What determines the meaning of a work of art? This paper considers three theories of art-critical interpretation: moderate actual intentionalism (the artist’s intention partly determines the work’s meaning), hypothetical intentionalism (the work’s meaning is the best hypothesis of what the artist could have meant), and the value-maximizing theory (interpretations which maximize the work’s value are to be preferred). I argue that moderate actual intentionalism is incoherent, collapsing either into the intentional fallacy or into an extreme form of intentionalism. I argue further that hypothetical intentionalism is premised on a distinction between two orders of intention which cannot be maintained, and, trades on a mischaracterization of the force of hypothetical intentions. I argue for the value-maximizing theory, which I claim provides an elegant interpretive framework while being theoretically untroubled vis-à-vis its competitors.

No description available.

Yes / The field of mental health tends to treat its literary metaphors as literal realities with the concomitant loss of vague “feelings of tendency” in “unusual experiences”. I develop this argument through the prism of William James’ (1890) “The Principles of Psychology”. In the first part of the paper, I reflect upon the relevance of James’ “The Psychologist’s Fallacy” to a literary account of mental health. In the second part of the paper, I develop the argument that “connotations” and “feelings of tendency” are central to resolving some of the more difficult challenges of this fallacy. I proceed to do this in James’ spirit of generating imaginative metaphors to understand experience. Curiously, however, mental health presents a strange paradox in William James’ (1890) Principles of Psychology. He constructs an elaborate conception of the “empirical self” and “stream of thought” but chooses not to use these to understand unusual experiences – largely relying instead on the concept of a “secondary self.” In this article, I attempt to make more use of James’ central division between the “stream of thought” and the “empirical self” to understand unusual experiences. I suggest that they can be usefully understood using the loose metaphor of a “binary star” where the “secondary self” can be seen as an “accretion disk” around one of the stars. Understood as literary rather the literal, this metaphor is quite different to more unitary models of self-breakdown in mental health, particularly in its separation of “self” from “the stream of thought” and I suggest it has the potential to start a re-imagination of the academic discourse around mental health.

The research undertakes a critical study of informal fallacies in some socio-political and religious discourses in Ghana. It clearly and aptly demonstrates that the aforementioned discourses are mostly, if not, always laced with fallacies which obscure and distort clear and critical thinking. The study shows that language, which is the fundamental means by which to engage in socio-political discourse, can be viewed as a complicated tool which is open to misuse and abuse. It shows that language used in socio-political discourses is more often than not utilized poorly, and as such assertions and appeals can be confused with factual/logical inaccuracies. Statements can be formulated in ways that make their content dangerously vague, ambiguous or generally misleading. The research shows that although fallacies can be committed intentionally or unintentionally, in discourses in general, they are mostly, if not always, committed intentionally in socio-political discourse so as to achieve political gains and agenda. Another area of discourse that is tackled in this work where fallacies frequently occur is the religious sector. The study notes that matters of religion are mostly matters that are delicate to handle as these matters are mostly, again if not always, based on faith. It is shown herein that many a time, religious personalities use fallacious as means to drive their religious agenda across. The research then looks at what these aforementioned fallacies imply in relation to socio-political and religious discourses. It proceeds to discuss the positive implications of fallacies before it progresses to the negative implications of same. It then asks how a fallacy will be beneficial to a person and or how it will disadvantage the same person. If fallacies often occur in socio-political and religious discourses, then one must have the ability to detect these fallacies and try to avoid them. The work discusses how to detect fallacies and how to avoid them. It makes bold claims that if one has knowledge about fallacies then one will be able to avoid them. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / Ph. D. (Philosophy)

Heuristic estimates of probabilities may be an obstacle to decision making within High Reliability Organizations. Accident reports have found that two from each other separate phenomenon, Blame Culture and Type 1 processing constitutes a particularily serious threat to decision making. The present study (N = 70) investigated if a perceived risk of negative feedback and cognitive load would lead to more heuristic estimates on the Conjunction Fallacy. Three experiment conditions were included in the study: Negative feedback, cognitive load and control. The results were non-significant for both negative feedback and cognitive load. Furthermore, the estimated negative affect was higher when violations to the Conjunction Rule was made. Previous studies showing that high scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) indicate less sensitivity to conjunction fallacies, were replicated. The present study concluded that the CRT may be a strong predictor of the Conjunction Fallacy.

