Os bancos nunca foram tão grandes como depois da Crise de 2008. No momento de maior pânico, logo após a quebra do Lehman Brothers, autoridades do mundo inteiro autorizaram fusões e aquisições antes vetadas. Era preciso garantir a estabilidade do sistema financeiro alegava-se e tentar preservar a concorrência nesse instante apenas aumentaria o pânico. O Brasil não ficou imune a esse movimento. Fusões como a do Itaú com o Unibanco e aquisições como a da Nossa Caixa pelo Banco do Brasil levaram o setor a um grau de concentração nunca visto antes. A discussão entre o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE) e o Banco Central, sobre quem deve julgar tais concentrações, faz parecer que existe uma contradição entre a disciplina constitucional da defesa da concorrência e a garantia da segurança e estabilidade das instituições financeiras. O resultado é a proliferação de instituições hipertrofiadas, os megabancos, em prejuízo desses mesmos princípios da ordem concorrencial estabelecidos constitucionalmente. Os principais argumentos em favor dos megabancos seriam, primeiro, o de que as rendas derivadas de poder no mercado que estes auferem (o chamado valor de franquia) formaria um colchão que aumentaria a sua resistência no caso de choques como o de 2008. Em segundo lugar, sugere-se que esses bancos, ao crescerem, acumulariam ganhos de escala, de escopo e de eficiência custo. Este trabalho propõe que não existe nenhum antagonismo entre a defesa da concorrência e a regulação bancária tradicional, de cunho prudencial e sistêmico. Propõe ainda que o modelo dos megabancos coloca um grande risco para a sociedade, tratando-se na realidade de um movimento estratégico de grandes instituições para acumular mais poder no mercado. São dois os motivos pelos quais se defende que não existe nenhum ganho no crescimento dessas instituições. Em primeiro lugar, as economias de escala se esgotam muito cedo, proposição com amplo suporte teórico e empírico. Na previsão mais otimista, bancos com mais do que 25 bilhões de dólares em ativos já estão na área de deseconomias de escala. Tampouco existem economias de escopo que autorizem a concentração de atividades tão diversas como as de banco comercial e de investimento. Bancos que concentram muitas atividades são, na realidade, avaliados negativamente pelo mercado. Mesmo os ganhos de eficiência custo, resultantes de uma melhor gestão de instituições mal administradas, não tem suporte empírico relevante. Em segundo lugar, uma estrutura moderna do setor bancário pressupõe bancos especializados e concentrados nas áreas em que têm maior eficiência. São bancos menores, que dividem com os mercados financeiros e outros intermediários a tarefa de prover o crédito. A concorrência do mercado de capitais, de instituições não bancárias (como gestores de fundos e financeiras) e de instituições não financeiras (como redes de supermercados, correios e empresas comerciais) forçou esses bancos a fazer o descruzamento de subsídios e a abandonar as atividades em que eram menos eficientes. Os megabancos vão na contramão dessa modernização, negando os princípios da Ordem Concorrencial. A reação dessas instituições, entretanto, é contundente. Os bancos procuram o crescimento excessivo, de forma a criar as megainstituições, para colher ganhos que não vêm de uma operação mais eficiente. São ganhos provindos das inconsistências na atuação do regulador. Este trabalho propõe a extensão das doutrinas de comportamento estratégico, de forma a incluir três categorias novas de comportamentos adotados pelos megabancos: 1. Expansão Não-Eficiente de Participação no Mercado: Bancos operam muito além da escala eficiente para obter as vantagens da garantia de socorro aos grandes bancos (o too big to fail), para influenciar a regulação e aumentar lucros e, por fim, para explorar os acionistas não controladores. 2. Saturação Anticompetitiva de Mercados: Bancos acumulam produtos para além do recomendado pelos ganhos de escopo, e também agências além do que geraria ganhos de escala, para bloquear a entrada de novos concorrentes. Mostra-se neste trabalho como o excesso de agências e produtos funciona como uma barreira à entrada, o que explicaria essas expansões como um movimento preventivo. 