Corporate governance and executive remuneration are not new phenomena, but have erupted to the forefront of corporate, academic and public attention as a result of a series of well publicized corporate collapses and scandals over the last decade, which have raised both a curiosity of executive remuneration levels, and an awareness of the potential impact of conflicts of interest between owners and executives in modern corporations. Although literature on corporate governance and executive remuneration in general is plentiful, there is a lack of comment on the relationships between certain specific components of these two broad constructs. These specific components, such as disclosure, executive remuneration and governance needed to be analysed individually before they could be combined into a whole that explains both their interrelationships with each other and the larger corporate governance sub-system, and ultimately in the corporation, as an organisational system. In view of greater globalisation of the world economy, and the market for executive talent, the consequent reforms in the fields of corporate governance and executive remuneration, as well as the changing competitive dynamics of modern corporations, it was necessary to examine whether traditional theory and regulatory frameworks have kept pace with corporate development. A review of both classic and current literature show vastly different approaches to both executive remuneration and corporate governance mechanisms practiced around the world. There is however a noticeable trend towards convergence of these different sub-systems.The most prominent differences in respect of these sub-systems relate to the extent to which disclosures are made. Some of these issues relate to full or limited disclosure, internal or external corporate governance measures to regulate executive remuneration, and differences in respect of a narrow shareholder focus or broad stakeholder focus of different interests in an organisation. / Business Leadership / Ph.D. (Business Leadership)

1997年亞洲發生金融風暴後，國內亦發生多起企業舞弊案件，再加上2001年底美國大型公司會計醜聞案，公司所揭露的資訊是否仍為投資人所相信，似乎存有許多問號，加強公司治理機制應是一個較佳的解決方案，也逐漸為世界各國所重視。本研究以董監事會特性做為衡量公司治理機制良窳的代理變數，探討其與財務預測準確性之關聯性為何。 本研究以曾發佈民國九十年及九十一年強制性財務預測之上市公司為樣本，實證結果發現，當公司控制股東佔全體董事席次之比例愈高、次大股東佔全體董事席次之比例愈低、次大股東佔全體監察人席次之比例愈低、董事及監察人異動之比例愈高、公司有參與管理的情形、公司沒有獨立監察人的存在以及總經理發生異動時，公司所發佈之財務預測愈不準確，且其更新幅度愈大。 / Since the Asia financial crisis in 1997, there were much fraudulence of the listed companies in Taiwan. Then in the United States, Enron and Xerox were suffered from scandals in 2001. Do investors still believe the information companies disclose? We never know. But one way to recover the belief of investors is to reinforce the corporate governance mechanism and many countries have placed importance on it. Using the characteristics of board of directors and supervisors as the proxy of corporate governance mechanism, this paper examines the relationship between the characteristics of board of directors and supervisors and the financial forecast accuracy. The research data are collected from listed companies that have released the financial forecast in 2001 and 2002. The empirical result suggests the larger proportion of board seats the controlling shareholders hold, the smaller proportion of board seats and supervisor seats the secondary major shareholders hold, the higher rate of changes of directors and supervisors, participation in management, no independent supervisor and the change of CEO would lead the financial forecast less accurate and the range of renewal larger.

