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<p>In <em>Physics</em> IV, Aristotle poses the question whether time depends on mind for its existence (223a25-27). This thesis begins by arguing that Aristotle’s account of time is, in fact, one in which time is mind-dependent. The remainder of the thesis demonstrates how this interpretation of time informs and explains Aristotle’s accounts of perception, recollection, and habituation. The thesis is divided into four chapters, each dealing in detail with the topics of time, perception, recollection, and habituation. In Chapter One I argue that time is a phenomenon which requires minds in order to be actualized. In the second chapter I argue that time, as mind-dependent, is an incidental object of perception perceived by the common sense, and that this is consistent with Aristotle’s description of perception in <em>De Anima</em>. Chapter Three provides arguments that recollection, as understood in <em>De Memoria</em>, is a capacity which allows for the association between present perceptions and memory-images. In the final chapter, I argue that the process of habituation in the <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em> is best understood with reference to the associative power of recollection. In this way, I hope to demonstrate how Aristotle’s analysis of time in the <em>Physics</em> has significant implications for our understanding of his views on perception, recollection, and habituation.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

<p>This work critically examines Aristotle’s statements regarding truth in relation to what does not exist, and defends a cohesive interpretation of Aristotle on truth and non-existence against contemporary commentators. Aristotle speaks of what does not exist in various contexts within his works, and questions about things that don’t exist arise at every level of the structure of reality Aristotle lays down in Chapter One of <em>De Interpretatione</em>. Aristotle refers to things, affections of the soul, and statements as truth-bearing. However, the ways in which each is said to be true or false suggests that Aristotle applied the notion of “truth” more strictly at some times than at others. In the following chapters I examine what Aristotle conceives of as non-existent; how it is possible to speak about these things; the apparent contradiction between the <em>Categories</em> and <em>De Interpretatione</em> regarding what is true to say of what does not exist; how fictional entities are conceived and to what exactly it is that words that signify the fictional refer; Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth with regard to what does not exist; the definition of truth as applied to non-standard truth-bearers (objects, perceptions and <em>phantasia</em>); and how Aristotle avoids the contemporary problem of “empty” terms. This work, as a whole, finds a great amount of complexity in Aristotle’s concept of truth, evidenced by his accounting for what does not exist. What does not exist does not in fact cause much trouble for Aristotle, either with respect to how they are objects of thought, or with respect to the utterances that can be made about them, or with respect to the truth of those utterances.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

The principal claim defended in this thesis is that for Aristotle arousing the emotions of others can amount to giving them proper grounds for conviction, and hence a skill in doing so is properly part of an expertise in rhetoric. We set out Aristotle’s view of rhetoric as exercised solely in the provision of proper grounds for conviction (pisteis) and show how he defends this controversial view by appeal to a more widely shared and plausible view of rhetoric’s role in the proper functioning of the state. We then explore in more detail what normative standards must be met for something to qualify as “proper grounds for conviction”, applying this to all three of Aristotle’s kinds of “technical proofs” (entechnoi pisteis). In the case of emotion, meeting these standards is a matter of arousing emotions that constitute the reasonable acceptance of premises in arguments that count in favour of the speaker’s conclusion. We then seek to show that Aristotle’s view of the emotions is compatible with this role. This involves opposing the view that in Rhetoric I.1 Aristotle rejects any role for emotion-arousal in rhetoric (a view that famously generates a contradiction with the rest of the treatise). It also requires rejecting the view of Rhetoric II.2-11 on which, for Aristotle, the distinctive outlook involved in emotions is merely how things “appear” to the subject.

[Typescript] Includes bibliography.

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Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis seeks to evaluate MacIntyre's claim that recourse to the tradition of virtue ethics in the Aristotelian-Thomist sense is the only viable intellectual option, given the alleged demise of the so-called"Enlightenment Project". It raises a twofold question: First, is it coherent to argue that MacIntyre's reappropriation of an ancient moral tradition is possible? Does such a claim duly reckon with the conditions under which meaningful forms are understood? The first claim being defended is that MacIntyre does not sufficiently respect Gadamer's conditions under which understanding occurs. It is also argued that MacIntyre does not provide coherent conditions for rationally choosing between traditions in order to possibly vindicate them. As such, MacIntyre's re-appropriating of the Aristotelian tradition in moral theory is not coherent and convincing. Secondly, does the dichotomy of "Nietzsche versus Aristotle" represent the only viable alternatives for us in our efforts to continue the enterprise of moral theorising? The second claim being defended is that the dichotomy is not a coherent way of moral theorising. The third claim being defended is that Gadamer represents a viable alternative to the ultimatum in that his thought provides the possibility of a more coherent way of moral theorising than MacIntyre's. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis stel ten doel die evaluasie van MacIntyre se standpunt dat die deugde-etiek van die Aristoteliaanse-Thomistiestradisie die enigste blywende opsie is, aangesiendie sogenaamde"Verligtingsprojek" misluk het. Die tesis stel twee kernvrae aan die orde: Eerstens, is dit sinvol om te argumenteer dat MacIntyre se appropriasie van bogenoemde etiese tradisie moontlik is? Verleen so n aanspraak genoegsame waarde aan die kondisies waaronder sindraers verstaan word? Die eerste standpunt wat verdedig word, is dat MacIntyre nie genoeg ag slaan op Gadamer se opvatting oor die kondisies vir verstaan nie. Daar word verder ook geargumenteer dat MacIntyre nie koherente kondisies aandui vir 'n keuse tussen tradisies nie en as sodanig ondermyn dit die koherensie van sy werk. MacIntyre se appropriasie van die Aristoteliaanse tradisie in morele teorie is dus nie koherent of oortuigend nie. Tweedens, is die dichotomie van "Nietzsche of Aristoteles" die enigste moontlike alternatief vir die voortgaande studie van morele teorie? Die tweede aanspraak wat verdedig word, is dat die dichotomie nie 'n koherente wyse van morele argumentasie is nie. Die derde aanspraak wat verdedig word is dat Gadamer 'n werkbare alternatief verskaf vir die dichotomie. Sy denke voorsien 'n meer koherente wyse om met morele teorie om te gaan as die een wat MacIntyre verskaf.