The Diploma Thesis is based on the Case study of the direct election of the President of the Czech Republic. Due to this Case study it examines expertise of the Czech political parties. Is there any expertise in political parties represented in the Parliament of the Czech Republic? Why analytical capacities have (or not have) influence on policy decisions? In theoretical concept including democracy, policy work, expert capacities, elections etc. the Thesis examines the relationship between the expertise of political parties and enactment of the direct presidential elections.

本論文從轉型理論與大眾動員理論來探討蒙古與台灣在民主轉型時期其影響選舉制度與憲政制度的因素。其中，將選舉制度進一步區分為總統選舉制度和國會選舉制度，以了解政治菁英間的互動與社會運動此兩個自變項的影響力。在民主鞏固時期，本論文則聚焦在影響兩國採取不同憲政體制的因素，欲探討政治菁英改革的動機與當時政治脈絡如何促使蒙古採用總理總統制，如何使得台灣採用總統議會制。此外，社會運動對當時政治菁英是否亦發揮一定程度的作用，是否提升或阻礙憲政的改革，亦是本研究探討重點之一。 本研究指出兩國在民主轉型時期，既有統治菁英在民主改革的壓力下，開始與反對運動菁英協商，既有的政治菁英有較大的決定權。政治菁英之間的互動是政治改革的重要推進力量，而下面的大衆抗議社會運動則提供了這些菁英之間達成協商的條件，其導致憲政改革或選舉制度改革。在憲政制度上，除了既有憲政遺緒與政治文化外，政治菁英間的不同偏好，亦影響兩國憲政體制的發展。在蒙古，制度的遺續應使得憲政體制傾向於總統制，但大多數菁英偏好權力較為分散的議會制，在政治協商下，最後促成半總統制的施行。在台灣，保守派政治菁英與改革派政治菁英的互動促成半總統制的影響，不過，也存在相關程度上的社會運動間接影響。 在民主鞏固時期台灣和蒙古皆是由政治菁英主導修憲，其中政治菁英間的互動主要影響憲政體制的設計，取得總統職位的民進黨和掌握立法院多數的國民黨政治菁英間的互動因素使得台灣偏向總統議會制，而掌握國會多數的民主黨和反對勢力人革黨政治菁英互動使得蒙古採用總理總統制。然而，公民社會對憲政體制設計並沒有直接的影響，但兩國的公民社會對於新生民主體制的鞏固扮演著重要角色。 綜言之，本研究所論有關政治菁英的互動與公民社會回顧如何影響選舉制度與憲政制度的設計，由於蒙古和台灣的經驗來看，大抵可了解政治菁英的改革動機與社會運動的壓力，是特定選舉制度與憲政制度被建立的重要關鍵。 / In this dissertation, the theory of transition and mass mobilization trying to explore different factors between Mongolia and Taiwan in the period of democratic transition and its impact on the electoral system and constitutional system. The electoral system will be further divided into presidential and parliamentary, to understand the interaction of political elites, the social movements, and their influence on the electoral and constitutional systems. Then, this dissertation will focus on the factors of democratic consolidation, affecting Mongolia and Taiwan to develop into a different constitutional system, the political elite reform motivation and how the political context promoted the premier-presidentialism in Mongolia, and how Taiwan acquired the president-parliamentarism. Moreover, to understand whether social movements played a certain degree of influence on the political elites, or whether they enhanced or hindered the constitutional reform is also one of the priorities of this investigation research. The dissertation also pointed out the ruling elite under the pressure of democratic reform, when they began negotiations with the opposition movement elites, they had greater discretion. The interaction among the political elite was an important force to promote political reform, and the following Mongolia public protest social movement created the conditions to reach consensus among these elites, which led to constitutional reforms or the reform of electoral systems. On the constitutional system, in addition to the existing constitutional legacy of the political culture, the different preferences among the political elites, but also affect the development of the two countries constitutional system. In Mongolia, institutional legacy made constitutional system tend to presidentialism, however most of the political elites prefer a more decentralized parliamentary system, in political consultations finally led to the implementation of semi-presidentialism. In Taiwan, the interaction with the conservative and the reformist political elite contributed to the impact of semi-presidentialism, however, there are indirect effects on the relevance of social movements either. The period of democratic consolidation in Taiwan and Mongolia was dominated by the political elites on constitutional system, the interaction among the political elites mainly affected the establishment of the constitutional system. The DPP won the presidency and the KMT the parliamentary majority, and the interaction of these political elites tend to shape Taiwan’s president-parliamentarism. In Mongolia, the Democratic Party political elite, with parliamentary majority, and the opposition MPRP political elite interaction evolved to premier-presidentialism. Although civil society had no direct impact on the constitutional system establishment, however, the development of civil society in Taiwan and Mongolia played an important role to consolidate the nascent democratic institutions. In conclusion, from Mongolian and Taiwan experience, we can understand that the motivation for the reforms of the political elite and the social movement pressure are the key for a particular electoral and constitutional system to be established.

Le droit d’agir devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme est assurément unique dansl’ordre juridique international. Erigé en « pierre angulaire » du système européen de sauvegarde,bénéficie-t-il pour autant d’une protection à la hauteur de cette qualification? L’engorgementmanifeste de la Cour de Strasbourg place cette interrogation dans une actualité perpétuelle.L’étude de ce droit processuel supranational illustre l’existence simultanée de deux courantsprétoriens aux effets diamétralement opposés sur l’exercice du droit d’agir : l’un souple, provictima, qui ouvre largement le prétoire de la Cour et l’autre restreignant a contrario son accès. Sil’approche souple satisfait naturellement l’intérêt individuel des requérants, elle permet égalementà la Cour de bâtir un ordre public européen de protection des droits de l’Homme. Parallèlement,l’interprétation stricte des conditions d’accès repose sur la responsabilisation des acteurs dumécanisme européen et sous-tend un filtrage rigoureux des affaires individuelles. Le droit d’agirreprésente, par conséquent, une composante d’un système de protection de nature« constitutionnelle » évoluant aux rythmes des liens tissés entre les deux courants prétoriensévoqués. C’est en effet par un mouvement pendulaire entre l’ouverture et la fermeture du prétoirede la Cour de Strasbourg que la garantie durable du droit d’agir peut être assurée. / The right of action in front of the European Court of Human Rights is certainly unparalleled in theinternational legal order. In the light of the constant congestion at the Strasbourg Court, one canonly ask if this right is genuinely guaranteed as the corner stone that is intended to be in theEuropean system of protection. The analysis of this supranational procedural right reflects theexistence of two distinct case law dynamics that influence the right of action: the pro victimaeffect, widening the access to the Court, and the opposite restraining effect. The first effect, moreflexible, not only favors the individual interest of the plaintiff, but also allows the Court todevelop the European public order of human rights protection. In parallel, the restraining effect onthe grounds of access to the Court entails a rigorous filtering of the individual cases, in order toachieve an increased accountability on human rights protection both of States and individuals.Therefore, the right of action represents the component of what can be nowadays qualified of a« constitutional » system of Human rights protection. Moreover, the alternate dynamics, closingand opening access to the Court, describe a pendula movement that is essential for a sustainableright of action.