This dissertation focuses on how a specific conceptual thread of the history of mathematics unfolded throughout the centuries from its original account in Ancient Greece to its demise in the Modern era due to new mathematical developments and, finally, to its revival in the work of Brentano. In particular, we shall discuss how the notion of continuity and the connected notion of continua and boundaries developed through the ages until Brentano's revival of the original Aristotelian account against the by then established mathematical orthodoxy. Thus, this monograph hopes to fill in a gap in the present state of Brentanian scholarship as well as to present a thorough account of this specific historical thread.

In this thesis I examine three models of justification for the epistemic authority of the principle of contradiction. Aristotle has deemed the principle "that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect" the most certain and most prior of all principles, both in the order of nature and in the order of knowledge, and as such it is indemonstrable. The principle of contradiction is involved in any act of rational discourse, and to deny it would be to reduce ourselves to a vegetative state, being incapable of uttering anything with meaning. The way we reach the principle of contradiction is by intuitive grasping (epagoge) from the experience of the particulars, by recognizing the universals in the particulars encountered, and it is different from simple induction, which, in Mill's view, is the process through which we construct a general statement on the basis of a limited sample of observed particulars. Hence, the principle of contradiction, being a mere generalization from experience, through induction, loses its certainty and necessity. Even though it has a high degree of confirmation from experience, it is in principle possible to come across a counter-example which would refute it. Mill's account opens the path to the modern view of the principle of contradiction. In Principia Mathematica, Russell and Whitehead contend that the principle of contradiction is still a tautology, always true, but it is derived from other propositions, set forth as axioms. Its formulation, "~ (p & ~p)" is quite different from Aristotle's, and this is why we are faced with the bizarre situation of being able to derive the law of contradiction in a formal system which could not have been built without the very principle of which the law is an expression of. This is perhaps because the principle of contradiction, as a principle, has a much larger range of application and is consequently more fundamental than what we call today the law of contradiction, with its formal function.

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This essay will research aspects of romantic love, as well as aspects of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The purpose of the essay is to discuss if romantic love can be part of virtue ethics and eudaimonia. The philosopher Raja Halwani presents two concepts of romantic love that are relevant to the discussion. The concepts are romantic love 1 and romantic love 2. The first one is a new love, where the partners only want to be with each other. The second type of love is closer to companionship where the partners are familiar with each other and have been together for a long time. To contrast this, I will use Martin Hägglund’s theory concerning romantic love. In Hägglund’s theory love is built upon the care we feel for our partners. However, it is the fear that the loved one can be taken away from us that constitutes this care. In the end, one of the two concepts Raja Halwani were determined to be virtuous and part of eudaimonia. Hägglund’s theory was partly virtuous due to the care he deems that we feel for our loved ones. / Denna uppsats kommer att undersöka aspekter av romantisk kärlek, samt aspekter av Aristoteles Nichomachean Ethics. Uppsatsen syfte är att diskutera om romantisk kärlek kan vara en del av dygdetiken och eudaimonia. Filosofen Raja Halwani presenterar två olika typer av romantisk kärlek som är relevanta för diskussionen. Dessa två typer är romantic love 1 och romantic love 2. Den första är en typ av ny kärlek där personerna endast vill vara med varandra. Den andra typen av kärlek är närmare engelskans companionship. Här är partnerna väldigt nära varandra och har varit tillsammans under en lång tid. För att kontrastera detta så kommer jag använda Martin Hägglunds teori som har att göra med romantisk kärlek. Hägglunds teori bygger kärlek på omsorgen vi känner för våra älskade. Dock är det rädslan att våra älskade kan tas ifrån oss som utgör denna omsorg. Till slut klargjordes det att en av Halwanis typer av kärlek var dygdig och del av eudaimonia. Hägglunds teori var till viss del dygdig på grund av omsorgen han fastställer att vi känner för våra älskade.

