Att företag använder sig av global sourcing och har leverantörer i lågkostnadsländer har blivit allt vanligare. Detta för att arbetskraftskostnaden i dessa länder är låg. Men en kostnad som i stället ökar i och med detta är transportkostnaden. Godset behöver transporteras längre sträckor vilket även gör att transportledtiden ökar. Samtidigt ställer kunder allt högre krav på snabba leveranser och de företag som valt global sourcing måste därför många gånger ha stora lager för att kunna möta kundernas krav. De företag som har leverantörer i Asien väljer oftast att transportera godset med sjötransporter då det är det billigaste transportsättet. Dock är det också det transportsätt som har längst transportledtid. Kinas nya infrastrukturprojekt Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) bidrar till att järnvägstransporter kan användas i större utsträckning, men många svenska företag vet inte vilka möjligheter det finns med BRI och järnvägen. Syftet med denna studie är därför att ge svenska företag en ökad förståelse om vad BRI kan bidra med för de företag som använder global sourcing. Studien har uppfyllt sitt syfte genom att göra en fallstudie hos ett svenskt företag som har leverantörer i Asien och visade ett intresse för BRI och järnvägstransporter. Syftet uppfylldes även genom att göra en litteraturstudie där relevant information om studiens ämne inhämtades som grund för studiens teori. Det resultat som framkommer av studien visar vilka motiv och riskfaktorer svenska företag kan ta i beaktning vid användandet av BRI och järnvägstransporter. Utifrån dessa har en modell med riktlinjer utformats för att hjälpa företag att göra valet om de bör använda järnvägen som transportsätt eller inte. Fallföretaget skulle dra nytta av järnvägstransporter på grund av den minskade transportledtiden, den ökade flexibiliteten samt att leverantörer inte behöver vara lokaliserade nära en hamn. Genom denna studie ska fallföretaget och andra svenska företag förstå vad BRI är för något och vilka motiv det kan finnas med att byta transportsätt och fyller därför det kunskaps- och informationsgap som finns gällande detta.

The following thesis conducted a case study to investigate the opinion of exper ts working on the Bombay-Ahmadabad HSR and Ankara-Istanbul HSR on how China uses HSRD and BRI to develop and utilize its soft power and whether that opinion ma tches the official Chinese point of view. The official Chinese view about BRI is that it seeks to deliver win-win outcomes, development, and improvement of lives for partici pating countries. In addition, it 'has no geopolitical motives, seeks no exclusionary bl ocs, and imposes no business deals on others … addresses people's desire for a better l ife … and shared benefits.' Ramo (2007)'s operationalization of the term global image was used to assess the respondents' opinions. The results showed that there is low dependability of the overa ll BRI among the respondents. A majority of the respondents (60%) claimed that BRI and HSRD are successful but were not impressed by the delivered value and quality o f BRI. 70% of the respondents believed that the Bombay-Ahmadabad HSR would ach ieve its objective and that it had a high level of technology. In terms of financial, socia l and political impact, the responses showed proportions of 40%, 37%, 44% respectiv ely gave a positive answer. Overall, it can be concluded that in terms of image the Bo mbay-Ahmadab gave...

Работа посвящена анализу развития экономического сотрудничества между РФ и КНР в контексте реализации китайской глобальной инициативы «Один пояс, один путь» (ОПОП). На основе широкого круга источников и литературы определяются основные направления взаимодействия, особенности и результаты сотрудничества в рамках ОПОП. Также анализируются позиции обеих стран и оценки взаимодействия, транслируемые международным экспертным сообществом. Автор приходит к выводу, что РФ и КНР не являются равноправными партнерами в проекте ОПОП, однако их сотрудничество, в целом, имеет положительную динамику. / The work analyses the development of economic relations between Russia and China in the context of the implementation of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). On the basis of a wide range of primary and secondary sources, the interaction, features and results of cooperation within the framework of BRI are determined. The official positions of the two countries are analyzed, as well as the assessment of interaction by the international expert community. The author comes to the conclusion that the RF and the PRC are not equal partners in the BRI project, however, their cooperation, in general, has positive dynamics.

