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The research question that moves the present work is whether and how competition law shall play a role in making our society more ‘sustainable’, intending this term in a broad meaning, and therefore linked to social, economic and environmental sustainability. The question raises from the awareness of the problems that are affecting our society, also if we refer at its democratic foundations. In particular, we considered that issues such as increasing income inequalities, raising market concentration rates and the even faster climate changes are topics that cannot be outside the academic analysis of the various policies. Therefore, if we try to answer at the question if competition law shall play a role in this context, the analysis should start from the very foundations of this discipline. At this purpose, in our research, we scrutinised how the most representative competition law regimes in the world - i.e., the US antitrust law and the EU competition law systems – developed during their history. This analysis is conducted by reading through legislative sources, policy statements, judicial decisions and scholar works. What emerges is that competition law shall not only be focused on mere economic and econometric objectives, such economic efficiency, but it was intended more as a structural instrument, created for preventing the concentration of an excessive degree of economic power on the same subject or on a bounce of entities. Therefore, after having affirmed this structuralist aim of competition law, it is possible to understand how every other objective shall be considered as a by-product of a healthy competitive process, and not as an end of competition law in itself. This is particularly clear in the European context, as competition law ought not to be intended as a separate or lone subject, but as a field of law well rooted into the EU and its Member States’ constitutional traditions. After having established that competition law shall play a role in the transition towards a more sustainable society, the focus moves on how this task shall be performed. For this purpose, the present research scrutinised the issues we mentioned before, by making a comparative analysis between the EU and the U.S. competition law and antitrust models and, inside the EU environment, among the various solutions adopted in the Member States. This analysis first needed to be carried out by means of an empirical assessment of the issue at stake, especially from an economic standpoint. Then, the legal tools needed in order to reach the desired outcomes were scrutinised, first by making reference to the solutions already adopted by enforcers and Courts on the basis of the existing rules, and, subsequently, new tools are analysed and proposed. In particular, the research establishes a connection between income inequalities and the increasing rates of market concentration. The latter dynamic was deemed particularly intense in the digital market context, which are characterised by market dynamics which escape from the common understanding of competition, as they lead the market to tip in favour of a firm, usually the first mover. In a nutshell, they are characterised by a sort of winner takes all structure. This field represents the core of this research, as it is where excessive market concentration shows most its detrimental effects and the need to a structuralist approach to competition law appears much needed. Therefore, this work aims to provide its contribution to the very active academic debate on this field. However, this research does not want to be limited to the digital market problem but is directed at casting lights on the need for a multi-value approach to competition law at 360 degrees, which can turn into a multi-tool enforcement to better tailor the application of competition rules to all the analysed issues, which are however interrelated thanks to the broad concept of ‘sustainability’ outlined above, in line with the Brundtland Report on sustainability issued in 1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Development. What emerges is that competition law ought to play a role in the transition towards a more sustainable economy and society. This depends on policy choices, and this work is aimed – in the realm of the current scholar debate on this topic – at providing its constructive contribution. However, what is important to affirm is that policy choices directed at establishing the multi-value and multi-tool competition law described above are not only based on progressive or hipster academic ideas, but they are deeply rooted into our societies’ constitutional traditions, and, in the end, in a healthy conception of the liberal economy itself.

Dagens samhälle förändras snabbt, och digitala marknader med det. Digitaliseringen har lett till revolutionerande utvecklingar av vårt samhälle, och bakom dessa förändringar står primärt ett fåtal dominerande teknikjättar och deras plattformar. Dessa dominerande digitala plattformar, och de marknader på vilka dessa verkar, är ofta flersidiga och karaktäriseras av särskilda möjligheter till kostnadsfördelning, utveckling och ett beroende av starka nätverkseffekter, samt möjligheter att utveckla affärsmodeller som på olika sätt utnyttjar och kapitaliserar på insamlad data. Detta möjliggör inte bara upprättandet och bibehållandet av marknadsmakt på dessa marknader, utan leder även till höga inträdeshinder med resultatet att marknadens aktörer blir få och att inträdeshindren är höga. Trots att digitaliseringen till stora delar måste anses positiv, har utvecklingen även medfört nya typer av konkurrensproblematik som inte alltid kan hanteras på ett effektivt och adekvat sätt av den tidigare EU-rättsliga konkurrenslagstiftningen. Denna framställning undersöker hur EU:s konkurrenslagstiftning kan tillämpas på nyare typer av dominansmissbruk på digitala plattformar genom att analysera den tidigare regleringen av dominansmissbruk och hur denna har tillämpats rent praktiskt. För att uppnå detta mål undersöker detta arbete de särskilda utmaningar och särdrag som finns på dessa marknader, och ger en utförlig sammanfattning av hur artikel 102 FEUF har använts för att hantera dessa. Här konstateras att denna konkurrenslagstiftning lämnar en del att önska, och att inträdeshinder och risken för tippning ger starka incitament för dominanta digitala plattformar att försöka kringgå prestationsbaserad konkurrens. Framställningen utvärderar även de kompletteringar som gjorts av konkurrenslagstiftningen på dessa områden genom DMA, och hur denna reglering kan tänkas påverka hanteringen av vissa av de dominanta digitala plattformarnas beteenden framöver. Här konkluderas att DMA är en välbehövlig komplettering av tidigare konkurrensreglering på området, men att det fortfarande finns osäkerheter och utvecklingspotential, samt att de snabbföränderliga marknaderna förr eller senare kommer att hitta nya, innovativa sätt att kringgå även denna reglering. Därmed är det viktigt att den EU-rättsliga konkurrensregleringen gör vad den kan för att ligga steget före.

