Este trabalho versa sobre o conceito de potência natural em Espinosa, sua amplitude e abrangência e seus reflexos no direito natural e na política. Procura revelar a originalidade do conceito de direito natural em Espinosa, muito diferente dos pontos de vista de Grotius, de Hobbes e de todos os demais filósofos e doutrinadores, levando-o, também, a uma visão diferente sobre a formação do Estado; e, finalmente, a sua doutrina sobre o Estado e suas diversas instituições políticas, enfatizando sempre a liberdade e a dignidade humanas como a razão de ser da criação desse mesmo Estado. Procuramos também revelar neste modesto trabalho o avanço, a novidade e a contribuição de Espinosa à ciência jurídica contemporânea. / This paper deals with the concept of natural power in Spinoza, its breadth and scope and its effects on natural law and politics. Seeks to reveal the originality of the concept of natural law in Spinoza, very different from the views of Grotius, Hobbes and all other philosophers and scholars, too, leading him to a different view of state formation; and finally, his teaching on the State and its various political institutions, always emphasizing freedom and human dignity as the reason for the creation of that State. We also seek to reveal in this modest work the advance, the novelty and contribution of Spinoza to contemporary legal science.

This study is an attempt to explicate Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz&rsquo / s search for a way out of the labyrinth of the continuum in his early years of philosophizing. The main motive of the study is the belief that it would be worthwhile to see how Leibniz initially goes into the labyrinth and comes across with the riddles contained in it. Accordingly, this thesis is intended to discuss what the problem of the composition of the continuum is for the young Leibniz, which concepts and metaphysical problems are associated with the labyrinth, and what particular difficulties challenge Leibniz in his struggle. More importantly, the study seeks to delineate how Leibniz responds to these difficulties, what kinds of solutions he suggests, and how and why he changes his mind and offers different accounts concerning the composition of the continuum in his early writings. In this search for a way out of the labyrinth, some of the early writings of Leibniz written between 1666 and 1675 were studied with a particular emphasis on those directly related with the labyrinth of the continuum. During the study, the differences and transitions between geometrical, physical, and metaphysical accounts concerning the problem of the composition of the continuum were examined with a special focus on the bridging role of &lsquo / motion&rsquo / and the notion of &lsquo / conatus.&rsquo

Este trabalho versa sobre o conceito de potência natural em Espinosa, sua amplitude e abrangência e seus reflexos no direito natural e na política. Procura revelar a originalidade do conceito de direito natural em Espinosa, muito diferente dos pontos de vista de Grotius, de Hobbes e de todos os demais filósofos e doutrinadores, levando-o, também, a uma visão diferente sobre a formação do Estado; e, finalmente, a sua doutrina sobre o Estado e suas diversas instituições políticas, enfatizando sempre a liberdade e a dignidade humanas como a razão de ser da criação desse mesmo Estado. Procuramos também revelar neste modesto trabalho o avanço, a novidade e a contribuição de Espinosa à ciência jurídica contemporânea. / This paper deals with the concept of natural power in Spinoza, its breadth and scope and its effects on natural law and politics. Seeks to reveal the originality of the concept of natural law in Spinoza, very different from the views of Grotius, Hobbes and all other philosophers and scholars, too, leading him to a different view of state formation; and finally, his teaching on the State and its various political institutions, always emphasizing freedom and human dignity as the reason for the creation of that State. We also seek to reveal in this modest work the advance, the novelty and contribution of Spinoza to contemporary legal science.

Ce mémoire examine le thème des causes finales dans l’Éthique (1677) de Spinoza. À l’aide d’une classification quadripartite des types de discours sur les causes finales, il identifie d’abord en le finalisme théologico-métaphysique la cible philosophique visée par la critique de l’Appendice de la première partie de cet opus magnum. Radicalisant le postulat épistémologique cartésien voulant que la volonté divine ne puisse servir de principe explicatif aux phénomènes naturels, Spinoza rejette complètement l’idée selon laquelle le rapport entre Dieu et sa création puisse être conçu sous le mode de la cause finale et élabore, à l’ombre de cette critique, une conception de la causalité divine selon laquelle la production du monde est le résultat nécessaire de l’essence de Dieu. Ensuite, notre mémoire se penche sur le concept de conatus qui se situe à l’intersection de la philosophie naturelle et de l’ontologie. Nous explorons, selon trois hypothèses convoquées tour à tour pour comprendre son fonctionnement, la possibilité de dynamiques téléologiques dans la nature malgré la critique de l’Appendice. Finalement, la dernière partie de notre mémoire tente de faire la lumière sur l’articulation entre, d’une part, la philosophie naturelle et l’ontologie de Spinoza et, d’autre part, sa philosophie pratique. Nous démontrons ainsi l’utilité de faire appel aux causes finales pour expliquer sa conception de la psychologie humaine et pour rendre compte de la dernière station de son éthique, à savoir la beatitudo. De cette façon, nous entendons reconstruire le rapport qu’entretiennent les différents volets de la philosophie spinoziste avec la question des causes finales. / This paper examines the theme of the final causes in Spinoza’s Ethics (1677). Using a quadripartite classification of the types of discourse on the final causes, we define theological-metaphysical finalism as the main philosophical target of Spinoza’s critics. Radicalizing the epistemological Cartesian postulate according to which the divine will cannot serve as an explanatory principle for natural phenomena, Spinoza completely rejects the idea that the relationship between God and his creation can be conceived under the mode of the final cause and elaborates, in the shadow of this criticism, a conception of divine causality that presents the production of the world as a necessary result of God’s essence. Then, we briefly look at the concept of conatus, which is at the intersection of natural philosophy and ontology. We explore, according to three hypotheses, the possibility of teleological dynamics in nature. Finaly, the last part of our thesis tries to shed light on the articulation between, on the one hand, Spinoza’s natural philosophy and ontology and, on the other hand, his practical philosophy. We thus demonstrate the usefulness of using the final causes to explain human psychology and to account for the last station of the spinozist ethics, the beatitudo.

