本研究以羅吉斯迴歸模型探討影響上市櫃公司選擇公開募集或私募之因素。 實證結果發現採私募或現金增資的決策，和下列因素有關：(1)資訊不對稱程度愈高之公司愈傾向以私募發行新股，且上櫃公司較上市公司更傾向以私募發行新股；(2) 資訊透明度越低的公司，資金成本越高，籌資也較困難，會傾向以私募方式發行新股；(3) 投資機會愈多的公司，因為控制權考量，會選擇公開募集資金；(4) 當景氣愈好，公司愈傾向以公開募集發行新股，且上市公司較上櫃公司更易傾向以現金增資方式發行新股。 / This study applies logit model to examine the determinants of choice of private placements/seasoned equity offerings. The results indicate that firms being severe in information asymmetry tend to choose private placements. Contrast to listed firms, OTC firms prefer private placements to seasoned equity offerings. Firms with lower information transparency pay higher costs in seasoned equity offerings and therefore tend to choose private placements. Firms being abundant in investment opportunities prefer to choose seasoned equity offerings because of control considerations. In bull markets, more firms choose seasoned equity offerings other than private placements while listed firms have stronger tendency to choose seasoned equity offerings than OTC firms.

abstract: Managers’ control over the timing and content of information disclosure represents a significant strategic tool which they can use at their discretion. However, extant theoretical perspectives offer incongruent arguments and incompatible predictions about when and why managers would release inside information about their firms. More specifically, agency theory and theories within competitive dynamics provide competing hypotheses about when and why managers would disclose inside information about their firms. In this study, I highlight how voluntary disclosure theory may help to coalesce these two theoretical perspectives. Voluntary disclosure theory predicts that managers will release inside information when managers perceive that the benefits outweigh the costs of doing so. Accordingly, I posit that competitive dynamics introduce the costs associated with disclosing information (i.e., proprietary costs) and that agency theory highlights the benefits associated with disclosing information. Examining the context of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), I identify three ways managers can use information in SEO prospectuses. I hypothesize that competitive intensity increases proprietary costs that will reduce disclosure of inside information but will increase discussing the organization positively. I then hypothesize that capital market participants (e.g., security analysts and investors) may prefer managers to provide more, clearer, and positive information about the SEO and their firms. I find support for many of my hypotheses. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2017

本研究以民國94年至96年曾採私募增資之上市、上櫃公司為研究對象，探討私募增資決策是否影響企業之經營績效，並比較企業在採取私募或現金增資之不同增資方式下之經營績效。 實證結果發現，企業私募增資兩年後其經營績效顯著優於增資前一年；增資前私募企業之經營績效比現金增資企業之經營績效差，但其差距在增資後顯著縮小。綜合而言，私募後企業本身之經營績效不但有顯著的改善，相對於現金增資企業之經營績效，在增資後也有顯著的改善。 此外，私募普通股占原已發行普通股股數之比例越高的公司，其累計異常報酬大；而參考價格與私募實際價格間的差異，亦會影響投資人對於股價的反應，其差距越大，累計異常報酬越小。 / This study examines the effects of private placement or seasoned equity offerings on performance. Three main findings are as follows. In general, the corporate performance of firms with private equity offering is worse than that of firms with public offering, but the difference lessens after the fund raising. The evidence shows that the firm performance is improved after private placement. Moreover, the change of performance after private placement is better than public offering. The evidence also shows that the volume of private equity offering is positively associated with cumulative abnormal return, but the difference between the actual price and consultative price is negatively associated with cumulative abnormal return.

Denna studie undersöker huruvida nyemissioners bakomliggande motiv påverkar hur det emitterande företaget värderas efter tillkännagivandet. Fenomenet undersöks på den svenska marknaden, då majoriteten av tidigare forskning bedrivits på utländska handelsplatser. Effekten av olika motiv analyseras för ett urval bestående av 203 observationer under en 14-årsperiod, mellan år 2005-2018, där samtliga nyemissioner genomförts på Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. Studien omfattar både riktade och företrädesmissioner. Avvikande avkastning beräknas på kort och lång sikt i samband med nyemissionernas tillkännagivande med hjälp av tre olika metoder (CAR, BHAR samt FF3M). Således mäts både den kortsiktiga annonseringseffekten såväl som företagets långsiktiga prestation mot index (OMXSPIoch SIXRX). Vidare används även multipel regressionsanalys för att undersöka om samband går att återfinna mellan motiven och avvikande avkastning.  Studien finner signifikanta bevis för att underprestation i regel följer nyemissioners tillkännagivande. Negativt avvikande avkastning återfinns i de fall motivet uppges vara antingen rekapitalisation eller generella ändamål. Däremot förekommer ett positivt samband mellan avvikande avkastning och motivet investeringar, vilket indikerar på att dessa företag snarare överpresterar marknaden. Således argumenterar studien för att nyemissioners motiv har betydelse för hur företaget presterar, både på kort och lång sikt, vilket indirekt påverkar företagets värdering. / The purpose of this thesis was to examine if the stated motive for a seasoned equity offering (SEO) affects company valuation, post-SEO. This was accomplished by calculating abnormal returns for a sample containing 203 SEOs over a 14 year period between 2005 and 2018. All companies being listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm during the time of their respective equity offering. By providing three different measurements for abnormal return (CAR, BHAR, and FF3M) as well as performing multiple regression analysis, the study finds significant evidence for general underperformance following the SEO. This is true for when the motive is stated as recapitalization or general corporate-related purposes. When the motive is stated as investment, the study finds significant evidence for post-SEO overperformance.

