The following thesis conducted a case study to investigate the opinion of exper ts working on the Bombay-Ahmadabad HSR and Ankara-Istanbul HSR on how China uses HSRD and BRI to develop and utilize its soft power and whether that opinion ma tches the official Chinese point of view. The official Chinese view about BRI is that it seeks to deliver win-win outcomes, development, and improvement of lives for partici pating countries. In addition, it 'has no geopolitical motives, seeks no exclusionary bl ocs, and imposes no business deals on others … addresses people's desire for a better l ife … and shared benefits.' Ramo (2007)'s operationalization of the term global image was used to assess the respondents' opinions. The results showed that there is low dependability of the overa ll BRI among the respondents. A majority of the respondents (60%) claimed that BRI and HSRD are successful but were not impressed by the delivered value and quality o f BRI. 70% of the respondents believed that the Bombay-Ahmadabad HSR would ach ieve its objective and that it had a high level of technology. In terms of financial, socia l and political impact, the responses showed proportions of 40%, 37%, 44% respectiv ely gave a positive answer. Overall, it can be concluded that in terms of image the Bo mbay-Ahmadab gave...

China has gone through a phase of rapid economic development in the last four decades. The country is the world’s biggest economy, measured in GDP purchasing power parity terms, and the largest trading nation in terms of the total sum of exports and imports of merchandise trade. With the launch of the century’s largest infrastructure project – the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – by Xi Jinping in 2013, China is planning to revive the Ancient Silk Roads in order to gain geopolitical power beyond Asia. Thus far, huge flows of FDI have already made their way from China to countries along the Belt and Road, especially the ones in need of additional infrastructure provision. In this paper, the effect of Chinese outward FDI on economic growth in the BRI economies through infrastructure development is examined, thereby conducting a cross-country analysis with panel data for 34 and 27 countries, respectively, over the period 2005–2017. The direct effect of Chinese FDI on economic growth in BRI countries is ambiguous, supporting previous literature on FDI and economic growth. When adding infrastructure indicators to the regressions and accounting for the endogeneity problem, the effect of Chinese FDI on economic growth changes but remains insignificant, nevertheless. This is most likely due to the reduced sample sizes, on the one hand, and the fact that Chinese construction contracts play a bigger role than actual FDI in the BRI.

一帶一路倡議是中國第五代領導人的政策之一，應該被視為整體戰略的一部分。為了評估一帶一路倡議的實際目的與風險，研究中國地緣政治與社會經濟局勢、前幾代中國領導人的政策（如西部大開發）、現任第五代領導人的政策（如中國夢與四個全面）。雖然並非與其它相關的分析相互排斥，結論指出一帶一路與第五代領導人其它政策具有協同效應、同時面對相對的急迫性，是中國第五代領導人經濟改革、輸出國營企業生產能力過剩、減輕資產泡沫破裂風險的工具之一。 / The Belt and Road Initiative is one corner of the Chinese fifth-generation leadership’s policymaking under the Xi Jinping administration, and should be understood as part of a cohesive whole. This study assesses the BRI, its actual goals, and its risks when analyzed alongside China’s geostrategic and socioeconomic positions, similar policies from previous generations of Chinese leadership such as the Western Development Strategy, and existing concurrent policies from the fifth-generation Chinese leadership such as the Chinese Dream and the Four Comprehensives. While not mutually exclusive with other explanations proposed for the BRI, this study suggests that due to its synergy with existing policies and its exceptional urgency, the fifth-generation leadership primarily uses the BRI as one tool amongst many to accommodate its economic reform, to export the production overcapacity of state-owned enterprises, and to mitigate any risks of an asset bubble collapse.