3. Bloqueio de Modernização Pró-Competitiva: Como uma estrutura moderna do setor obriga uma redução do tamanho dos bancos e, também, uma redução da participação do setor bancário nas atividades de crédito, os bancos tentam bloquear a modernização. O bloqueio é feito através de práticas anticoncorrenciais já conhecidas, como o bloqueio ao acesso de bens essenciais (por exemplo, ao sistema de pagamentos) e as ações concertadas, entre outros. A resposta do regulador para esses comportamentos estratégicos seria a aplicação pura e simples das ferramentas do Direito Concorrencial. Este deve aplicar medidas ordenando a desconcentração de mercados e deve investigar e punir as práticas anticompetitivas. É uma atuação que difere, portanto, da regulação bancária tradicional, em que constantemente se consideram os aspectos prudenciais e sistêmicos. Isso ocorre porque, no caso desses comportamentos, o restabelecimento da livre concorrência é condição necessária e suficiente para garantir a segurança e a higidez dos mercados financeiros. Essa conclusão, aplicada ao Brasil, leva a que se deve proceder à desconcentração no setor, com a adoção de medidas compensatórias para a maioria das fusões recentemente aprovadas. Essas medidas encontram precedente significativo naquelas adotadas tanto na Europa quanto nos Estados Unidos durante a Crise de 2008. Finalmente, algumas das previsões das hipóteses desenvolvidas no trabalho são testadas empiricamente. Foi desenvolvido um modelo jurimétrico que mostra que mais competição resulta em maior estabilidade financeira. O modelo também confronta a abordagem da Nova Economia Institucional com a NeoEstruturalista, mostrando que esta última resulta em mais competição e maior estabilidade financeira. / Banks have never been as great as after the 2008 crisis. At the moment of greatest panic, just after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, authorities all around the world authorized otherwise unlawful mergers and acquisitions. It was necessary to ensure the stability of the financial system, it was claimed, and try to preserve competition right now would only increase the panic. Brazil has not been immune to this trend. Mergers such as Itaú and Unibanco and operations as the acquisition of Nossa Caixa by Bank of Brazil led the industry to a concentration degree never seen before. The discussion between the Council for Economic Defense (CADE) and the Brazilian Central Bank, about who should examine such concentrations, makes it appear that there is a contradiction between the constitutional underpinnings of antitrust policy and the ensuring of soundness and stability of financial institutions. The result is a proliferation of institutions hypertrophied, the megabanks, with unrepairable damages to the principles of competition constitutionally assured. The main arguments in favor of megabanks would be, first, that the income derived from market power they earn (franchise value) form a buffer that increases its resistance to such shocks as the 2008 Crisis. Secondly, it is suggested that banks accumulate economies of scale, scope and cost efficiency as they grow. This research proposes that there is no antagonism between antitrust law and traditiona banking regulation, more focused in prudential and systemic aspects. It also proposes the model of megabanks poses a major risk to society, since it is actually a strategic move from large institutions to accumulate more market power. There are two reasons why it is argued that there is no gain in the growth of these institutions. First, economies of scale are exhausted too early, a proposition that rests in extensive theoretical and empirical support. In the most optimistic forecast, banks with more than $ 25 billion in assets are already incurring in scale diseconomies. Nor are there economies of scope allowing the concentration of activities as diverse as commercial and investment banking. Financial institutions that concentrate many activities are actually evaluated negatively by the market. Even the cost efficiency gains resulting from better management of institutions has no relevant empirical support. Second, a modern financial system requires specialized banks, focused in areas which they have greater efficiency. They are smaller banks, which share with the financial markets and other intermediaries the task of providing credit. The competition provided by non-bank institutions (such as mutual funds and credit unions) and non-financial institutions (such as retail stores and conglomerates) forced these banks to do the unwinding of subsidies and abandon activities they were less efficient. Megabanks go against this modernization, and they are a deny of the principles of the competition order. The reaction of these institutions, however, is striking. Banks seek overgrowth in order to create megainstitutions, seizing profits that does not come from a more efficient operation. They seek gains stemmed from inconsistencies in the work of regulators. This work suggests the extension of the opportunistic behavior doctrines, in a way to include three new types of strategic behavior adopted by the megabanks: 1. Non-efficient Increase of Market Share: Banks operate far beyond efficient scale to take advantage of the implicit government guarantee of the rescuing of large banks (the too big to fail policy), to influence regulation and thus increase profits, and finally, to explore non-controlling shareholders. 