In this work I reconstruct the physical and mental descriptions of perception in Aristotle. I propose to consider the thesis that αἴσθησις is a μεσότης (DA II 11) as a description of the physiological aspect of perception, meaning that perceiving is a physical act by which the sensory apparatus homeostatically counterbalances, and thence measures, the incoming affection produced by external perceptible objects. The proposal is based on a revision of the semantics of the word mesotês in Plato, Aristotle and later Greek mathematicians (mostly Nicomachus of Gerasa). I show how this interpretation fits the text, and how it solves problems that afflict the rival interpretations. I further develop a ‘non-dephysiologizing’ spiritualist reading of the additional description of perception as reception of forms without the matter (DA II 12). I show that Aristotle uses the expression ‘forms without matter’ to describe actually abstracted items in one’s mind rather than the way in which the form are received. In opposition to forms-in-matter, such items are causally powerless and metaphysically sterile: an F-without-matter somewhat determines the subject it is in (one’s mind content F) without qualifying or identifying it as an F-subject. Thus, we have a second ‘mental’ description of perception. Further parts of the thesis are devoted to settle interpretive questions raised by controversial statements about perception found in De Anima II 5 and III 2, and to discuss the question of how the mental and physiological descriptions of perception Aristotle offers are related. My conclusion is that Aristotle’s views combines a form of quasi-dualist vitalism about powers (the faculty of perception, and more generally the soul, are not just irreducible to matter, but also primitive and non-supervenient) which is nonetheless compatible with hylomorphism, and a form of epiphenomenalism (and thence the ‘bottom-up’ determination typical of modern supervenience) with regard to perceptual events (i.e., the activity of perceiving).

In Poetics, Aristotle defines lexis as being the “language” of tragedy, and this language is one of the elements of tragedy that creates the mimetic representation. As Aristotle literally describes of the words of tragic composition as “doing” something, I consider lexis as an equivalent to J.L. Austin’s locutionary function of language, and the creation of the mimetic representation as the illocutionary. Aristotle’s conception of tragic composition requires a rigid understanding of the tragic form and its proper deployment as he leaves no room for perlocution, and so I also employ Jan Mukařovský’s theory of intentionality/unintentionality in art to explain how a play such as Euripides’s Electra may be understood as a product of the literary culture in which it arose. I then review historical trends of translating Greek tragedy into English to establish how modern translation is moving further away from reverence to the lexis of tragedy. Finally I address the various sections of Electra, a play with an almost non-existent performance record in English, to establish how I may respect the original lexis in my own translation, thereby imparting a (hopefully) similar effect on a modern audience.

This thesis has as its main aim to present Peirce's project as an organic system that is able to provide a reasonable account of our complex experience of freedom. For this reason, in the first chapter I will maintain that there are three conditions of possibility for human freedom that can be established according to an attentive reading of Aristotle's works, namely, the contingency of the world, the existence of a being who can take advantage of the world's contingency, and the capacity of a person to decide his or her own idea of Happiness or final good in a human community. These conditions can be tracked, consolidated, and improved through Peirce's philosophy. It can be tracked, first of all, in their common perspective regarding the world's element of contingency and openness to growth. Second, both philosophers think that human beings have the power to decide and actively participate in the world through experience and habit. Finally, both grant an important role to community in their philosophies in order to give sense to persons' actions. After establishing this background, I will focus primarily on the detailed presentation of the first condition of possibility for freedom, that is, in Peirce's idea of God as a metaphysical condition for freedom. In the second chapter, I will explore the historical development of Peirce's cosmology, in order to show that Peirce's idea of God is not the product of a stubborn religious prejudice but a genuine achievement of his philosophy that harmonizes with his general project of an evolutionary philosophy open to critique and working hand in hand with science. Finally, in the third chapter, I will try to clarify further Peirce's idea of God in dealing with some misconceptions generated by standard religious notions of God and by the philosophical conception of the Absolute. Thus, I hope to present Peirce's idea of God as a middle ground between these two approaches. I will argue that, on the one hand, he wanted to propose an idea of God that is open to scientific critique, as is the conception of the philosophical Absolute. On the other hand, he defended an idea of God that has bearing upon our conduct of life and, therefore, is sentimental and approachable as is the idea of God proposed at least by Christian religion. As a result, Peirce's God works as a condition of possibility for freedom insofar as he is the living idea of a developmental telos open to growth. That is, Peirce provided an idea of a cosmos that shares with us the general features of being reasonable and free.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University. / The problem of this dissertation is to determine how Aristotle, Kant, and Bowne defined a category. This question is one which has neither been answered previously nor approached through an exhaustive analysis of relevant texts. The dissertation examines first Aristotle's Categories. This early document suggests that simple verbal expressions signifying substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and affection are the categories. The doctrine implied may mean a classification of namable entities. It is argued, however, that at this stage "category" for Aristotle meant the ultimate type of predicate which is predicable of namable entities.[TRUNCATED]

