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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
21

In Search of Prototypes and Feminist Bank-Tellers: Exploring the Representativeness Heuristic

Nilsson, Håkan January 2008 (has links)
According to the heuristics and biases approach, the representativeness heuristic (RH) is one of the heuristics available for assessing subjective probabilities (A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, 1974). A subjective probability assessed by the RH is determined by how representative the target object is of the target category. Several aspects of the RH are argued to cause systematic biases, for example: (i) When the RH is used, the category is represented by one single prototypical exemplar. This feature is argued to cause biases such as misperception of chance and insensitivity to sample size. (ii) The RH assesses the inverse rather than the conditional probability. This feature is argued to cause biases such as the conjunction fallacy and base-rate neglect. The present thesis focuses on the cognitive aspects of the RH. Three studies were conducted. Overall, data indicated that the RH does not play a major role when subjective probabilities are assessed. Study I indicated that subjective probabilities are not typically determined by how representative the target object is of the target category. Study II indicated that the category is not represented by one single prototypical exemplar when subjective probabilities are assessed. Study III indicated that conjunction fallacies are not caused by the RH. The results presented in Studies I-III cast serious doubts on the claim that subjective probabilities are routinely assessed using the RH. Rather, Studies I-II suggested that subjective probabilities are based on exemplar memory and Study III suggested that the conjunction fallacy is caused by people combining component probabilities in a an inappropriate way. In the General Discussion, it is suggested that people use a weighted average rule when combining component probabilities into conjunction probabilities. A simulation showing the ecological relevance of the weighted average rule is presented.
22

Critical thinking on a logical fallacy

Shim, So Young, 1970- 10 June 2011 (has links)
Ad hominem argument is an argument that attacks the defender of a claim rather than the claim in dispute. The purpose of my dissertation is to answer the question of whether ad hominem argument is fallacious. I search for the answer by exploring several areas of philosophy and discussing ad hominem argument from historical, logical, epistemological, and linguistic perspectives. I reach the following conclusions: First, since the conclusion of an ad hominem argument does not appear explicitly in actual argumentation, how to formulate the conclusion plays a crucial role in judging the legitimacy of ad hominem argument; Second, there is no type of logical fallacy unified under the name of “ad hominem” because, at least, some instances of so-called ad hominem fallacy are epistemically justifiable arguments; Third, since an ad hominem argument is used to refute a person’s testimony by attacking his trustworthiness, an ad hominem argument playing a role of undercutting defeater of a speaker’s testimony is legitimate from the perspective of epistemology of testimony; Fourth, since ad hominem argument can be treated as a speech act of argumentation, an ad hominem argument that satisfies the felicity conditions for argumentation is legitimate from the perspective of speech act theory and an ad hominem argument can be legitimately used to reveal the infelicity of the opponent’s argument. / text
23

On the Functions of Morality

Conrad, Aryn Ashley January 2015 (has links)
<p>This dissertation seeks to bring together two philosophical literatures: the functions literature from the philosophy of biology, and the functionalist literature in naturalistic metaethics. Biological function suggests both objectivity and normativity: “the function of the heart is to pump blood” is an objective fact, and yet, hearts may malfunction—and malfunctioning is normative. Many ethicists wish to naturalize ethics—to help find a place for human normative lives in the objective natural world. In order to do so, they need tools to analyze humans as the products of evolutionary processes. Humans have a dual inheritance system involving both cultural and genetic inheritance that makes analysis of function for them particularly complex. In this dissertation, I develop a set of conceptual tools for those who wish to naturalize. I begin by developing an account of inheritance that can handle culture. Then, I elaborate the selected effects account of function so that it can handle all the evolutionary strangeness of culture. I then introduce the monolith fallacy—an error often committed by those studying human evolution—a tendency to oversimplify—to emphasize the high degree of complexity involved in any naturalizing project. Finally, I introduce the notion of value-guided functions—a kind of functioning not tied to our intentions, but to our values to round out the picture. I then apply the whole framework to the work of the functional metaethicists: Allan Gibbard, David Wong, Richard Joyce, and Philip Kitcher.</p> / Dissertation
24

Una definición pragmática de la falacia de petición de principio

Vilaró, Ignacio 09 April 2018 (has links)
En este trabajo propongo una definición pragmática de la falacia de petición de principio. En la primera parte considero y rechazo la sugerencia de Frank Jackson de que la argumentación posee otro fin además del de convencer racionalmente a nuestro interlocutor de que algo es el caso. En la segunda parte ofrezco la definición. En la tercera parte hablo brevemente acerca de la representación de argumentos por medio de grafos. Finalmente, en la cuarta parte aplico la definición propuesta a algunos ejemplos de argumentos.---A Pragmatic Definition of the Begging the Question Fallacy”. A pragmatic definition of the Begging the question fallacy is presented in this paper. In the first part of it I consider and reject Frank Jackson’s suggestion according to which argumentation possesses a different end than rationally persuading an audience that something is the case. The definition is presented in part II. Part III refers briefly to the representation of arguments through graphs. Finally, in part IV, the proposed definition is applied to some argument examples.
25

