This thesis is essentially about the origin, course, and impact of

The world has moved into an era where the tempering mechanism of a balance of power has diminished and security is decidedly more complex. Globalization which became a buzzword in the 1990¡¦s as interdependence did in the 1970¡¦s, meant real changes that are of fundamental and profound implications to the politics, economics, military, socio-cultural and environment. The number of players in the international system has increased and the myriad of issues confronting the international community show no sign of letting up. International relations conducted by governments have been supplemented by relations among private individuals, groups, and societies that can and do have important consequences for the course of events. Like all other states, the Philippines pursues foreign policy objectives to promote national security and development. Jumpstarting from a logical foreign policy framework which is ASEAN centrist, though with strong cognizance of the three dominant power players (United States, Japan and China) in the global politics, the ASEAN with the Philippines as one of the prime movers. All these existing ASEAN dynamics, however, officially does not include the country of Taiwan which is the most proximate to the Philippines, and is also strategically situated vis a vis the other ASEAN countries. Most of ASEAN member countries have already recognized and established official relations with the People¡¦s Republic of China (PROC). China officially requires that any country establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing must recognize the ¡¥One-China principle¡¦, which means no diplomatic relations with the Republic of China or Taiwan will ever be made after the signing of the communiqué. Thus, foreign governments have to painstakingly choose between recognizing Taipei or recognizing Beijing, depending upon their respective national interests. Ironically, because of the complexities of the cross-strait issues, ASEAN countries and the rest of the world, except for nineteen (19) countries as of 2006, have chosen to traverse the conventional foreign policy path to China, with the unconventional detour of ¡§unofficial relations¡¨ mode with Taiwan. A cooperation, which is acceptable for Beijing, is only within the realm of economics ¡V trade and investments, cultural, educational and social relations. While the traditional diplomatic track of Philippine-Taiwan relations is consistent with the veritable ¡§one china policy¡¨, as everyone else in the rest of the world, the Philippines maintains an unofficial relationship with Taiwan for trade, investments, social, cultural, educational and other levels of low politics. The timeless challenge lies on the capability of the institutional mechanisms of the Philippines that promotes, harness and enhance these dynamics without transgressing the official metes and bounds of the one china policy. The Philippines entered into official relations with Republic of China (ROC), then the government of Mainland China, when President Manuel A. Roxas signed a Treaty of Amity with Chinese Chen Chih-ping on April 18, 1947. The Philippine consulates in Shanghai and Xiamen, and the legation in Nanjing were closed in 1949 in view of the advancing communist forces. The Philippine Legation was reopened in Taipei in January 1950 during the time of President Ramon Magsaysay and was elevated into an embassy on March 15, 1956. Chinese involvement in the Korean War and the communist insurgency in the country precipitated the Philippine government decision to recognize the nationalist government in Taiwan. No official contacts were made with Mainland China until the early 1970s. . In 1975 however, the Philippines opened diplomatic relations with China, thus the birth of its One-China policy. Correspondingly, on the same year, the Philippines terminated all diplomatic and political relations with Taiwan. The effects on trade and investments were initially dampening for both countries. From 1975 to 1977, economic relations were severely affected - there was no fresh Taiwanese investment in the Philippines. Relations with Taiwan were downgraded to an unofficial, non-governmental level and were limited to economic, trade, commercial and cultural activities. The Taiwan embassy in Manila was renamed Pacific Economic and Cultural Center, while the Philippine Embassy in Taipei became the Asian Exchange Center, a semi-private organization reporting directly to the Office of the President. From 1975 to date, the Philippine-Taiwan relations were all within the sphere of economics and culture, in strict adherence to the 1975 Communiqué, although there were numerous diplomatic protests lodged by China on allegations of violations to the One China rule. Under the One China Policy environment, the Philippines has enjoyed the benefits of maintaining diplomatic relations with the People¡¦s Republic of China (PROC) while pursuing non-official relations with Taiwan. However as an offshoot of these non-diplomatic ties, some strategic concerns have been in the offing, which necessitates a rethinking of the current policies. This paper has taken to task the consolidation of all past studies on Philippine-China-Taiwan relations, and subjected the findings in an analytical framework based on well-established international relation theories. Thus, the two houses of congress (Senate and Representative) can use the paper as aid to legislation in any national policy enhancements vis a vis China relations and possibly, pass the policy that will prescribe the nature of relationship with Taiwan. There had been efforts in the past from various interest groups to pass the legislation, but was vehemently opposed by the Chinese Embassy in Manila. A legislative debate essentially coming from a non-partisan academic endeavor could be acceptable to the Chinese psyche. The assessment of the changing relational pattern using the four theories of realism, neo-realism, liberalism and neo-liberalism will bring to the fore the strengths, opportunities, weaknesses, threats and triggers of the past relations within the two countries domestic environment and the international system. It will subsequently be the basis of the model building and forward looking strategies based on a ¡¥constructivist¡¦ mode of enhancing the people to people contact between the two countries, but without risking and transgressing the metes and bounds of the ¡¥one China policy¡¦. This dissertation is essentially an analytical revisit of the changing relational pattern given the imperative at this juncture of Philippine nation building to re-examine the Philippine ¡V Taiwan relations amidst the backdrop of the ¡§one china policy¡¨ and by and large, reinvent the relations to the best interest of the Philippines. Specifically, the research study will seek answers to the following questions: 1. What is the relational pattern of the Philippine-Taiwan relations from 1947 to 2005 using the key theoretical factors of Realism, Neo-realism, Liberalism and Neo-liberalism? 2. Coming from an ASEAN centrist with strong deference to the power nations of the United States, Japan and China foreign policy framework, what are the implications of the ¡§one china policy¡¨ to this changing relational pattern? 3. In the light of the findings of the preceding research questions and using the constructivism framework, what policy and program model can be drawn up to reinvent the Philippine ¡V Taiwan relations in a one china policy environment and subsequently promote its national interests? In more contemporary initiatives, the author has observed that the Philippine-Taiwan relation is actively dominated by the initiatives of both the business sector and the third sector as well. On one hand, the Joint economic Conference led by the Chinese Philippine Business Council has actively been engaging the businessmen of both countries to undertake policy and program agreements that are mutually relevant to them. On the other hand, some Civil Society Organizations (NGOs and Pos) has through the years been pursuing collaborative efforts in development and humanitarian programs. This study will endeavor to draw up a model of people to people engagement of both countries towards development cooperation. This definitely is within the realm of what is acceptable in the one china policy framework and consistent to the global governance trend in the offing. This dissertation is on a strong proposition that: a). The level of official relationship between the Philippines and PROC will affect the level of relationship between the Philippines and Taiwan; b). The Level of relationship between PROC and Taiwan will affect the level of relationship between the Philippines and PROC; and, c). The Level of relationship between the Philippines and Taiwan will affect the relationship between the Philippines and PROC. Coming from the comprehensive analytical revisit of the Philippine ¡VTaiwan relations in a One China Policy environment in Chapter 4 and the highlighted most crucial points in the preceding ¡§Summary¡¨ portion of this paper, the overarching conclusion of the dissertation is that Philippine ¡V Taiwan relations is decidedly more complex, than be simply viewed from a singular perspective of a theory ¡V Realism, Neo-realism, Liberalism, and Neo-Liberalism. The interplay of the various triggers in the decision making processes of the leaders and the state is predicated on the domestic realities and the international environment. Undoubtedly though, the study has amply proven that ¡§it is an imperative to reinvent the Philippine-Taiwan relations, but MUST be within the metes and bounds of the One China Policy¡¨. The cursory on the recommendations and model building to reinvent Philippine-Taiwan relations is capsulized in Figure 39 below, taking into account the three tracks of ¡§enhanced people to people¡¨ relations, the establishment of the People¡¦s Forum through the Center. All these are geared towards the attainment of the two countries national interests and subsequently, the promotion of the Philippines and Taiwan¡¦s national security