本研究的主旨在探討台灣證卷交易市場之上市公司辦理現金增資時採用不同承銷配售方式下各種資訊內涵差異，研究樣本包括民國八十四年至民國八十六年間，曾在台灣證卷交易市場宣告辦理現金增資之 278 家公司，其中又區分為 201 家採公開申購配售方式及 77 家採詢價圈購配售方式之現金增資公司樣本。本研究鑑於民國 84 年新版承銷配售制度施行以來，現金增資採行詢價圈購配售方式之公司股價出現特定人套利現象，甚至引發立法院於民國 86 年底，提出修正法案欲將詢價圈購提撥比率之但書規定廢除事件，故本研究目標將著重於探討公開申購配售與詢價圈購兩種不同承銷配售方式來現金增資之公司間其財務屬性及其對股價之影響是否有差異，以檢驗現行的詢價圈購制度是否有缺失。 實證結果顯示：採兩種不同承銷配售方式現金增資之公司，其財務變數並無顯著差異，顯示公司的財務特質並不影響其承銷配售方式的選擇。經由股價反應的驗證則發現採公開申購配售及詢價圈購承銷配售方式之現金增資之公司，其發行宣告首次見報時對股價異常報酬均有顯著正面的影響。但兩者對股價異常報酬之影響於統計上卻發現有顯著差異。至於在首日申購（圈購）日時之股價異常報酬反應，採公開申購配售者為顯著正股價異常報酬反應，採詢價圈購者股價異常報酬則為顯著負反應，因此兩者在首日申購日時對股價之反應有顯著差異，採公開申購配售公司之股價異常報酬反應明顯優於採詢價圈購配售公司。而於發行日時之價格異常報酬反應，採公開申購配售公司並不顯著，採詢價圈購配售方式公司卻有正向股價異常報酬反應，兩種承銷配售方式於發行日時顯示顯著的股價異常報酬反應差異。 兩種承銷配售方式為公司以現金增資向股東或投資大眾取得資金的途徑，其最終目的均相同，因此不同配售方式對股價異常報酬之影響應不會有太大差異，但本研究卻發現在首次宣告日、首日申購日及發行日時三種不同事件日下，兩種配售方式之股價異常報酬反應卻出現顯著差異的情形。由於此一差異與公司的財務特質無關，所以顯示詢價圈購配售方式可能存有缺失，造成特定人可藉由現行制度的漏洞來進行套利或取得比以往更多的新股，因此對於無法進行套利或取得新股的股東而言，現行的詢價圈購制度並不公平，確實有改善之必要。 / The study is based on a sample, consisting of 278firms, of the announcements of SEO(seasoned equity offerings) in Taiwan stock market during the period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 1997, to detect whether the current circling system in TW is not proper. There are two major SEO underwriting procedures in TW: by offer=for-sales and by circling. The paper focuses on two types of firms which adapt different SEO underwriting. By comparing the both firms' financial characteristics and stock price responses, we know if the existing system is fair. The evidence shows that 89% financial ratios (in the research) of firms, adapting different underwriting procedures, don't have statistically significant positive abcdrmal returns for both underwriting procedures and the reaction levels for both are different. During the circling procedure, circling firms' stock price response is significantly negative but is significantly positive for offer-for- sales firms'. It's very clear that the latter firms have the better stock price performance than the former. During the days of offerings, circling firms' stock price response is significant positive but is not significant negative for offer-for sales firms'. In the research, we can be sure that these two SEO underwriting procedures are significantly different in all of three event days. Since the different market responses are not associated with firms' financial characteristics, we now can be sure that current circling system exist some problems. The system may provide some big stockholders having chances to arbitrage and to get more newissuing shares then they should have. To the other stockholders who can't engage in arbitraging and get new issuing shares, the existing circling system is unfair.

