The diploma thesis examines the role of music as an expression of certain deep moment of reality in the philosophical conceptions of Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche and Henri Bergson. The first part of the work points out the fact that these different theories are connected by the emphasis on the aspect of musicality. For the observed authors, music in its creation and perception means leaving the everyday, shallow grasping of reality and denying the false claim of the objective rationality. In the musical "ecstasy", we immediately encounter the world in its deep nature. That determines a special position of music among other kinds of art and some common and significant features of examined theories. The second part of the work deals with conception of music beyond the categories of codified art. It presents music in the form of a psychologically, physiologically and culturally effective element namely in Nietzsche's and Bergson's thought. Finally, the work identifies the dualism of the romantic and the post-romantic tendency as a frame that establishes thinking about music. The diploma thesis aims to present the position of music a musicality in the philosophy of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Bergson. It points out significant features of these conceptions of music and highlights the dual...

This is the first intensive study of Henri Bergson's influence on Katherine Mansfield's fiction. As I shall explore more fully in Chapter 1, it has frequently been mentioned that Bergson was a great influence on modernist writers and artists, and even on the public at that time. Although it has been at least acknowledged that Mansfield was also inspired by Bergson's philosophy, with the exception of Angela Smith's discussion in Katherine Mansfield: A Literary Life, no detailed account has been offered as to how much and in what ways Bergson's philosophy influenced Mansfield's writing. The lack of studies on this topic might seem surprising, given that Mansfield played some part in introducing the then new philosophy of Bergson to British literary society, with her colleagues, working on the Bergsonian magazine,Rhythm. Nevertheless, it is no wonder that the link between Mansfield and Bergson has not been dealt with in most studies in Mansfield's fiction, considering that her writing does not show what commentators at present commonly know as 'Bergsonian' as obviously as works by some of her contemporaries do. It might seem easier to link Bergson and writers whose famous works are experimental such as James Joyce and Virginia Woolf In this thesis, however, I argue that this view of the difference between Joyce and Woolf, who are 'Bergsonian', and Mansfield, who is not, results from basic misunderstandings and stereotypicali deas of Bergson's philosophy and Modernism in present literary criticism. Agreeing with other Mansfield critics, I find it worth noting that her fiction has not been appreciated as much as work of some of her contemporary writers such as Woolf, who was jealous of Mansfield's writing. Just like Bergson, who was extremely popular in his lifetime but soon lost his fame posthumously, Mansfield has failed to attract as much critical attention as might have been expected, although it is significant that her work is popular with common readers, and has never gone out of print. Scholars of her work have studied her as a modernist, woman, and colonial writer, but she is seldom discussed in detail in extensive studies on Modernism; her work has not been a major focus for feminist or postcolonial critics either despite the fact that she is a female New Zealand writer. I argue that the ambiguity, or duality, of Mansfield's writing in terms of nationality, gender, and class which often prevents us from reaching a lucid conclusion on these issues in her stories, is one of the causes of the difficulty of approaching Mansfield's apparently simple writing. Although her well planned ambiguity, like Bergson's, might cause her ideas to be wrongly interpreted as inconsistent at times, I see it as her crucial link with Bergson, or as a strong piece of evidence of her modernity. The aim of this thesis is to reassess Mansfield from multiple perspectives by closely examining her connections with Bergson.

William Faulkner is famous for stating he agrees with Henri Bergson's optimistic philosophy of time, a philosophy that emphasizes human freedom and action precisely as they relate to time. However, many of Faulkner's characters are defined by their stagnant and lethargic personalities which cannot change; these characters are held immobile by an over – identification with the rich history of their mythic, southern past. This paper, through in depth explorations of Faulkner's masterpieces, Absalom, Absalom! and The Sound and The Fury seeks to consider human mythmaking as the key to understanding Faulkner's difficult works. This critical approach allows us to better understand these works as conflicts between diachronic (linear or "normal") time and synchronic time (mythological or circular) time or more simply conflicts between the brute, inexorable world of fact and the human, meaning making world that is often a specious undermining of reality and change.

