Cette thèse est consacrée à une analyse doctrinale et philologique du commentaire de Thomas d'Aquin sur la distinction 35 du premier Livre des Sentences de Pierre Lombard. Le sujet de cette distinction est la science que Dieu a de lui-même et des autres choses. La première partie de notre travail est une présentation conceptuelle et historique de l'arrière-fond de cette distinction. Elle est divisée en quatre étapes. Dans la première, nous nous sommes interrogé sur la science divine dans une perspective linguistique. Dans la seconde, nous avons discuté le rôle de l'autre, en tant qu'objet, dans la connaissance divine. Dans la troisième,nous avons étudié la synthèse chez Thomas des éléments aristotéliciens et pseudo-dionysiens, comme la notion d'actus purus et la notion d'esse. La quatrième étape, présente brièvement le contexte historique pour comprendre la méthode du commentaire des Sentences, ainsi qu'un bref panorama de l'Université de Paris au XIIIe siècle. La deuxième partie de la thèse offre une édition critique de la distinction 35. Après avoir collationné les témoins manuscrits selon les critères de la Commission Léonine, nous avons présenté le texte avec une introduction où nous établissons les différentes familles de la transmission textuelle. / This dissertation provides a doctrinal and philological study of Aquinas' Commentary on Book I, dist. 35 ofPeter Lombard's Sentences. At issue is the knowledge that God has of Himself and of the things other thanHimself. The first part of the dissertation investigates the conceptual and historical background of dist. 35. Itdivides into four sections. First, we approach the topic of the divine science from a linguistic perspective.Secondly, we examine the role of things other than God as objects of the divine knowledge. Thirdly, we drawattention to Aquinas' synthesis of Aristotelian and pseudo-Dionysian elements, namely the notions of actuspurus and esse. The fourth section provides an overview of the historical context and the XIIIth-centuryUniversity of Paris, in order to better understand the method of commentaries on the Sentences. The secondpart of the dissertation intends to provide, for the first time, the critical edition of Aquinas' Commentary onBook I, dist. 35 of Peter Lombard's Sentences. The manuscripts are collated according to LeonineCommission's criteria. The critical text is introduced by a philological study in which we investigate the textualtransmission of dist. 35 and we propose a stemma.

Ce travail consiste en une édition, une traduction française et un commentaire du traité pseudo-aristotélicien Περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν. L'édition est faite à partir de la recension effectuée par D. Harlfinger en 1971 de tous les manuscrits connus contenant ce traité. Dans l'édition, le plus souvent, la lecture des manuscrits a été préférée aux éventuelles corrections des éditeurs et commentateurs. La traduction se veut la plus proche possible du texte grec nonobstant son caractère très elliptique et, parfois, syntaxiquement fautif. Le commentaire s'attache en premier lieu à contextualiser ce texte (hypothèses de datation à défaut de pouvoir l'attribuer indiscutablement à tel ou tel auteur) et à déterminer les liens qu'il y a entre lui et, d'une part, les autres textes du corpus aristotélicien et, d'autre part, les traités philosophiques qu'il réfute. En outre, le commentaire permet de justifier les choix éditoriaux et de traduction en comparant la leçon retenue aux variantes existantes et aux corrections apportées par les éditeurs et commentateurs successifs du traité. L'objectif du Περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν est de démontrer l'impossible existence de lignes indivisibles. Il prend place dans une réfutation générale de l'atomisme dans l'école aristotélicienne. Aristote avait réfuté l'existence des atomes dans le domaine physique, y opposant une théorie continuiste, l'auteur de ce traité reprend ce problème en l'appliquant aux objets géométriques. Il démontre l'impossibilité qu'une ligne soit indivisible ou composée d'indivisibles, puis, après avoir défini le point, l’impossibilité qu'une ligne en soit composée. Enfin, l'auteur établit une distinction entre limite et articulation. / This works aims to propose an edition, a translation into French and a commentary of the pseudo-aristotelian treatise Περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν. The edition is based on D. Harlfinger's 1971 manuscripts review known to bear the treatise. Most of the time, in the edition the readings of the manuscripts were favoured to the editors' and commentators' emendations. The translation is as close as possible to the Greek text despite its very elliptical wording and its occasional defective syntax. Initialy, the commentary tries to set the background to this text (dating hypothesis in spite of attributing it to a precise and definite author) and to define the links which exist between the text and, on the one hand, the other Aristotelian treatises and, on the other hand, the philosophical works that are refuted. The commentary then helps to justify the editorial choices and translations in comparison to existing variants and corrections suggested by previous editors and commentators.The aim of the Περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν is to prove the impossibility of indivisible lines. It belongs to a more general confutation of atomism in the Aristotelian school. Aristotle previously refuted the existence of atoms in the physical field, setting up a theory of continuity. The author of this treatise takes up the issue confronting it to geometrical objects. He proves impossible the indivisibility of a line or the fact that a line may be composed of indivisible elements. After having defined the point, he proves that a line can neither be composed of points. To conclude, the author draws the distinction between a limit and a joint.

