Historically, “offender”-focused discourses have dominated the field of criminology while overlooking those family members who become subject to justice intervention by virtue of their familial bonds. In this qualitative study, unstructured interviews were conducted with eight nuclear family members of criminalized persons in Ontario and Quebec. Participant accounts reveal that the interviewed family members self-imposed significant moral and legal responsibilities for their relatives following criminal justice intervention and simultaneously experienced negative role re-evaluation driven by feelings of guilt, failure, and self-blame. Participants’ inherent lack of control over their criminalized relatives’ behaviours and the criminal justice system’s decisions exacerbate negative impacts of criminalization on non-criminalized relatives’ self-concepts. This lack of control increases the stress of criminal justice intervention while straining family resources. When relatives are justice-involved for prolonged period, the family becomes stuck in a constant state of stress and uncertainty, which may have lasting consequences on the family if left unmanaged. Criminal justice intervention as a disruptive event then reconfigures the family in ways that often leave lasting impacts on nuclear family relationships. This thesis engages with Boss’ (1999, 2006) theory of Ambiguous Loss to analyze participants’ experiences and demonstrate the consequences of criminalization on various nuclear family members in a Canadian context. To mitigate certain limitations of Boss’ (1999, 2006) theory, criminal justice intervention is first defined as a disruptive event that transforms family members’ known realities into threatening and uncertain environments. This thesis then explores the stress and strain that justice intervention places upon the family and applies the theory of Ambiguous Loss to understand criminalization as a source of ambiguous loss. Further, this thesis expands the scope of Boss’ (1999) theory beyond the experiences of certain populations (i.e. children of incarcerated parents) and discovers the limitations of this theory in the context of criminological research. It also opens the door for future research to apply this theory to criminalized populations.

<p>Obemannade flygplan med attackförmåga (UCAV) används i allt större utsträckning i konflikter idag. En av de främsta fördelarna med dessa är att det inte finns någon risk att mista en pilot, då dessa är fjärstyrda. I attacker utförda av amerikanska UCAV:er i framför allt Afghanistan och Pakistan, har collateral damage inträffat vid ett flertal tillfällen. Det innebär att civila oavsiktligt fallit offer för attacker. Enligt krigets lagar kan sådana händelser rättfärdigas av att militär nödvändighet föreligger, men det är tveksamt om det går att hävda det när man inte riskerar egna förluster. Detta innebär i så fall att collateral damage alltid är krigsbrott när det orsakats av UCAV. Då är det viktigt att det går att utkräva ansvar ur obemannade system och det finns farhågor att ansvarsförhållandena blir otydligare när det inte sitter en pilot i flygplanet som ”trycker på knappen”. Men så länge den obemannade farkosten fjärrstyrs och besluten tas av en människa går det inte att se några skillnader i möjligheten till ansvarsutkrävande från bemannade system.</p> / <p>The use of Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) has seen an increasing use in modern conflicts. One of the main advantages of these is the fact that there is no risk of losing a pilot, as the aircraft are remote-controlled. The attacks carried out by U.S. UCAVs in Afghanistan and Pakistan have resultet in a number of incients with collateral damage. According to the laws of war, only military necessity can justify such incidents and it is highly doubtful if you can claim such necessity when you do not risk any loss of life yourself. This would mean that collateral damage caused by UCAVs automatically becomes a war crime. This raises the issue of accountability and wether it is possible to extract such from unmanned systems. There are fears that this would be difficult when no pilot is present in the aircraft to ”pull the trigger”. However, as long as operators remotely control the unmanned aircraft and the decision to release weapons in anger are made by humans, there are no differences to be found in terms of accountability between manned and unmanned systems.</p>