董監事會為公司治理之核心，本研究以民國87年至民國91年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司探討董監事會特性與權益資金成本之關聯性，而不同於以往國內有關估計權益資金成本的方法，本研究以Ohlson模型來設算權益資金成本。實證結果顯示： 1.董監事會成員持股比率與企業權益資金成本率之關係並不顯著，若觀測兩者間是否存有非線性關係，本研究亦未發現兩者間的不顯著關係是由非線性因素所造成。 2.複迴歸分析顯示，董監事會持股質押比與權益資金成本之關係並不顯著，若進一步區分全體樣本為正、負盈餘樣本，則發現在負盈餘樣本中，董監事會持股質押比與企業權益資金成本呈現顯著正向關係；另外，若以Panel Data分析，本研究則發現在電子業中董監事持股質押比與權益資金成本始呈現正相關。 3.公司是否聘任獨立董監與權益資金成本之關係並不顯著，且不論是在有聘任或無聘任獨立董監之樣本間，或是在自願性聘任與強制性聘任獨立董監之樣本間，其權益資金成本並無明顯的差異。 / This study examines the relations between characteristic of board of directors and supervisors and cost of equity capital. It is unlike previous research to use capital assets pricing model（CAPM）, this research adopts an alternative technique for estimating the cost of equity capital. Specifically, we use Ohlson (1995) model to generate a market implied cost of capital. Our samples consist of all public companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporate over 5 years period 1998-2002. The empirical results are as follows: 1.There is no significant negative relation between the ratio of the stock held by the board and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. Moreover, we don’t find this relation caused by nonlinear specification. 2.There is no significant positive relation between the pledged share ratio of the board and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. When the entire samples are divided into the sub-samples of firms experiencing losses and others, the existence of the positive relationship is found only in the firms experiencing losses. In addition, the relation is further proved in the electronic industry when adopting panel data analysis. 3.There is no significant reverse relation between the independent directors and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. And there is also no significant difference in the cost of equity capital between companies with implementing the independent directors and supervisors and those without implementing the regulation.

In Sweden all limited liability companies are required to have a board of directors. The board of directors’ task is to manage the business of the firm, but in recent years boards have been subjected to critical review in the media, questioning the tasks and structure of the board. Further, there are differences in the regulations regarding limited liability companies, depending on whether they are private or public companies. Moreover, a majority of the research within the area of corporate governance has been conducted on public companies. However, corporate governance in small and medium sized enterprises (SME) has in the last 30 years become a field of interest. Several scholars and doctorates have used different board roles to explain e.g. the tasks, demographics, and financial performance. The board roles are mainly derived from the agency-, resource dependence-, and stewardship theory. Many papers have come to the conclusion that a board of directors who performs their task, and/or have a certain board demography is beneficial to the firm. Hence, the board and its activity is of importance, however, a general image is conveyed that boards in SMEs rarely are active, but rather are seen as a necessary mean in order to have a firm. Due to this, the research question in this thesis is: What motivates small and medium sized firms to have an active board and are boards in Norr- and Västerbotten active? The criteria for having an active board has been derived from antecedent research and are further recommendations from StyrelseAkademien. Three different board roles have been used with the purpose of explaining the motivation behind having an active board. Further, this thesis has had a quantitative method, and in order to gather data a survey was sent out to board members in Norr- and Västerbotten. The results show that the motivation behind having an active board cannot be explained through the roles network and service of the board. The control role could partly explain the motivation behind having an active board of directors in SMEs in Norr- and Västerbotten, having a negative relationship to board activity. Moreover, due to the opposing results in terms of whether or not boards are active, an unambiguous answer could not be found. However, 49.1 percent of the sample is considered to be active. Lastly, the finding support that in order to have an active board, the firm must recognize a need to include outside directors.