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Knotted Numbers, Mnemonics, and Narratives: Khipu Scholarship and the Search for the “Khipu Code” throughout the Twentieth and Twenty First CenturyLysaght, Veronica L., Lysaght January 2016 (has links)
No description available.
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Let There Be War: Competing Narratives and the Perpetuation of Violence in GeorgiaMcBrayer, William Daniel 27 April 2009 (has links)
No description available.
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Location, Location, Location: A Probabilistic Model of Banked Earthwork Placement Within the Central Ohio Landscape During the Early and Middle Woodland PeriodsAngel, Julie R. 30 July 2010 (has links)
No description available.
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Isotope Analysis on the Great Hungarian Plain: An Exploration of Mobility and Subsistence Strategies from the Neolithic to the Copper AgeGiblin, Julia Irene 27 July 2011 (has links)
No description available.
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The Influence of Culture and Arts on the Development of Peruvian ChildrenChurch, Rebecca 21 June 2010 (has links)
No description available.
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Homogeneity and heterogeneity of political traditions in the remaking of world orderSchiele, Alexandre 08 1900 (has links)
Deux décennies après la chute de l'URSS (1991), ce mémoire propose une réévaluation de la thèse de Francis Fukuyama sur la Fin de l'Histoire, élaborée en 1989, qui postule qu'avec la chute de l'URSS aucune idéologie ne peut rivaliser avec la démocratie libérale capitaliste; et de la thèse de Samuel P. Huntington sur le Choc des civilisations, élaborée en 1993, qui pose l'existence d'un nombre fini de civilisations homogènes et antagonistes. Pourtant, lorsque confrontées à une étude approfondie des séquences historiques, ces deux théories apparaissent pour le moins relatives. Deux questions ont été traitées: l'interaction entre Idéologie et Conditions historiques, et la thèse de l'homogénéité intracivilisationnelle et de l'hétérogénéité antagoniste intercivilisationnelle. Sans les invalider complètement, cette recherche conclut toutefois que ces deux théories doivent être nuancées; elles se situent aux deux extrémités du spectre des relations internationales. La recherche effectuée a montré que les idéologies et leur poids relatif sont tributaires d'un contexte, contrairement à Fukuyama qui les pose dans l'absolu. De plus, l'étude de la Chine maoïste et particulièrement de la pensée de Mao Zedong montre que les traditions politiques locales sont plus hétérogènes qu'il n'y paraît au premier abord, ce qui relativise la thèse de Huntington. En conclusion, les rapports entre États sont plus dynamiques que ne le laissent penser les thèses de Fukuyama et de Huntington. / The central purpose of this research is a revaluation, two decades after the 1991 demise of the USSR, of Francis Fukuyama's 1989 "End of History" theory, which postulates that with the fall of the USSR no major ideology is a challenger to the domination of liberal capitalist democracy; and of Samuel P. Huntington's 1993 "Clash of Civilizations" theory that postulates the existence of a finite number of antagonistic homogeneous civilizations. When confronted with the actual unfolding of historical events, these two absolute and uncompromising theories appear increasingly relative. Two questions were researched: the interaction between Ideology and Historical conditions in the case of Fukuyama, and that of the presupposed Intra-civilizational homogeneity and Inter-civilizational antagonistic heterogeneity. This research, not dismissing them totally, comes to the conclusion that they constitute the two opposite poles of a continuum that encompass most types of interactions between polities. First, this thesis comes to the conclusion that ideologies and their relative weight are part of a broader picture rather than absolutes in themselves, as Fukuyama argues. Furthermore, the study of Maoist China and especially of the thoughts of Mao Zedong strongly suggests the heterogeneity of political traditions locally, contrary to Huntington's thesis. In other words, interactions between polities seem more dynamic than the simplistic linear approaches of Fukuyama and Huntington.
