, dubbed as materially [hulekos, ÍlekÀc] by Aristotle, can only be defended as an alternative to Platonism if mathematical objects exist potentially enmattered in physical objects. In the fourth part, I compare Aristotle's and Plato's views on how we obtain knowledge of mathematical objects. The fifth part is an extension of my comparison between Aristotle's and Plato's epistemological views to their respective ontological views regarding mathematics. In the last part of my thesis I bring Frege's view on numbers into play and engage with Plato, Aristotle and Frege equally while exploring their ontological commitments to mathematical objects. Specifically, I argue that Frege should not be mistaken for a historical Platonist and that we find surprisingly many similarities between Frege and Aristotle. After having acknowledged commonalities between Aristotle and Frege, I turn to the most significant differences in their views. Finally, I defend Aristotle's abstractionism in mathematics against Frege's counting block argument. This whole project sheds more light on Aristotle's view on mathematical objects and explains why it remains an attractive view in the philosophy of mathematics.

Most people share a strong intuition that there is much to be learned from great literature and other forms of narrative art. This intuition is, however, philosophically contentious. Plato was the first to argue against the possibility of learning anything from narrative art, but he founded a tradition that persists to the present day. I will engage in this debate in order to examine the role narratives might be able to play in acquiring virtue on Aristotle's ethical account, as it is presented in Nicomachean Ethics. I will claim that narratives have so long seemed a problematic source of learning because philosophers have traditionally approached the issue in the wrong way. They have typically tried to show how we might acquire propositional knowledge through our engagement with art, but this approach has failed because of insoluble problems involved in satisfying the justification criterion. Fictions may be rescued from their problematic status by realising that what we truly get from them is, instead, a type of knowledge-how. I will argue that Aristotelian virtue is itself a kind of knowledge-how and so the type of learning that takes place in engaging with narratives has a role to play in its acquisition and exercise. Virtue depends on types of reasoning that are themselves kinds of knowledge-how and which are employed and improved in engaging with narrative art. These types of reasoning will be described as conceptual, emotional and imaginative understanding. I will show how each is important in relation to virtue and how each is a kind of knowledge-how that may be improved through exposure to narrative art.

Submitted by Fabio Sobreira Campos da Costa (fabio.sobreira@ufpe.br) on 2016-04-18T12:16:05Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) TeseConcluídaFernandoJoaquimCORRETA.pdf: 1941112 bytes, checksum: 962c307a79bfc4d2ed093af803267d3c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-18T12:16:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) TeseConcluídaFernandoJoaquimCORRETA.pdf: 1941112 bytes, checksum: 962c307a79bfc4d2ed093af803267d3c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-02-29 / Parte-se da hipótese de que Cícero continua e desenvolve a retórica de Aristóteles a partir de um ponto em comum, ainda que dirigido à realidade romana: a politização da ética e da filosofia. O orador tem um papel político na defesa do Estado e da ordem social e deve participar ativamente do controle do sistema jurídico, da proteção e da reprodução das relações sociais e respectivos valores e instituições. Ao fazer isso, oferece contribuições específicas que vão caracterizar a retórica jurídica em Roma e marcar sua originalidade. Defendem-se então três teses específicas. Pela primeira, Cícero coloca no mesmo plano a retórica, a filosofia e o direito, pois une o “como dizer” a “o que dizer”. Liga-se a Aristóteles ao tentar aproximar a retórica da filosofia, da ética e da política, embora o Estagirita, ao atacar os sofistas, coloque a política e a filosofia acima da retórica e assim tente separar a boa da má retórica. Cícero atenta mais para a eficiência do discurso e defende que a retórica seja informada por todos os saberes. Na segunda tese, aponta-se aqui que Cícero realça o discurso judicial. Ainda que ambos os filósofos problematizem os três gêneros retóricos (deliberativo, judicial e epidíctico), Aristóteles os coloca em um mesmo nível, com privilégio para o deliberativo. Cícero preocupa-se com o consenso em torno da lei, da tradição, da ordem e do Estado e realça o discurso forense. O orador, quando funda a sua argumentação na equidade, permite a compreensão do que seja reto, verdadeiro, justo e útil para a sociedade. Na última tese, Cícero centraliza o ethos nos atributos pessoais do orador. Do mesmo modo que Aristóteles, valoriza o ethos como técnica de persuasão, mas não foca nele a argumentação, pois os atributos do orador estão previamente concentrados nos valores sociais que encarna, o que reforça o discurso ideológico do orador. / Continuing with Cicero’s hypothesis and developing Aristotelian rhetoric from a common point, still directed to the Roman reality: the politicalization of ethics and philosophy. The Orator has a political role in the defense of the State, and social order, and should actively participate in control of the judicial system, in the protection and reproduction of social relations, together with respective values and institutions. In doing this, he offers specific contributions that go on to characterize the juridical rhetoric in Rome, marking its origins. Three specific theses are proposed. Regarding the first, Cicero places rhetoric, philosophy and law on the same level, since they link “what to say” with “how to say it”. The reasoning is associated to Aristotle’s attempt to approximate rhetoric with philosophy, ethics, and politics. The Estagirita, in attacking the sophists, places politics and philosophy above rhetoric, and thus tries to separate good rhetoric from bad. Cicero looks towards the efficiency of discourse, and defends that rhetoric be backed by all the fields of knowledge. The second thesis points out that Cicero emphasizes judicial discourse. Though their philosophies consider the three genders of rhetoric, (deliberative, judicial and epidictic); Aristotle places them all on the same level, with privilege given to the deliberative. Cicero is concerned more with consensus surrounding laws, tradition, order, and the State, emphasizing forensic discourse. The Orator, when basing his reasoning on fairness, enhances the understanding of what is right, true, just, and useful for society. In the last thesis, Cicero centralizes ethos as a personal attribute of the Orator. In the same manner that Aristotle’s values ethos as a technique for persuasion, without focusing his reasoning on it, since the attributes of the Orator are primarily concentrated on social values, reinforcing the ideological aspects of the discourse.