In recent times, the Internet revolution has spawned numerous innovative enterprises-virtual companies, and electronic markets. Electronic markets (or digital markets) are scalable web-based platforms for buyers, sellers, marketmakers, and brokers to carry out business transactions. Over the last two years, there has been a proliferation of such E-Markets on the web. In this thesis, we develop an E-marketplace, which we call IMAGINE (Intelligent Market with AGents and Integrative NEgotiations) that improves upon the existing state-of-the-art in several non-trivial ways. IMAGINE combines the best features of existing E-marketplaces with several innovations. The thesis describes the conceptualization, analysis, and design of IMAGINE and provides details of implementation of a prototype of IMAGINE at the Electronic Enterprises Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science. IMAGINE is a collaborative, co-operative, intelligent E-Market that maximizes the combined utility value of the all traders involved. IMAGINE has several distinctive features: • It uses an innovative business model, which is intelligent in the sense of perceiving the nature of the market and market forces and using this market intelligence in matching buyers with sellers and in determining the prices. • It uses integrative negotiations, which make it attractive for buyers and sellers to reveal their true business interests and valuations. • A sound and robust software architecture for a web-based implementation using best practices in object technology. • Implementation of a prototype of IMAGINE has been carried out using leading edge Internet technologies such as multi-agent technology, Jini, and Javaspaces.

New digital distribution and value capture models have emerged on the global music industry scene in the last ten years. These models are highly dependent on a strong underlying communications and broadband internet infrastructure which is largely present in most developed markets. South Africa, however, is a developing country whose broadband infrastructure is still nascent and not as widely available or accessible. Due to the permeation of mobile technology, most broadband internet access is likely to occur through the mobile networks in most developing markets. This stands in stark contrast to developed markets where broadband internet access occurs primarily via fixed line infrastructure with mobile as a secondary option.This research set out to investigate whether digital value distribution and value capture models which succeeded in developed countries would be suitable for the South African music industry given the broadband infrastructure constraints and the different internet access methodologies prevalent in this developing market. This research employed an exploratory research methodology in order to investigate this question and found that a mixture of value distribution and value capture models would address the entire market requirement, with mobile-centric digital distribution models being most suitable for mass market deployment. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

No other markets have likely ever been as closely part of our everyday lives as digital markets have. Digital markets can be described as a place for innovation where new products, services, and companies pop up on a nearly daily basis. These markets can at the same time be described as highly concentrated, in the hands of a few, who control the market, and make the rules on the market. It is without a question that digital markets are full of possibilities for innovative companies and therefore it is of such importance that these markets are protected and kept as fair, competitive, and transparent as possible. There have been concerns whether the existing competition law is the best tool to be used on digital markets and whether the often-lenghty process of Article 102 TFEU can, or at least effectively can, control these gatekeepers controlling digital markets. The purpose of the thesis is therefore to analyse the existing and new theories of harm when it comes to Article 102 TFEU and whether they could be useful in the Commissions' ongoing investigations against these gatekeepers. As existing theories of harm margin squeeze, unfair contractual terms and conditions as well as tying will be analysed and their applicability in the digital markets. While some conducts might fall under the existing theories of harm others won't and thereof it is worth looking into new theories of harm such as self-preferencing, forced free riding, and privacy policy tying, in order to determine whether they could be used by the Commission.  While the application of Article 102 TFEU is of great importance, the Commission has also drafted a proposal called Digital Markets Act which would be an ex-ante tool to be used alongside EU competition law and which could help address the problems the current competition law isn't at least effectively addressing. The Digital Markets Act is based on certain undertakings when fulfilling the criterium, being defined as gatekeepers, and when defined as such, the obligations of the Digital Markets Act become applicable. This would offer the Commission a tool that is likely more efficient and legally certain than the application of Article 102 TFEU. Since the existing competition law hasn't been able to prevent digital markets becoming even more and more concentrated, the Digital Markets Act might be exactly what is needed in order to secure the internal market remaining competitive, fair, contestable, and transparent.