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Problemformulering: Jämställdheten i bolagsstyrelser debatteras flitigt och företag jobbar aktivt med att öka andelen kvinnor. Inflödet av nya bolag och utflödet av bolag från Stockholmsbörsen påverkar andelen kvinnor i styrelserna totalt och denna effekt är inte tidigare analyserad. Outforskat är även hur fördelningen av oberoende och ägarberoende styrelseledamöter ser ut i de nylistade och avlistade bolagen. Vad dessa två parametrar har för effekter, vad jämställdhetsarbetet har för ursprung och vad som kan påverka könsfördelningen är aspekter som genom analys skulle kunna bidra med värdefulla insikter för det framtida arbetet för ökad jämställdhet i bolagsstyrelser. Syfte: Att studera in- och utflödet av bolag på Stockholmsbörsen för att se hur det påverkar det totala snittet när det gäller könsfördelningen i bolagsstyrelser. Genom intervjuer ämnar studien ge en djupare förståelse för frågans uppkomst samt att utifrån detta försöka ge relevanta rekommendationer gällande åtgärder och framtida forskning. Metod: I studien används både kvantitativ och kvalitativ metod för att uppfylla syftet. Detta innebär att både kvalitativ och kvantitativ metod har använts för datainsamlingen. Studien har en abduktiv ansats och tre olika designer för att nå en slutsats. Åtta semi-strukturerade intervjuer har genomförts för att komplettera den kvantitativa datainsamling som genomförts för nylistade och avlistade bolagen på Stockholmsbörsen. Slutsats: Både nylistade och avlistade bolag har en lägre andel kvinnor än de befintliga, vilket gör att effekterna i princip tar ut varandra. Andelen ägarberoende kvinnor i de nylistade bolagen är väldigt låg. Huvudägaren i ett bolag har stort inflytande på styrelsesammansättningen och att få kvinnor äger och grundar börsnoterade bolag förklarar delvis varför det ser ut som det gör. / Problem discussion: A question that is frequently discussed is the gender equality among board of directors in listed companies and how companies actively try to increase the average share of women. The newly listed and unlisted companies on Nasdaq’s Stockholm Exchange affects the total average share of women but the actual effect has never been analyzed before. The difference in gender allocation between independent and owner dependent board of directors in newly listed and unlisted companies are unexplored. The effect of these two categories of board of directors, the origin of the development in gender equality among the board of directors and what effects that can increase the gender equality are interesting to research. By analyzing these aspects, the study can contribute with valuable knowledge for the future development of more gender equal boards. Purpose: By researching the board of directors gender in the newly listed and unlisted companies on Nasdaq’s Stockholm Exchange the result can be compared to the gender of the existing board of directors. The study also analyzes the background to the average gender equality among the board of directors as well as potential recommendations to increase the average. Methodology: A mixed methods research has been used in order to fulfill the study’s purpose. This means that a mix of a quantative and a qualitative study has been used to collect data. The study has an abdutive approach as well as three different designs in order to accomplish the study’s purpose. Eight semi-structured interviews have been conducted to complement the data of the average gender equality among the board of directors gathered from the inflow and outflow of companies Nasdaq’s Stockholm Exchange. Conclusion: The study concludes that the newly listed and unlisted companies decrease the total average share of women on Nasdaq’s Stockholm Exchange, also the newly listed companies’ owner dependent directors is under represented among women. The majority share holders’ influence on the combination of board members is high and there are very few women who own and start listed companies which partly explains the underlying reason why the average gender equality is what it is today.

Muito em função da dificuldade de se observar o dia-a-dia dos conselheiros nas empresas, acadêmicos e profissionais se questionam sobre a importância dessas estruturas de governança corporativa (GC) quando o assunto é propriedade dos números contábeis. Nesse sentido, esta tese, além de discutir extensivamente e traçar um panorama geral acerca da configuração desses conselhos no Brasil ao longo dos últimos cinco anos, estuda de que forma essas e outras estruturas de GC se associam com medidas de qualidade da informação contábil das firmas brasileiras. Diferentemente do que se encontra na literatura existente, a pesquisa em tela buscou compreender o ambiente dos conselhos de administração (CAs) e Fiscais (CFs) de modo mais amplo, avaliando de forma agregada 35 características estruturais, de remuneração e de composição desses órgãos, considerando suas inter-relações e implicações quando da associação destas com variáveis que medem as propriedades informacionais contidas no lucro. Para tanto, analisou-se, em média, cerca de 325 empresas por ano, compreendendo análise de 19.487 currículos de conselheiros de administração e fiscais efetivos no país, além da análise das outras variáveis de governança, tais como avaliação formal de conselheiros, frequência de reuniões, tipos de contrato de remuneração e outras. Posteriormente, utilizou-se a técnica de Análise Fatorial para estabelecer constructos subjacentes e não correlacionados entre si, de modo que os coeficientes estimados nas regressões posteriores fossem reportados de forma mais consistente do que se construídos com um número limitado de variáveis