Depuis le début des années 2000, la Chine et la RPDC (« Corée du Nord) ont tenté de mettre en œuvre des programmes de coopération économique et d’intégration transfrontalière. Ces programmes de coopération ont été facilité par des politiques réformatrices en Corée du Nord, la famine des années 1990 ayant fait prendre conscience à Pyongyang qu’un certain degré de réforme économique était nécessaire pour reprendre le contrôle et relancer une économie désorganisée et appauvrie. En conséquence, les échanges et les investissements entre la Chine et la RPDC ont connu une hausse spectaculaire. Ceci étant, les expérimentations politiques menées par Pyongyang, dont notamment les Zones Économiques Spéciales, n’ont pas réussi à attirer l‘attention des entrepreneurs et des officiels chinois.A travers l’étude empirique d’une selection de Zones Économiques Spéciales et de leurs environnements politiques et législatifs, des entretiens avec des hommes d’affaires chinois impliqués dans les relations économiques bilatérales à la frontière et des observations sur le terrain en Corée du Nord, l’auteur développe l’idée selon laquelle les stratégies d’engagement économiques chinoises et les politiques de développement économique nord-coréennes sont fondamentalement incompatibles, ce qui fait des actuellespratiques de coopération économique une source de tensions politiques. Il semblerait que la Chine a en effet essayé d’atteindre certains objectifs politiques et géopolitiques à travers des outils économiques, ce qui est vu par Pyongyang comme une ingérence dans ses affaires internes. Ces stratégies chinoises sont particulièrement intéressantes à étudier dans le contexte de l’initiative « One Belt, One Road ». Paradoxalement, l’auteur cherche à expliquer que les plus récentes générations de Zones Économiques Spéciales ne visent pas seulement à faciliter une certaine forme d’intégration économique bilatérale mais incarnent dans le même temps une forme de résistance à l’étreinte économique chinoise. / Since the beginning of the 2000’s, China and the DPRK (North Korea) have tried to implement economic cooperation and crossborder-economic integration programs. These cooperation programs have been facilitated by reformist policies in the DPRK, as the 1990 decade famine that struck North Korea convinced the Pyongyang leadership that some degree of economic reform was needed to restart and regain control over a greatly damaged economy. As a result, trade and investment ties between China and North Korea soared. However, political experimentations by the Pyongyang leadership, such as Special Economic Zones, have attracted limited attention from Chinese entrepreneurs and officials.Through an empirical analysis of a selection of North Korean Special Economic Zones and related policies, interviews with Chinese businessmen active in the borderlands as well as anecdotal evidence gathered in the DPRK, the author argues that Chinese economic engagement policies and North Korea’s economic development strategy bear structural incompatibilities which makes the current economic cooperation patterns a source of diplomatic and political friction. It seems that China has indeed been trying to achieve different political and geopolitical objectives through economic means, which largely resonates with the larger Chinese-led “One Belt, one Road” initiative” but is seen as interfering from Pyongyang. Quite paradoxically, the author argues that later generations of Special Economic Zones do not only constitute institutions designed to foster economic integration between China and the DPRK but also embody political resistance to the Chinese economic embrace. / Seit dem Beginn der 2000er Jahre haben China und die Demokratische Volksrepublik Korea (Nordkorea) versucht, eine wirtschaftliche Kooperation und grenzüberschreitende wirtschaftliche Integrationsprogramme zu implementieren. Diese Projekte wurden durch reformorientierte Politik in der DPRK ermöglicht, da die Hungersnot, welche Nordkorea in den 90er Jahren heimsuchte, die Pjöngjanger Führung überzeugte, dass ein gewisser Grad an wirtschaftlichen Reformen nötig sei, um die schwer beschädigte Wirtschaft neu zu starten und über sie Kontrolle auszuüben. Infolgedessen steigerten sich der Handel und die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen insgesamt zwischen China und Nordkorea auf ein noch nie da gewesenes Niveau. Jedoch haben politische Experimente der Führung in Pyongyang, einschließlich eines direkten „Policytransfers“, welche chinesischen Erfahrungen nachempfunden waren, wie zum Beispiel Sonderwirtschaftszonen, eingeschränkte Aufmerksamkeit von chinesischen Unternehmern und Beamten erfahren.Auf Basis einer empirischen Analyse einer Auswahl von nordkoreanischen Sonderwirtschaftszonen und damit verbundenen „Policies“, Interviews mit im Grenzgebiet aktiven, chinesischen Unternehmern und in Nordkorea gesammelten Einzelberichten, argumentiert der Autor, dass die chinesischen wirtschaftlichen Engagement Strategien und die wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsstrategie Nord-Koreas strukturellen Unvereinbarkeiten aufweisen, welche die derzeitigen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsmuster zu eine Quelle diplomatischer und politischer Spannungen werden lassen. Es scheint, dass China in der Tat versucht hat, verschiedene politische und geopolitische Ziele auf wirtschaftlichem Wege zu erreichen, was größtenteils in der bedeutenden, von China angeführten, „One Belt, one Road“ Initiative seinen Nachhall findet, jedoch von Pjöngjang als Einmischung gesehen wird. Paradoxerweise sind, so die Argumentation des Autors, spätere Generationen der Sonderwirtschaftszonen nicht nur Institutionen zur Förderung der wirtschaftlichen Integration zwischen China und der Demokratischen Volksrepublik Korea, sie verkörpern auch den politischen Widerstand gegen die chinesische wirtschaftliche Umklammerung.