[pt] A atual pesquisa teve como impulso investigativo primeiro o papel da linguagem dentro a proposta filosófica aristotélica, tendo como premissa que a linguagem seria o meio pelo qual se expressariam os conhecimentos derivados da percepção. Como a percepção é sempre particular, a linguagem teria o papel crucial na construção de um entendimento generalizante do real e, portanto, tornaria possível o conhecimento sistemático. No entanto, tal premissa pressupõe que a percepção configuraria um meio de acesso à uma realidade exterior, ao real, por assim dizer. Assim, no decorrer da investigação, tornou-se necessário estabelecer qual é o entendimento aristotélico sobre a percepção, se é possível conhecer através dos processos perceptivos e se, para Aristóteles, é possível dizer que há o real a ser apreendido por meio da percepção. Nesse sentido, a presente dissertação dedica-se a investigar o processo de apreensão do conhecimento através do percurso: aísthesis, mneme e empeiría, com intuito de responder a essas questões. / [en] The current research s first exploratory impulse was to look into the role of language in the aristotelian philosophical approach, with the assumption that language would be the means by which we express knowledge acquired from perception. As perception is always of the particular, language would play a crucial role in the construction of a generalizing apprehension of the real and, therefore, would make systematic knowledge possible. However, such a premise assumes that perception would be configured as a means of access to an external reality, or the real, in other words. Thus, in the course of the investigation, it became necessary to establish what the aristotelian understanding of perception is, if it is possible to know through perceptual processes and if, according to Aristotle, it is possible to say that there is the real to be apprehended through perception. In this sense, the current dissertation is dedicated to investigating the process of knowledge apprehension through the path: aísthēsis, mneme and empeiría, in order to answer those questions.

I argue that Aristotle aids in understanding the tension between the political art and moral virtue through his examination of courage in The Nicomachean Ethics. The end of the political art is to habituate the city and citizens towards "the good." Aristotle examines five held opinions of non-courage, requiring that we reflect on our own vices. I describe how Aristotle prepares his readers for the task of examining the political art. I then view courage found in the citizen and spiritedness as an example of two common opinions where individuals are inclined towards pleasure, as opposed to being inclined to the noble. To conclude, I show that Aristotle provides opinions of non-courage to emphasize how institutions are, and must remain, a foundational part of society.

Thesis advisor: Robert C. Bartlett / Government, today, encapsulates both politics and bureaucracy. Yet if politics and bureaucracy are understood within this context it is hard to conceptualize the nature of each or their effect on one another. In this paper I attempt to separate bureaucracy from politics in order to understand each before considering their effect upon one another. I begin by considering bureaucracy according to its most famous commentator, Max Weber. Since bureaucracy must be understood in relation to the modern state, I include a treatment of the modern state that presumes a beneficial civil service, G.F.W. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. If Hegel shows us a politics dependent upon the bureaucracy and seamlessly reflected in that bureaucracy, we must examine politics anew in a context in which it is neither entangled with nor compromised by bureaucracy. Aristotle provides a definition of politics unencumbered with bureaucratic administration: a seeming alternative to the modern state. But is such activity possible today? Or in the American republic? I conclude with a discussion of these questions using the work of Hannah Arendt and James Q. Wilson. Arendt discusses the worst effects of bureaucratic administration while Wilson suggests that the American constitutional order can withstand the addition of bureaucratic administration. The question that remains is whether politics as described by Aristotle—speech about justice and injustice on the public stage—can exist alongside the American bureaucracy. My initial response to this question is yes and no: political speech in America is still possible, but its character has been altered. The productive form of political speech has become complaint—complaint against the actions of the government, complaint that makes its way to the floors of the House and Senate, and complaint that is registered in the voting box or the courthouse. Complaint, however, is not the whole of political speech, and therefore bureaucracy cannot be wholly compatible with political activity. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