individuais. Cinco fatores representam mais de 80% da variância dos dados, sinalizando que características como idade, formação básica em administração, contabilidade e/ou economia, remuneração, board interlocking e tamanho do conselho formam um agregado parcimonioso de características que representam a maior parte da diversidade subjacente dos conselhos brasileiros. Destarte, após análise de simultaneidade dos modelos, testou-se as associações existentes entre as propriedades dos números contábeis e os fatores de GC por intermédio de modelos de regressão múltipla estimados pelo método OLS, e de modelos de regressão logística, controlados por setor, tamanho das empresas, adesão aos níveis diferenciados de governança, emissão de ADR, presença de CF permanente instalado, estrutura de propriedade e outros. Os resultados indicam uma associação inversa e significante entre a proporção dos membros que participam de outros CAs e os níveis de persistência, sinalizando que empresas com CAs formados por membros dedicados tendem a reportar, na média, lucros mais persistentes. A remuneração variável é positivamente relacionada com a persistência dos lucros reportados sugerindo que a remuneração dos conselheiros é influenciada pela substância econômica dos resultados divulgados e com o conservadorismo contido no lucro sinalizando para redução do conservadorismo contábil na medida em que a remuneração variável dos conselheiros aumenta. A idade também mostrou ser fator relevante para explicar os níveis de conservadorismo e de gerenciamento de resultados das firmas, sinalizando tendência de maior grau de conservadorismo e menor grau de gerenciamento de resultados por parte dos conselheiros mais velhos. Adicionalmente, não foi possível afirmar que o conselho fiscal afeta de forma positiva o monitoramento da qualidade dos lucros reportados no mercado de capitais brasileiro / In view of the difficulty of observing the day-to-day activities of members of oversight board and board of directors, academics and professionals wonder about the importance of corporate governance (CG) structures when the subject is the propiety of accounting numbers. In this sense, besides discussing extensively and tracing an overview of the configuration of these boards in Brazil over the past five years, I also study how these and other CG structures are associated with proxies of accounting information of Brazilian firms. Contrary to what has been found in the existing literature, I seek to understand the environment of the board of directors (BoD) and oversight board (OB) more broadly, evaluating in an aggregate way 35 variables of structural, remuneration and composition characteristics of these boards, considering their interrelations and implications when associated with variables that measure the informational properties contained in earnings. For that, I analyze, on average, 325 companies per year and 19,487 résumés of the members of these boards, in addition to analyzing other variables such as their attendance at meetings, compensation contracts, board interlocking and others. Later, I use factor analysis to establish underlying constructs not correlated with each other, so that the estimated coefficients in subsequent regressions are reported more consistently than if built with a limited number of individual variables. Five factors represent more than 80% of the variance of the data, signaling that characteristics such as age, basic training in business administration, accounting and/or economics, board compensation, board size and interlocking form a thrifty aggregate of characteristics that represent most of the underlying diversity of Brazilian boards. Thus, after analysis of simultaneity, I test the existing associations between the earnings quality and factors of CG through multiple regression models estimated by OLS and logistic regression models, controlled by sector, firm size, adherence to the different levels of corporate governance, issuance of ADRs, presence of a permanent OB, ownership structure and others. The results indicate a significant inverse association between the proportion of members who participate in other BoDs and persistence levels of earnings, signaling that companies with BoDs formed by dedicated members tend to report, on average, more persistent earnings. The variable pay for board members is positively related to earnings persistense suggesting that the board members compensation is influenced by the economic substance of the disclosed results and with accounting conservatism signaling a decrease in accounting conservatism when the remuneration of these members increases. The age of members also proved to be a relevant factor to explain the levels of conservatism and earnings management of firms, signaling a trend toward greater levels of conservatism and a lesser levels of earnings management of when these boards are formed of older members. Additionally, it was not possible to affirm that the oversight board has a positive effect on the quality of monitoring accounting information reported in the Brazilian capital market.