2. Anticompetitive Market Crowding: Banks accumulate products beyond what is recommended in order to attain gains of scope, and also agencies in excess of what generates economies of scale, doing so to block the entry of new competitors. It is shown here how the excess branches and products acts as entry barrier, explaining these expansions as a preemptive move. 3. Blocking of Pro-Competitive Modernization: As a modern industry structure requires a reduction in the size of banks and also a reduction in the share of the banking sector in lending activities, banks try to block the modernization. This blocking is done through anticompetitive practices already known, such as denying access to essential facilities (eg, the payment system) and by adopting a collusive behavior, among others. The answer of regulators for such strategic behavior would be a pure and simple application of Competition Law remedies. They should apply measures ordering the deconcentration of markets and should investigate and punish anticompetitive practices. This approach differs from traditional banking regulation, in which constantly consideration of prudential and systemic aspects reign. This is because, in the case of these behaviors, restoring free competition is necessary and sufficient condition to ensure the safety and soundness of financial markets. This conclusion applied to Brazil, means that one must increase competition in the industry, with the adoption of compensatory measures to the most recently approved mergers. These measures have a significant precedent in the measures adopted in both Europe and the United States during the Crisis of 2008. Finally, some of the predictions of these hypotheses are tested empirically. It is developed a jurimetric model, which shows that more competition yields more financial stability. The model also confronts the New Insitutional Economics approach to the question with a neo-structuralist approach, showing that the former entails more competition and financial stability.

In chapter one, by exploiting the staggered interstate banking deregulation as exogenous shocks to bank geographic expansion, we examine the causal effect of geographic diversification on systemic risk using the gravity-deregulation approach developed in Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2013, 2016). We find that bank geographic diversification leads to higher systemic risk measured by the change in conditional value at risk (ΔCoVaR) and financial integration (Logistic(R2)). Furthermore, we document asset similarity and bank inter-connectedness as two channels to explain the documented results. The impact of geographic diversification on systemic risk is more pronounced in BHCs located in states comoving less with the U.S. aggregate economy. In chapter two, by integrating the staggered interstate bank deregulation into a gravity model, we construct a time-varying bank-specific instrument for geographic diversification, and investigate how geographic expansion affects borrowing firms’ innovation. Our approach disentangles the effects of bank deregulation on geographic expansion from competition and isolates its direct impact on innovation via the lending channel. Bank geographic diversification boosts borrowing firms’ innovation input and output, enables firms to expand innovation scope beyond core business, and enhances the economic value of innovation. We find that relaxing debt covenants and alleviating borrowers’ financial constraints are two channels through which bank geographic diversification spurs innovation. In chapter three, we construct a novel bank-specific and time-varying measure of deregulation-induced bank competition following Jiang, Levine, and Lin (2016) and Goetz (2017), and investigate the causal effect of bank competition on borrowing firm’s accounting conservatism. We find that bank competition leads to an increase in firm accounting conservatism. Moreover, we find that bank competition intensifies lenders’ monitoring in that banks impose more strict and intensive covenants on bank loans, and bank monitoring reduces the probability of default of borrowing firms, and thereby result in more conservative reporting of borrowing firms. Our findings are robust to alternative accounting conservatism measure C-Score and potential multicollinearity issue.

