This dissertation examines the use of argumentum ad baculum in preaching in general and the sermons of George Whitefield in particular. Argumentum ad baculum has traditionally been considered an informal fallacy of relevance. The fallacy can be defined as an appeal to force or an appeal to fear. Chapter 1 discusses the relationship of argumentum ad baculum with the empirical study of fear appeals and the rhetorical use of pathos. Attention is also given to the preaching of Whitefield and his place in the history of preaching as an innovator. Whitefield's role in the shift to a more passionate and emotional sermon style is noted. The chapter also addresses the challenges a study of Whitefield's sermons presents. Chapter 2 is devoted to defining argumentum ad baculum, examining the history of the phrase, the two ways it has been defined, the nature of it as a fallacy, and fear appeals as a part of the definition. The chapter includes a discussion of source credibility in relation to fear appeals. Chapter 3 analyses the sermons of Whitefield to identify his use of fear appeals. The types of fear appeals he used in his sermons are listed along with evidentiary sermon material. The types of material Whitefield used to formulate the appeals are also discussed. Chapter 4 gives attention to the effect of Whitefield's fear appeals on his auditors. In order for an appeal to be effective, it must first arouse fear in the recipients of the appeal. Historical narratives are examined from Whitefield himself, eyewitness accounts, and personal testimonies of those who were present at his meetings. The chapter provides evidence of the general and specific effect of Whitefield's fear appeals. Chapter 5 concerns the ethicality of Whitefield's appeals. The chapter surveys a number of standards for ethical judgment. The chapter argues that Whitefield's use of fear in his published sermons was ethical, primarily because of the intention with which he used them. Chapter 6 offers guidelines for the contemporary use of argumentum ad baculum in preaching. Modern audiences are unaccustomed to the use of fear for persuasive means. However, this type of argumentation can be used ethically and effectively.

"Might makes right," so the saying goes. What does this mean? What does it mean to say that humans live by this saying? How can this saying that is considered by almost all as an expression of injustice play a justificatory role practically universally and ubiquitously? How can it be repulsive and yet, nonetheless, attractive as an explanation of the ways of the world? Why its long history? I offer a non-cynical explanation, one based on a re-interpretation of the saying and of both recognized and unrecognized related phenomena. This re-interpretation relies on the notion of a tacit justification for violence. This non-cynical, re-interpretive explanation exposes the ambiguity of the saying and the consequential unwitting, self-deceptive, fallacious equivocations that the ambiguity makes possible under common conditions. While this explanation, furthermore, focuses on thinking factors--specifically on fallacious thinking, on humans' unwittingly and self-deceptively committing the fallacy of equivocation--it does not deny the possible role of non-thinking factors; it only tries to show that the thinking factors are significantly explanatory. What is the ambiguity? "Might makes right" expresses two principles. The first principle is the common meaning, namely, that the dominance of the mightier over the weaker is right. This principle is generally considered to be not a definition of justice but an expression of injustice. The second principle, which is almost universally shared in a tacit and unreflective way, is a principle of life, namely, that it is right for any living being to actualize its potential. This second principle is originary and thus primary, while the first principle is derivative and thus secondary. The use of all powers, natural or social, can be ultimately derived legitimately or illegitimately from this primary principle. A common manifestation of "might makes right" is the unwitting abuse of power, an abuse that is not recognized as such by the so-called abuser, but that is rather suffered by this latter, who misapplies the second principle in situations that fall under the first principle, thereby unwittingly living by the saying, tacitly justifying abusive ways by it. This unwittingness calls for critical control and forgiveness.