Under de senaste två åren har jag genomfört min masterutbildning i komposition vid Kungliga Musikhögskolan i Stockholm. I det här arbetet gör jag en undersökning och ett formulerande av de tankar som kommit ur – och styrt – mitt komponerande, mitt lyssnande och mitt lärande under dessa två år. Begreppet anslag blir här en ledsagare för tanken och arbetet inleds med skapandet begreppet. Därefter presenteras och analyseras sex av de musikverk jag komponerat under masterutbildningen. Ingången till de sex verk som presenteras sker från vitt skilda håll, i hopp om att bredda förståelsen kring uppkomsten av begreppet anslag och att fördjupa dess dubbelverkande utbyte med musiken. Genom begreppet anslag bli skapandet av musik ett instrument med vilket undersökningar av världen och existensen tycks mer möjliga att påbörja.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-01-31T10:51:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Avila Matede.pdf: 520347 bytes, checksum: 7df3337231397ebbea1aa088a622f442 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-01-31T10:51:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Avila Matede.pdf: 520347 bytes, checksum: 7df3337231397ebbea1aa088a622f442 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-01-23 / Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico - CNPq / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The following work presents aspects of the philosophies of Heraclitus and Parmenides through the courses given by Bergson at the University of Clermont-Ferrand between 1884 and 1898 before publishing his first work, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Bergson’s perspective is highlighted in relation to the doctrines of Heraclitus and Parmenides in order to clarify the restorative effects of his interpretation, which renews important concepts of these philosophers at the same time as showing features of his future philosophy. We believe a deep study of Bergson’ s courses will contribute both to the research of his mature philosophy as well as to research in Greek philosophy / O trabalho a seguir se insere numa proposta geral que visa apresentar aspectos das filosofias de Heráclito e Parmênides através dos cursos ministrados por Bergson na Universidade de Clermont-Ferrand entre 1884 e 1898, período anterior a publicação de sua primeira obra Ensaio sobre os dados imediatos da conesciência. Ressaltaremos a perspectiva de Bergson em relação às doutrinas de Heráclito e Parmênides, de modo a tornar claros os efeitos restauradores de sua interpretação capaz de renovar os conceitos caros a esses filósofos, da mesma forma que torna patente traços de sua filosofia futura. Acreditamos que um estudo aprofundado dos cursos de Bergson contribui tanto para a pesquisa das obras de sua filosofia madura quanto para a pesquisa no campo da filosofia grega

O presente estudo tem como objetivo analisar as abordagens interpretativa e processual dos Estudos Organizacionais, expressas nas obras de seus principais autores – Karl Weick e Robert Cooper, discutindo sua relação com a filosofia do processo de Henri Bergson. Esta análise é executada no intuito de que, em se verificando uma aproximação entre estas abordagens e a filosofia bergsoniana – seus conceitos pilares e o método intuitivo – seja possível vislumbrar uma teoria do conhecimento em base processual, uma “epistemologia do processo”. A motivação para realização deste estudo deu-se por duas principais razões. A primeira é decorrente do meu próprio estranhamento e interesse, seguido de questionamentos que me levaram ao aprofundamento nas propostas destas abordagens e nas leituras dos seus principais autores. A segunda é que, em executando esta aproximação com a filosofia de Bergson e vislumbrando uma teoria do conhecimento em base processual, a negligência com que estas abordagens são tratadas dentro da área dos Estudos Organizacionais dominantes (mainstream) seja diminuída. A referência utilizada para a execução do trabalho dirigiu-se, em função da sua própria natureza, para a hermenêutica – mais especificamente para a hermenêutica filosófica de Hans-Georg Gadamer, que permite uma interpretação geradora de conhecimento político-moral engajado e preocupado. Por fim, o trabalho apresenta as considerações e os resultados da análise das abordagens processuais à luz da filosofia de Bergson, verificando que, embora estas abordagens entendam a realidade como processual, elas carecem de alinhamento ontológico e epistemológico com a filosofia do processo bergsoniana. Entretanto, ao entender e compreender a realidade sob a ótica do processo, denotando uma axiologia processual, ambas as abordagens abrem possibilidades interessantes para o reposicionamento das Teorias Organizacionais. Estas possibilidades permitirão discutir a falácia da centralidade, armadilha positiva e funcional que os Estudos Organizacionais são tentados a assumir quando entendem o processo e o movimento não como algo natural e constante, mas como exceção e hiato. / This study aims to analyze the processual and interpretative approach of Organisational Studies, expressed in the writings of its main authors - Karl Weick and Robert Cooper, discussing its relationship to the process philosophy of Henri Bergson. This analysis is performed in order that, in noting a connection between these approaches and Bergson’s philosophy - his core concepts and the intuitive method - it is possible to envision a theory of knowledge on a processual basis, an "epistemology of the process." The motivation for this study had two main reasons. The first is due to my own amazement, followed by questions that led me to go deeper on the proposals of these approaches and readings of its main authors. The second is that in executing this approach with the philosophy of Bergson, and overlooking a theory of knowledge on a processual basis, the neglect that these approaches are treated within the area of Organisational Studies (mainstream) could be decreased. The reference used for the execution of the study was, on according to its own nature, the hermeneutics – specifically the hermeneutical philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, which allows the generation of a moral-political knowledge, engaged and positioned (Schwandt , 2003). Finally, the study presents the findings of the analysis of the processual approach to the philosophy of Bergson, noting that although these approaches understand reality as process, they lack ontological and epistemological alignment with the process philosophy of Bergson. However, in understanding and comprehending the reality from a process perspective, denoting an axiology of process, both approaches open up exciting and interesting possibilities for the repositioning of Organisational Theories. These possibilities will discuss the fallacy of centrality, the positive and functional trap that Organisational Studies are tempted to fall when understanding the process and the movement as something not natural and not constant, but as exception and hiatus.