This dissertation contains four essays on various topics in the fields of corporate finance and corporate governance. The first essay, entitled Corporate Governance and Ownership, presents an overview of the causes and consequences of, and possible remedies for, the separation of ownership and control in corporations. In particular, the essay addresses the costs and benefits of ownership concentration. A specific purpose is to put the role of ownership into perspective, while bringing the reader up to date with some recent developments. Essay number two, Shareholder Gains from Equity Private Placements: Evidence from the Stockholm Stock Exchange, contains an empirical investigation of the stockmarket’s reaction to announcements of equity private placements and rights issues. The essay sets out to test a range of hypotheses put forward in the literature. Extensive cross-sectional analyses of private placement discounts and abnormal returns are performed. The third essay is named Optimal Deterrence and Inducement of Take-overs: An analysis of Poison Pills and Dilution. This essay models how the ex ante wealth of shareholders could be increased with customized contractual provisions that affect takeover probabilities and premia. The proposed provisions resemble anti-takeover defense measures in the form of poison pill plans, and conversely, voluntary dilution schemes in the fashion prescribed by Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart (1980). Finally, the fourth essay models the wealth effects of a particular takeover regulation, The Mandatory Bid Rule. This rule requires a potential bidder for a control position in a target firm to extend the offer to include any or all of the outstanding shares. Although the mandatory bid rule is aimed at the protection of minority shareholders, the essay argues that this regultion is not generally in the best interest of the shareholders. Each essay is self-contained and could, in principle, be read in any order chosen by the reader. However, for readers less familiar with the corporate finance literature, the first essay may also serve as a helpful introduction to the following three essays. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk.

Essay one investigates registered insider sales as stated in the final prospectus filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to test managerial market timing ability during the Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) process. Using a comprehensive sample of 1,051 SEOs between 1997 and 2005, the findings suggest that the initial market reaction and the long-run post-issue performance of issuers are negatively related to C-level executive insider sales, but unrelated to sales by non-executive insiders. Overall, the findings are consistent with the notion that executive insiders are aware of the mispricing in their firm’s securities and successfully time their sales by participating in the secondary components of SEOs. The implication is that SEOs with C-level executive sales are overvalued relative to both SEOs without insider sales and SEOs with only non-executive insider sales. In the second essay, we compare shareholder wealth effects of dual-class and single-class Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) between 1997 and 2005. While there is no difference in pre-issue stock performance or the initial market reaction to the SEO announcements, dual-class issuers significantly underperform single-class issuers in the post-issue years. The mean three-year underperformance of dual-class firms relative to single-class is a significant 28.93% (30.45%) in buy-and-hold raw (abnormal) stock returns, and robust to alternative model specifications. We document that this relative long-run stock underperformance is related to differences in the impacts of post-issue capital expenditures and acquisitions for dual and single-class issuers. Similarly, post-issue corporate cash holdings also contribute less to the shareholder wealth for dual-class firms.

Yes / This study examines stock market reaction to the announcement of various forms of seasoned issues in China. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that market reactions differ in ways that suggest a difference between management's internal assessment and the market's assessment of the stock price. The market responds unfavourably to the announcement, notably in the case of rights issues and also with regard to open offers. Private placements experience an unfavourable pre‐announcement reaction, which contrasts with the favourable reaction after the event. Convertible bond issues generate positive excess returns consistent with the market's confidence that they can help to align management and shareholders’ interests. Further investigation shows that market reaction is related to factors specific to the issuer and issue by reference to the period immediately surrounding the issue. Specifically, ownership concentration, agency matters connected with equity offerings, investor protection connected with fund allocation and security pricing, and the influence of powerful moneyed interests together provide an instructive insight into market reaction. Institutional inefficiency pertaining to underwriting, auditing, analysts’ forecasts and credit ratings are found to have a weak association with market price, consistent with due public scepticism concerning management and their gatekeepers.