This project foregrounds two undertheorized features of Heidegger’s philosophy of science: his critique of physicalism and the positive counterpart to his critiques of modern science. Chapters 1–2 examine Heidegger’s early work up to Being and Time. Chapters 3–4 focus on Heidegger’s post–Being and Time work. Chapter 1 refutes the widespread view (advanced, for instance, by Joseph Rouse, Hubert Dreyfus, and Robert Brandom) that the early Heidegger thinks science generally studies entities that instantiate a mode of being that he calls presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). I call this the Vorhandenheit claim; I reconstruct and refute three arguments on its behalf. I argue that Heidegger thinks modern physicalistic science, rather than science or natural science as such, privileges the study of present-at-hand things. Chapter 2 develops my positive interpretation of the early Heidegger’s philosophy of science. Heidegger’s “existential” conception of science (which, I argue, has roots in Aristotle’s ethics) posits a special connection between science, truth, and authenticity. Heidegger also thinks that modernity is physicalistic. I discuss physicalism’s negative consequences and trace Heidegger’s analysis of its roots in Aristotle and Descartes. I also compare Heidegger with key Anglophone philosophers of science like Thomas Kuhn, W. V. Quine, and Helen Longino. Chapter 3 discusses Heidegger’s analysis of quantum physics and his dialogue with Werner Heisenberg. Many (such as Taylor Carman and Trish Glazebrook) interpret Heidegger as a deflationist on quantum physics’s historical significance vis-à-vis classical physics. But on my reading, Heidegger is ambivalent. I unpack Heidegger’s non-deflationary remarks about quantum physics. I then argue that his ambivalence about physics reflects and informs his ambivalence about the relationship between early modernity and the late-modern “technological” age. Chapter 4 asks how science might be reformed in response to Heidegger’s criticisms. I examine why Heidegger’s vision for science reform led him to support the Nazis. I then offer a sketch of a Heideggerian science consistent with liberal-democratic principles. Heideggerian science would promote pluralistic and philosophically-historically informed research at the potential cost of highly specialized research and technological development. I also compare liberal-democratic Heideggerian science with the accounts offered by Paul Feyerabend, Helen Longino, and Philip Kitcher. / 2025-01-24T00:00:00Z

Since the first recorded theatrical events, theatre has been presented in a linear fashion. It is no surprise that the majority of American Musical Theatre also follows a linear plot conception. Musicals that blatantly defy linearity are often called "concept" musicals. However, there is a small portion of concept musicals that do not abandon their linear plot altogether, but instead choose to skew the line in order to give the audience a unique perspective of the story being told. This mass categorization does not accurately take into account the extreme difference in structure of the two types of concept musicals. For this purpose, I explored the notion of a new structural category, the Less Linear Concept Musical, in hopes of identifying the unique characteristics and challenges associated with this type of musical. Beginning with Aristotle's "The Poetics" and ending in modern day Musical Theatre, I examine key events in the shaping of this musical theatre form, as well as define the form itself. The application of this research culminated in a classroom presentation of Jason Robert Brown's The Last Five Years, which I directed. I pose the question, "Can sound direction conquer the pitfalls found within the Less Linear Concept Musical?"

The mind as it is found in Aristotle's great work De Anima is a special capacity of the soul. It has both active and passive properties that work together to allow discursive thinking and moral ethical behavior to emerge. This work will look at Aristotle's philosophy of mind, and I will forward a new interpretation of the mind as he understood it: what I call the active and passive mind property dualism. Aristotle's four causes allow for a unique application of a form of dualism that accounts for the ontological status of the mind and the emergence of rational thinking. The importance of potentiality and actuality in Aristotle's metaphysics gives a different sort of formulation of the mind-body problem than is traditionally understood in the philosophy of mind. The first section of this paper will look at the terms used, especially actuality and potentiality. A comparison to Plato's tripartite soul will be given. Next, Aristotle's different kinds of soul and their varied capacities will be explored. Finally, the active mind will be explained as it appears in Book III, chapter 5.