This study is concerned with the spiritual impetus and the lived dimension of the philosophy of the French Thomist Jacques Maritain in light of John Caputo's Heideggerian critique of Thomist metaphysics. In Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics, Caputo argues that the thought of Thomas Aquinas, probably the most important and most representative figure of orthodox Catholic thinking, is a paradigmatic case of what Martin Heidegger calls 'ontotheology'. This is the dominating tendency of Western philosophy and theology to view Being not as a mystery, but metaphysically as a mere collection of things which are simply present- external to the human being and the value of which is use. For Aquinas, according to Caputo, God is the highest 'being' that creates other 'beings', and it is in virtue of this relationship that human beings, allegedly made in God's image, view the world simply as a collection of things to be manipulated. The first question constituting this study's point of departure, then, is: if Aquinas is indeed an exemplar of ontotheological thinking, is the same true of Jacques Maritain, perhaps the twentieth century's most influential follower and interpreter of Thomas Aquinas? Yet in the same work Caputo also proclaims that what has been said is not the whole truth about Aquinas, and the argument that his thought is an instance of ontotheology is in fact what Caputo sets out to respond to-for the sake of recovering an Aquinas who was not a 'cold rationalist', but a spiritually gifted contemplative, a Catholic saint. Caputo makes the case that we can, by employing a method of 'retrieval' or 'deconstruction'-inspired by Heidegger and Jacques Derrida-find that which is hidden or left 'unthought' in Aquinas but which nevertheless determines his entire philosophical and religious life. This, Caputo argues, is a pre-metaphysical, mystical tendency directed towards the mystery of being, which overcomes metaphysics and escapes ontotheology. Here I apply this Heideggerian critique and retrieval to Maritain, and I argue that while there is in Maritain the same 'ontotheological' tendency to view reality as a collection of things and God as paradigmatic maker of things-the prima causa so richly expressed in Thomistic doctrines of the 'transcendentals' and participative being-there is in him a deep pre-metaphysical, mystical tendency which is, in fact, far more explicit than in Aquinas. In the first part of the study, I compare the philosophical doctrines and projects of Maritain and his first teacher and guide, Henri Bergson, and then of Heidegger in relation to Maritain. I also give a sketch of Maritain's religious and intellectual development, identifying the key religious and artistic figures involved: the novelist Léon Bloy and the painter Georges Rouault. In light of the philosophical analyses and what can be gleaned from Maritain's biographical notes, his correspondence, and the biographical insights provided by those close to him, I argue that we can see in Maritain the same concern for the question of the meaning of being in relation to human life that we find in Heidegger, and that, like Heidegger, this concern underlies his philosophical thought and serves as the impetus for something beyond philosophy. I show that from his Bergsonian beginnings to his later days as a Little Brother of Jesus, Maritain has a profound sense of the pre-conceptual and intuitive kinds of knowledge that we find in existentialist thinkers such as Heidegger, and also artists and mystics. I posit that while Maritain claims what he calls the 'intuition of being' is the most primordial experience human beings can have of ultimate reality, there is, in fact, an experience, or aspiration to have such an experience, which is even more basic, with greater implications for overcoming metaphysics and ontotheology: mystical communion with ultimate reality. The aspiration for such communion is, I claim, the 'unthought' in Maritain that must be sought out for the purpose of retrieving a Maritain who goes beyond metaphysics. Mapping out the main branches of Maritain's thinking about being in terms of the classical doctrine of the 'transcendentals' and corresponding instances of connatural knowledge, the second part of the study is devoted to finding where, in Maritain's thought, a retrieval might be possible. Examining Maritain's conceptions of the connatural experience-knowledge of the moral good and mystical experience, I conclude that we cannot discover any overcoming of metaphysics and ontotheology in either when they are taken on their own terms. For underlying both conceptions, I claim, is Maritain's 'master concept' of the 'act of existence', or esse, the metaphysical principle which makes it possible for the human being to take hold of their own existence and participate in the moral and divine life. The distinction between esse and the essence of beings (essentia) and a stress on the former, as Caputo argues with regard to Aquinas, in fact only supports Heidegger's thesis on the