Announcements of acquisitions of publicly traded companies are usually accompanied by their share price booming by tens of percent. The underlying reason is that the acquirer of the company gains a controlling stake, due to which he can help the company pivot in the desired direction or benefit from synergy effects. A minority investor, by definition, is not capable of doing this, thus he is willing to pay a lower price for the shares than the acquirer of the controlling stake. The thesis analyzes whether a minority shareholder can profit from the acquisition premium by purchasing shares of companies which he believes will be later acquired. The paper consists of two parts - theoretical and analytic. The theoretical part discusses the significance of the acquisition premium and its value, with regard to the type of investor and his motivations for the acquisition. The theoretical part yields into the analytic part, where acquisition waves are tested. It also includes an analysis of individual acquisitions and their underlying reasons, which are grouped into categories in order to find patterns of aquired companies.

The dissertation thesis deals with discounts and premiums in business valuation, especially lack of marketability discount and control premium (minority discount). There are no complex theoretical publications concerning these topics in the Czech Republic. Abroad, the publications are mostly descriptions and results of empirical studies originated in U.S. markets. These empirical studies usually deal with a single or a few aspects of a discount or premium. There are still some blank areas in the discounts and premiums theory even abroad, such as the sources of control premium, relationship between the levels of value and standards of value, the relation between the value of a company as a whole and the value at the level of shareholders. I develop a theoretical model of control premium, in the dissertation, which is trying to fill-in these blank areas and thus help practitioners to deal with the control premium or minority discount in a correct way. Moreover the model shows how protection of minority shareholders in general and especially during acquisitions influences the magnitude of control premium. It also shows that the magnitude of control premium depends on the market competition structure. If the competition is perfect (as we can suppose it would be at financial markets for minority interests) or there is a strong oligopsonistic competition the subjects of transaction are not able to influence the price, whereas for monopsonic structure (as it usually is in the M&A market in the Czech Republic) the subjects can influence the price. For monopsonic structure at the M&A market I conclude it is impossible to estimate the value of transaction as a point estimate since it will depend on nonfinancial factors what the price of transaction will be. We can only estimate the upper and lower boundary of interval the final price of transaction will lie within. The boundaries are the maximum price for the acquirer and minimum price for the seller in the sense of German Köln School. The dissertation also tests the possibility and theoretical correctness of using the results of foreign empirical studies of discounts and premiums for valuing businesses in the CR. We analyze the methodology and synthetize the problems connected with application of results of various studies. I conclude that it is impossible to use the results directly in the conditions of the CR. I suggest there should be a deeper analysis done and factors that influence the magnitude analyzed and considered. We should not rely just on averages. The thesis also contains an empirical part testing the magnitude of the lack of marketability discount in the Czech Republic.

Submitted by Vitor Frango (vitorpollo@yahoo.com.br) on 2014-03-10T14:51:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Vitor Frango.pdf: 552731 bytes, checksum: be98ecc9e672434717e644336c1c4c32 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by JOANA MARTORINI (joana.martorini@fgv.br) on 2014-03-10T14:58:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Vitor Frango.pdf: 552731 bytes, checksum: be98ecc9e672434717e644336c1c4c32 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-03-10T15:43:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Vitor Frango.pdf: 552731 bytes, checksum: be98ecc9e672434717e644336c1c4c32 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-01-30 / This study aims to estimate the control premium in the Brazilian stock market, based on the price differential between classes of stocks with different voting rights. In Brazil for the period from 01/07/2003 to 28/06/2013 the average control premium is positive, a result that differs from those found in previous studies, where the control premium is negative. This paper investigates the determinants that imply this voting shares valuation relative to the non-voting share. Particularly, the paper analyzes the impact of the liquidity, dividends differential, the negative impact of the extension of the right of the Tag Along for non-voting shares, the negative impact of ADR companies, a negative impact when firms are classified with upper level corporate governance in BMF&Bovespa. Finally, the positive impact when the major shareholder holding more than 50% of the voting shares and government holding more than 20% of voting shares. / Este trabalho visa estimar o prêmio por controle no mercado acionário brasileiro, com base no diferencial de preços entre espécies de ações com direitos diferenciados de voto. No Brasil para o período de 01/07/2003 a 28/06/2013 a média do prêmio por controle foi positivo, resultado que difere dos encontrados em estudos anteriores, onde o prêmio por controle é negativo. Este trabalho investiga os determinantes que implicam na valorização da ação ordinária em relação à ação preferencial. Em particular, o trabalho analisa os impactos da liquidez, do diferencial dos dividendos, o impacto negativo da extensão do direito do Tag Along para ações preferenciais, o impacto negativo das empresas que possuem ADR, impacto negativo quando a empresas está classificada com nível superior de governança corporativo da BMF&Bovespa e pro fim, o impacto positivo para quando o acionista majoritário detêm mais de 50% das ações ordinárias e da participação do governo nas empresas que possui 20% das ações ordinárias.