<p>Financial sector development can reduce poverty and promote economic growth by extending access to financial services in developing countries. Traditionally, banking in Sub-Saharan Africa has been conducted by state-owned banks. Although, evidence has shown that severe government involvement in the banking sector has proved to cause low profitability and inefficiency. During 2001, Uganda Commercial Bank, the dominant provider of banking experienced financial problems; as a result, the government had to privatize the bank. The aim of this thesis is therefore to investigate if the privatization prevented the banking sector from collapse and if it made the sector more competitive and outreaching. The main conclusion is that the privatization strongly prevented the banking sector from collapse. Since privatization, competition has increased sufficiently in urban areas of Uganda while rural areas have not experienced any significant increase in competition. Finally, we conclude that the outreach of banking has increased somewhat since the privatization, but it is still relatively poor.</p>

How Bank Competition Influences Financial Stability Abstract This paper investigates the link between financial stability and bank competition by means of the Arellano & Bond (1991) GMM model using annual panel data over the period 2000 - 2014 for 205 countries. Our data source is a new, richer and updated dataset The Global Financial Development Database available at World Bank. Due to the specifics of this dataset we are able to use new combinations of measures of financial stability and of bank competition and to study their relationship in greater depth. We find a positive link between financial stability and bank competition. Furthermore, our results provide evidence that it matters what measures of financial stability and bank competition we apply. Lastly, we ascertain that the relationship between financial stability and bank competition does not change over time. Keywords Financial Stability, Bank Competition, Dynamic GMM, the Arellano and Bond Estimator Author's e-mail VildovaRomana@gmail.com Supervisor's e-mail Roman.Horvath@gmail.com

This thesis argues that the financial sector played a positive, but limited role in British economic growth from 1850 to 1913. It examines empirically the role played by different types of financial institutions: commercial banks, stock markets and merchant banks. To this end, the thesis uses recently developed time series and dynamic panel methods for the econometric analysis, alongside new data on different parts of the financial system. The results suggest that at a national level, the growth of commercial banks had a limited impact on British economic development over the long run, and stock markets had no impact. However, changes in bank lending influenced economic growth to a significant extent in the short term. Growing conservatism in bank lending practices did not significantly increase credit constraints, as had been previously suspected. Findings from new geographically disaggregated data indicate that the spread of bank offices improved the economic performance of English and Welsh counties. Increased concentration of the banking industry did not hinder economic growth, a result that challenges widespread suggestions in the relevant literature. Moreover, the development of provincial stock exchanges – exchanges outside London - did not influence county-level economic growth, contrary to the view that they were important for the expansion of local industry. Finally, this thesis is the first to assess econometrically the role of merchant banks. It demonstrates that their trade financing activities were beneficial not only for the growth of British international trade, but also for that of the domestic economy.

Financial sector development can reduce poverty and promote economic growth by extending access to financial services in developing countries. Traditionally, banking in Sub-Saharan Africa has been conducted by state-owned banks. Although, evidence has shown that severe government involvement in the banking sector has proved to cause low profitability and inefficiency. During 2001, Uganda Commercial Bank, the dominant provider of banking experienced financial problems; as a result, the government had to privatize the bank. The aim of this thesis is therefore to investigate if the privatization prevented the banking sector from collapse and if it made the sector more competitive and outreaching. The main conclusion is that the privatization strongly prevented the banking sector from collapse. Since privatization, competition has increased sufficiently in urban areas of Uganda while rural areas have not experienced any significant increase in competition. Finally, we conclude that the outreach of banking has increased somewhat since the privatization, but it is still relatively poor.