The European Union (EU) is a key trading partner for the People's Republic of China (PRC). Nearly one third of PRC's production is send to the EU and half of EU exports is directed to the PRC. Such huge trade volumes require an appropriate logistical connection, which is currently dominated by maritime transport. However, since 2007 railway transport has also been available. The aim of this dissertation is to evaluate the position of the railway transport of the PRC European route (with focus on the position of the Czech Republic) with regard to its development, obstacles and potential for the future. Firstly, the paper describes the background and reasons for the establishment of the New Silk Road (One Belt One Road initiative), followed by the trade and economic cooperation between the PRC and the Czech Republic. The practical part deals with individual aspects of railway connection. Neither in terms of trade volumes nor price can railway compete with the maritime solution, nevertheless it slowly but surely acquires its first regular customers.

The aim of the diploma thesis is the comparison of maritime and rail freight transport between Asia and Europe. The thesis focuses on characteristic of rail transport as an alternative mode of transport and identification of possibilities, how to increase its competitiveness towards to maritime transport. First part of the thesis analyses current situation in maritime and rail transport and focuses on their specifics and future potential. The practical part deals with the change of fictitious company´s logistics system. Maritime and rail transport are compared in terms of risks, costs and shipping time. The last part of thesis deals with possibilities of increasing competitiveness of rail transport in the future.

This paper attempts to explore China's direct investment in Central Europe under the OBOR initiative. China's economic cooperation in Central Europe is short and the total amount is small. First, this paper analyzes the current situation of Chinese investment including scales, industrial structure, investment entities. Second, through data integration, this paper analyzes the competitive advantage of China's investment in Central Europe. Finally, this paper explores the motives of Chinese investment through the panel data model. The results show that the market size, technology level, resources and other factors of the Central European countries can attract Chinese investment. At the same time, the local environment, economic stability and other factors do not affect China's investment in infrastructure construction. China has laid the foundation for its economic and trade cooperation with Central Europe and is also a strategic choice between China and the United States. Keywords CE-China investment, competitive advantage, OBOR，economic cooperation，motivation of investment Author's e-mail feelingtime1995@163.com Supervisor's e-mail vladimir.benacek@fsv.cuni.cz

