Private military companies have rapidly filled in many operational force capacities that national militaries now longer have the capabilities to fill natively. As such, PMCs have expanded their rosters as well as their services provided to fill in many roles, and have carried out many such roles such as logistics management, personal and site security, and some inherently state functions such as training indigenous security forces and interrogation of prisoners. This rise has impacted national militaries in many facets of their operations and abstract professional bases. The ability of the PMC to carry out operations at the same standard as regular soldiers but with higher pay has impacted how the regular soldier views their own place in the professional national military, and creates problems for the establishment as a whole. This thesis will discuss the Iraq War as a case study and the impact of PMCs on the war, as well as introduce the Huntingtonian theories of soldier professionalism and corporateness, and will also employ a critical Marxist perspective to analyse the role and impact of PMCs in the modern military convention and in civil-military relations.

In connection with the events of the Arab Spring in 2011, the region of northern Africa in particular underwent significant political changes. One of the states in which widespread protests caused the overturn of the authoritarian regime and subsequently established the democratization process was also Egypt, whose case is profoundly analysed in the second part of the thesis. Generally speaking, the thesis is concerned with the analysis of civil-military relations in states characterized by the low political culture. In the first place, it focuses on societies undergoing democratization process where the military traditionally maintains strong position within the state and hence often assumes the role of the leader of the transition. Therefore, the principal objective of the analysis constitutes the role of the army at the time of transition to democracy. At the same time, the thesis poses three research questions aiming partly at the military position, partly at the motives determining the willingness of the military to intervene. In the second part, the thesis analyses the given case through five defined factors which it subsequently examines in two levels: conceptual and interventionist. The goal of the thesis it to explain which factors determine strong position of the army in given praetorian...

This work narrates a qualitative sociological exploration with auto-ethnographic underpinnings. It deals with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) as a contextual case among others. The thesis seeks to answer the question of whether countries following a TRC route did better than those that did not use TRCs, when it comes to establishing civil control over the military. The author's exposure and involvement in the process as participant, participant observer, observer participant and observer inform the study. With the SATRC as one cornerstone other cases reflected upon include Argentina and Chile (Latin America), Spain and Portugal (Southern Europe), Namibia, Nigeria and Rwanda (Africa). / Sociology / D.Litt. et. Phil. (Sociology)

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 11, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

This work narrates a qualitative sociological exploration with auto-ethnographic underpinnings. It deals with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) as a contextual case among others. The thesis seeks to answer the question of whether countries following a TRC route did better than those that did not use TRCs, when it comes to establishing civil control over the military. The author's exposure and involvement in the process as participant, participant observer, observer participant and observer inform the study. With the SATRC as one cornerstone other cases reflected upon include Argentina and Chile (Latin America), Spain and Portugal (Southern Europe), Namibia, Nigeria and Rwanda (Africa). / Sociology / D.Litt. et. Phil. (Sociology)