In my thesis I analyse the issue of democracy in antiquity. Research includes practice and theory. At the beginning I will focus on the analysis of the real functioning of democracy in the Athenian polis (how the idea of democracy arose, what were the political institutions, who had or did not have a share in the controlling of the polis etc.). Emphasis is placed on the history of Athens in the 6th to 4th centuries BC. The core of this chapter is the time of Pericles when Athenian democracy reached its peak. The second part of the thesis describes how democracy was viewed by leading ancient thinkers - Plato and his disciple Aristotle. One of the aims of this thesis is to understand their criticism of the democratic establishment and what alternatives governments offer as better. The third part of the thesis is a comparison between political reality in ancient Athens and political theory in the works of Plato and Aristotle.

This paper attempts to mark out new ground in the connections between the philosophical writings of Martin Heidegger and Aristotle by posing an interesting question that has never been addressed. Both writers devote much of their early thoughts to questions concerning human beings' practical ways of understanding. However, in their later thoughts Heidegger and Aristotle suddenly seem to completely change the subject to ideal or transcendental ways of understanding. At first glance these ideal modes of human apprehension seem to have nothing to do with each other. Yet, Heidegger and Aristotle seem to have similar motives for turning away from the practical realm and towards a transcendental realm, and they seem to have similar outcomes. My investigation of their respective motives and outcomes has led me to believe that although there are some similarities that are thought provoking, they are not strong enough to conclude that Heidegger's later writings are connected to his recovery of Aristotelian ideas. Given that the core of Heidegger's early questions of Being can be interpreted as a retrieval of Aristotle, to be able to demarcate the point at which Heidegger ceases his attempts at this recovery may allow us to examine the differences in Heidegger's later thought concerning Being.

<p>My dissertation analyzes the overlooked character types of <i>akrasia </i>(un-self-control) and <i>enkrateia </i>(self-control) in Aristotle’s ethics. In Chapter 1, I argue for the thesis that <i>akrasia </i>and <i>enkrateia </i>are character types, or settled psychological dispositions, definable in terms of unique un-self-controlled and self-controlled relations to choice-making. In Chapters 2 and 3, I argue for the thesis that agents do not express these character types only in temperance’s practical domain; rather, agents can express <i>akrasia</i> and <i>enkrateia</i> in any practical domain where one’s reason can conflict with one’s desire, so the character types have wide ranges of expression. More specifically, in Chapter 2, I develop a distinction between strict forms of the character types, which agents express in temperance’s practical domain, and loose forms of the character types, which agents express in other practical domains (e.g., in courage’s practical domain). I also argue that the strict and loose forms of each of the character types are united according to the ontological and terminological relation of metaphor, or inclusive resemblance. In Chapter 3, I draw two lines of psychological justification for the view that <i>akrasia </i>and <i>enkrateia </i>are wide-ranging character types and respond to some scholarly objections. In Chapter 4, I build an account of ethical practical syllogisms and differentiate them from non-ethical practical syllogisms; I argue that an agent expresses her character type through each feature of an ethical practical syllogism (i.e., not only through the enacted choice that concludes an ethical practical syllogism, but also through the propositions she exercises in it). Finally, in Chapter 5, I construct and analyze loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in a variety of practical domains to show that <i>akrasia </i>and <i>enkrateia </i>are character types with wide ranges of expression.<b></b></p>

I inquire into the ethical significance of emotions in Aristotle’s thinking. Commentators who have thus far argued for the importance of emotions in Aristotle’s philosophy claim that they can be useful for ethical judgment or support premises of ethical reasoning. I claim that (1) emotions are indispensable for good ethical discernment or, what we may call, moral perception and they usefully constrain the possibilities of action and deliberation. They are indispensable because they register ethically significant information in a unique way; they do so in virtue of their intensity, duration, and the felt quality of pain or pleasure associated with them. (2) Emotions are also necessary for good ethical judgment (gnōmē) in at least some cases in legal (and political contexts) especially where the law fails to provide sufficient guidance or when the relevant wrong is not yet conceptualised. In these cases, emotions, I argue, can be elicited in a non-coercive way that respects and even enlists the agency of the listener.

Diploma thesis deals the Aristotle's conception of ethics. The aim of this thesis is to introduce and to do understandable a overview of ethics. First of all, the thesis concentrates general characteristic time, Aristotele's life and status of ethics in the Aristotle's philosophy. Secondly, the thesis mentions general Aristotle's ethics. It deals with the subjekt, goals, good and hapiness, virtue and moral conduct. Third, the thesis deals intelectuall virtue including knowledge, art, wisdom and understanding. Fourth, the thesis concentrates moral virtuos and courage, moderation, generosity, other generosity, healthy ambition, calmness and truthfulness. Fifthly, the thesis mentions the conception of justice and its division into general and partiak justice. Last, thesis is devoted friendship and its companions. Keywords: Aristotle, ethics, virtue, justice, friendship