Submitted by Rafael Gonzalez Moyano (rflgonzalez@gmail.com) on 2017-05-02T22:01:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Moyano - Dissertação MPA.pdf: 874971 bytes, checksum: cbbaddef3e884c775681b83a83490f48 (MD5) / Rejected by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br), reason: Rafael, boa noite Para que possamos aceitar seu trabalho junto à biblioteca, é necessário realizar o seguinte ajuste: Retirar a numeração romana que consta nas páginas anteriores a Introdução. Em seguida, submeter o arquivo novamente. Att Renata on 2017-05-03T00:20:42Z (GMT) / Submitted by Rafael Gonzalez Moyano (rflgonzalez@gmail.com) on 2017-05-03T01:16:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Moyano - Dissertação MPA.pdf: 875031 bytes, checksum: 5d58481302aae0d33c960c777c7de817 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2017-05-03T18:39:05Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Moyano - Dissertação MPA.pdf: 875031 bytes, checksum: 5d58481302aae0d33c960c777c7de817 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-03T19:38:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Moyano - Dissertação MPA.pdf: 875031 bytes, checksum: 5d58481302aae0d33c960c777c7de817 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-05 / This study is about premiums paid for corporate control in mergers and acquisitions in Brazil whose target company had, at the transaction date, shares traded on the stock exchange. This issue is relevant because it influences the amounts paid for equity interest when there is a change in corporate control, indicating that, under certain circumstances, the market value per share traded in the market may not represent its fair or trading value. This work analyzed the impacts in the premiums paid for corporate control caused by certain characteristics of the companies involved in those transactions, such as the size and degree of leverage of target companies, total shares acquired and the existence of foreign investors as the acquirer in part of those transactions. As a result, an average premium of 17.78% was paid for the acquisition of corporate control in publicly traded companies in Brazil. In addition, this study suggests that the size and degree of leverage of the target company positively influences the premium offered, while there is no statistical evidence that the total equity interest acquired and the existence of a foreign investor can influence the dimension of this premium / Este estudo trata da questão de prêmios pagos pelo controle corporativo em operações de fusões e aquisições no Brasil, cuja empresa-alvo possuía, na data da transação, ações negociadas na bolsa de valores. Tal questão é relevante porque influencia os valores pagos por participação acionária quando há a troca do controle corporativo, indicando que, sob determinadas circunstâncias, o valor por ação negociado no mercado pode não representar o seu valor justo ou transacionável. Neste trabalho foram analisados os impactos de determinadas características das empresas envolvidas nas transações analisadas, nos prêmios pagos pelo controle corporativo, tais como o tamanho e o grau de alavancagem das empresas-alvo, total de participação societária adquirida e existência de investidor estrangeiro em parte dessas transações. Como resultado, foi encontrado um prêmio médio de 17,78%, pagos pela aquisição do controle corporativo em empresas de capital aberto no Brasil. Além disso, por este trabalho sugere-se que o tamanho e grau de alavancagem da empresa-alvo influenciam, positivamente, o prêmio oferecido, por outro lado não houve evidência estatística de que a participação societária total adquirida e a existência de investidor estrangeiro possam, de alguma forma, influenciar na dimensão deste prêmio.