一帶一路倡議是中國最近的經濟發展策略，其目的是透過基礎設施發展和貿易，將中國與歐亞大陸的其他國家連結在一起。儘管並非單純為了能源所規劃的策略，但是倡議的組成部分對中國提供日增的能源需求扮演了一個角色。 本論文透過與1990 年代末中國走出去策略之比較，在中國能源需求的大架構下，檢驗一帶一路倡議。為評估一帶一路倡議對中國能源安全的影響，本論文首先界定中國對能源安全的見解，然後分析一帶一路計畫如何應對中國對能源安全的關切。 本論文發現一帶一路倡議可視為走出去策略的後續策略。此外，本論文也發現中國主要是透過供應的角度來觀察能源的安全，且一帶一路計畫（如，石油和天然氣管道的構築）確保了能源運輸的可靠性。 / The Belt and Road Initiative is China’s latest economic development strategy, which seeks to connect China to the rest of Eurasia through infrastructure development and trade. While not a dedicated energy strategy, components of the initiative will play a role in meeting China’s growing energy needs. This paper examines the Belt and Road Initiative in the greater context of China’s energy policy by comparing it to China’s “going-out” strategy of the late 1990s. It assesses the impact that Belt and Road projects will have on China’s energy security by first defining how China views its energy security and then analyzing how Belt and Road projects address China’s energy security concerns. This paper finds that the Belt and Road Initiative can be considered a successor to the“going-out” strategy. It also finds that China views energy security primarily through the lens of supply, and that Belt and Road projects such as port and pipeline construction contribute by ensuring reliability of transport.

This paper attempts to explore China's direct investment in Central Europe under the OBOR initiative. China's economic cooperation in Central Europe is short and the total amount is small. First, this paper analyzes the current situation of Chinese investment including scales, industrial structure, investment entities. Second, through data integration, this paper analyzes the competitive advantage of China's investment in Central Europe. Finally, this paper explores the motives of Chinese investment through the panel data model. The results show that the market size, technology level, resources and other factors of the Central European countries can attract Chinese investment. At the same time, the local environment, economic stability and other factors do not affect China's investment in infrastructure construction. China has laid the foundation for its economic and trade cooperation with Central Europe and is also a strategic choice between China and the United States. Keywords CE-China investment, competitive advantage, OBOR，economic cooperation，motivation of investment Author's e-mail feelingtime1995@163.com Supervisor's e-mail vladimir.benacek@fsv.cuni.cz

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Power as a concept has a long history of being debated in regards to foreign policy, whereforeign aid as a tool can create asymmetrical power dynamics between donor and recipient.Traditional donors' own national interests have frequently been reduced to security oreconomic motives. China, an independent and emerging donor, is thought to be among themajor donors of foreign aid today. With the growing Belt and Road Initiative, China's globaleconomic ambition is increasing. The general theme of this study is power in relation toforeign aid. The aim is to examine donor motives and how foreign aid can transitioneconomic power to political influence in accordance with Joseph Nye’s theory of power. Inaddition, could China's aid-project be regarded as a “smart power”-strategy? This was doneby examining China’s whitebook on development cooperation through a motive analysis. Inaddition, a method of process-tracing on the case of Chinese aid to Cambodia wasimplemented to examine how China’s foreign aid can manifest as a means of power.Cambodia is a top receiver of Chinese aid, and therefore interesting to explore. The resultsshowed that China’s donor motives can be summarised as security, global development andambition, cooperation, commercial and diplomatic interests. Furthermore, evidence was foundthat Chinese foreign aid can be considered a means of power in Cambodia. Largely becauseof an asymmetrical bilateral relationship as well as Cambodia’s weak state capacity.