Cette thèse de doctorat vise à répondre à une question qui a été largement négligée par la littérature sur les crises des régimes autoritaires : pourquoi les forces armées tolèrent-elles ou répriment-elles les mouvements d’opposition en faveur de changements du régime ? L’hypothèse principale stipule que l’attitude conciliante ou réfractaire des forces armées dépend de la nature des mesures adoptées par le régime autoritaire afin de s’assurer de leur loyauté et prévenir des coups d’État. Lorsque ces mesures de préventions des coups d’État contribuent à créer des divisons au sein de l’armée, les factions marginalisées sont enclines à tolérer les mouvements d’opposition, si ces derniers offrent une alternative crédible au régime, en raison de leur capacité à s’unir autour d’une plate-forme commune de revendications modérées, réalistes et acceptables pour les militaires. À l’inverse, lorsque les mesures de prévention des coups d’État favorisent la cohésion interne de l’armée et son attachement au régime, les militaires adoptent une attitude répressive à l’égard des forces contestataires. Ces hypothèses sont vérifiées à l’aide d’une analyse comparative des différentes mesures de prévention des coups d’État adoptées par les régimes autoritaires du Bénin et du Togo et de leurs impacts sur le succès, dans le premier cas, et l’échec, dans le second cas, des mouvements d’opposition dans les deux pays, au début des années 1990. Cette analyse est effectuée à l’aide de deux approches méthodologiques : le traçage de processus ainsi que la comparaison de deux études de cas. / This Ph.D. dissertation analyzes the factors that influence armed forces’ decisions to tolerate or suppress opposition movements demanding political reforms which could lead to regime change. This dissertation helps to fill a large gap in the literature as only a few scholars have attempted to explain military behaviour during regime crisis. It does so through an analysis of how anti-coup policies and opposition forces’ characteristics lead to the formation of marginalized military cliques and their potential support for regime change. It theorizes that the head of state’s survival strategy, specifically coup-proofing measures, influences military factions’ willingness to preserve the status quo. Reliance on loyalists leads to armed forces with a powerful core loyal to the incumbent regime and willing to use repression, while the strategy of counterbalancing leads to armed forces largely unattached to the maintenance of the regime. Under these circumstances, opposition forces can foster regime defection when they offer a viable alternative to the incumbent government, if the opposition can unify around a moderate platform that provides realist demands vis-à-vis regime forces. The main argument, on the influence of divergent coup-proofing policies on military actions, is assessed through a comparison of Benin and Togo. In each state, authoritarian regimes responded to the challenge of opposition mobilization by initiating negotiation processes. Divergences in coup-prevention techniques and credible commitment capacity of the opposition explain why the opposition campaign in the beginning of the 1990s was successful in Benin but failed in Togo. This research is based on two methods: process-tracing and the comparative method.

This work examines the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first year of the Korean War. Officially created in 1947, the Joint Chiefs saw their first true test as an institution during the conflict. At various times, the members of the JCS failed to issue direct orders to their subordinate, resulting in a divide between the wishes of President Truman and General MacArthur over the conduct of the war. By analyzing the interaction between the Joint Chiefs and General Douglas MacArthur, the flaws of both the individual Chiefs as well as the organization as a whole become apparent. The tactical and strategic decisions faced by the JCS are framed within the three main stages of the Korean War.

La nature du rôle joué par les institutions militaires dans les États démocratiques se diffère de celui joué dans les États en développement et/ou en période de transition politique. Dans le premier cas, les institutions militaires ont un rôle professionnel qui consiste à protéger l'État contre toute agression extérieure. Alors qu'au cas second, l'institution militaire dépasse ses taches professionnelles jusqu'à l'intervention sur la scène politique via le pouvoir militaire direct ou indirect. Prenant en considération le fait que l'institution militaire dans la deuxième catégorie des pays, n'a pas toujours confiance en le régime démocratique, - souvent considéré comme une menace à la sécurité nationale-, l'exigence de la démocratie reste donc en report permanent. Le débat académique autour de la relation la démocratie et l'arrivée des militaires au pouvoir s'accroît depuis le déclenchement des révolutions du printemps arabe, bien que la question de la transition-même a été au centre des recherches politiques depuis la seconde moitié des années 60-70. Les peuples sont à la recherche des régimes démocratiques basés sur la loi, la citoyenneté le respect des libertés et des droits de l'homme et qui mènent des politiques de développement au profit des niveaux pauvres avant les autres riches. Cependant, un nouveau problème est apparu ; trouver une formule approprié pour la place de l'Armée dans les nouveaux régimes démocratiques. Comment contrôler le rôle croissant de l'institution militaire sans exposer l'État au danger de la division interne ni de l'agression venant de l'extérieur ? Cette recherche se focalise sur les relations civilo-militaires en Libye ainsi que le rôle de l'institution militaire dans les transitions politiques qu'a connues le pays depuis son indépendance, ainsi que les facteurs historique, économiques, géopolitiques et sociaux, qui ont parfumé ces relations par la particularité libyenne. De plus, depuis 2014, durant le dialogue national libyen entre les parties hostiles, la question de l'institution militaire a posé de réels obstacles devant un consensus national, parce que les partie étaient, et le sont toujours, divisé autour de l'article 8, concernant l'Armée dans le projet signé du consensus. Dans ce cadre, le problématique de l'étude tourne autour une interrogation générale ; dans quelle mesure l'institution militaire peut-elle permettre ou contribuer à une transition vers un régime démocratique basé sur le pluralisme et non le tribalisme ni l en Libye ? / The nature of the role played by military institutions in democratic states differs from that one played in developing States and / or those in times of political transition. In the first case, military institutions have a professional role of protecting the state against external aggression. Whereas in the second case, the military institution goes beyond its professional tasks until intervention on the political scene via direct or indirect military power. Taking into account the fact that the military institution in the second category of countries does not always trust the democratic regime, often considered as a threat to national security, the requirement of democracy therefore remains in permanent postponement. The academic debate on the relationship between democracy and the arrival of the military in power has increased since the start of the Arab Spring revolutions, although the question of transition itself has been at the center of political research since the the 1960s and 70s. People are seeking democratic regimes based on law, citizenship, respect for human rights and freedoms, and pursuing development policies to benefit the poor before the other rich. However, a new problem arose; How to find a suitable formula for the place of the Army in the new democratic regimes. How can we control the growing role of the military institution without exposing the State to the danger of internal division or aggression from outside? This research focuses on civil-military relations in Libya and the role of the military institution in the political transitions that the country has undergone since independence, as well as the historical, economic, geopolitical and social factors that have perfumed these relations by the Libyan peculiarity. Moreover, since 2014, during the Libyan national dialogue between hostile parties, the question of the military institution posed real obstacles to a national consensus, because the parties were, and still are, divided around the article 8, concerning the Army in the signed draft of the consensus. In this context, the problem of study revolves around a general question; to what extent can the military institution allow or contribute to a transition to a democratic regime based on pluralism and not tribalism or Libya ?