Obemannade flygplan med attackförmåga (UCAV) används i allt större utsträckning i konflikter idag. En av de främsta fördelarna med dessa är att det inte finns någon risk att mista en pilot, då dessa är fjärstyrda. I attacker utförda av amerikanska UCAV:er i framför allt Afghanistan och Pakistan, har collateral damage inträffat vid ett flertal tillfällen. Det innebär att civila oavsiktligt fallit offer för attacker. Enligt krigets lagar kan sådana händelser rättfärdigas av att militär nödvändighet föreligger, men det är tveksamt om det går att hävda det när man inte riskerar egna förluster. Detta innebär i så fall att collateral damage alltid är krigsbrott när det orsakats av UCAV. Då är det viktigt att det går att utkräva ansvar ur obemannade system och det finns farhågor att ansvarsförhållandena blir otydligare när det inte sitter en pilot i flygplanet som ”trycker på knappen”. Men så länge den obemannade farkosten fjärrstyrs och besluten tas av en människa går det inte att se några skillnader i möjligheten till ansvarsutkrävande från bemannade system. / The use of Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) has seen an increasing use in modern conflicts. One of the main advantages of these is the fact that there is no risk of losing a pilot, as the aircraft are remote-controlled. The attacks carried out by U.S. UCAVs in Afghanistan and Pakistan have resultet in a number of incients with collateral damage. According to the laws of war, only military necessity can justify such incidents and it is highly doubtful if you can claim such necessity when you do not risk any loss of life yourself. This would mean that collateral damage caused by UCAVs automatically becomes a war crime. This raises the issue of accountability and wether it is possible to extract such from unmanned systems. There are fears that this would be difficult when no pilot is present in the aircraft to ”pull the trigger”. However, as long as operators remotely control the unmanned aircraft and the decision to release weapons in anger are made by humans, there are no differences to be found in terms of accountability between manned and unmanned systems.

The jus in bello proportionality rule establishes an upper boundary on how much collateral damage combatants can cause whilst striking a lawful target and its associated rule on precautions in attack compels them to take all feasible measures to properly understand the situation on the ground and to mitigate civilian harm. Proportionality and precautions in attack have been codified in API for over forty years, but in that time, it has been difficult to hold troops and their leaders accountable for breaches of these rules. In this study, I examine several reasons for why these rules have been difficult to apply ex post by considering the strategic motivations of state officials and prosecutors. Specifically, I propose a game-theoretic model which describes the decisions that state officials and prosecutors have historically made, and I explore what changes to this model would prompt these actors to behave differently. The model was developed using insights gained from legal case studies, archival research and a series of interviews with relevant actors. It suggests, inter alia, that to induce state officials to support a stricter liability standard for unlawful attacks, they must either ascribe much more value to legitimacy than to the success of future military operations, or they must perceive the success of future military operations to be unaffected by the possibility of losing criminal or civil adjudication. State officials may perceive losing a civil case based on state liability as being less likely to affect the success of future military operations compared with criminal liability against individual troops. Therefore, state officials may be inclined to support a stricter civil liability standard, if they believed it would help the state to secure greater legitimacy.

Unintended killing and harming to civilians is a common problem in war. The Just of War theory uses the doctrine of double effect (DDE) to morally defend this actions. As long as the agent fulfill the principle of proportionality and doesn´t intend to harm civilians DDE allows these actions. DDE is too permissive and Michael Walzer has presented the doctrine of double effect and double intention (DDE+). DDE+ tells us that the agent should take due care of civilians and also increase risk to themselves. Objections to DDE+ mainly focuses on morally challenges of soldiers and officers. This theses presents the idea of moral challenges on an organizational level connected to DDE+. What does it mean, on an organizational level, to follow the premise of increasing risk? This is a organizational moral challenge that does more harm than good with the result of problems with the use of DDE+ in a few number of situations. / I krig är det ett vanligt problem att civila skadas och dödas oavsiktligt. I teorin om rättfärdigt krig används ofta doktrinen om dubbel effekt (DDE) för att moraliskt försvara att detta sker under förutsättning att agenten uppfyller kraven för proportionalitetsprincipen och inte har för avsikt att skada civila. Michael Walzer anser att DDE är för tillåtande och har därför presenterat doktrinen om dubbel effekt med dubbel intention (DDE+). DDE+ innebär att en kombattant ska göra vad hen kan för att undvika negativa sidoeffekter samt även acceptera en egen ökad kostnad, det vill säga en ökad risk för att själv bli skadad. Invändningar mot DDE+ har i huvudsak fokuserat på de moraliska utmaningar enskilda soldater och officerare ställs inför. I den här uppsatsen utvecklar jag en invändning mot DDE+ som fokuserar på den organisatoriska nivån. Vad innebär det för en militär organisation som exempelvis ett lands försvarsmakt att följa DDE+ premiss avseende att öka risken för egen personal? Jag argumenterar för att detta i vissa fall kan innebära en moralisk utmaning för den militära organisationen och därmed gör DDE+ svår att använda i vissa situationer.