abstract: Recently, philosophers have charged that Aristotelian-based virtue theories are empirically inadequate because the conception of character in which they are grounded is largely unfounded by findings in psychology. These philosophers argue in favor of situationism, the theory from social psychology that situational rather than dispositional differences among individuals are in large part responsible for human behavior. Situationists dispute the existence of traits that remain consistent across time and diverse situations and argue that features of situations can better explain and predict human behavior. After analyzing the psychological literature and historical cases put forth as evidence for situationism as well as the basic premises grounding arguments against situationism, I make some conclusions about the best responses to situationism. I agree with situationists that Aristotelian-based virtue and character are not quite empirically adequate but disagree that human behavior owes more to situational rather than dispositional determinants. Basing my theory on literature from social psychology, I argue instead that a concept of character grounded in social-cognitive theory is more psychologically realistic and can explain and predict human behavior and ground a character-based virtue theory. A social-cognitive conception of character would highlight the dynamic role between situations and individual psychological factors like beliefs, values, desires and the way that an individual perceives a situation. I sketch out a non-ideal theory of virtue based in a social-cognitive conception of character that is partially dependent on social networks for its maintenance and is fragmented, or contextualized to particular types of psychological situations. However, fragmented and socially dependent virtue is not an optimal type of virtue because it is vulnerable to situational features that place strong psychological pressures on agents to behave in various ways, including ways they would not have normally endorsed. I agree with Aristotelian virtue ethicists that argue that a type of practical wisdom can help to counter the often unwanted and dangerous influence of these strong situations but also maintain that some measure of moral luck is inevitably involved, even in the development of practical wisdom. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Philosophy 2012

This dissertation inaugurates a study on the connections between the philosophies of Aristotle and Charles S. Peirce. It discusses, first, Peirce's reading of Aristotle's works and philosophy, with an emphasis on three studies by Peirce of a translation of Aristotle's Categories, a study on Aristotle's notion of priority, and a study on the current situation of the Corpus Aristotelicum. Secondly, this dissertation deals with logic, particularly induction, abduction, and analogy. In the case of induction, Peirce claimed that Aristotle stated perfectly the form of induction in Prior Analytics II 23. However, Aristotle's concept of induction is not univocal, but, I argue, it stands for six different notions. Peirce seemed to neglect such diversity in Aristotle's concept of induction, even though his own concept of induction is also diverse. Aristotle's six concepts of induction and Peirce's kinds of induction do not match each other, and therefore, the chapter on induction closes with a comparison between these notions in order to determine to what extent they resemble or differ from each other. With regard to abduction, Peirce claimed that it originated in Prior Analytics II, 25. I argue that Peirce was mistaken in focusing on this passage. This does not mean that Aristotle did not have an idea of abduction. As I will show, there are other passages in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, neglected by Peirce, in which it is possible to find such an analysis of this kind of reasoning. In the case of analogy, both philosophers have a similar and clear account of it as a compound or composite. However, whereas Aristotle claimed it to be composed of induction and deduction, Peirce included abduction too. Thirdly, I explore and compare their theories of cognition. Peirce did not feel indebted to Aristotle and, on the contrary, criticized the positions of the Greek philosopher. However, I will argue that their theories of cognition agree in their general features, namely, empiricism, realism, and synechism. Peirce's critiques of Aristotle are in part due to a misinterpretation of Aristotle's philosophy that took Aristotle to be, in modern terms, a dualist and a rationalist. In sum, I aim to show through these three features, the ways in which Peirce's philosophy is ‒and is not‒ aligned with that of Aristotle.