La notion de cause est l’alpha et l’oméga de l’Éthique. Mais elle apparaît principalement de manière oblique : à travers « l’idée d’une cause extérieure » qui accompagne les passions dérivées. La cause, imaginée de façon assignable, n’est en fait plus assignable. L’individu étant complexe, il est difficile de démêler ce qui lui arrive de l’extérieur, de ce qui est produit par l’intérieur. Dans la passion, on se modifie à son insu pour devenir un sujet de ce qui lui arrive, et comprend la cause de ce changement sous la forme d’un récit. Cette dynamique imaginaire, nous l’appelons « causalité imaginaire » et nous l’expliquons en termes mécaniques. Nous dégageons d’abord l’essentiel de la mécanique spinoziste : la positivité ontologique de chaque idée (nature agissante) ; la multiplicité des référentiels qui se croisent en une seule et même nature (enveloppement) ; et le concept d’individu originairement composé (emboîtement des individus). La coexistence de ces référentiels autour d’un seul, voilà ce qui constitue la structure de la causalité imaginaire, et la variation de leur proportion, son contenu effectif. Conformément à cette structure, nous appliquons le « conatus », principe d’autoconservation, en premier aux idées ou affects, pour montrer que le désir, essence actuelle de l’homme, est un complexe d’affects qui, individus eux-mêmes, médiatisent l’influence des autres. Il en résulte que la causalité imaginaire est la causalité mécanique elle-même, relative aux individus complexes. Enfin, tout en nous référant à la causalité psychique freudienne, nous tentons d’esquisser un nouveau concept d’Inconscient, comme rapport sans sujet ou structure sans centre. / The notion of cause is the alpha and omega of Ethics. But it appears mostly in an oblique way: through "the idea of ​​an external cause" that accompanies the derived passions. The cause, imagined assignable, is actually no more assignable. As the individual is complex, it is difficult to disentangle what is happening in it from the exterior, from what is produced by the interior. In passion, one is modified unwittingly to become a subject of what happens to him, and understand the cause of this change under the form of a story. This imaginary dynamics, I call it "imaginary causality" and explain it in mechanical terms. I establish first the key features of Spinoza’s mechanics: the ontological positivity of each idea (acting nature); the multiplicity of referential frames that intersect at a single nature (envelopment); and the concept of the individual as originally composed (nesting individuals). The coexistence of these referential frames around only one of them, this is precisely what constitutes the structure of imaginary causality, and the variation of their proportion, its actual content. In accordance with this structure, I apply "conatus", self-preservation principle, to ideas or affects at first, to show that desire, actual essence of a man, is a complex of affects which, as individuals themselves, mediate the influence of others. It turns out that imaginary causality is the very mechanical causality, concerning the complex individuals. Finally, while I refer to Freudian psychic causality, I attempt to outline a new concept of the unconscious: as relation without a subject or structure without a center.

Spinoza évaluera la révolution copernicienne et prônera un naturalisme rationaliste et matérialiste contre la tradition onto-théologique, Aristote et Descartes en étant les deux figures clés, sans parler des théologiens et de la Bible. Spinoza interprète l’erreur du géocentrisme comme signalant deux autres erreurs : le dualisme anthropologique classique qui inféodait le corps à l’âme et l’illusion du libre-arbitre. Par la réhabilitation gnoséologique, psychophysique et socio-affective du corps, il prétend conduire l’homme au salut présent, non eschatologique, le réconciliant avec lui-même et avec le Dieu-Nature. La permanence d’une sensibilité anthropologique hébraïque y est prégnante, ce qui n’annule pas des disparités conceptuelles, métaphysiques, sotériologiques et éthiques entre lui et l’Écriture. Ces disparités pourraient rapprocher Spinoza plus d’Aristote que de Descartes. Le projet spinozien tiendra-t-il ses promesses sans retomber dans les travers du mythique et du mystique ? / Spinoza assesses the Copernican revolution and advocates a rationalist and materialistic naturalismagainst the onto-theological tradition, Aristotle and Descartes as the two main figures thereof,theologians and the Bible not to mention. Spinoza interprets the error of geocentrism as indicating twoother errors: classical anthropological dualism which subjugated the body to the soul and the illusion offree-will. By gnoseological, psychophysical and socio-emotional rehabilitation of the body, he claims tolead man to present salvation, not eschatological, reconciling him with himself and with God as Nature.The permanence of Hebraic anthropological sensibility is pregnant, which does not cancel metaphysical,soteriological and ethical disparities between him and the Bible. These disparities could bring Spinozacloser to Aristotle than to Descartes. Will the spinozian project keep its promises without relapsing intothe traps of the mythical and the mystical ?