The 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Canada highlights a broad range in ethical challenges, particularly in priority setting. Presently, a leading theory in ethical priority setting is Daniels’ and Sabin’s Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R), which enhances fair and legitimate procedural decision making in typical healthcare settings. A4R attempts to mitigate conflicting interests and facilitate fairness in deliberations over priority setting issues. Whether this framework may be applied to public health emergencies has yet to be examined. This qualitative study describes the outbreak through the lens of A4R and explores the applicability of A4R in atypical or emergent circumstances. Findings from 25 structured key informant interviews of public health officials suggest refinements to the framework may be required for emergency events. The presence of such a framework may minimize collateral damage during and after a response. The lessons may guide future preparedness efforts such as pandemic planning.

The 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Canada highlights a broad range in ethical challenges, particularly in priority setting. Presently, a leading theory in ethical priority setting is Daniels’ and Sabin’s Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R), which enhances fair and legitimate procedural decision making in typical healthcare settings. A4R attempts to mitigate conflicting interests and facilitate fairness in deliberations over priority setting issues. Whether this framework may be applied to public health emergencies has yet to be examined. This qualitative study describes the outbreak through the lens of A4R and explores the applicability of A4R in atypical or emergent circumstances. Findings from 25 structured key informant interviews of public health officials suggest refinements to the framework may be required for emergency events. The presence of such a framework may minimize collateral damage during and after a response. The lessons may guide future preparedness efforts such as pandemic planning.

This dissertation offers a new understanding about wartime decision making in the face of likely, but unintended, harm to foreign civilians. It empirically identifies conditions under which leaders in democratic nations are more or less likely to choose to attack a target when confronted with a dilemma between pursuing national security objectives and avoiding civilian casualties. An innovative targeting decision model was constructed that described both the theorized structure of the decisions inputs and the process by which these inputs are assembled into a choice. The model went beyond the normal target benefit and civilian casualty cost considerations of proportionality to also include the contextual input of prospect frame. Decision makers were expected to address the same benefit and cost differently depending on whether they were winning or losing the conflict. This was because the prospect frame would influence their risk attitudes, as predicted by prospect theory. This model was then tested via two decision-making experiments that used military officers and defense civilians as participants. Additionally, a statistical analysis of data collected from an extended period of the second Intifada was done to seek evidence that the model also applied in actual wartime decision making. All three tests supported portions of the targeting decision model. Higher target benefit and lower civilian casualty estimates increased support for the planned attack. Prospect frame influenced decisions in the cases where both target value and the civilian casualty estimates were high and the resulting dilemma was very difficult. In these situations, those told that their forces were losing the conflict were less sensitive to humanitarian harm and more likely to support the attack than when they were told their side was winning. Furthermore, the Intifada data analysis of attacks approved by Israeli officials against Palestinians found this same effect of prospect frame held generally across all six years of observations.

The paper deals with the use of unmanned aircraft of the American national security policy. It examines the history of unmanned aviation, its military use, and cost- efficiency. It then examines the main obstacles and problems with their use in national security that this technology meets and will meet in the future after a higher level of autonomy is developed. These problems involve legal issues, international and domestic American law, the issue of civilian casualties, the role of the media, and public opinion. The final chapter focuses on the problems of technical, strategic and operational issues. In this section the research paper comes to the first conclusion which claims that the introduction of more autonomous systems to war will radically change its structure and, consequently, standard procedures and strategies. Case studies are included to illustrate how successful the drone strategy is applied in the five countries where the United States leads a war on terror. The research using the theory of the revolution in military affairs concludes that these UAVs pose the greatest challenge in history and it goes well beyond military matters. UAVs in national security affect the understanding of the basic principles of war in relation to the concepts of warrior ethos and just war.