Submitted by Eduardo Cotrim (edulucascotrim@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-09-11T21:41:56Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_ELC_final revisada.pdf: 901904 bytes, checksum: 34ced8d99037b195a9bf9d7a754202cf (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Joana Martorini (joana.martorini@fgv.br) on 2017-09-11T22:25:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_ELC_final revisada.pdf: 901904 bytes, checksum: 34ced8d99037b195a9bf9d7a754202cf (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-12T16:45:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_ELC_final revisada.pdf: 901904 bytes, checksum: 34ced8d99037b195a9bf9d7a754202cf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-09 / In the last decades several papers have tried to estimate and explain the existence of control block premium in a number of countries. A lot of factors are related to it, like the private benefits of control, shareholder structure, the stage of corporate governance development in each country, idiosyncratic characteristics of the companies, etc. This paper studies the Brazilian stock market taking into account the evolution occurred since the early 2000 in terms of laws and rules of corporate governance. It was found that a high premium is paid to take control of the companies in Brazil and that larger premiums are verified in transaction involving companies with lower corporate governance practices. / Nas últimas décadas diversos estudos tiveram por objetivo quantificar e explicar a existência de prêmios pago por blocos de controle em inúmeros países. Muitos fatores estão relacionados a tal variável, como benefícios privados derivados do controle, estrutura acionária, estágio de evolução da governança corporativa em cada economia, aspectos específicos referentes às companhias, etc. Este trabalho aborda o mercado de capitais brasileiro em um ambiente mais desenvolvido em termos de leis e governança corporativa se comparado aos trabalhos acadêmicos do início da década de 2000. Foi verificado que existe um prêmio de controle significante nas transações com alienação de controle no país, além de haver indícios de que os maiores prêmios sejam pagos em transações envolvendo empresas listadas em segmentos de governança corporativa mais baixos.

自我國企業併購法容許以現金作為併購對價後，現金逐出合併即成為我國法制上適法之併購類型。惟現金逐出合併通常為控制股東利用股權優勢，以現金對價剝奪少數股東留存於併購後公司之手段，故控制股東是否濫用資本多數決侵害少數股東權益以獨占併購利益乃成為現金逐出合併上不可忽視之討論重點。 本文以比較日本法之觀點，針對專屬於併購之保護機制及公司法上既有之救濟機制進行比較分析，以釐清及了解現行制度於實際操作上是否確實能夠在現金逐出合併之實行過程中發揮保護少數股東之功能。討論範圍上，前者，包含「資訊揭露制度」與「股份收買請求權」；後者，包含「股東制止請求權」與「爭執併購決議效力之訴訟」。比較內容圍繞在此四項制度於解釋適用上之學說與實務觀點。 除保護機制之討論外，本文另從二階段收購之角度探討少數股東之權益侵害。討論範圍上，主要以與股份收買請求權具有密切關係之控制權溢價分配及公開收購壓迫性兩者作為討論之對象，並從日本法之比較分析觀點，探討是否可透過股份收買請求權使少數股東分享控制權溢價，及解決二階段收購下可能引發之壓迫性問題。 最後，本文針對現行制度提出檢討與建議。在保護機制部分，資訊揭露制度應補強揭露內容與強化非公開發行公司之保護，股份收買請求權應調整目前實務採用之計算方式，股東制止請求權與爭執決議效力之訴訟應作一體性之調整。至於二階段收購部分，則應容許少數股東可分享控制權溢價，並暫以股份收買請求權解決公開收購之壓迫性問題。