The relationship between a country's political decision-making and top military leadership is central, but also debated. Not least whether the military side should take political life into account and to what extent one should become a part of it. This essay aims to increase the understanding of the challenges of the military-political relationship, focusing on the borderland between peace and war that is usually described as a gray zone. Through scenario-based interviews with senior officials and politicians within the Swedish government and government office, it is investigated what impact a gray zone problem can have on the military advice provided. By combining a future scenario with interviews, an empirical material unique to the research field is created. The results show that the gray zone affects the strategic decision-making process, but not really by adding any completely new challenges, but mainly by strengthening and partly developing existing ones. The logic of peace, rather than war, on strategy should therefore form the basis for how the gray zone is viewed from a decision-making process perspective. The gray zone's character of ambiguity creates and reinforces tensions between different actors in the strategy process, which in turn risks delaying strategic decisions. The ambiguities arise mainly in three areas: the view of the strategic problem, the political consequences and the organization that will deal with the gray zone. Some of the ambiguities are amplified by the opponent, while others are more the result of internal factors. In order to reduce the negative effects of the gray zone problem, a much closer integration between the military and politics is proposed than in peacetime: policy-making must take place jointly and traditional boundaries need to be redrawn. The key is spelled relationships and these must be created and maintained in good time before the gray zone enters. / Relationen mellan ett lands politiska beslutsfattning och högsta militärledning är central, men också omdebatterad. Inte minst huruvida den militära sidan ska ta hänsyn till det politiska livet och i vilken grad man själv ska bli en del av detta. Denna uppsats syftar till att öka förståelsen för den militär-politiska relationens utmaningar, med fokus på det gränsland mellan fred och krig som brukar betecknas som en gråzon. Genom scenariobaserade intervjuer med högre tjänstemän och politiker inom Sveriges regering och regeringskansli undersöks vilken påverkan en gråzonsproblematik kan ha på de militära råd som lämnas. Genom att kombinera ett framtidsscenario med intervjuer skapas ett för forskningsfältet unikt empiriskt material. Resultatet visar att gråzonen påverkar den strategiska beslutsprocessen men egentligen inte genom att tillföra några helt nya utmaningar, utan främst genom att förstärka och till del utveckla redan existerande. Fredens, snarare än krigets, logik på strategi bör därför ligga till grund för hur gråzonen betraktas ur ett beslutsprocessperspektiv. Gråzonens karaktär av otydlighet skapar och förstärker spänningar mellan olika aktörer inom strategiprocessen, som i sin tur riskerar att försena strategiska beslut. Otydligheterna uppstår främst inom tre områden: synen på det strategiska problemet, de politiska konsekvenserna och den organisation som ska hantera gråzonen. Vissa av otydligheterna förstärks av motståndaren, medan andra mer är ett resultat av interna faktorer. För att minska gråzonsproblematikens negativa effekter föreslås en betydligt närmare integrering mellan militär och politik än i fredstid: policyskapandet måste ske gemensamt och traditionella gränser behöver dras om. Nyckeln stavas relati-oner och dessa måste skapas och underhållas i god tid innan gråzonen träder in.