Submitted by Rodrigo de Andrade (rodrigo.andrade@bcb.gov.br) on 2015-09-23T15:12:37Z No. of bitstreams: 1 EESPTeseRASdeAndrade.pdf: 1266696 bytes, checksum: 1b719b6fe0e4fb6ec5f537e62599baab (MD5) / Rejected by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br), reason: Boa tarde Rodrigo, Por favor, tirar o acento da palavra Getulio. Obrigada. Suzi 3799-7876 on 2015-09-23T17:38:24Z (GMT) / Submitted by Rodrigo de Andrade (rodrigo.andrade@bcb.gov.br) on 2015-09-23T18:04:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 EESPTeseRASdeAndrade.pdf: 1265756 bytes, checksum: 82c4e08660eaa9502491828c36fba380 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2015-09-23T18:09:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 EESPTeseRASdeAndrade.pdf: 1265756 bytes, checksum: 82c4e08660eaa9502491828c36fba380 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-23T18:21:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 EESPTeseRASdeAndrade.pdf: 1265756 bytes, checksum: 82c4e08660eaa9502491828c36fba380 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-08-25 / This dissertation investigates how credit institutions’ market power limits the effects of creditor protection rules on the interest rate and the spread of bank loans. We use the Brazilian Bankruptcy Reform of June/2005 (BBR) as a legal event affecting the institutional environment of the Brazilian credit market. The law augments creditor protection and aims to improve the access of firms to the credit market and to reduce the cost of borrowing. Either access to credit or the credit cost are also determined by bank industry competition and the market power of suppliers of credit. We derive a simple economic model to study the effect of market power interacting with cost of lending. Using an accounting and operations dataset from July/2004 to December/2007 provided by the Brazilian Central Bank, we estimate that the lack of competition in the bank lending industry hinders the potential reducing effect of the BBR on the interest rate of corporate loans by approximately 30% and on the spread by approximately 23%. We also find no statistical evidence that the BBR affected the concentration level of the Brazilian credit market. We present a brief report on bankruptcy reforms around the world, the changes in the Brazilian legislation and on some recent related articles in our introductory chapter. The second chapter presents the economic model and the testable hypothesis on how the lack of competition in the lending market limits the effects of improved creditor protection. In this chapter, we introduce our empirical strategy using a differences-in-differences model and we estimate the limiting effect of market power on the BBR’s potential to reduce interest rates and on the spread of bank loans. We use the BBR as an exogenous event that affects collateralized corporate loans (treatment group) but that does not affect clean consumer loans (control group) to identify these effects, using different concentration measures. In Chapter 3, we propose a two-stage empirical strategy to handle the H–Statistics proposed by Panzar and Rosse as a measure of market competition. We estimate the limiting effects of the lack of competition in replacing the concentration statistics by the H–Statistics. Chapter 4 presents a structural break test of the concentration index and checks if the BBR affects the dynamic evolution of the concentration index. / Esta dissertação investiga como o poder de mercado de instituições de crédito limita os efeitos de medidas de proteção ao credor sobre os juros de operações de crédito. Fazemos uso da Reforma na Lei de Falência Brasileira de Junho/2005 (RLF) como evento que afetou o ambiente institucional no mercado de crédito. A Lei elevou a proteção ao credor objetivando melhorar o acesso das empresas ao mercado de crédito e reduzir custos de financiamento. Tanto acesso ao crédito, quanto custos dos empréstimos são, também, determinados pela competição na indústria e pelo poder de mercado dos ofertantes. Derivamos um modelo econômico simplificado, a fim de estudarmos os efeitos da interação do poder de mercado com os custos dos empréstimos. Usando uma base de dados contábeis e de operações de crédito de Julho/2004 a Dezembro/2007, fornecida pelo Banco Central do Brasil, estimamos que a falta de competição na indústria de crédito limita em aproximadamente 30% o efeito redutor potencial da RLF sobre juros e em 23% sobre spreads. Não encontramos evidências estatísticas que a RLF afetou o nível de concentração no mercado de crédito no Brasil. Apresentamos um breve relato sobre as reformas na legislação falimentar em alguns países, as mudanças na legislação brasileira e alguns artigos recentes relacionados no capitulo introdutório. O segundo capítulo apresenta o modelo econômico e as hipóteses testáveis sobre como a falta de competição no mercado de crédito limita os efeitos da elevação da proteção ao credor. Neste capítulo, introduzimos nossa estratégia empírica usando o modelo de diferenças-em-diferenças e estimamos o efeito limitador do poder de mercado sobre o potencial da RLF em reduzir juros e spreads. Usamos a RLF como um evento exógeno que afeta empréstimos corporativos colateralizados (grupo de tratamento), mas não afeta empréstimos a consumidores (grupo de controle) com diferentes medidas de concentração. No Capítulo 3, propomos uma estratégia empírica em dois estágios, a fim de usarmos a Estatística-H proposta por Panzar e Rosse como medida de poder de mercado. Estimamos o efeito limitador da ausência de competição sobre a taxa de juros e sobre o spread, substituindo os índices de concentração pela Estatística-H. O Capítulo 4 apresenta uma análise de séries temporais do índice de concentração e testa se a RFB afetou a concentração.

