This thesis articulates the resonances between J.M. Coetzee's lifelong engagement with mathematics and his practice as a novelist, critic, and poet. Though the critical discourse surrounding Coetzee's literary work continues to flourish, and though the basic details of his background in mathematics are now widely acknowledged, his inheritance from that background has not yet been the subject of a comprehensive and mathematically- literate account. In providing such an account, I propose that these two strands of his intellectual trajectory not only developed in parallel, but together engendered several of the characteristic qualities of his finest work. The structure of the thesis is essentially thematic, but is also broadly chronological. Chapter 1 focuses on Coetzee's poetry, charting the increasing involvement of mathematical concepts and methods in his practice and poetics between 1958 and 1979. Chapter 2 situates his master's thesis alongside archival materials from the early stages of his academic career, and thus traces the development of his philosophical interest in the migration of quantificatory metaphors into other conceptual domains. Concentrating on his doctoral thesis and a series of contemporaneous reviews, essays, and lecture notes, Chapter 3 details the calculated ambivalence with which he therein articulates, adopts, and challenges various statistical methods designed to disclose objective truth. Chapter 4 explores the thematisation of several mathematical concepts in Dusklands and In the Heart of the Country. Chapter Five considers Waiting for the Barbarians and Foe in the context provided by Coetzee's interest in the attempts of Isaac Newton to bridge the gap between natural language and the supposedly transparent language of mathematics. Finally, Chapter 6 locates in Elizabeth Costello and Diary of a Bad Year a cognitive approach to the use of mathematical concepts in ethics, politics, and aesthetics, and, by analogy, a central aspect of the challenge Coetzee's late fiction poses to the contemporary literary landscape.

Cette thèse a comme objectif de démontrer combien Alaric et ses Goths étaient Romains dans pratiquement toutes les catégories connues sur leur compte. Pour ce faire, l’auteur a puisé dans les sciences sociales et a emprunté le champ conceptuel de l’éminent sociologue Pierre Bourdieu. À l’aide du concept d’habitus, entre autres choses, l’auteur a tenté de faire valoir à quel point les actions d’Alaric s’apparentaient à celles des généraux romains de son époque. Naturellement, il a fallu étaler le raisonnement au long de plusieurs chapitres et sur de nombreux niveaux. C’est-à-dire qu’il a fallu d’abord définir les concepts populaires en ce moment pour « faire » l’histoire des barbares durant l’Antiquité tardive. Pensons ici à des termes tels que l’ethnicité et l’ethnogenèse. L’auteur s’est distancé de ces concepts qu’il croyait mal adaptés à la réalité des Goths et d’Alaric. C’est qu’il fallait comprendre ces hommes dans une structure romaine, au lieu de leur octroyer une histoire et des traditions barbares. Il a ensuite fallu montrer que la thèse explorait des avenues restées peu empruntées jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Il a été question de remonter jusqu’à Gibbon pour ensuite promouvoir le fait que quelques érudits avaient autrefois effleuré la question d’Alaric comme étant un homme beaucoup moins barbare que ce que la tradition véhiculait à son sujet, tel que Fustel de Coulanges, Amédée Thierry ou encore Marcel Brion. Il s’agissait donc de valider l’angle de recherche en prenant appui d’abord sur ces anciens luminaires de la discipline. Vint ensuite l’apport majeur de cette thèse, c’est-à-dire essentiellement les sections B, C et D. La section B a analysé la logistique durant la carrière d’Alaric. Cette section a permis avant tout de démontrer clairement qu’on n’a pas affaire à une troupe de brigands révoltés; le voyage de 401-402 en Italie prouve à lui seul ce fait. L’analyse approfondie de l’itinéraire d’Alaric durant ses nombreux voyages a démontré que cette armée n’aurait pas pu effectuer tous ces déplacements sans l’appui de la cour orientale. En l’occurrence, Alaric et son armée étaient véritablement des soldats romains à ce moment précis, et non pas simplement les fédérés barbares de la tradition. La section C s’est concentrée sur les Goths d’Alaric, où on peut trouver deux chapitres qui analysent deux sujets distincts : origine/migration et comparaison. C’est dans cette section que l’auteur tente de valider l’hypothèse