Studien undersökte konjunktionsfelslutet och hur det påverkas av förvåning och en konjunktions komponentlängd. En konjunktion (A&B) kan enligt sannolikhetslärans konjunktionsregler endast vara mindre eller lika sannolik som någon av dess komponenter (A eller B). Bryts denna regel begås ett konjunktionsfelslut. 227 deltagare (142 män och 86 kvinnor) randomiserades till 2 olika betingelser och fick utifrån olika långa konjunktioner av fotbollsrelaterade matchresultat antingen bedöma resultatens sannolikhet eller hur förvånade de blev av utfallet. Konjunktionerna var varierande långa och innehöll upp till 3 matchresultat som var utformade för att upplevas som mycket sannolika samt 1 matchresultat som utformats för att upplevas som mycket osannolik. Inga signifikanta resultat erhölls för att antalet konjunktionsfelslut förändras tillsammans med konjunktionens komponentlängd. Ju fler sannolika komponenter en konjunktion hade desto sannolikare (η2part=0,145) och mindre förvånande (η2part=0,336) bedömdes den däremot vara. Korrelationen mellan sannolikhet och upplevd förvåning utifrån varje konjunktions medelvärden var r=-0.985. Resultatet tyder på antalen konjunktionsfelslut inte påverkas av komponentlängden men däremot att konjunktionens utformning kan influera bedömningen av olika valalternativ samt att förvåning har ett mycket starkt samband med sannolikhetsbedömningar.

There are two serious methodological problems in the research literature on school effectiveness, the ecological problem in the analysis of aggregate data and the problem of not controlling for important confounding variables. This dissertation corrects these errors by using multilevel modeling procedures, specifically Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM), and the Canadian Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 2007 data, to evaluate the effect of school variables on the students’ academic achievement when a number of theoretically-relevant student variables have been controlled. In this study, I demonstrate that an aggregate analysis gives the most biased results of the schools’ impact on the students’ academic achievement. I also show that a disaggretate analysis gives better results, but HLM gives the most accurate estimates using this nested data set. Using HLM, I show that the physical resources of schools, which have been evaluated by school principals and classroom teachers, actually have no positive impact on the students’ academic achievement. The results imply that the physical resources are important, but an excessive improvement in the physical conditions of schools is unlikely to improve the students’ achievement. Most of the findings in this study are consistent with the best research literature. I conclude the dissertation by suggesting that aggregate analysis should not be used to infer relationships for individual students. Rather, multilevel analysis should be used whenever possible.

There are two serious methodological problems in the research literature on school effectiveness, the ecological problem in the analysis of aggregate data and the problem of not controlling for important confounding variables. This dissertation corrects these errors by using multilevel modeling procedures, specifically Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM), and the Canadian Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 2007 data, to evaluate the effect of school variables on the students’ academic achievement when a number of theoretically-relevant student variables have been controlled. In this study, I demonstrate that an aggregate analysis gives the most biased results of the schools’ impact on the students’ academic achievement. I also show that a disaggretate analysis gives better results, but HLM gives the most accurate estimates using this nested data set. Using HLM, I show that the physical resources of schools, which have been evaluated by school principals and classroom teachers, actually have no positive impact on the students’ academic achievement. The results imply that the physical resources are important, but an excessive improvement in the physical conditions of schools is unlikely to improve the students’ achievement. Most of the findings in this study are consistent with the best research literature. I conclude the dissertation by suggesting that aggregate analysis should not be used to infer relationships for individual students. Rather, multilevel analysis should be used whenever possible.

Daniela Foltinová: Constantly Think: A Philosophical Interpretation of Thinking in Thomas Bernhard and Friedrich Nietzsche The thesis presents a philosophical interpretation on the problem of thinking acquired through the thorough analysis of Thomas Bernhards' novels Gehen, Verstörung and Alte Meister and an interpretation of knowledge, fallacy and thinking in the works of Friedrich Nietzsches' Menschliches, Allzumenschliches and Fröhliche Wissenschaft. The focal question of the thesis is: What does it mean to think? Interpretations of Bernhard held in three lines are always connected with the character in the novel. The fourth interpretation focuses solely on Nietzsches' thinking. There are four interpretations of thinking then. The first one characterizes thinking as a state of chaos taking place in the madmans' mind. The second one leads to the conception of reflective thinking of an observer. Both of them present a negative way of treating thinking as non-thinking. The third one with a storyteller taking thinkers' position shows procesual part of thinking: it is necessarily an activity with no further need for reflecttion or conceptualization. Therefore, it is to be found in the literary form of the novels. The analysis of Nietzsches' thinking emphasizes the need to dispute over the conceptual...