O Conselho de Administração (CA) é foco de diversas pesquisas por ser considerado o principal mecanismo de governança corporativa. Inserido na linha de pesquisa que investiga o impacto da estrutura do CA sobre as decisões corporativas, esta pesquisa tem o intuito de verificar a relação entre o alinhamento às práticas recomendadas de governança relativas ao CA e o nível de evidenciação das empresas. Especificamente, avalia-se a relação de complementaridade ou substituição entre as práticas de governança e o nível de evidenciação. Adicionalmente, investiga-se a relação entre a presença do profissional da área contábil nos conselhos e o nível de evidenciação das empresas. Optou-se pela elaboração de índices para mensurar o alinhamento às práticas de governança. O índice construído é composto por subíndices referentes à independência, disponibilidade de tempo, diversidade e comitês. Para a variável dependente, foi elaborado um índice de evidenciação com base na divulgação de políticas sobre gerenciamento de risco, gastos com auditoria, operações com partes relacionadas, código de ética e remuneração dos administradores. Foram realizadas análises exploratórias por meio de diferenças de médias entre determinados grupos de empresas, e análise de dados em painel a fim de verificar a consistência das relações entre o alinhamento às práticas de governança e o nível de evidenciação. Os resultados exploratórios evidenciam que tanto a média do índice de alinhamento às práticas de governança do CA quanto o índice de evidenciação ficaram abaixo da metade da pontuação máxima, 16 e 6 pontos, respectivamente. Constata-se que muitas recomendações em relação à independência, disponibilidade de tempo, diversidade e comitês ainda não foram adotadas pelas empresas, havendo ainda muito a ser aprimorado. Em relação à participação do profissional da área contábil, destaca-se que empresas com conselheiros ou membros externos com formação em contabilidade na composição do Comitê de Auditoria apresentam média estatisticamente superior em relação ao índice de evidenciação se comparada às empresas que não têm profissionais com essa formação na composição deste Comitê. Os resultados da análise de dados em painel não confirmam a hipótese desta pesquisa em relação à complementaridade entre a adoção de práticas recomendadas de governança corporativa e o nível de evidenciação. Porém confirmam a complementaridade entre o nível de evidenciação e as variáveis relacionadas à negociação no Novo Mercado e na Bolsa de Nova Iorque (empresas com emissão de ADRs), provavelmente este fato pode sugerir o esforço dos administradores em evidenciar informações devido ao fortalecimento do papel de monitoramento dos conselhos das empresas com estas características. Os progressos nas melhorias das práticas de governança corporativa no Brasil dependem de maior ação dos agentes de mercado e as evidências desta pesquisa indicam alguns pontos para melhoria e aprofundamento de pesquisas acadêmicas tanto na adoção de práticas de governança quanto no nível de transparência de informações. / The Board of Directors (BoD) is the focus of several researches as it is considered the main corporate governance mechanism. Following the research line that investigates the impact of BoD structure on corporate decisions, this research aims to investigate the relationship between the alignment of recommended governance practices related to the BoD and the disclosure level of companies. Specifically, it evaluates the complementary or substitute relationship between governance practices and disclosure level. Additionally, it investigates the relationship between the presence of accounting professional in the BoD and the disclosure level of companies. An index has been elaborated to measure the alignment to corporate governance practices. The index has been built comprising sub indexes relating to independence, time availability, diversity and committees. For the dependent variable, a disclosure index has been elaborated based on disclosure of policies on risk management, audit expenditures, related party transactions, ethics code and administrators\' remuneration. Exploratory analyses were performed by differences between average of certain companies groups and panel data analysis to verify the consistency of the relationship between governance practices alignment and disclosure level. The exploratory results presented that both means of alignment to governance practices of BoD index and disclosure index were below half the maximum score, 16 and 6 points respectively. It appears that many recommendations in relation to independence, time availability, diversity and committees have not yet been adopted by companies and there is still much to be improved. Regarding the accounting professionals participation in BoD, the relevant results presented that companies that have directors or external advisors with accounting background in the composition of the Audit Committee have statistically higher average of disclosure index compared to companies that do not have accounting professionals in the composition of this Committee. The panel data analysis results haven\'t confirmed the research hypothesis that there is a complementary relationship between the adoption of recommended governance practices and disclosure level. However confirm the complementarity between the level of disclosure and the variables related to trading on Novo Mercado and New York Stock Exchange (companies issuing ADRs), probably this may suggest this relation follows the administrators\' efforts to disclose information due to the strengthening of boards monitoring role. Progress in the improvement of corporate governance practices in Brazil depends on greater action of market agents, the evidences of this research indicate some points for improvement and further academic research development in both adoption of governance practices and on transparency information level.