que les Goths d’Alaric n’étaient pas vraiment Goths, d’abord, et qu’ils étaient plutôt Romains, ensuite. Le chapitre sur la migration n’a comme but que de faire tomber les nombreuses présomptions sur la tradition gothe que des érudits comme Wolfram et Heather s’efforcent de défendre encore aujourd’hui. L’auteur argumente pour voir les Goths d’Alaric comme un groupe formé à partir d’éléments romains; qu’ils eurent été d’une origine barbare quelconque dans les faits n’a aucun impact sur le résultat final : ces hommes avaient vécu dans l’Empire durant toute leur vie (Alaric inclus) et leurs habitus ne pouvaient pas être autre chose que romain. Le dernier chapitre de la section C a aussi démontré que le groupe d’Alaric était d’abord profondément différent des Goths de 376-382, puis d’autres groupes que l’on dit barbares au tournant du 5e siècle, comme l’étaient les Vandales et les Alamans par exemple. Ensemble, ces trois chapitres couvrent la totalité de ce que l’on connait du groupe d’Alaric et en offre une nouvelle interprétation à la lumière des dernières tendances sociologiques. La section D analyse quant à elle en profondeur Alaric et sa place dans l’Empire romain. L’auteur a avant tout lancé l’idée, en s’appuyant sur les sources, qu’Alaric n’était pas un Goth ni un roi. Il a ensuite analysé le rôle d’Alaric dans la structure du pouvoir de l’Empire et en est venu à la conclusion qu’il était l’un des plus importants personnages de l’Empire d’Orient entre 397 et 408, tout en étant soumis irrémédiablement à cette structure. Sa carrière militaire était des plus normale et s’inscrivait dans l’habitus militaire romain de l’époque. Il a d’ailleurs montré que, par ses actions, Alaric était tout aussi Romain qu’un Stilicon. À dire le vrai, mis à part Claudien, rien ne pourrait nous indiquer qu’Alaric était un barbare et qu’il essayait d’anéantir l’Empire. La mauvaise image d’Alaric n’est en effet redevable qu’à Claudien : aucun auteur contemporain n’en a dressé un portrait aussi sombre. En découle que les auteurs subséquents qui firent d’Alaric le roi des Goths et le ravageur de la Grèce avaient sans doute été fortement influencés eux aussi par les textes de Claudien. / This thesis hopes to demonstrate how Alaric and his Goths were Romans in virtually all that is known about them. To do this, the author has drawn from the social sciences to take the conceptual scope of the eminent sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Using the concept of habitus, among other things, the author has tried to argue how Alaric’s ‘habits’ were similar to those of the Romans of his time. Naturally, the reasoning was spread over several chapters and on several levels. That is to say, it was first necessary to define the concepts popular at this time to "tell" the History of the Barbarians in Late Antiquity. We have to think here of terms such as ethnicity and ethnogenesis. The author has distanced himself from these concepts he thought ill-suited to the reality of the Goths and of Alaric. We should understand these men in a Roman structure, instead of granting them a History and/or barbaric traditions. He then had to show that the thesis explored avenues which have remained understudied until today. He had to start with Gibbon and work his way up the erudite chart while promoting the fact that some scholars had previously touched on Alaric as a man much less barbaric than the tradition was promoting, such as Fustel de Coulanges, Amédée Thierry and Marcel Brion. It was therefore important to validate the research angle by first acknowledging the place of these great scholars. Then came the major contribution of this thesis, that is to say essentially the sections B, C and D. Section B is focusing on the logistical side of Alaric’s story. This section have foremost allowed to demonstrate clearly that we are not dealing with a band of revolted brigands : the travel of 402 in Italy alone proves this fact. The detailed analysis of the routes taken by Alaric during his many trips demonstrates that the army could not have done all these movements without the support of the eastern court. In that case, Alaric and his army were truly Roman soldiers and not just the barbarous federated people of the tradition. Section C focus on Alaric's Goths where one can find two chapters covering two distinct areas: Origin/Migration and Comparison. It is in this section that the author attempts to support the hypothesis that the Goths of Alaric were not really Goths but rather Romans. The chapter on migration had the goal