Agency Costs of Controlling Minority Shareholders (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist) estimates the agency costs of controlling minority shareholders (CMSs) using a panel of Swedish listed firms. CMSs are owners who have a control stake of the firm’s votes while owning only a minority fraction of the firm’s equity. The study documents that families in control are almost exclusively CMSs through an extensive use of dual-class shares. The results show that increased ownership of votes by a controlling owner is associated with an economically and statistically significant decrease in firm value, but that the decrease in firm value is significantly larger for firms with family CMSs than for firms with financial institutions or corporations in control. This indicates that the agency costs of family CMSs are larger than the agency costs of other controlling owners.Family Ownership, Control Considerations, and Corporate Financing Decisions: An Empirical Analysis analyzes the relation between concentrated family control and firms’ choice of capital structure for a panel of Swedish listed firms. The results suggest that the capital structure choices made by firms with families in control are influenced by the controlling families’ desire to protect their control, and that the resulting capital structures are likely to increase the agency costs of family control. The Choice between Rights Offerings and Private Equity Placements (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist) analyzes the determinants of the choice between rights offerings and private equity placements using a sample of rights offerings and private placements made by listed Swedish firms. The results indicate that control considerations explain why firms make uninsured rights offerings. The evidence also suggest that private placements, and to some extent underwritten rights offerings, are made by potentially undervalued firms in order to overcome underinvestment problems resulting from asymmetric information about firm value. Furthermore, private placements are frequently made in conjunction with the establishment of a product market relationship between purchaser and seller, which is consistent with equity ownership reducing contracting costs in new product market relationships. Why Agency Costs Explain Diversification Discounts (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist and Peter Högfeldt) studies diversification within the real estate industry, in which firms can diversify over property types and geographical regions. Similar to previous studies, this essay documents the existence of a diversification discount. However, the major cause of the diversification discount is not diversification per se but anticipated costs due to rent dissipation in future diversifying acquisitions. Firms expected to pursue non-focusing strategies do indeed diversify more, are valued ex ante at a 20% discount over firms anticipated to follow a focusing strategy, and are predominantly family controlled. The ex ante diversification discount is, therefore, a measure of agency costs.  The Difference in Acquirer Returns between Takeovers of Public Targets and Takeovers of Private Targets shows, for a sample of Swedish takeovers, that the average acquirer abnormal return is positive and significant when the target firm is privately held but insignificant when the target firm is listed on a stock exchange. These results are robust when controlling for sample selection problems and other variables capable of explaining acquirer returns. The evidence is consistent with greater acquirer bargaining power and resolution of information asymmetries in takeovers of private targets. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2002

本研究探討台灣上市櫃公司發行可轉債及現金增資的決策議題。從發行公司的角度來看，利用錯誤評價及成長機會，同時輔以一些公司特徵變數以了解發行動機。後續並追蹤發行公司發行後資金運用情形，以了解發行公司發行動機及目的是否一致。另一方面，從投資人角度來看，觀察可轉債及現金增資公司宣告效果，並由後續資金配置驗證宣告效果之可靠性。 本研究採用Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan(2005)提出的方法，將市值帳面比(M/B)拆解成錯誤評價與成長機會。以2001年至2011年台灣上市上櫃公司發行可轉債或現金增資為研究對象，發現無論是可轉債或現金增資，發行公司發行前錯誤評價及成長機會皆顯著較未發行公司高。接著，利用logit模型，發現可轉債發行公司之成長機會及代理問題為其主要發行動機，而現金增資公司則利用資訊不對稱擇時與調整資本結構為發行考量。本文進一步檢視發行後資金配置情況，發現成長機會越高之可轉債，後續資金用途顯著投資於資本支出與研發費用上，符合實質投資理論之觀點。另一方面，錯誤評價越高之現金增資，在前兩年有累積現金之現象，但不用於償還長期負債，且顯著運用於資本支出與研發費用上，僅部分符合行為理論之解釋。因此，本研究歸納現金增資公司發行動機除擇時外，亦有投資需求。最後，在宣告效果上，可轉債與現金增資均呈現負向宣告效果，且投資人給予現金增資較為負向的宣告效果，本文認為此乃投資人意識到公司利用資訊不對稱擇時，且後續資金配置不完全符合行為理論的預期造成的結果。 / This study examines the issuance of convertible bonds (CBs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) for listed companies in TSE and OTC market in Taiwan. From the aspects of issuers, we use mispricing and growth opportunities along with other firm characteristics to understand the motivation of the issuance. We also track the use of post-issue proceeds and relate to the motivations of issuers. From the aspects of investors, we look at the announcement effects to examine appropriateness. We decompose market-to-book ratios into mispricing and growth option components through a methodology proposed by Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005). By using the samples of CB and SEO issuance between 2001 and 2011, we find that issuing firms of both types are overvalued and have greater growth opportunities relative to non-issuers. Next, we find that CB issuers show greater pre-issue growth opportunities and agency problems, while SEO issuers have greater pre-issue mispricing and tend to adjust capital structure implied by logit model. Furthermore, we examine the post-issue use of proceeds. For CB, firms with greater growth opportunities invest more in capital expenditures and R&D, consistent with real investment explanations. On the other hand, for SEO, firms with greater mispricing stockpile cash in the first two years but don’t pay down long-term debt. They also invest in capital expenditures and R&D. Thus, we conclude that the motivation of SEO firms might be timing and investment needs, partly consistent with behavioral explanations. Finally, the announcement effect of SEO is more negative than CB. Judging from the evidence above, it seems that investors know something.