Nesta pesquisa descrevem-se e exploram-se pela primeira vez os papéis de controle, direcionamento (estratégia e política) e prestação de serviços dos Conselhos de Administração (CAs) e sua relevância no sistema de governança corporativa nas empresas listadas na BOVESPA. Estuda-se, ainda, também pela primeira vez, de um lado a relação entre os papéis do CAs e a estrutura e tipo de propriedade, tamanho e idade da empresa, determinantes da qualidade de governança no nível do CA e de outro a relação entre os papéis e a participação de investidores institucionais. Os resultados, dada a concentração da amostra, são principalmente aplicáveis às empresas listadas no Novo Mercado ou que emitem ADRs na Bolsa de Nova Iorque. No estudo quantitativo, de caráter descritivo e correlacional, considerou-se uma amostra não probabilística, por conveniência composta por 65 empresas listadas e 122 administradores. O Modelo de Equações Estruturais foi usado inicialmente, mas suspeitas sobre sua adequação levaram a um segundo modelo - o Modelo de Equações Simultâneas. Devido à ausência de dados, o modelo estatístico acabou por utilizar um total de 88 observações. Os CAs em grande parte são dominados pelos acionistas controladores. A participação de conselheiros independentes ainda está abaixo da recomendação das melhores práticas e a presença de acionistas minoritários nos CAs é pequena. O acúmulo dos cargos de presidente do conselho e presidente executivo não é um problema maior, porém mais importante é o acúmulo de poder verificado já que a presidência do CA é, em grande parte, ocupada por familiar do acionista controlador ou por ele próprio. A frequência relevante de presidentes executivos que também são familiares do controlador é outro elemento de concentração de poder. O papel de controle predomina nos CAs estudados, mas o papel de direcionamento também é relevante. O papel de serviço é o menos importante. O papel de controle pode ser enfraquecido nas empresas onde o presidente executivo e o presidente do conselho são familiares dos acionistas controladores. CAs com maiores níveis decisórios estão associados a um número maior de melhores práticas de governança. Os resultados não confirmaram as hipóteses de relação entre os elementos estudados e o papel das empresas listadas brasileiras. A pesquisa traz contribuições práticas aos agentes de mercado, indicando prioridades para a melhoria das práticas do CA e introduzindo não só o conceito de estilo do CA, mas também seu nível decisório. Para a pesquisa acadêmica, contribui-se com a construção de dois indicadores de concentração de poder e de endogenia/exogenia dos CAs que poderão ser utilizados não só em futuras pesquisas, como também pelas empresas. Os papéis do conselho de administração devem ser mais explorados e, já que o entendimento do órgão central do sistema de governança está apenas se iniciando, conclui-se esta dissertação com proposições de caminhos de pesquisa. / This study is the first to describe and to explore the control, guidance (strategy- and policydirecting), and service roles of boards of directors (BoD) and their relevance to the corporate governance system of companies listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA). It also studies on one side the relationship between the roles of the boards and structure and type of ownership, company size and age, board-level determinants of governance quality and on the other, the role of boards and institutional investor participation, and was also the first study to analyze this. Due to the concentration of the study sample, results are mainly applicable to companies listed on the Novo Mercado or issuing ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange. This quantitative, descriptive, and correlational study used a nonprobabilistic convenience sample of 65 listed companies and 122 executives and board directors. Structural equation modeling was initially employed, but suspicion on its adequacy led to an alternative one, the simultaneous equation model. Because there was an absence of data, a total of 88 observations were used in the statistical model. Boards are mostly dominated by controlling shareholders; participation of independent directors is still below the