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Throughout the early Platonic dialogues, Socrates repeatedly tells his interlocutors that if, as they claim, they truly have knowledge concerning some morally significant property, then they should be able to define the nature of that property. Invariably, the interlocutors fail to furnish him with such definitions, leading him to conclude that they, and all humankind, are ignorant of any knowledge about such property. This leads him to encourage his interlocutors, and us, to adopt a sense of intellectual humility and to dedicate their lives to studying these properties in an effort to gain moral insight. Many scholars have cited Socrates' demand for definition as evidence that he accepts a Priority of Definition principle - an epistemological principle asserting that a person must first know the definition of a property before she can know anything else about the property. Many of the scholars who make this ascription also argue, for various reasons, that such a principle is erroneous. If these scholars are correct and Socrates does accept a flawed Priority of Definition principle, then his epistemology, along with his whole philosophy, suffers devastating harm. Students of the early dialogues must consider whether Socrates does, in fact, accept the principle and, if so, whether the principle is incorrect. The thesis will examine the issues that arise from the ascription of a Priority of Definition principle to Socrates. The study will first examine textual evidence supporting the ascription along with texts that bring the ascription into question. It will then outline three general philosophical criticisms of the principle. Finally, this study will examine a number of different understandings of Socrates' conception of knowledge. Hopefully, an understanding can be discovered that preserves his philosophy by effectively showing that either (1) Socrates does not accept the principle, or (2) he does accept the principle but the principle is not philosophically problematic. If such an understanding can be discovered, then Socrates' conception of knowledge is saved from the criticisms raised by scholars. Otherwise, his whole philosophy will be placed in a very troubling light. / Master of Arts

I Role of Behavioral Finance in Portfolio Investment Decisions: Evidence from India Abstract Extreme volatility has plagued financial markets worldwide since the 2008 Global Crisis. Investor sentiment has been one of the key determinants of market movements. In this context, studying the role played by emotions like fear, greed and anticipation, in shaping up investment decisions seemed important. Behavioral Finance is an evolving field that studies how psychological factors affect decision making under uncertainty. This thesis seeks to find the influence of certain identified behavioral finance concepts (or biases), namely, Overconfidence, Representativeness, Herding, Anchoring, Cognitive Dissonance, Regret Aversion, Gamblers' Fallacy, Mental Accounting, and Hindsight Bias, on the decision making process of individual investors in the Indian Stock Market. Primary data for analysis was gathered by distributing a structured questionnaire among investors who were categorized as (i) young, and (ii) experienced. Results obtained by analyzing a sample of 92 respondents, out of which 53 admitted to having suffered a loss of at least 30% because of the crisis, revealed that the degree of exposure to the biases separated the behavioral pattern of young and experienced investors. Gamblers' Fallacy, Anchoring and...

<p>According to the heuristics and biases approach, the representativeness heuristic (RH) is one of the heuristics available for assessing subjective probabilities (A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, 1974). A subjective probability assessed by the RH is determined by how representative the target object is of the target category. Several aspects of the RH are argued to cause systematic biases, for example: (<i>i</i>) When the RH is used, the category is represented by one single prototypical exemplar. This feature is argued to cause biases such as misperception of chance and insensitivity to sample size. (<i>ii</i>) The RH assesses the inverse rather than the conditional probability. This feature is argued to cause biases such as the conjunction fallacy and base-rate neglect.</p><p>The present thesis focuses on the cognitive aspects of the RH. Three studies were conducted. Overall, data indicated that the RH does not play a major role when subjective probabilities are assessed. Study I indicated that subjective probabilities are not typically determined by how representative the target object is of the target category. Study II indicated that the category is not represented by one single prototypical exemplar when subjective probabilities are assessed. Study III indicated that conjunction fallacies are not caused by the RH. </p><p>The results presented in Studies I-III cast serious doubts on the claim that subjective probabilities are routinely assessed using the RH. Rather, Studies I-II suggested that subjective probabilities are based on exemplar memory and Study III suggested that the conjunction fallacy is caused by people combining component probabilities in a an inappropriate way. In the General Discussion, it is suggested that people use a weighted average rule when combining component probabilities into conjunction probabilities. A simulation showing the ecological relevance of the weighted average rule is presented.</p>