to break down many assumptions about this gothic tradition that scholars like Wolfram and Heather are still trying to defend. The author argues to see Alaric's Goths as a group formed from Roman elements; to know if in fact any of them was of barbarian stock is irrelevant to the end result : these men had lived in the Empire throughout their entire lives (Alaric included) and their habitus could not have been anything other than Roman. The last chapter of Section C showed without any doubt that the group of Alaric was firstly deeply different from the Goths of 376-382, but then also from other groups that are said to have been barbarians at the turn of the fifth century, as were the Vandals and Alamanni for example. Together, these three chapters cover the totality of what is known about the group of Alaric and offers fresh interpretation following the last trends in social sciences. The section D is for its part an in-depth analysis of Alaric and his place in the Roman Empire. The author has demonstrated above all, relying on sources, that Alaric was not a Goth nor a king. He then analyzed the role of Alaric in the power structure of the Empire and came to the conclusion that he was one of the most important men of the Eastern Empire between 397 and 408, while still being totally dependant on that structure. His whole military career up to 397 was unassuming and was part of the Roman military habitus of the time. He also showed that by his actions, Alaric was also as Roman as Stilicho. To tell the truth, apart from Claudian, nothing could tell us that Alaric was a barbarian and was trying to destroy the Empire. The bad image of Alaric is liable only to Claudian alone : no contemporary writer did draw such a dark portrait of him. It follows that subsequent authors who made Alaric the king of the Goths and the destructor of Greece must had followed Claudian as well.

According to the orthodox priest John Meyendorff, the Byzantine dream consisted of the establishment of a universal Christian empire spiritually and politically governed by the emperor of Constantinople. This essay intends to shed light on the topic of Byzantine religious and political expansion in the context of Byzantine view on Barbaricum and the barbarians inhabiting it. The fundamental question asked is: how do the Byzantines view the barbarians outside the Byzantine Empire and in what sense, if any, does this view have implications for the Byzantine dream? To answer the question the essay examines four 6th century historians, namely: Procopius of Caesarea, Johannes Malalas, Menander Protector and Agathias of Myrina. The method being used is a hermeneutical method and the theoretical framework is made up of Edward Said’s Orientalism. The results indicate that the barbarians in Barbaricum were viewed upon with great distrust. The Byzantines considered the barbarians to be ontologically different from themselves. Furthermore, the Byzantines regarded the barbarians behaviour as uncivilized. The typical barbarian was deemed to be wild, cruel, irrational, mostly religiously backwards, lacking in education and, more often than not, displaying arrogance and boasting. At the same time they were mystified, and thought of as physically impressive beings capable of unnatural strength. Consequently, the barbarians were viewed upon as creatures of lust and physicality rather than, like the Byzantines, beings of rationality and sense. The conclusion can be made that the Byzantines regarded Barbaricum in much the same manner as the postcolonial powers regarded the Orient – through the construction of a dichotomy between the self and the other. Concerning the Byzantine adherence to the Byzantine dream as expressed by John Meyendorff, to spread the Byzantine Empire beyond its borders and consume Barbaricum by political and religious means, the results indicate that there are reasons to question Meyendorff’s assumption. It’s plausible that there indeed were Byzantine inclinations to transform Barbaricum. Furthermore, the results indicate that the Byzantine view of the barbarians played some part in shaping that inclination. It’s, however, also plausible that while the Byzantines may have strived to transform Barbaricum, it doesn’t neccessarily follow that it had to succumb to Byzantine imperial authority. The investigated sources seem to suggest that the primary Byzantine goal was solely to transform Barbaricum religiously and politically into something that resembled the Byzantine Empire but wasn’t necessarily a full fledged part of it.