Cette étude examine comment l’argument de la pente glissante est employé dans les débats sur l’avortement et sur l’euthanasie. L’hypothèse est la suivante : l’argument de la pente glissante peut être utilisé de manière fallacieuse dans certains cas, mais il peut également s’avérer raisonnable dans d’autres. L’objectif de cette étude est d’étudier certains arguments récurrents du discours bioéthique afin de tester leur pertinence, leur validité et leurs conséquences sur le plan philosophique. Cette étude se divise en deux parties. La première partie s’intéresse à l’usage de la pente glissante de type « sorite » dans le débat sur l’avortement. La deuxième partie se penche sur l’argument de la pente glissante complète telle qu’il est employé dans le débat sur l’euthanasie. / This study examines how the slippery slope argument is used in debates on abortion and euthanasia. The hypothesis is that the slippery slope argument can be used wrongfully in some cases, but it may also be reasonable in others. The objective of this study is to investigate some of the recurring arguments in bioethics in order to test their relevance, validity and their impact on the philosophical level. This study is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the use of the “sorites” slippery slope argument in the abortion debate. The second part focuses on the “full slippery slope argument” as used in the debate on euthanasia.

The sunk-cost fallacy (SCF) occurs when an individual makes an investment with a low probability of a payoff because an earlier investment has already been made. It is considered an error because a rational decision should not factor in now-irretrievable investments, as they do not affect current outcome likelihoods. Previous research has measured the tendency to commit the SCF by using hypothetical scenarios in which participants must choose to make a future investment or not after making an initial investment. There are many theories as to why people commit the SCF. Loss aversion, which is the preference for uncertain over certain losses, may be related to the SCF. Dual-process theory, which views decision-making in terms of a fast, automatic process called system 1 and a slow, deliberate process called system 2, may also help to explain the SCF. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to complete a sunk-cost questionnaire in which the initial-investment types and amounts varied. They also completed an endowment-effect task as a measure of loss aversion. The SCF was committed most often when the initial investment was large compared to small and most often with money, less with time, and least with effort. There was an interaction effect in which small differences were seen in the SCF between time, effort, and money when the initial investment was small, and differences grew larger as the initial investment increased. Loss aversion displayed a non-significant negative relation with the SCF. In Experiment 2, participants completed a sunk-cost questionnaire in which they were asked to respond as they normally would and then from the perspective of a fictional person described as a logical decision maker. In cases in which they committed the SCF, they were asked to indicate why they continued to invest. They also completed a risky-lottery loss-aversion task. As seen in Experiment 1, the SCF was more likely when initial investments were greater and occurred most when the initial investment was money, less when it was time, and least when it was effort. Loss aversion had a significant but small negative relation with SCF scores. There was no effect of perspective taking. It may be that the SCF is simply due to the over-application of the personal rule “don't waste”, as not wanting to be wasteful was the most-common reason participants gave for why they committed the SCF.

No description available.

Cette étude examine comment l’argument de la pente glissante est employé dans les débats sur l’avortement et sur l’euthanasie. L’hypothèse est la suivante : l’argument de la pente glissante peut être utilisé de manière fallacieuse dans certains cas, mais il peut également s’avérer raisonnable dans d’autres. L’objectif de cette étude est d’étudier certains arguments récurrents du discours bioéthique afin de tester leur pertinence, leur validité et leurs conséquences sur le plan philosophique. Cette étude se divise en deux parties. La première partie s’intéresse à l’usage de la pente glissante de type « sorite » dans le débat sur l’avortement. La deuxième partie se penche sur l’argument de la pente glissante complète telle qu’il est employé dans le débat sur l’euthanasie. / This study examines how the slippery slope argument is used in debates on abortion and euthanasia. The hypothesis is that the slippery slope argument can be used wrongfully in some cases, but it may also be reasonable in others. The objective of this study is to investigate some of the recurring arguments in bioethics in order to test their relevance, validity and their impact on the philosophical level. This study is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the use of the “sorites” slippery slope argument in the abortion debate. The second part focuses on the “full slippery slope argument” as used in the debate on euthanasia.

This thesis focused on disinformation, providing analysis of media system in the Czech Republic. The main focus is on content analysis of disinformations and their persuasive function - explaining what are the ain characteristics of those news and which lingual and rhetorical tools they use. The main tool which is discussed and analysed in this thesis is fallacy, false or invalid arguments. Disinformation phenomenon and its place in today's world is explained in their first part of the thesis. The second, empirical part of the thesis looks at specific examples of disinformations which were published at selected Czech disinformation news websites (Aaronet, AC24, Instory.cz). Selection of those websites was guided by their diversity when it comes to structure and themes. The sample of analysed articles was subject to predefined standards, chosing articles with the theme of immigration crisis which were published between 2015 and 2017.