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Critique de la modernité et philosophie de l'enracinement : la médiation des valeurs dans l'oeuvre de Simone Weil / Critique of the Modernity and the Philosophy of Root : the mediation of Values in Simone Weil's worksEnyegue abanda, Fabien Mathurin 12 February 2013 (has links)
Basée sur l’idée de progrès, la science moderne, d’inspiration cartésienne, est perçue par Simone Weil comme la principale cause de la crise moderne des valeurs. Sous-tendue par le mouvement droit, elle a perdu le principe d’analogie et s’est, de la sorte, dessaisie du monde ambiant des réalités quotidiennes. Aussi apparaît-elle non seulement comme à la source du scientisme, de la croyance en une raison scientifique autonome et du culte rendu aux applications techniques, mais aussi à l’origine du capitalisme industriel, du communisme révolutionnaire, du totalitarisme, de l’effondrement de l’ordre axiologique universel traditionnel concomitant à la crise de la civilisation. Les conséquences issues de ce mouvement de déracinement n’ont pas seulement conduit à l’oppression prolétarienne et coloniale ou au modernisme comme primat des valeurs d’innovation sur les valeurs de tradition, mais surtout à l’oppression généralisée et à l’oubli des structures axiologiques primordiales universelles que sont l’Etre, la Nécessité, le Passé, le Surnaturel. Fondé sur une dialectique structurelle déracinement-enracinement, pesanteur-grâce, le discours philosophique de Simone Weil sur la modernité poursuit un double enjeu. Sans se démarquer de la raison philosophique immanente, elle s’attelle à la fois à la dénonciation des propensions et défaillances qu’offrent les valeurs illusoires modernes d’argent, d’algèbre, de machinisme, d’impérialisme, de révolution, de démocratie, qu’à la conception d’une philosophie de la médiation des valeurs apte à contribuer à la renaissance d’une culture d’attention au capital axiologique de l’humanité. En effet, la modernité n’apparaissant plus que comme synonyme de crise des valeurs, il convient de tirer au clair ce piège qui fait de l’homme l’esclave de ses propres productions en y entreprenant une herméneutique ouverte non seulement au principe ontologique de nécessité, au-delà de toute projection avant-gardiste, mais surtout à une herméneutique des civilisations inspiratrices de l’humanité, en dehors de tout misonéisme passéiste, où le Surnaturel s’atteste dans sa plénitude comme critérium des valeurs authentiques et principe de médiation témoignant de l’enracinement de toutes choses dans l’être. Sans être en opposition avec les impératifs de découverte, d’invention et de développement, la philosophie weilienne de la médiation des valeurs se dévoile dans sa posture et sa validité comme une philosophie d’inspiration universelle à l’enracinement des peuples, des cultures et des nations, attentive à une pensée permanente des rapports entre la tradition et l’innovation, l’universalité et l’historicité. / Based on the idea of progress, the modern science, inspired by Descartes, is seen by Simone Weil as the primary cause of the modern crisis of values. Sustained by a linear movement, this science has lost the principle of analogy and, by consequent, it has lost its bindings with the surrounding world of everyday reality. Also, this science shows itself not only as the source of scientism, this belief in an independent scientific reason and the cult of the technical applications, but also as the source of industrial capitalism, of the revolutionary communism, of the totalitarianism, of the collapse of the traditional axiological order simultaneously to the crisis of civilization. Theses consequences resulting from the movement of uprooting not only led to the proletarian and the colonial oppression and to the modernism as the priority of the values of innovation on the values of tradition, but especially to a generalized oppression and the forgetting of the primordial universal axiological structures: the Being, the Need, the Past and the Supernatural.Based on a structural dialectic, the dislocation and the rooting, the fall and salvation, the philosophical discourse on modernity of Simone Weil seeks a double stake. Without a delimitation of the reason of the immanent philosophy, she is equally attached to the denunciation of the propensities and the failures of the modern illusory values of the money, of the algebra, of the machinery, of the imperialism, of the revolution, of the democracy, and to the conception of a philosophy of the mediation of values able to contribute to the rebirth of a culture attentive to the axiological capital of the humanity. Indeed, if the modernity appears no more as a synonym of the crisis of values, we must clarify this trap that makes the man the slave of his own productions by a hermeneutic open not only to the ontological principle of necessary, beyond any avant-garde projection, but principally a hermeneutic of the inspired civilizations of the humanity, without any outdated misoneism, where the Supernatural is attested in its fullness as criterion of the authentic values and as a principle of mediation reflecting the roots of all things in the Being. Without being in a conflict with the requirements of the discovery, of the invention, of the progress, the weilian philosophy of values mediation reveals itself as a philosophy of universal inspiration, founding the rooting of peoples, of cultures and of nations, paying permanent attention to the relationship between the tradition and the innovation, between the universality and the historicity.