The Íslendingasögur, written in Iceland in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, primarily describe the lives of Icelanders during the tenth and eleventh centuries. Many of these lives involve encounters with foreign peoples, both abroad and in Iceland, who are portrayed according to stereotypes which vary depending on the origins of those people. Notably, inhabitants of the places identified in the sagas as Írland, Skotland and Vínland are portrayed as being less civilized than the Icelanders themselves. This thesis explores the ways in which the Íslendingasögur emphasize this relative barbarity through descriptions of diet, material culture, style of warfare, and character. These characteristics are discussed in relation to parallel descriptions of Icelandic characters and lifestyle within the Íslendingasögur, and also in the context of a tradition in contemporary European literature which portrayed the Icelanders themselves as barbaric. Innovatively, comparisons are made with descriptions of barbarians in classical Roman texts, primarily Sallust, but also Caesar and Tacitus. Taking into account the availability and significance of classical learning in medieval Iceland, the comparison with Roman texts yields striking similarities between Roman and Icelandic ideas about barbarians. It is argued that the depiction of foreigners in the Íslendingasögur is almost identical to that of ancient Roman authors, and that the medieval Icelanders had both means and motive to use Roman ideas for inspiration in their own portrayal of the world. Ultimately it is argued that when the medieval Icelanders contemplated the peoples their Viking Age ancestors encountered around the world, they drew on classical ideas of the barbarian to complement the mix of oral tradition, literary inspiration and contemporary circumstance that otherwise form the Íslendingasögur.

L’armée de Gaule sous le Bas-Empire fut une des trois armées principales de l’Empire romain. Son évolution de la fin du IIIe siècle jusqu’au début du Ve fut marquée par une réorganisation graduelle dans le commandement, ainsi que dans l’organisation des troupes et des fortifications. Ces réformes ont fait l’objet d’études qui ont dressé un schéma de déploiement des troupes resté longtemps populaire. À ce schéma s’est ensuite ajoutée l’idée de la stratégie à grande échelle qui y aurait été associée. Ce mémoire tâche de dresser une synthèse des derniers travaux sur l’armée romaine tardive en Gaule. L’approche choisie repose sur une réévaluation des sources sans l’influence d’un schéma défensif préconçu, ainsi que sur une critique de certaines idées reçues concernant l’armée romaine du IVe siècle. / The army stationed in Gaul during the Later Empire was one of the three main armies available to the Roman Empire. Its evolution from the late IIIrd century to the early Vth century was marked by reforms applied gradually to the high command, and to the organization of troops and fortifications. These measures have interested scholars who established a model of troop deployment which enjoyed great popularity over a long period of time. The idea of strategy applied on a great scale was later included in this concept. This thesis proposes a synthesis of the latest research on the late Roman army in Gaul. The selected approach of analysis is based on a reevaluation of the sources without the bias of a preconceived defensive model. Some obsolete ideas regarding the late Roman army will also be subject to criticism.