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The concept of matter as it is treated in the philosophical systems of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus is examined, partly to ascertain the influence which the original Aristotelian concept of matter had on the two medieval thinkers, and partly to determine which of these two thinkers remained more faithful to the original Aristotelian concept. An analysis is carried out of the views of the three philosophers regarding the ontological status of matter; the intelligibility of matter; the issue of the real distinction between matter and form; the role played by matter in individuating composite substances; and its role in defining composite substances and determining their essences. Finally, the views of Aquinas and Scotus regarding the theory of universal hylomorphism and the theory of the plurality of forms are discussed and compared. It is shown that, while most of the Franciscan philosophical tradition up to Scotus's time was far more influenced by Platonist than by Aristotelian principles, Scotus, though a Franciscan, was much closer to Aristotle than to Plato in his views regarding matter. In fact, the few deviations from the original Aristotelian concept found in Scotus's theory can be ascribed to theological concerns. It is argued, furthermore, that Scotus's views on the concept of matter are far closer to the original Aristotelian theory than our analysis shows Aquinas himself to be.

This thesis develops a disjunctivist approach to action as an alternative to the standard causal theory, or 'causalism'. The standard theory promotes a concept of action as constituted by a bodily event joined to certain mental conditions by a bond of causation. A disjunctivist approach, in contrast, claims that action must be distinguished by more than merely its etiology: action and mere movement are fundamentally different kinds. Recent objections to the causal theory of action are first surveyed, and the common causalist assumption claiming Aristotle as the progenitor of the causal theory is examined and dismissed. More refined interpretations of Aristotle's thought on action yield two different concepts: action as change, and action as a unified psychophysical process. The latter in particular is argued to hold promise as a basis for developing the disjunctivist approach to action. The remainder of the thesis therefore considers a contemporary account of psychophysicality, known as 'embodiment theory' (Hanna and Maiese 2009), with the conclusion that the intelligibility of the account depends on appeal to a recent variant of top-down causation (Steward 2012). The thesis also concludes that consideration of the concept of an animal agent makes it entirely unsurprising that the mental and physical are always found together in voluntary movement, and that the embodiment theory's central notion of ‘property fusion' potentially complements a naturalistic variant of top-down causation in explanations of agency.

This doctoral thesis explores a subject falling in the interface between ancient Greek philosophy and literature. Specifically, I am concerned with common ground between the New Comedy of Menander and aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy. The thesis does not argue that the resemblance identified between the two writers shows the direct influence of Aristotle on Menander but rather thay they share a common thought-world. The thesis is structured around a series of parallel readings of Menander and Aristotle; key relevant texts are Menander’s "Epitrepontes", "Samia", "Aspis", "Perikeiromene" and "Dyscolos" and Aristotle’s "Posterior Analytics", "Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics", "De Anima" and "Poetics". My claim is that Menander’s construction of characters and plots and Aristotle’s philosophical analyses express analogous approaches on the subject of the relationship between knowledge and ethics. Central for my argument is the consideration that in Aristotle’s writings on ethics, logic, and psychology, we can identify a specific set of ideas about the interconnection between knowledge-formation and character or emotion, which shows, for instance, how ethical failings typically depend on a combination of cognitive mistakes and emotional lapses. A few years later than the composition of Aristotle’s school-texts, Menander’s comedies, as expressed in the extant texts, present to a wider audience a type of drama which, as I argue, reflects an analogously complex and sophisticated understanding of the interplay between cognitive or rational understanding and character or emotion. More broadly, Aristotle and Menander offer analogous views of the way that perceptions and emotional responses to situations are linked with the presence or absence of ethical and cognitive understanding, or the state of ethical character-development in any given person. Thus, I suggest, the interpersonal crises and the progress towards recognition of the identity of the crucial figures in Menandrian comedies embody a pattern of thinking about perception, knowledge and the role of emotion that shows substantial linkage with Aristotle’s thinking on comparable topics.

Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study finds its roots in the ancient quarrel, as mentioned by Plato 400 BC, between poets (artists) and philosophers on the nature of our ethical existence. The ancient philosophers participating in the ancient quarrel, such as Plato, had a metaphysical understanding of our existence and they believed that we should communicate about our ethical existence through a style which acknowledges the transcendental nature of our human existence. The styles and language used by the philosophers of the ancient quarrel were therefore often very abstract, and mostly concerned with the rationality of human reasoning. The ancient poets participating in this quarrel, however, did not share the metaphysical worldview of their philosophical rivals. They denied the transcendental nature of our existence, and argued that our ethical existence should be portrayed and communicated through a style which acknowledges the fact that we are humans with a concrete existence. The poets of the ancient quarrel also promoted a style which acknowledges humans as beings with both rational and emotional faculties. It is for this reason that we find today in literature concerned with moral matters, both the abstract style of moral philosophy which is concerned with the rational aspects of our existence, and the concrete style of fictional literature which is concerned with the emotive aspects of our existence. The quarrel on how to communicate about the nature of our ethical existence is, however, an ongoing debate which is still prevalent in our modern times. This study turns to the modern argument of Martha Nussbaum on how to communicate about the nature of our ethical existence. Nussbaum argues that the abstract style of philosophical texts on morality acknowledges the abstract and rational aspects of our human nature and existence, but that it often fails to fully acknowledge the fact that we are concrete human beings for whom emotions play an integral part in our ethical existence. She therefore believes that moral philosophy should be presented in combination with fictional literature in order to give a true and complete picture of our ethical existence. This study thus enters into a critical dialogue with Nussbaum on her proposal to combine fictional literature with moral philosophy. Accordingly, this study focuses on three specific aspects of our ethical existence, which Nussbaum argues, are acknowledged through fictional literature such as novels, but not through the typical style of abstract moral philosophy. They are; 1) that human values are plural and often incommensurable; 2) that the particulars of situations play an important role in ethical deliberation; and 3) that human emotions and the imagination form a big part of our ethical existence. The fundamental aim of this study is thus to answer the question whether the style of fictional literature actually acknowledges the three above mentioned aspects of our ethical existence. The novel which is used to determine this is Alan Paton’s Cry the Beloved Country. Nussbaum classifies the three above mentioned aspects of our ethical existence as 1) The Non- Commensurability and Plurality of Values; 2) Priority of the Particular; and 3) Ethical Value of the Emotions and Imagination. These three aspects are, however, derived from Aristotle’s ethics and they form, as Nussbaum has argued, the bases of the Aristotelian ethical position – a position from which practical knowledge can be obtained. The aim of this study is therefore not only to determine whether certain fictional literature acknowledges the three fundamental aspects of the Aristotelian ethical position, but it also aims to answer the question whether the Aristotelian ethical position (and therefore practical wisdom) can be obtained through the reading of fictional literature such as novels. The study concludes that some fictional literature, such as the novel Cry, the Beloved Country, does in fact adequately portray the three fundamental features of the Aristotelian ethical position, and that Nussbaum’s proposal should receive serious consideration, since the inclusion of some fictional literature into moral philosophy my lead to deeper ethical understanding from which practical wisdom can be obtained. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie vind sy oorsprong in die eeue oue stryd, soos al reeds geïdentifiseer deur Plato 400 vC, tussen digters (kunstenaars) en filosowe oor die aard van ons etiese bestaan. Die antieke filosowe wat deelgeneem het aan hierdie eeue oue vete, soos byvoorbeeld Plato, het ‘n metafisiese verstaan van ons bestaan gehad, en het daarom geglo dat ons oor ons etiese bestaan moet kommunikeer deur middel van style wat erkenning gee aan die transendentale aard van ons menslike bestaan. Die style en taal wat deur die filosowe van hierdie eeue oue vete gebruik is, was dus dikwels baie abstrak en uiters bemoeid met die mens se rasionele denkvermoëns. Die antieke digters wat deelgeneem het aan hierdie vete het egter nie, soos die filosowe, ‘n metafisiese wêreldbeskouing van ons bestaan gehad nie. Hulle het die transendente aard van ons bestaan ontken, en het daarom daarop aangedring dat ons etiese bestaan voorgestel en oor gekommunikeer moet word deur style wat erkenning gee aan die feit dat ons mense is met ‘n konkrete bestaan. Hulle het egter ook aangedring op ‘n styl wat erkenning gee dat mense beide rasionele en emosionele wesens is. Dit is weens hierdie rede dat ons vandag, in literatuur aangaande morele kwessies, die abstrakte en meer rasioneel geöriënteerde styl van morele filosofie, sowel as die konkrete en meer emosioneel geöriënteerde styl van fiktiewe literatuur aantref. Daar is egter vandag steeds nie klaarheid oor hoe daar oor ons etiese bestaan gekommunikeer moet word nie, en onenigheid is dus steeds te bespeur in huidige debatte oor hierdie tema. Hierdie studie ondersoek ‘n moderne argument, soos voortgestaan deur Martha Nussbaum, oor die wyse waarop daar oor die aard van ons etiese bestaan gekommunikeer moet word. Nussbaum neem die standpunt in dat die abstrakte styl van morele filosofiese tekste erkenning gee aan die abstrakte en rasionele aard van ons menslike aard en bestaan, maar dat dit nie altyd daarin slaag om erkenning te gee dat ons mense is met ‘n konkrete etiese bestaan waarin emosies (eerder as net rasionele denke) ook ‘n baie belangrike rol speel nie. Hierdie studie neem dus die vorm aan van ‘n kritiese dialoog met Nussbaum aangaande haar voorstel om fiktiewe literatuur te kombineer met morele filosofie. Gevolglik fokus hierdie studie op drie spesifieke aspekte van ons etiese bestaan, wat Nussbaum glo wel deur fiktiewe literatuur aangespreek word maar nie altyd deur tekste van morele filosofie nie. Hierdie drie aspekte is 1) dat menslike waardes uiteenlopend en dikwels onversoenbaar is; 2) dat die partikuliere elemente van situasies ’n belangrike rol speel in etiese besluitneming; en 3) dat ons menslike emosies en verbeelding ’n groot deel uitmaak van ons etiese bestaan. Die fundamentele doel van hierdie studie is dus om te bepaal of die styl van fiktiewe literatuur wel erkenning gee aan die drie bogenoemde aspekte van ons etiese bestaan. Die fiktiewe werk wat gebruik is om dit te bepaal, is Alan Paton se Cry, the Beloved Country. Nussbaum klassifiseer die drie bogenoemde aspekte van ons etiese bestaan as 1) Onversoenbaarheid and Pluraliteit van Waardes; 2) Prioriteit van die Partikuliere; en 3) Etiese Waarde van die Emosies en Verbeelding. Hierdie klassifikasie vind egter sy oorsprong in die etiek van Aristoteles, en vorm dus volgens Nussbaum die basis van die Aristoteliaanse etiese posisie – ‘n posisie van waaruit praktiese wysheid geput kan word. Die doel van hierdie studie is dus nie net om te bepaal of fiktiewe literatuur erkenning gee aan die drie fundamentele aspekte van die Aristoteliaanse etiese posisie nie, maar die doel is ook om te bepaal of die Aristoteliaanse etiese posisie (en dus praktiese wysheid) bekom kan word deur die lees van fiktiewe literatuur. Die studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat sekere fiktiewe literatuur, soos die werk Cry, the Beloved Country, inderdaad wel bevredigende erkenning gee aan die drie eienskappe van ons etiese bestaan, soos veronderstel deur die Aristoteliaanse etiese posisie, en dat Nussbaum se voorstel ernstige aandag behoort te geniet, aangesien die insluiting van sekere fiktiewe literatuur in morele filosofie ‘n dieper etiese verstaan teweeg kan bring, waaruit praktiese wysheid geput kan word.

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This thesis argues that, in spite of his explicit denunciation of Aristotle's theory of perception and thought, Thomas Reid's own theory of perception marks a return to the central themes of Aristotle's theory. It is argued, first, that Aristotle's 'De Anima' presents an account of sensation and thought in which the functions of the object of perception play the determining role with respect to the structure, order and intelligibility of the act of perception. Thomas Aquinas' and Descartes' transformation of Aristotle's account are then discussed, showing how the "apparatus" of Aristotle's theory remains while the ground of order and intelligibility is shifted from the functions of the object of perception to those of the perceiver as subject. The theories of the British empiricists are then shown to be continuous with this transformation of Aristotle's thought. Finally, it is argued that Reid returns to an objectivism by way of his rejection of the subjectivistic transformation wrought by Descartes et al. It is argued that this rejection is not---as Reid himself believes---a rejection of the crucial aspects of Aristotle's theory, but instead constitutes a return to its primary themes and theses.

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