x, 216 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / This dissertation engages three facets of Greek philosophy: (1) the phenomenon of tyche (chance, fortune, happening, or luck) in Aristotle's Physics, Nicomachean Ethics , and Poetics ; (2) how tyche informs Socrates' own philosophical practice in the Platonic dialogues; and (3) how engaging tyche in these Greek texts challenges established interpretations of Greek thought in contemporary scholarship and discussion. I argue that the complex status of tych e in Aristotle's texts, when combined with its appearance in the Platonic dialogues and the framework of Greek myth and poetry ( poiesis ), underscores the seriousness with which the Greeks consider the role of chance in human life. I claim that Aristotle's and Plato's texts offer important counterpoints to subsequent Western philosophers who deny the importance and existence of chance in human affairs and in the universe, dichotomously privileging reason over fortune (Boethius), necessity over chance (Spinoza), certainty over contingency (Descartes), and character over luck (Kant). My investigation of tyche unfolds in relation to a host of important Greek words and ideas that are engaged and transformed in Western philosophical discourse: anank e (necessity), aitia (cause, or explanation), automaton, logos (speech), poietic possibility, and philosophy. First, a close reading of tyche in the Physics shows that its emergence in Book II challenges the "four causes" as they are traditionally understood to be the foundation of the cosmos for Aristotle. Attentiveness to the language of strangeness (that which is atopos ) and wonderment ( t o thauma ) that couches Aristotle's consideration of tyche unveils a dialogical character in Aristotle's text. I also show how tyche hinges together the Physics and the Nicomachean Ethics . Second, I argue that tyche illuminates the possibility of human good through an inquiry into human nature in the Ethics , exploring the tension that tych e is, paradoxically, a necessity as it is grounded in nature and yet relates to human beings in "being good" ( EN 1179a20), ultimately returning to a deeper understanding of the relation between physis and tyche . Third, I argue that the Poetics also sustains an engagement with tyche insofar as poi esis speaks to human possibility, turning to Heidegger and Kristeva to see how this is so. / Adviser: Peter Warnek

The paper is concerned with the question, if Aristotle among the other scientifical areas dealt also with the economics. The first part is mainly an introduction to the historical context. The second part explaines the economical passages from Nicomachean Ethics, and the third part analyses several key terms from the economical passages in Politics (oikos, oikonomike, chrematistike). In the end is the paper focused on the contrast between Aristotle's notion of oikonomike and the modern economics.

Submitted by Bruna Rodrigues (bruna92rodrigues@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-10-02T12:33:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TeseLMF.pdf: 1232465 bytes, checksum: 9e94adffc43d6d0569317bc09f90b140 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ronildo Prado (bco.producao.intelectual@gmail.com) on 2018-01-29T18:25:39Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TeseLMF.pdf: 1232465 bytes, checksum: 9e94adffc43d6d0569317bc09f90b140 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ronildo Prado (bco.producao.intelectual@gmail.com) on 2018-01-29T18:25:49Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TeseLMF.pdf: 1232465 bytes, checksum: 9e94adffc43d6d0569317bc09f90b140 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-01-29T18:28:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TeseLMF.pdf: 1232465 bytes, checksum: 9e94adffc43d6d0569317bc09f90b140 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-30 / Não recebi financiamento / For G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), the historical deployments demonstrate as a whole a progression in the recognition of the Self of the Spirit and the knowledge of freedom, which enables the philosophy of history to verify the effectiveness of reason in the world and the progressive achievement of the absolute ultimate End purpose. As Hegel considers that the conception of purpose is the main determination that arrives at us from the Aristotelian philosophy, the central objective of this thesis is to understand the role of the Aristotelian philosophy of the history of Hegel. The singularity of the Hegelian teleological conception is characterized by resorting to Aristotelian philosophy as a necessary moment for Hegel's reaction to Kantian and post-Kantian idealism, providing greater clarity about Hegel's understanding of the teleological question in history and its relation to its conception of the history of philosophy according to its own conceptual heritage. The analytical starting point of this thesis is the Phenomenology of the Spirit, a work in which Hegel develops the introduction to his philosophical system and also presents a peculiar teleological perspective, which is systematically exposed later in the texts of the Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. These works of systematic character has a central importance for the understanding of the teleological question in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, since they are deployments of their own philosophical system. In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy there is a more detailed exposition of Aristotelian philosophy and the teleological question. However, the philosophical problems faced by Hegel are specific to his time, which implies conceptual peculiarities concerning teleology in the Hegelian system and, consequently, in the Philosophy of History. In addition, Hegel has a very specific conception of the interpretation of the history of philosophy, linked to the systematic notion of the development of the Spirit. In this sense, by accepting a conceptual heritage in relation to Aristotelian teleology, Hegel searches one more internal coherence for his own systematic conception of the history of philosophy, in other words, one conception where there is a progression of the Spirit from which Aristotle and the other philosophers were part of it, rather than a philosophical fidelity or a strict conceptual affiliation to Aristotle. / Para G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), os desdobramentos históricos demonstram em seu conjunto uma progressão no reconhecimento de Si do Espírito, do saber da liberdade, o que possibilita à filosofia da história constatar a efetividade da razão no mundo e a progressiva consecução do fim último absoluto. Como Hegel considera que a concepção de finalidade é a principal determinação que nos chega da filosofia aristotélica, o objetivo central desta tese é compreender o papel da filosofia aristotélica para a concepção de teleologia na filosofia da história de Hegel. A singularidade da concepção teleológica hegeliana caracteriza-se por recorrer à filosofia aristotélica como momento necessário à reação de Hegel em relação ao idealismo kantiano e pós-kantiano, propiciando maior clareza a respeito da compreensão hegeliana acerca da questão teleológica na história e sua relação com sua concepção da história da filosofia no que diz respeito à suas próprias heranças conceituais. O ponto de partida analítico desta tese é a Fenomenologia do Espírito, obra na qual Hegel desenvolve a introdução ao seu sistema filosófico e já apresenta uma perspectiva teleológica peculiar, que é sistematicamente exposta posteriormente nos textos da Ciência da Lógica e da Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas. Essas obras de caráter sistemático têm importância central para a compreensão da questão teleológica nas Lições sobre a Filosofia da História, já que essas são desdobramentos do seu próprio sistema filosófico. Nas Lições sobre a História da Filosofia há uma exposição mais detalhada da filosofia aristotélica e da questão teleológica. Contudo, os problemas filosóficos enfrentados por Hegel são específicos de seu tempo, o que implica tratar de peculiaridades conceituais concernentes à teleologia no sistema hegeliano e, consequentemente, na Filosofia da História. Além disso, Hegel tem uma concepção muito própria de interpretação da história da filosofia, vinculada à noção sistemática de desenvolvimento do Espírito. Nesse sentido, ao admitir uma herança conceitual em relação à teleologia aristotélica, Hegel busca mais uma coerência interna à própria concepção sistemática de história da filosofia, ou seja, a de que há uma progressão do Espírito da qual Aristóteles e os demais filósofos foram parte, do que propriamente uma fidelidade filosófica ou uma filiação conceitual estrita a Aristóteles.