Dans un contexte de déploiement des nouvelles routes de la soie, la ville portuaire et balnéaire de Sihanoukville au Cambodge est ciblée par des investissements chinois importants. Ces investissements s’accompagnent par la présence de multiples acteurs chinois – investisseurs, commerçants, ouvriers, touristes – qui produisent un nouvel urbain à Sihanoukville. Ainsi, de nombreux casinos se développent aux côtés de zones économiques spéciales, d’hôtels, de quartiers fermés et de commerces variés. La ville portuaire apparaît comme un front pionnier où les ressources touristiques, commerciales, industrielles et stratégiques doivent être exploitées et où les acteurs chinois jouissent d’une marge de manoeuvre conséquente. Ceci est possible car les élites cambodgiennes, autorités et propriétaires terriens en tête, mettent en place un cadre économique et politique favorable pour attirer les investissements chinois et ainsi profiter du développement de la ville. La nouvelle production urbaine de Sihanoukville limite l’accès aux ressources à certaines populations, ce qui mène à des dynamiques de fragmentation urbaine. Par-delà l’idée d’une opposition entre riches investisseurs chinois et habitants cambodgiens défavorisés, la récente production urbaine de Sihanoukville met plutôt en lumière des clivages entre ceux qui ont accès aux ressources et ceux qui n’y ont pas accès. Loin de l’image officielle mise de l’avant par Pékin concernant les nouvelles routes de la soie, la présence chinoise à Sihanoukville conduit à une production urbaine fragmentée. / In a context of deployment of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the coastal city of Sihanoukville, Cambodia, is targeted by massive Chinese investments. Those investments come with the arrival of many Chinese stakeholders – investors, sellers, workers, tourists – who produce a new urbanization in Sihanoukville. Many casinos are being developed in the city, alongside special economic zones, hotels, gated communities, and various other businesses. The city seems to be a frontier where touristic, commercial, industrial, and strategic resources must be exploited, and where the Chinese stakeholders enjoy a certain autonomy. Based on neoliberal logics, Cambodian elites, authorities, and landowners above all, build a favorable economic and political environment to attract Chinese investments and take advantage of the situation. The new urbanization produced in Sihanoukville limits the access to the resources to certain populations, which leads to urban fragmentation. Beyond the idea of an opposition between rich Chinese investors and disadvantaged Cambodian inhabitants, the new Sihanoukville highlights divisions between those who have access to the resources and those who have not. Far from BRI’s official image putting forward by Beijing, the Chinese presence in Sihanoukville comes with a fragmented urban production.

Since its independence almost three decades ago, the nation-state of Kazakhstan has been nestled in a search for identity and unity. Located in a geographically strategic location between two of the world's most significant actors, and with a colonial history to one of them —the Soviet Union— the country's strive for identity in a self-determined world continues. Surrounding the influx of Chinese investments coming with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, the country now sees the national political space drifting in a different direction. By looking at identity building and researching contemporary scholarly articles, and with aid from the methodology of a case study. This thesis aims to utilise postcolonial theory to analyse how and if Chinese investments through the BRI are the beginning of a new neocolonial in post-independent Kazakhstan and if the previously colonised country's identity, or lack thereof, is a leading factor in being more susceptible to Chinese influence in the twenty-first century. To conclude, this work presents new research on how the Kazakh nation responds to Chinese BRI and determines that a lack of national identity due to previous colonisation can increase susceptibility to new actors' influence later down the road.

By looking at the reactions of Russian actors regarding the development of the Belt and Road Initiative of the People’s Republic of China in Central and Eastern Europe, this dissertation presents new theoretical and empirical findings that can be used extensively in the fields of Area and Global Studies, as well as practical policymaking. In this context, the Russian Federation’s foreign policy in the region is understood as cumulative activity and strategy developed by the government of Russia regarding the relationship with other countries that are being impacted by multiple internal and external factors. In order to understand a complex relationship between Russian, Chinese, and Central-Eastern European actors, this study employs uniquely created methods focusing on analyzing the reactions of the relevant Russian policymakers, as well as literature, documents, and statistical data. The reactions are also collected via extensive reflection of interviews and primary source material. In this framework, the areas of Russian interests directly related to and operationalized in Central-Eastern Europe are identified, and those affected by the Belt and Road Initiative the most are researched. The study’s results highlight the many discourses and contradictions when contrasting portrayal and perceptions against statistical data. Since none of these areas were analyzed under these circumstances before, many characterizations about the nature of the Initiative, perception of the actors’ behavior, understanding of the positioning of Russia within contemporary geopolitical realities, and many other aspects have been broadened. That leads to a better comprehension of the mechanisms and networks between the companies and political actors based in the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, and Central-Eastern Europe, the effects of their interdependencies and relationship, and general international relations. This research demonstrated a tension of interests within the Russian expert community when assigning securitization to the Belt and Road Initiative sections that affect Russia and East-Central Europe. They are recognized as intertwined with internal politics, economics, geopolitical competitiveness, and international strategy and are thus appropriately employed when reacting to and debating them.