best practice recommendations levels, and minority shareholder participation is low. The functions of CEO and chairman played by the same person is not a major concern; the power concentration is more important, as boards are often chaired by relatives of controlling shareholders or by controlling shareholders themselves. Another element that concentrates power is the relevant frequency with which controlling shareholders relatives hold CEO positions. In the selected boards, the control role is dominant, with guidance also playing a relevant part; the service role was the least important. The control role may be weakened in companies where CEO and chairmen are from controlling shareholders family. Boards with higher decision-making levels are associated with a higher number of best governance practices. Results did not confirm the hypotheses of a relation between the studied elements and the role of listed Brazilian companies. This dissertation provides practical contributions for market agents, suggesting priorities for the improvement of board practices and introducing the concept of board style and decision-making level. The study also contributes to the academic literature by constructing two indicators concentration of power and board endogeny/exogeny which may be used in future researches and in the corporate environment. The roles of the BoD must be explored further, as we have only just begun to understand this central body of the corporate governance system. This dissertation concludes by proposing several possible research directions.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-04-11T11:51:25Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Luciana de Godoy Penteado Gattaz.pdf: 2109377 bytes, checksum: 47205c9a14485eb937cb0fb231368280 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-11T11:51:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luciana de Godoy Penteado Gattaz.pdf: 2109377 bytes, checksum: 47205c9a14485eb937cb0fb231368280 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-08 / The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse all legal theories regarding shareholders’ agreement binding members of a board of directors, in order to identify which theory seems to be more appropriate from the legal point of view and from the perspective of the development of the market’s dynamic, as well as to verify the necessity to establish limits to such binding. By examining the concepts of corporate interest, shareholders’ agreement, the duties of administrators and controlling shareholder, from the analysis of legal doctrine and in particular from empirical studies and court precedents, there was an effort to ascertain, where corporate governance is concerned, which of the theories is more compatible with the duty to observe the corporate interest, assigned to the administrators and the controlling shareholder by law. After verifying all aspects required to the full understanding of all questions raised in this study, it emerged that the theory that should be adopted is the one favourable to a limited binding of directors to the shareholders’ agreement / A presente dissertação tem por objeto analisar as correntes doutrinárias que tratam da vinculação de membros do conselho de administração ao acordo de acionistas, a fim de identificar qual delas parece ser a mais adequada, tanto do ponto de vista legal, quanto do ponto de vista da evolução da dinâmica do próprio mercado, e de verificar a necessidade de limites para essa vinculação. Mediante o exame dos conceitos de interesse social e acordo de acionistas, bem como dos deveres dos administradores e do acionista controlador, buscou-se averiguar, a partir da doutrina e, principalmente, de estudos empíricos e de precedentes judiciais e administrativos, no âmbito da governança corporativa, qual das correntes doutrinárias sobre o tema é mais compatível com o que se deve entender pelo dever de observar o interesse social, atribuído por lei ao acionista controlador e aos administradores. Após verificados todos os elementos imprescindíveis à plena compreensão das questões levantadas neste estudo, concluiu-se pela adoção da teoria favorável a uma vinculação limitada do conselheiro ao acordo de acionistas