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Power as a concept has a long history of being debated in regards to foreign policy, whereforeign aid as a tool can create asymmetrical power dynamics between donor and recipient.Traditional donors' own national interests have frequently been reduced to security oreconomic motives. China, an independent and emerging donor, is thought to be among themajor donors of foreign aid today. With the growing Belt and Road Initiative, China's globaleconomic ambition is increasing. The general theme of this study is power in relation toforeign aid. The aim is to examine donor motives and how foreign aid can transitioneconomic power to political influence in accordance with Joseph Nye’s theory of power. Inaddition, could China's aid-project be regarded as a “smart power”-strategy? This was doneby examining China’s whitebook on development cooperation through a motive analysis. Inaddition, a method of process-tracing on the case of Chinese aid to Cambodia wasimplemented to examine how China’s foreign aid can manifest as a means of power.Cambodia is a top receiver of Chinese aid, and therefore interesting to explore. The resultsshowed that China’s donor motives can be summarised as security, global development andambition, cooperation, commercial and diplomatic interests. Furthermore, evidence was foundthat Chinese foreign aid can be considered a means of power in Cambodia. Largely becauseof an asymmetrical bilateral relationship as well as Cambodia’s weak state capacity.

Dans un contexte de déploiement des nouvelles routes de la soie, la ville portuaire et balnéaire de Sihanoukville au Cambodge est ciblée par des investissements chinois importants. Ces investissements s’accompagnent par la présence de multiples acteurs chinois – investisseurs, commerçants, ouvriers, touristes – qui produisent un nouvel urbain à Sihanoukville. Ainsi, de nombreux casinos se développent aux côtés de zones économiques spéciales, d’hôtels, de quartiers fermés et de commerces variés. La ville portuaire apparaît comme un front pionnier où les ressources touristiques, commerciales, industrielles et stratégiques doivent être exploitées et où les acteurs chinois jouissent d’une marge de manoeuvre conséquente. Ceci est possible car les élites cambodgiennes, autorités et propriétaires terriens en tête, mettent en place un cadre économique et politique favorable pour attirer les investissements chinois et ainsi profiter du développement de la ville. La nouvelle production urbaine de Sihanoukville limite l’accès aux ressources à certaines populations, ce qui mène à des dynamiques de fragmentation urbaine. Par-delà l’idée d’une opposition entre riches investisseurs chinois et habitants cambodgiens défavorisés, la récente production urbaine de Sihanoukville met plutôt en lumière des clivages entre ceux qui ont accès aux ressources et ceux qui n’y ont pas accès. Loin de l’image officielle mise de l’avant par Pékin concernant les nouvelles routes de la soie, la présence chinoise à Sihanoukville conduit à une production urbaine fragmentée. / In a context of deployment of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the coastal city of Sihanoukville, Cambodia, is targeted by massive Chinese investments. Those investments come with the arrival of many Chinese stakeholders – investors, sellers, workers, tourists – who produce a new urbanization in Sihanoukville. Many casinos are being developed in the city, alongside special economic zones, hotels, gated communities, and various other businesses. The city seems to be a frontier where touristic, commercial, industrial, and strategic resources must be exploited, and where the Chinese stakeholders enjoy a certain autonomy. Based on neoliberal logics, Cambodian elites, authorities, and landowners above all, build a favorable economic and political environment to attract Chinese investments and take advantage of the situation. The new urbanization produced in Sihanoukville limits the access to the resources to certain populations, which leads to urban fragmentation. Beyond the idea of an opposition between rich Chinese investors and disadvantaged Cambodian inhabitants, the new Sihanoukville highlights divisions between those who have access to the resources and those who have not. Far from BRI’s official image putting forward by Beijing, the Chinese presence in Sihanoukville comes with a fragmented urban production.