This thesis studies how firms’ investment and credit are affected by different financial imperfections related to firm and bank learning, relationship lending and financial wealth. After reviewing in chapter 2 the related literature, in chapter 3 I investigate the main determinants of different types of financial constraints, such as credit rationing and excessive cost of debt, by constructing new measures of these problems based on qualitative data. I then develop in chapter 4 a model of firm investment with financial constraints and Bayesian learning that provides a new framework to analyze the problem of asymmetric learning between a bank and a firm and its effect on a firm’s investment decision. This model is used to investigate, theoretically and empirically, the relationship between firms’ investment and internal funds in the presence of limited information, learning and bankruptcy costs, providing new arguments to support a ushaped curve theory of investment and internal funds. Finally, in chapter 5 this model is used to analyze how relationship lending affects the evolution of interest rates during the life cycle of firms. / Esta tesis estudia cómo la inversión y el crédito están afectados por diferentes imperfecciones financieras relacionadas con el aprendizaje, las relaciones de crédito y la riqueza financiera. Luego de revisar la literatura relacionada, en el Capítulo 3 se investiga los principales determinantes de distintas restricciones financieras relacionadas con el acceso y las condiciones del crédito, mediante la construcción de nuevos indicadores de estos problemas. Luego, en el Capítulo 4 se desarrolla un modelo de inversión con restricciones financieras y aprendizaje Bayesiano que provee un nuevo marco para analizar el problema del aprendizaje asimétrico entre un banco y una firma y su efecto en las decisiones de inversión de esta última. Dicho modelo es utilizado para investigar de forma teórica y empírica la relación entre la inversión y los recursos propios en la presencia de información asimétrica, aprendizaje y costes de quiebra, obteniendo nuevos argumentos para apoyar la teoría de una relación en forma de U entre la inversión y los recursos propios. Finalmente, en el Capítulo 5 se estudia como una relación de crédito afecta la evolución de los tipos de interés durante el ciclo de vida de las firmas.

Submitted by ramon silva vilarins (rsvilarins@gmail.com) on 2016-06-23T12:02:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_final.pdf: 914787 bytes, checksum: f76ebd195ce25157615f7f14bebdee55 (MD5) / Rejected by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br), reason: Bom dia Ramon, Para que possamos dar andamento a sua submissão é necessário um pequeno ajuste. RESUMO E ABSTRACT não pode ter borda. Apos o ajuste submeter novamente para analise. Qualquer duvida estamos a disposição. Att, Pâmela. Tonsa on 2016-06-23T14:25:04Z (GMT) / Submitted by ramon silva vilarins (rsvilarins@gmail.com) on 2016-06-23T14:43:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_final.pdf: 914257 bytes, checksum: c2720e7e809ab96d52c03e041847360c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2016-06-23T14:48:08Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_final.pdf: 914257 bytes, checksum: c2720e7e809ab96d52c03e041847360c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-23T14:49:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_final.pdf: 914257 bytes, checksum: c2720e7e809ab96d52c03e041847360c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-06-01 / This dissertation analyzes the impact of government bailout policies on the risk of the banking sector in OECD countries between 2005 and 2013. First, in line with the moral hazard hypothesis, I verify that financial institutions with high bailout expectations assume higher risks than others. Second, I find that, in normal times, rescue guarantees to large financial institutions distort competition in the sector and increase the risk of the other institutions. However, during the recent financial crisis, increases in the rescue expectation of competitors of an institution, to the extent that they represent a reduction in its chance of bailout, decrease its risk taking. Additionally, in a crisis period, I find that the deterioration in the countries’ sovereign capacity to bailout banks is associated with lower risk taking; on average, i.e., the increase in risk taking is higher in countries with a lower credit default swap spread. / Esta tese analisa, entre 2005 e 2013, o impacto das políticas governamentais de resgate sobre o risco do setor bancário nos países da OCDE. Primeiro, em linha com a hipótese de moral hazard, verifica-se que instituições financeiras com expectativa elevada de bailout, assumem riscos mais elevados do que as demais. Segundo, constata-se que, em períodos normais, garantias de socorro às grandes instituições distorcem a competição no setor e incrementa o risco das demais. Durante a crise, entretanto, mostra-se que elevações na expectativa de resgate dos concorrentes de uma instituição, à medida que representa uma redução em sua chance de eventual socorro governamental, diminuem sua tomada de riscos. Adicionalmente, em período de crise também é evidenciado que: reduções na capacidade financeira dos países estão associadas a menor assunção de riscos; em média, o aumento na tomada de riscos é maior nos países com menor spread de Credit Default Swap.