Syftet med denna studie är att fastställa vad som motiverade de adliga officerarna i den svenska militären att delta i Gustav III:s revolution 1772. Denna undersökning kommer att använda material skrivet av deltagande adliga officerare mellan 1771 - 1773, med ursprung från Gustavianska eller Sprengtportenska samlingen, samt från biografierna av Johan Christopher Toll och Jakob Magnus Sprengtporten. För att uppfylla det etablerade syftet formuleras tre forskningsfrågor, en primär och två sekundära, som besvaras i separata kapitel. Dessutom kommer undersökningen att tillämpa en kvalitativ textanalytisk metod tillsammans med en deduktiv teoretisk ansats. Denna metod, tack vare dess hermeneutiska användbarhet, möjliggör en omfattande analys av de motiv som anges i materialet, och hur resultaten återspeglar militärens sociala och politiska kultur. Det valda teoretiska ramverket, som tillämpas deduktivt i analysen, är Samuel Finers teori om militär intervention. Mer specifikt används koncept från avsnitt i boken som täcker militära officerares motiv för att ingripa i politik. De slutliga slutsatserna i denna undersökning är att officerarna främst motiverades att gå med i kuppen för att driva det "nationella intresset". De adliga officerarna hade ett långvarigt hat mot landets politiska system, baserat på uppfattningen att det var oförmöget att på ett adekvat sätt skydda vad de såg som nationens intressen. Officerarna, som såg sig själva som fosterlandets beskyddare, anslöt sig till revolten för att installera ett politiskt system som de ansåg kunde skydda nationens fortsatta existens. Officerarna motiverades också på grundval av "ideologi", eftersom konspirationen gav en möjlighet att implementera rojalistiska dygder. Slutligen var ytterligare ett motiv strävan efter "sektionsintressen". Beskyddandet av "gruppintressen", i form av att skydda adelns politiska och ekonomiska privilegier, samt "individuella intressen", där ekonomiska belöningar och befordringar begärdes i utbyte mot lojalitet, fanns också med i bilden. / The purpose of this study is to determine what motivated the noble officers of the Swedish military to participate in Gustav III:s 1772 Revolution. This investigation will be utilizing material written by participating noble officers between 1771 - 1773, originating from Gustavianska or Sprengtportenska samlingen, or from the biographies of Johan Christopher Toll and Jakob Magnus Sprengtporten. In order to fulfill the stated purpose of this investigation, three questions, one primary and two secondary, are formulated and answered in separate chapters. In addition, the investigation will be applying a qualitative text analytical method along with an deductive theoretical approach. This method, thanks to its hermeneutic utility, allows a comprehensive analysis of the motives stated in the material, and how the findings reflect on the military’s societal and political culture. The chosen theoretical framework which is applied deductively in the analysis, is Samuel Finers ‘military intervention’ theory. More specifically concepts from the section that covers military officers' motivations for intervening in politics. The final conclusions made in this investigation is that the officers were primarily motivated to join the coup to pursue the ‘national interest’. The noble officers had a longstanding hatred for the country’s political system, based on the conception that it was unable to adequately protect what they viewed as the nation's interests. The officers, who viewed themselves as the fatherlands protectors, joined the revolt in order to install a political system that they felt could protect the nation's continued existence. The officers were also motivated on the basis of ‘ideology’, as the conspiracy provided a opportunity to enforce Royalist political doctrine. Lastly, a further motive was the pursuit of ‘sectional interests’. The protection of ‘group interests’, in the form of protecting the nobility's political and financial privileges, as well as ‘individual interests’, where financial rewards and promotions were requested in exchange for allegiance, were also present.