L’armée de Gaule sous le Bas-Empire fut une des trois armées principales de l’Empire romain. Son évolution de la fin du IIIe siècle jusqu’au début du Ve fut marquée par une réorganisation graduelle dans le commandement, ainsi que dans l’organisation des troupes et des fortifications. Ces réformes ont fait l’objet d’études qui ont dressé un schéma de déploiement des troupes resté longtemps populaire. À ce schéma s’est ensuite ajoutée l’idée de la stratégie à grande échelle qui y aurait été associée. Ce mémoire tâche de dresser une synthèse des derniers travaux sur l’armée romaine tardive en Gaule. L’approche choisie repose sur une réévaluation des sources sans l’influence d’un schéma défensif préconçu, ainsi que sur une critique de certaines idées reçues concernant l’armée romaine du IVe siècle. / The army stationed in Gaul during the Later Empire was one of the three main armies available to the Roman Empire. Its evolution from the late IIIrd century to the early Vth century was marked by reforms applied gradually to the high command, and to the organization of troops and fortifications. These measures have interested scholars who established a model of troop deployment which enjoyed great popularity over a long period of time. The idea of strategy applied on a great scale was later included in this concept. This thesis proposes a synthesis of the latest research on the late Roman army in Gaul. The selected approach of analysis is based on a reevaluation of the sources without the bias of a preconceived defensive model. Some obsolete ideas regarding the late Roman army will also be subject to criticism.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-01T11:58:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 9895320 bytes, checksum: df7252cc03f7f058ce75a4c24c03427b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-10-18 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This dissertation investigates the formation of the urban network in the Hinterland of Piranhas and Piancó throughout the eighteenth century. The urban network is understood from the urbanizing policy implemented by colonial agents, the State, the Church and the economic agents, that sparked the occurrence of fixed points (villages to indoctrinate the natives, barracks, villages, towns and cities) and communication routes, linked to the flows generated by the expansion process of cattle ranching. The main objective is to check how was the structure of this urban network in the Hinterland of Piranhas and Piancó in the eighteenth century, through the activities of colonization agents. This is a research of historical synthesis that adopted, as the main procedure, an analysis of historiography and written documentation and cartographic on the issue. Was concluded that the formation of an urban network, in Hinterland of Piranhas and Piancó, occurred in the first half of the eighteenth century, linked to the process of War of the Barbarians", resulting in barracks and in villages to indoctrinate the natives; and, in the second half of the eighteenth century, marked by post-war, was implemented a policy of forming villages, initially established in Pombal's Period (1750 - 1777) and conducted to the rest of the century. In parallel, throughout the eighteenth century, was verified a formation of chapels for the installation of settlements, as a result of the interests of landowners in their local setting, through donations of land assets, which gave the initial apparatus for its existence. It is intended to contribute to the study of eighteenth-century urban history of Paraíba from these findings. / A presente dissertação tem por objeto de investigação a formação da rede urbana no Sertão de Piranhas e Piancó ao longo do século XVIII. A rede urbana é entendida a partir da política urbanizadora executada pelos agentes coloniais, o Estado, a Igreja e os agentes econômicos, que proporcionou o surgimento de pontos fixos (aldeamentos, arraiais, povoações, vilas e cidades) e de vias de comunicação, vinculados aos fluxos gerados pelo processo de expansão da pecuária. O objetivo central é verificar como se deu a estruturação dessa rede urbana no Sertão de Piranhas e Piancó no século XVIII, através da atuação dos agentes da colonização. Trata-se de um trabalho de síntese histórica que adotou, como procedimento principal, uma análise da história e da documentação escrita e cartográfica sobre o tema. O resultado identificou que a formação de uma rede urbana, no Sertão de Piranhas e Piancó, ocorreu na primeira metade do século XVIII, vinculada ao processo de Guerra dos Bárbaros , tendo como resultado os arraiais e os aldeamentos de índios em missões; e, na segunda metade do século XVIII, marcada pelo pós-guerra, houve a realização de uma política de formação de vilas, instituída inicialmente no Período Pombalino (1750 1777) e conduzida ao restante do século. Em paralelo, ao longo de todo o século XVIII, foi verificada a formação de capelas para instalação de povoações, pelos interesses dos proprietários rurais em definir seu poder local, através de doações de patrimônios de terras, que dava o aparato inicial para a sua existência. Busca-se, a partir de tais constatações, contribuir para os estudos da história urbana na Paraíba setecentista.

