The purpose of this thesis to to investigate if the complex and ambiguous means of a hybrid warfare strategy in the context of the ‘armed attack’ threshold. The ‘armed attack’ threshold sits within the UN Charter article 51 and it constitutes the legal provision that the right to self-defence, both unilaterally and collectively, is only triggered in the event of an ‘armed attack’. It is therefore important to determine if this threshold can through the ambiguous and complex structure of hybrid warfare be circumvented or obfuscated to prevent, delay or weaken a State’s ability to act in self- defence or by other means. To examine this problem, this thesis approached it by describing the concept of hybrid warfare and the legal framework that constitute the ‘armed attack’ notion in the context of self-defence. And by, to the extent possible analysed if the hybrid warfare means; cyber warfare, information warfare and the use or support of proxy forces could individually amount to an ‘armed attack’ by viewing how these means were used in Ukraine by Russia. This thesis argues, that a hybrid adversary can through the inherently complex and ambiguous nature of hybrid warfare and its means, obfuscate its attribution under certain circumstance to prevent, limit or delay the ability of a State to act in self-defence or by other means.

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This thesis examined the relationship between cyber operations and armed attacks to determine when the right of self-defence is triggered by cyber operations. The research question for this thesis was under what circumstances a cyber operation is considered a cyber attack and what kind of self-defence the targeted victim State can use.  The thesis concluded that it is not the weaponry used, but the scale and effects of an operation that determines whether it amounts to an armed attack or not. Thus, cyber operations can be amount to armed attacks i.e., cyber attacks if the scale and effects caused by the operations are severe enough. However, the thesis concluded that there are certain challenges regarding the determination of the severity threshold of operations through cyberspace that do not exist for operations of kinetic nature. Specifically regarding whether cyber operations that cause disruption of critical infrastructure can amount to a cyber attack. The thesis concluded that it is unclear whether these kinds of effects can be comparable to the effects caused by traditional military force. However, cyber operations that result in mere economic damages do not reach the scale and effects needed to amount to cyber attacks.  The thesis concluded that an imminent threat of a cyber attack triggers the right of self-defence. The meaning of imminence is ‘the last possible window of opportunity’ to repel the cyber attack, as this meaning coheres with the purpose of being able to resort to force in self-defence against an attack that has yet occurred.  The issue of responsibility of non-State actors was addressed in the thesis. The essay demonstrated that the questions regarding non-State actors are even more relevant for operations carried out in cyberspace. It was concluded that although the high threshold of attribution becomes even more challenging in cyberspace, the threshold is necessary in order to maintain international peace and security. Regarding independent non-State actors, it was concluded that State practice has shown acceptance of resorting to force against non-State actors without attribution to the territorial State. To balance opposed interests, this thesis concluded that the doctrine of unwilling and unable should be followed when a victim State considers resorting to force against a non-State actor.  Regarding the principles of necessity and proportionality, this thesis could conclude that the means used against a cyber attack, whether kinetic or cyber, are not vital to determine whether the self-defence used is legal or not. Instead, force used in self-defence used must be a means of last resort and cannot exceed the force needed to repel the attack.

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The Master's Paper analyses the scope of the right to self-defence under international law. The Author seeks to present a thorough evaluation of the provisions of the United Nations Charter, the rules formed in the customary international law, the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice as well as the state practice in respect of the implementation conditions of the right to self-defence.The Paper also focuses on the analysis of the theory of preventive self-defence undergoing the formation process as well as on the disclosure of the predicted negative entailments attached to its legalisation.

The world has found itself in the unsatisfactory position of depending greatly upon the services of satellites, all while the risk of satellites becoming targets during conflict looms ever greater. This paper assesses the lex lata of the law of self-defence as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, focusing on the rationae materiae aspect of the armed attack concept. It thereafter applies general conclusions in this regard to the specific context of hostile acts against satellite systems, with an aim to clarify under what conditions such hostile acts justify the exercise force in self-defence.

The Defence Commission has proposed that the Swedish Armed Forces once again will be assigned the main task of defending Sweden against an armed attack. Defence against an armed attack has gained more focus since the defence decision 2015 and prior to the upcoming defence decision it is even more emphasized. Are the politics and the Swedish Armed Forces in agreement regarding the meaning and implications of this on basis of contemporary threats? The overall aim of the study is to understand the interaction between politics and the Swedish Armed Forces in the designing and shaping of the Swedish Armed Forces. This study has a starting point in the prelude to the planned political defence decision 2020 and aims to understand some of this major context. It is focusing on identifying the coherence between the Defence Committee and the Swedish Armed Forces’ military strategic leadership in terms of the meaning of an armed attack being the primary basis of designing and shaping the Swedish Armed Forces. In addition, important factors that have an impact on the interaction between politics and the Swedish Armed Forces are identified. The empiricism is taken from international law, the military strategic doctrine of the Swedish Armed Forces, reports from the Defence Commission and interviews with members of the Defence Committee and the military strategic leadership of the Swedish Armed Forces. The results show that there is lack of coherence within the Defence Committee as well as between the Defence Committee and the Swedish Armed Forces regarding the meaning of the proposed main task to the Swedish Armed Forces and how it should relate to other tasks. There is an illusion regarding the definition of an armed attack. In reality it is the government that, under constitutional responsibility, defines an armed attack when there is an act of aggression. In addition, it is identified that it is suitable to mutually improve trust between politics and the Swedish Armed Forces by increasing knowledge of each other's realities. / Försvarsberedningen har föreslagit att Försvarsmakten åter ska få huvuduppgiften att försvara Sverige mot väpnat angrepp. Försvar mot väpnat angrepp har fått ett allt större fokus sedan försvarsbeslutet 2015 och inför det kommande försvarsbeslutet föreslås en ytterligare inskärpning. Är politiken och Försvarsmakten överens om innebörden utifrån samtidens hot? Studiens övergripande syfte är att förstå samspelet mellan politiken och Försvarsmakten i utformningen och inriktningen av Försvarsmakten. Studien tar avstamp i förspelet inför det planerade försvarsbeslutet 2020 och tar sikte på att förstå en del av detta stora sammanhang genom att fokusera på att identifiera samstämmigheten mellan försvarsutskottet och Försvarsmaktens militärstrategiska ledning om innebörden av att väpnat angrepp ska vara dimensionerande för Försvarsmaktens inriktning. Därtill identifieras viktiga faktorer som påverkar samspelet mellan politiken och Försvarsmakten. Empirin är hämtad från internationell rätt, Försvarsmaktens militärstrategiska doktrin, försvarsberedningens rapporter samt intervjuer med försvarsutskottet och Försvarsmaktens militärstrategiska ledning. Resultatet visar på att det saknas samstämmighet såväl inom försvarsutskottet som mellan försvarsutskottet och Försvarsmakten avseende innebörden av Försvarsmaktens föreslagna huvuduppgift samt hur den ska förhålla sig till övriga uppgifter. Det råder en illusion om innebörden av ett väpnat angrepp. I verkligheten är det regeringen som under konstitutionellt ansvar fastställer vad som är ett väpnat angrepp när en aggressionshandling sker. Därtill identifieras lämpligheten av att ömsesidigt förbättra förtroendet mellan politiken och Försvarsmakten genom att öka kunskapen om varandras realiteter.

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