ontotheological character of Thomist thought. For a stress on esse, the principle by which God creates and sustains things in existence is only the outcome of a preoccupation with conceiving God primarily as the 'maker' of things. And what of esse when it comes to mystical experience? Mystical experience, Maritain says, is that of which metaphysical wisdom 'awakens a desire' even while it is unable to attain it, such that the testimony of it, such as that provided by St. John of the Cross, 'no philosophical commentary will ever efface'. Yet here, too, esse only serves to make an unbridgeable ontological and cognitive divide between God as viewed in terms of His causal transcendence and as an intentional object of consciousness, as presence- something or someone external to oneself. This is so even as one is, in virtue of the connatural experience-knowledge of love, united with Him in 'one spirit', as Maritain says, following St. John of the Cross. Given this, I seek a retrieval of Maritain elsewhere, in the richest and most original areas of his thought: the connatural experience-knowledge of the artist and the relationship between the artist and the mystic. For Maritain, true artists and mystics are not concerned with reducing reality to manageable chunks but with expressing the mystery of reality, and, as I demonstrate in the final two chapters, it is when the vocations of the Catholic artist and the Catholic mystic converge in Maritain's reflections-in the cases of Léon Bloy, St. John of the Cross, and Maritain's wife Raïssa-that we are able to retrieve a Maritain that, while very much remaining a Catholic philosopher, is also a mystic. I claim that it is when his thought is situated in its wider existential and religious context that Maritain as both thinker and contemplative escapes the charge of ontotheology because there exists in him a primordial and utterly determining mystical aspiration to experience a communion in love with ultimate reality, best expressed in terms of poetic and mystical language, rather than the metaphysical language of Thomist philosophy. Essential in demonstrating this are events in Maritain's life as well as people-artists and mystics-who reveal the mystery of Being to him. Toward the end of the study, I claim that this immanent mysticism in Maritain-which, unlike that of Caputo's retrieved Aquinas-balances apophatic and cataphatic elements and, as such, is complex and profound enough to render the categories of contemporary debate on the nature of mysticism and mystical experience in need of revision.

This thesis introduces pathogenesis as methodology for a vitalist metaphysics, where life is understood as emerging and developing through functioning and grounding. This methodology is defined in an analysis of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, whose work is used as central resource alongside the work of historical figures – Plato, Hume, Kant, Bergson and Nietzsche – and contemporary writings on Deleuze as secondary resources. The analysis proceeds by problematising the related concepts of function and ground in relation to Deleuze’s vitalist philosophy and in relation to the supplementary material indicated.

What does it mean to say that something is “temporal” or that something “exists” in time? What is time? And how should we interpret the “ontology” of time? One important strand in twentieth century thought and the philosophy of time has given these fundamental questions a neat and tidy set of influential answers—according to this view, time itself is understood to be a kind of series, and the basic ontology of time is taken to consist of events, together with either the tenses, which get interpreted as special sorts of second order properties known as “A properties” (i.e. the properties of being either Past, Present, or Future), or with special sorts of second order relations, known as “B relations” (i.e. the relations of “earlier than”, “later than”, or “simultaneous with”) which are typically referred to as tenseless. According to this particular view, taken together, A properties and B relations are understood to exhaust the ontology of time. This is an interpretation that has been typically found throughout much of the philosophical literature on the metaphysics of time throughout the twentieth century despite the fact that both of these prospective temporal ontologies had already been shown early on to face a major problem—McTaggart's paradox (1908). According to the paradox, regardless of whichever ready-made ontology we ultimately opt for, we still are led to the same ineluctable conclusion—that time is unreal. For the better half of the twentieth century, philosophers of time, science, and language have struggled with this paradox in different ways, in various attempts to wrest their own preferred categories of temporal being from its grasp, in order to redeploy them in the course of developing a number of competing metaphysical accounts of time, which get characterized technically, as either “A” or “B” theories