HARE SOBRE A FALÁCIA NATURALISTA / HARE ON THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY

Prola, Lucas Henrique Tentler 25 August 2009 (has links)
The aim of this dissertation is to present the criticism of Hare to ethical theories who commit the "naturalistic fallacy". These theories, according to the author, search for a "definition" of value words - words that underpin the majority of moral theories. Hare doubts the possibility of a definition of words like "good", "right, "fair", because he believes that such terms are used to recommend, or not, certain acts, to judge certain acts. In order to examine this fallacy, the author proposes the logical study of value words involved in moral judgments, seeking, reflexively, to clarify the role of words like "good" within the moral discourse. The discussion of the Harean metaethics is divided in three chapters. The first deals with the origin of the term "naturalistic fallacy", expressed initially by Moore, where the author firms its position on the undefinability of "good" and exposes the fallacy committed in the identification of good with natural objects. This chapter has, also, an analysis of the relationship between the definitional problem proposed by Moore and the inference problem of the "Law of Hume." The second chapter is a critique of Hare to naturalistic theories and his defense of the applicability of logic to moral discourse - which he believes is essentially prescriptive - through a review of sentences. In the third chapter criticisms to the vision of Hare on the naturalist theories are exposed, and an analysis of these criticisms is elaborated. After this presentation of the subject, I conclude that Hare has good reason to reject naturalism. / Este trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar a crítica de Hare às teorias éticas que cometem a chamada falácia naturalista . Estas teorias, segundo o autor, buscam uma definição para as palavras de valor palavras que alicerçam a maioria das teorias morais. Hare duvida da possibilidade de definição de palavras como bom , certo , justo , pois acredita que tais termos são usados para recomendar, ou não, certas atitudes, para julgar certos atos. Para analisar esta falácia, o autor propõe o estudo lógico das palavras de valor envolvidas nos julgamentos morais, procurando, reflexivamente, esclarecer o papel de palavras como bom dentro do discurso moral. A discussão da proposta metaética hareana está dividida, neste trabalho, em três capítulos. O primeiro trata da origem do termo falácia naturalista , expresso inicialmente por Moore, onde este firma sua posição sobre a indefinibilidade do termo bom e sobre a falácia cometida ao identificá-lo com objetos naturais. Ainda neste capítulo há uma análise da relação ente o problema definicional proposto por Moore e o problema inferencial da Lei de Hume . No segundo capítulo está a crítica de Hare às teorias naturalistas e sua defesa da aplicabilidade da lógica ao discurso moral que ele acredita ser essencialmente prescritivo através de uma reformulação de sentenças. No terceiro capítulo estão expostas as críticas feitas à visão hareana das teorias naturalistas, bem como uma análise destas críticas. Esta breve apresentação do tema permite chegar ao entendimento que Hare tem boas razões para rejeitar o naturalismo.
26

Exploring the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment: Conversational implicature or extension neglect?

Pagin, Amos January 2017 (has links)
According to the conjunction rule of probability theory, a conjunction of events cannot be more probable than either conjunct. However, participants often violate this rule in experimental settings, thus committing the conjunction fallacy. Why do participants commit this fallacy? One hypothesis suggests that participants interpret a task-critical statement designating the event A as designating the event A&amp;notB. If so, participants do not commit the conjunction fallacy. Another hypothesis suggests that participants fail to take task-relevant relations of set inclusion into account when judging probabilities. Both hypotheses were tested in an experiment utilizing a between-subjects design with 145 participants. The results, analyzed using Bayes factors, provide evidence for the null hypothesis in both cases, thus suggesting that neither hypothesis explains the fallacy. However, the unexpectedly low prevalence of the fallacy in the baseline group may have masked the true effects of the manipulations.
27

Rétorické a argumentačné konštrukty a ich implementácia v súčasných politických programoch / Analysis of rhetorical and argumentational constructs in contemporary political party programmes

Ščerbak, Alexander January 2016 (has links)
Diploma thesis is dealing with the political party programme as the basic building block of political rhetoric and related phenomena in the Czech and Slovak political discourse of reasoning, rhetoric and related statements and case studies that describe and approach these phenomena with examples from the current domestic political rhetoric. Author bases on contemporary critical analysis of argumentation and theory of pragma-dialectic which opposes fallacies or false arguments and then sees both methods in construction of arguments in cases of political rhetoric, mass media discourse and conotative values that they are gaining. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
28

Jangle Fallacy: Is Grit Distinct from Other Psychological Constructs?

Godkin, Natasha 01 August 2020 (has links)
This paper assessed the redundancy of the construct of grit (Crede, Tynan, Harms, 2017) compared to other similar constructs using structural equation modeling to remove the effect of measurement error. A series of models regressed grit and its subdomains (passion and perseverance of effort) on self-control, conscientiousness, achievement striving, and resilience. The R-squared values for these models ranged from 0.62 to 0.89. It is concluded that the concept of grit is mostly redundant with other constructs and is therefore an example of a Jangle fallacy (Kelley, 1927). The unique aspect of grit is mostly related to its passion subdomain. The latent correlation between the passion and perseverance of effort subdomains was r = 0.19. Further, it was found that several popular measures failed to conform to their intended factor structure.
29

Srovnání transpersonálních teorií vědomí s ohledem na psychedelickou zkušenost / A comparison of transpersonal theories of consciousness development with regard to the psychedelic experience

Koubková, Daniela January 2021 (has links)
This theoretical thesis is focused on mapping and comparing the leading psychological transpersonal approaches to the conception of development of consciousness of an individual. This research is exploring the theory of Ken Wilber, Michael Washburn and Stanislav Grof also paying attention to the main disagreement among them regarding the confusion of prepersonal and transpersonal spheres of consciousness. This disagreement is further elaborated in an effort to find a conclusion and to seek for an integrative theory. The theories are compared with regard to the findings about psychedelic experience. The psychedelic experience is psychologically elaborated with emphasis on the current scientific knowledge in the field and their embedding in the context of the developmental theories of consciousness taking the effort of unravelling the pre/trans fallacy and the clinical implications into account. KEYWORDS Developmental theory, consciousness, transpersonal, psychedelics, pre/trans fallacy
30

Psychological Distances and Sunk Cost Fallacy

Jiang, Huangqi January 2022 (has links)
No description available.

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