La présente recherche sous la direction de J.-M. Carrié, a porté sur les fédérés (foederati), ces combattants barbares servant dans leurs contingents ethnico-tactiques sous commandement de leurs chefs ethniques. Les fédérés étaient fournis par des groupes ethniques alliés de l’Empire dans le cadre de traités (foedus/foedera, spondê/spondai, synthêkê/synthêkai) : des gentes foederatae, enspondoi, hypospondoi, ces termes soulignant le lien diplomatique entre l’Empire et la gens. A la dimension diplomatique, s’ajoute la dimension militaire exprimée dans le vocabulaire de l’alliance (societas, symmachia), de l’auxiliariat (auxilium) ainsi que dans celui de l’amitié (amicitia/philia). L’analyse terminologique montre que les auteurs anciens utilisent le vocabulaire classique comme un filtre qu’il faut dépasser pour appréhender les fédérés. Une analyse fine et contextualisée des sources restituant une stratigraphie sémantique et révélant les anachronismes d'historiens décrivant d'après la situation de leur époque des phénomènes passés, a permis de souligner cette évolution masquée par la continuité terminologique. L’apparition des termes techniques foederati et phoideratoi au Ve siècle ne doit pas tromper. Il faut interpréter le terme foederati à partir des années 400 comme le recours à un terme républicain ancien pour désigner un nouvel aspect d’une réalité connue des Romains – celle des contingents fournis par les alliés selon des traités – notamment depuis le basculement stratégique des guerres danubiennes sous Marc Aurèle qui annoncent les difficultés à venir de l’Empire au IIIe siècle – puis aux Ve et VIe siècles – et la nécessité pour ce dernier de trouver des solutions aux périls pesant sur l’ordre impérial : le recours au substantif foederati permettait de nommer des combattants levés par traités auprès de gentes établies sur le sol impérial (gentes foederatae intra fines imperii), les Goths incarnant, après Andrinople, les premières gentes établies par traités dans l’Empire, alors que le terme désignait les contingents ethnico-tactiques fournis par des gentes foederatae extérieures au territoire impérial. Il faut distinguer les foederati extérieurs fournis par les gentes foederatae extérieures des foederati impériaux fournis par les gentes établies dans l’Empire à partir des années 380-400. Si le phénomène des foederati est ancien, les admissions territoriales de gentes par foedera/spondai lui conférèrent de nouveaux aspects. Par l’établissement territorial de gentes intra fines imperii, l’Empire appliquait à des groupes un mode de gestion de relations romano-barbares réservé aux gentes extérieures au territoire impérial : la conclusion de traités. Pris dans une logique de rapports de force, sur son sol et sur ses confins, l’Empire devait utiliser ces gentes selon ses intérêts. L’étude montre que l’Empire tenta de maîtriser le phénomène en intégrant les foederati au système militaire impérial suivant des besoins militaires, tactiques et stratégiques. Le recours aux chefs comme médiateurs entre leurs gentes, leurs fédérés et l’Empire a été fondamental. La volonté de contrôle de l’Etat impérial se mesure également à l’intégration des foederati au système logistique (ravitaillement, rémunérations, entretien) de la machine de guerre impériale. On peut se demander si l’Etat impérial n’a pas conçu les foederati comme un outil permettant de gérer différemment les ressources militaires, humaines et financières nécessaires à la défense de l’Empire. A cette fin, l’idéologie impériale a développé un discours justifiant l’emploi par l’Empire de ses gentes foederatae avec des objectifs stratégiques répondant aux défis auxquels l’Empire fut confronté de la fin du IIIe siècle au début du VIIe siècle. / The federates (foederati, symmachoi, auxiliares) were soldiers recruited among barbarian groups (gentes) – settled inside or outside the Empire – who committed by treaties (foedus/foedera ; spondê/spondai) to provide the Emperor with warriors serving on their owns.The study tries to show that the Empire attempted to control this phenomenon by including the foederati to the imperial military system in accordance with military needs and specific tactics.The will of control from the imperial state is also measured by the integration of the foederati into the imperial logistical system during military operations (food supplies, payment, and maintenance).One can wonder if the imperial state didn’t create the foederati as a tool allowing to manage – in a different way – the military, human, and financial resources required to the defense of the Empire.To that purpose, the imperial ideology seems to have set up a speech to justify and legitimate the employment by the Empire of these gentes foederatae (enspondoi, hypospondoi) with strategic goals/aims, in agreement with the challenges the Empire was confronted by from the end of the 3rd century to the beginning of the 7th (century).