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Homogeneity and heterogeneity of political traditions in the remaking of world orderSchiele, Alexandre 08 1900 (has links)
Deux décennies après la chute de l'URSS (1991), ce mémoire propose une réévaluation de la thèse de Francis Fukuyama sur la Fin de l'Histoire, élaborée en 1989, qui postule qu'avec la chute de l'URSS aucune idéologie ne peut rivaliser avec la démocratie libérale capitaliste; et de la thèse de Samuel P. Huntington sur le Choc des civilisations, élaborée en 1993, qui pose l'existence d'un nombre fini de civilisations homogènes et antagonistes. Pourtant, lorsque confrontées à une étude approfondie des séquences historiques, ces deux théories apparaissent pour le moins relatives. Deux questions ont été traitées: l'interaction entre Idéologie et Conditions historiques, et la thèse de l'homogénéité intracivilisationnelle et de l'hétérogénéité antagoniste intercivilisationnelle. Sans les invalider complètement, cette recherche conclut toutefois que ces deux théories doivent être nuancées; elles se situent aux deux extrémités du spectre des relations internationales. La recherche effectuée a montré que les idéologies et leur poids relatif sont tributaires d'un contexte, contrairement à Fukuyama qui les pose dans l'absolu. De plus, l'étude de la Chine maoïste et particulièrement de la pensée de Mao Zedong montre que les traditions politiques locales sont plus hétérogènes qu'il n'y paraît au premier abord, ce qui relativise la thèse de Huntington. En conclusion, les rapports entre États sont plus dynamiques que ne le laissent penser les thèses de Fukuyama et de Huntington. / The central purpose of this research is a revaluation, two decades after the 1991 demise of the USSR, of Francis Fukuyama's 1989 "End of History" theory, which postulates that with the fall of the USSR no major ideology is a challenger to the domination of liberal capitalist democracy; and of Samuel P. Huntington's 1993 "Clash of Civilizations" theory that postulates the existence of a finite number of antagonistic homogeneous civilizations. When confronted with the actual unfolding of historical events, these two absolute and uncompromising theories appear increasingly relative. Two questions were researched: the interaction between Ideology and Historical conditions in the case of Fukuyama, and that of the presupposed Intra-civilizational homogeneity and Inter-civilizational antagonistic heterogeneity. This research, not dismissing them totally, comes to the conclusion that they constitute the two opposite poles of a continuum that encompass most types of interactions between polities. First, this thesis comes to the conclusion that ideologies and their relative weight are part of a broader picture rather than absolutes in themselves, as Fukuyama argues. Furthermore, the study of Maoist China and especially of the thoughts of Mao Zedong strongly suggests the heterogeneity of political traditions locally, contrary to Huntington's thesis. In other words, interactions between polities seem more dynamic than the simplistic linear approaches of Fukuyama and Huntington.
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Úvahy o globálním řádu po skončení studené války: perspektiva Francise Fukuyamy a Samuela P. Huntingtona / Reflections on the Global Order after the End of the Cold War: the Perspective of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. HuntingtonJurásek, Miroslav January 2009 (has links)
The times coming with the End of the Cold War were very turbulent. Politicians had to take into the consideration lots of scenarios and the next global trends to make correct decisions. Most of the very numerous visions of the future global order followed more or less the twofold pattern: order or anarchy. "The End of History and the Last Man" and "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" written by two prominent American political scientists Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington and published at the beginning of the 90s are the most representative works that fit into this pattern. These provocative and controversial theories have been criticized and empirically challenged by many on one side, on the other side it hasn't impeded others to use them as a starting point for their next analyses. This dissertation thesis is a contribution to the debate between the dissenters and the supporters of these theories from a predictive point of view. Through the research theoretical methodology it is argued that the examined theories are still valid even nowadays because their theoretical essence (or hard core in the Lakatosian research program) has not been refuted yet. Nevertheless, the hard core of the theories determines their very specific character which puts forward the importance of the factors labelled in the Lakatosian framework as an external history of a science. These factors organized according to the Mehtas criteria of so called strong idea are, especially in the social sciences, decisive for how a theoretical construct is accepted in a broader non-academic context. It is demonstrated that both theories fulfill all criteria to be very influential in practice, although the idea of clash of civilizations is even more powerful in this respect. The specific features of all theories are illustrated on two case studies: Union of South American Nations and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Firstly, the selection of these case studies is justified and secondly, the anomalies in terms of the Lakatosian methodology are identified and then explained. There have been found no unexplainable anomalies, which practically confirms the validity of both research programs on one side, on the other side it facilitates a better assessment of the studied theories in a sense of their interpretative scope and possibilities.
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Sword Arm of the Demos: The Military Contributions of the Athenian EliteGreen, Derek Bryan January 2021 (has links)
No description available.
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