Submitted by Camila Ziliotto Camocardi (camila.camocardi@itau-unibanco.com.br) on 2013-03-05T14:06:30Z No. of bitstreams: 1 CZC_MPFE_20130304_VPublicacao.pdf: 2794331 bytes, checksum: c52fdaf83e3a276d9b2f60f63c0ae5f8 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2013-03-05T17:19:29Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 CZC_MPFE_20130304_VPublicacao.pdf: 2794331 bytes, checksum: c52fdaf83e3a276d9b2f60f63c0ae5f8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-03-05T17:32:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 CZC_MPFE_20130304_VPublicacao.pdf: 2794331 bytes, checksum: c52fdaf83e3a276d9b2f60f63c0ae5f8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-02-04 / Este estudo tem por objetivo verificar a evolução da abertura de agências bancárias no Brasil e em específico de dois grandes bancos privados brasileiros ao longo dos anos de 1991 a 2012 e entender sua relação, seja ela de curto, médio e/ou longo prazo, com a evolução tecnológica no país, a fim de observar a correlação entre esses dois ritmos, por meio de uma regressão entre as variáveis em estudo. O que se espera inferir aqui é uma relação crescente, porém em velocidades distintas tendo em vista o grande avanço tecnológico vivenciado nos últimos 10 anos. Ao olhar as séries dos dois grandes bancos em específico, pretende-se, por meio de um teste de cointegração em séries de tempos, caracterizar um modelo explicativo da competição por posições no mercado e consequente disputa pela liderança em participação de agências. Por fim, com base nos dados de quantitativo de agências e lucratividade do Sistema Financeiro Nacional e dos dois grandes bancos estudados, pretende-se observar a relação desse ritmo (taxa de crescimento da abertura de agências) com o retorno obtido em termos de lucro por agência, seu principal ponto de venda. Ao criar estes indicadores comparativos espera-se verificar evidências a respeito de lucratividade em bancos para a configuração sugerida no Paradigma da Eficiência . O crescente uso de internet está modificando um importante traço de comportamento dos clientes potenciais que influencia sua maneira de se relacionar com os serviços financeiros e, essa dinâmica estratégica, pode servir de referência para o desenvolvimento de um novo padrão de "estabelecimento bancário". / This study aims to verify the evolution of bank branches opening in Brazil, in particular of two large Brazilian banks, from 1991 to 2012, and to understand their short, medium and/or long term relation with the technological developments in the country, in order to observe the correlation between those two rhythms through a regression between the variables under study. The inference expected here is a growing relation, but at different speeds given the major technological advances experienced in the past 10 years. By looking at the series of the two banks in particular, this study intends, through a cointegration test in time series, to characterize an explanatory model of the competition for market positions and the consequent competition for leadership in branches share. Finally, based on quantitative data from branches and profitability from both the National Financial System (SFN) and the two banks under analysis, this study aims to observe the relation of this rhythm (growth rate of branches opening) with the payoff in terms of profit per branch, its main selling point. By creating those comparative indicators, this study expects to verify evidence about banks profitability for the configuration suggested in the Efficiency Paradigm. The increasing use of internet is modifying an important behavioral trait of potential customers that influences their way of relating to financial services, and that strategic dynamics can serve as a reference for the development of a new standard for “banking establishments”.