of time, depending primarily on whether their respective ontology remains either tensed or tenseless. What has thus emerged over the course of the past century, has been a growing preference among philosophers for interpreting temporal ontology along strictly A theoretical or B Theoretical lines, which has rendered this particular strand of thought a highly influential one with respect to a large portion of our contemporary understanding of temporal ontology, which remains one that ultimately boils down to a choice between A properties or B relations, as evidenced by Broad (1923), Smart (1963), Prior (1970), Mellor (1985), Oaklander and Smith (1994), Inwagen and Zimmerman (1998), Smith and Jokic (2003), Sider (2011), Tallant (2013), etc. Further evidence of this view can also be located not just within both A and B theories of time—which include both tensed and tenseless theories—but also within theories of presentism and eternalism, as well as within recent relationalist and substantivalist accounts of time. In the dissertation, it is argued that a common background assumption within these various accounts of time, perhaps one of the most basic and most wide-spread, turns out to be fallacious. More precisely, an extended argument is developed against the common and basic assumption found within these views that it is appropriate to depict time as consisting of either an A series or a B series in the first place. This metaphysical assumption is referred to as the “SER thesis”. The dissertation aims to show that any such serialized interpretation of time fails to be sufficiently distinguishable from what are merely formalized spatial representations or spatializations of time, and that when viewed from the standpoint of developing a viable metaphysics of time, any such formalized spatializations ultimately appear to result in something like a contradiction. Some objections are then raised to this main line of argument, where it is further shown, that the most intuitive strategies for replying to it are unsuccessful in the end, and serve only to supply us with various ways of masking the real problem, since each of these strategies seem themselves to commit some form of the ignoratio elenchi or red herring fallacies. In the remaining portions of the dissertation, a revisionary approach to the question of temporal ontology that seems capable of avoiding some of these problems is briefly sketched out. This approach employs the resources of a hermeneutic phenomenology of temporality to try and help us get outside of the standard view that is supplied by the A-B tradition and provide us with an alternative starting point. This approach draws heavily from the work of McTaggart's early twentieth century contemporaries Henri Bergson (1889) and Martin Heidegger (1927).

《亞里斯多德場所觀》一文是柏格森在1889年寫作的論文，筆者會以此文為題，一方面是由於對柏格森哲學的興趣，一方面乃是對強調綿延和時間的柏格森，會在早期著作中對亞里斯多德的場所觀進行討論的原因產生好奇。因此，本文由探討柏格森如何討論亞里斯多德的場所開始，企圖了解柏格森為何如此討論亞里斯多德的場所、有何看法及其批評背後的理由。 為了解柏格森討論亞里斯多德背後的理由，本論文分為五個部分討論：第一個部分為導論，先介紹柏拉圖的空間 ( chôra ) 觀，而後陳述亞里斯多德的場所 ( topos ) ，對空間與場所議題作一個概略式的理解。從第一章開始，會隨著柏格森對亞里斯多德場所的分析，一步步分析出亞里斯多德的場所觀。首先，討論柏格森對亞里斯多德場所設定的討論，排除一些不屬於場所的東西。而在排除不屬於場所的東西後，第二章討論柏格森所推導出的亞里斯多德的場所的定義，以及柏格森所提出的問題和批評，而後，柏格森認為亞里斯多德的場所就是空間的結論。接著，筆者參考柏格森在1990年寫的《意識的直接與料》、《物質與記憶》、《形上學導論》，以及康德與萊布尼茲的說法，在第三章進一步對柏格森所理解的空間進行探討與再思考。最後，在結論的部分，說明筆者認為柏格森討論亞里斯多德的場所的理由，並引入德勒茲的詮釋，初探在德勒茲的詮釋下，柏格森哲學的另一種面向。 / “Aristotle’s concept of place” is an essay that Bergson wrote in 1889. I take this article as the theme of my essay, partly to my interest in the philosophy of Bergson; on the other hand, to my curious about Bergson’s reason to wrote this article. Why Bergson discussed Aristotle’s concept of place in the early work？So, I start from the way how Bergson discussed Aristotle’s concept of place, attempt to realize Bergson’s view of it, and the reason why Bergson discussed it. For realizing the reason, I will discuss it in five parts. The first part is the introduction, in which I introduce Plato’s concept of “space” ( chôra ), and discuss Aristotle’s concept of “place” ( topos ). Then, start from the Chapter Ι, I will follow to Bergson’s analyze to the concept of Aristotle’ place, and I will inference the place of Aristotle step by step. First, I will discuss the hypothesis of Aristotle’s place, and exclude some characters which not belong to Aristotle’s place. Then, in the Chapter Ⅱ, I will discuss the definition of Aristotle’s place which inference by Bergson, and the problem and critic of Bergson. And, Bergson thought Aristotle’s concept of place is space. Again, I refer to Bergson’ work like Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory, and the Introduction of Metaphysics. And otherwise, I will refer to the openion of Kant and Leibniz, too, in order to discuss and reflect the further means of Bergson’s space in the Chapter Ⅲ. Finally, in the conclusion, I will return to my curious about why Bergson discussed Aristotle’s concept of place. Then, I will sketch in the interpretation of Deleuze, in order to see another feature of Bergson’s philosophy.