Much controversy has surrounded recent American policy toward China. Books of various stripes--distortions, misrepresentations, emotional accounts, and purportedly scholarly studies--have dealt with the formulation of a China policy. Several of the objective studies have featured the role that politics played in reducing American freedom of action. The emphasis has been that, since American diplomatic strategy during the decade of the 1940's was a Democratic responsibility, Republican critics took political advantage of the China "tangle." As congressional criticism mounted, the framework within which the Truman Administration could evolve a policy was increasingly restricted. With the Communist victory in China and the subsequent Korean War, Democratic strategy had apparently backfired. The public became aroused, and policy makers have since had difficulty adjusting to realities.

Abstract of Thesis The title of this thesis is A comparative study of the one ¡V china policy during the eras of Chiang Khai-Shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo. According to the relationship of the China Government and Taiwan, the cooperation on economic issue but the conflict in political ones, and the most controversial issue now is ¡§ One-China ¡¨ policy. Both sides of Taiwan Strait, the Authorities have the different explanations of it because the different of the histories and backgrounds between Taiwan and China since Ming and Ching dynasties. On this thesis, it discuss the policies of Chiang Khai-Shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo ¡¥s eras to handle this problem especially the international relationship of Taiwan and China during that times. After World War ¢º, America becomes a big country to be a turn point of the relationship between Taiwan and China, that ¡¥s what this thesis is written and discussion. According to the different background and histories, it do a comparative study of the policies between Chiang Khai-Shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo in final chapter.

Thesis (M.P.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1992.