A large proportion of the farming in Kenya and Eastern Africa is performed by smallholding farmers. At the same time, consumers are expecting to find foodstuff more close by and in a more convenient way than most smallholding farmers can provide. Crowdsourcing can efficiently be applied to many problems where many small producers need to collaborate to create the complete product, without exposing much of the complex process to the end consumers. Using semi structured interviews, systematic literature review and prototyping, the application of crowdsourcing to reach and empower smallholding farmers was explored. The findings were used to create recommendations in the form of guidelines that are expected to serve as ground work and background to future studies within the area. In general, a mobile based platform for crowdsourcing was found to be viable while still having some problems with the intended target market. Three primary factors which affects the potential success were identified; The generally low availability of internet to smallholding farmers (limited by high prices), lacking education which can limit comprehension of more complicated processes, and smartphones with limited capacity for advanced applications. / En stor del av jordbruket i Kenya och östra Afrika utförs av småbönder. Samtidigt förväntar sig konsumenter att kunna hitta matprodukter närmare och på ett mer bekvämt sätt än de flesta småbönder kan erbjuda. Crowdsourcing kan effektivt tillämpas på många problem där flera små producenter behöver samarbeta för att skapa den kompletta produkten utan att utsätta slutkonsumenten för den komplexa processen. Med hjälp av semi-trukturerade intervjuer, systematisk litteratur studie och prototyping, undersöktes tillämpningen av crowdsourcing för att nå och förstärka småbönder. Resultaten användes för att skapa rekommendationer i form av riktlinjer som förväntas fungera som grundarbete och bakgrund till framtida studier inom området. I allmänhet visade sig en mobilbaserad plattform för crowdsourcing vara realistisk, samtidigt som den fortfarande hade några problem med den avsedda målmarknaden. Tre primära faktorer som påverkar den potentiella framgången identifierades. Dessa var den generellt låga tillgängligheten av internet till småbönder (begränsad av höga priser), avsaknad av utbildning som kan begränsa förståelsen av mer komplicerade processer, och smartphones med begränsad kapacitet för avancerade applikationer.

The sui generis-right in article 7.1 of the database directive provides the maker of a database, who has made a qualitatively and/or quantitative substantial investment in the obtaining, verification and/or presentation of the contents in a database, the right to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part of the database contents. In order to prevent the circumvention of article 7.1, the right to prohibit tortious dispositions of the contents was sup- plemented by article 7.5, which extends the right for the maker to prevent non-substantial parts to be extracted and/or re-utilized, provided that the extraction and/or re-utilization are repeated and systematic in a way that undermines the substantial investment the maker of the database has made.  The way that the sui generis-right is framed as an investment protection, in combination with the fact that the right’s object of protection is the investment as such, is the reason that the right has come to be regarded as a protection clause against unfair competition rather than an intellectual property right. As a result, the sui generis-right is of great significance to unfair competition and competition and antitrust law in general. This applies not only to article 102 FEUF, but especially to the DMA and in relation to the prescribed data-sharing obligation in article 6.10 in the DMA.  Competition and antitrust law in general and the DMA in particular, through its rootedness in article 3 FEU, aim to maintain competitive, open and fair digital markets. This applies, to say the least, as a part of ensuring the efficiency in the EU internal market, which by enlarge is intended to benefit the consumers. In this way, it’s understood that the consumers perspective plays a fundamental role in competition policy. In relation to the DMA, this is expressed through articles 6.2 and 6.10 of the DMA, which have the function of promoting innovation and increasing the consumers’ diversity of choice, while simultaneously giving the business users better opportunities to compete with the gatekeepers and thus become more efficient.  By imposing on a gatekeeper a far-reaching data-sharing obligation under article 6.10 in the DMA, in combination with the prohibition to use the same data under article 6.2, the gatekeepers’ sui generis-right is limited in all material aspects. Thereby, these provisions impose greatly on the gatekeepers’ ability as a maker of a database to freely dispose of their own database contents and thus obtain future returns and other competitive advantages as a result of the substantial investment. This is due to the fact that the gatekeeper is subject to an obligation to share the results of the investment with the business users.  The database directive states, however, that the sui generis-right must not be afforded in such a way as to facilitate abuses of a dominant position. By this reference it’s understood that this exception was written with article 102 FEUF in mind. In light of the significant differences between article 102 FEUF and the DMA, it can be concluded that the exception does not apply to the DMA. This is particularly the case as the DMA is framed as an ex ante-regulation, whereas article 102 FEUF is an ex post-regulation.  As this paper has highlighted, it requires great forethought when imposing a compulsory data-sharing obligation such as the one in article 6.10 in the DMA. The intended function of the sui generis-right is to promote investments in data processing and storage functions. In order to even receive or make use of the effective and high-quality data the business users have a right to receive from the gatekeepers, they have to have effective and proper databases, because otherwise it's entirely pointless to even force the gatekeepers to share their data.  Thus, a proportional balance is required between the interest in protecting the data as such by maintaining ex ante incentives to invest and the interest to promote open and fair digital markets as a way to ensure the effectiveness of the internal market for the benefit of the consumers and ex post social welfare. This could be a possible explanation to the Commission’s proposal of the Data Act, specifically article 35, which stipulates that the sui generis-right shall not be applied to machine generated data. It remains, however, to see how the question of the sui generis-right’s to be or not to be will play out in the future.