Atualmente a Ética Nicomaqueia apresenta-se como uma obra fraturada. O tratamento do conceito de eudaimonia feito por Aristóteles não parece ser muito claro. Por um lado, ele privilegia explicitamente a atividade contemplativa como a eudaimonia perfeita e dessa forma dá ao conceito uma acepção dominante. Por outro lado, muito do tratamento teórico dispensado à atividade das virtudes éticas faz supor que a vida ideal deveria combinar contemplação e atividade prática em um todo coerente, e o resultado deveria ser uma eudaimonia inclusivista. A essa falta de coalizão somam-se ainda outros problemas. Por exemplo, qual é a correta interpretação de certos argumentos, notadamente o argumento de abertura do segundo capítulo do primeiro livro da Ética Nicomaqueia (EN I.2), sobre o qual pesa a acusação de ser falacioso, o argumento da finalidade e o argumento da autossuficiência (apresentados em EN I.7). Este trabalho tem como objetivo estabelecer uma interpretação coerente da eudaimonia. Apresento razões para considerar consistente o argumento de abertura de EN I.2, razões que o fazem coeso com os argumentos apresentados em EN I.7. A interpretação procura conciliar aspectos volitivos, prescritivos e lógicos do conceito de eudaimonia e dessa forma explicar a divisão entre as concepções inclusivista e dominante. Para tanto, é necessário ter em mente o escopo intensional da ética aristotélica e a distinção proposta por Aristóteles entre ação produtiva e ação prática. / Nowadays, Nicomachean Ethics presents itself as a fractured work in which Aristotles treatment of the concept of eudaimonia doesnt appear to be very clear. On one hand Aristotle explicitly endorses contemplation as perfect eudaimonia, thus giving this concept a dominant aspect. On the other hand much of the theoretical account dedicated to activity of practical virtues makes us believe that the ideal life should combine contemplation and practical activity in one coherent whole. The result should be an inclusivist eudaimonia. This lack of union also highlights other problems. For instance, which is the correct interpretation of some arguments - namely the opening argument of the second chapter of the first book of Nicomachean Ethics (EN I.2), against which there is a charge of being fallacious. Then there are the finality and the self-sufficiency arguments (both in EN I.7). The present work aims to establish a coherent interpretation of eudaimonia. I will present reasons to consider the opening argument of EN I.2 consistent, reasons that make it coherent with the arguments of EN I.7. This interpretation seeks to conciliate volitional, prescriptive and logical aspects of the concept of eudaimonia and thus explain the division between inclusivist and dominant views. To achieve this result, its necessary to bear in mind the intensional scope of Aristotelian Ethics and the distinction between productive and practical activity proposed by Aristotle.