In a surprising turn of events Chen Shui-bien won the 2000 presidential election in Taiwan, and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the ruling party of Taiwan. This marked a dramatic change in Taiwan's China policy, in that the DPP's China policy was quickly characterized by Taiwan’s objection to the one China principle, the DPP’s insistence on cross-Strait relations is a two-state’s relationship and emphasize Taiwan independence. However, Chen's actions prompted China to pass the Anti-Secession Law in March of 2005 and to force Chen and the DPP to moderate Taiwan’s China Policy. Part of the reasons for Chen's provocative actions toward China and China's response are Taiwan's domestic politics where elections control what the political parties do. The electoral factor in Taiwan has had a critical effect of the establishment of the DPP’s China policy. Therefore, the electoral factor in Taiwan’s domestic politics influences the DPP’s China policy because the DPP is primarily motivated by maintaining their power through vote maximization in elections and uses Taiwan’s China policy as a tool to increase their vote totals. This thesis explores how such domestic political issues have affected Chen and the DPP's China policy and China's response. It also explores how these domestic factors will affect Taiwan's China policy in the future under the DPP. Keywords: Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan domestic politics, DPP’s China policy, elections in Taiwan.

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「台灣問題」關係到中共未來國家戰略發展的核心，並涉及民族尊嚴的維護。所以中共無論基於區域博弈、國家安全、利益、發展維護等戰略需求，「台灣問題」勢將為中共必須面對的重要議題。自1978年以來，中共領導人受到內外在安全戰略因素影響，其統一戰略思維與策略運用，不斷的進行調整，逐漸由武力解放轉變為和平統一。當前中共國家戰略雖以「國家發展」為優先，但發生對主權原則的挑戰，勢被迫將統一問題提前解決。中共迄今不願承諾放棄武力主因，即基於國家安全戰略考量，以確保對台政策的靈活性與主動性。 基於整體情勢，中共體認「談判會比透過戰爭獲益更多」的戰略思維。當前中共對台策略係採取「政經分離、先經後政」柔性作為。依國際情勢、綜合國力及軍事能量而言，整體優勢明顯傾斜於中共，故未來兩岸關係發展情況，勢將大部份取決中共的戰略走向。更值得重視的是，中共確實有武力犯台能力與決心。 中共當前對台的經貿策略，無論基於全球化需求，或是中共所佔有的戰略優勢，對於台灣而言，乃勢之所趨，與其採取「抗衡」策略，不如運用擁有的籌碼，積極與之建立依存關係，進而在未來無可避免的政治談判中，爭取國家最大的利益與安全保障。 / The Taiwan issue sits at the center of China’s national security. It involves both China’s national dignity and national interests. Therefore, no matter in terms of its development projects, regional arrangements, or national security strategies, everything related to China’s national security has to do with the Taiwan issue. This is the reason why we have to address the cross-Strait situation from the angle of China’s national security concerns. Since 1978, under the constraint of China’s economic and security conditions, its leaders have been adjusting constantly its strategy to unify Taiwan: from military liberation gradually moving towards peaceful co-optation. As a result, China can reserve more energy for its economic catch-up. But still, according to the findings of this study, once sovereignty being threatened or challenged, China will consider the use of force without any delay. And, this is exactly why China has always been reluctant to denounce the use of force against Taiwan. For the moment, however, China prefers the unification through peaceful means and this lead to a strategy of “separation of politics and economy, with economy gong first and politics being last.” But, gradually, as Taiwan becomes more dependent on China economically and loses its advantages to China militarily, according to the findings of the research, China would gain more confidence over unifying Taiwan. Such confidence, if backed up by its physical strength, would very likely lead to a military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait. Facing such circumstance, more challenges against China’s determination of defend its sovereignty would add to the likelihood of the above-mentioned scenario. Thus, according to the findings of the study, Taiwan’s best strategy might probably be avoiding “balancing/confrontation” for now and at the same time making be best use of our economic advantages and bargaining chips to build up the economic and social interdependence across the Strait, which shall be the most reliable guarantee of Taiwan’s national security.

前人學者對於早期中國共產黨的研究，大多從第三國際輸出共產主義到中國的角度進行，自然強調了中蘇兩個共產之間在意識形態的影響及其作用，而忽略蘇俄對華政策如何影響中國共產黨（以下簡稱「中共」）的成立活動及其黨內路線變化的層面，包括蘇俄對中共的支援，本文集中探討此一過去學界所忽略的問題側面－－蘇俄對中共含有現實政治的動機與目的。 因此，本文主旨在於論析1917年10月革命後至1923年 1月為止，蘇俄的對華政策及蘇俄與中共間的互動關係。透過此論析，吾人欲加以論證者有以下兩點： 第一，中共的創立包括其主要路線的變化及大部分的活動，皆是在蘇俄的亞洲戰略以及對華政策的影響下進行。 第二，蘇俄接觸並支援中共，只是其亞洲戰略及對華政策的一個環節，並非只在於擴散共產主義理念的單一目的而已。 本文除導言及結論外，主體為參章。第壹章，闡明蘇俄於10月革命後，列寧政權如何從對外政策轉為現實路線，並闡述蘇俄對華政策的動機與其過程：第貳章，探討中共的創立及其活動與蘇俄在華工作的對應關係（functional relation）:第參章，論析中共自第一次全國代表大會（1921年7月）後開始至1923年1月「孫中山與越飛聯合宣言」為止的期間，中共政治路線及其發展因受到蘇俄對華政策影響的演變過程。