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11	Towards a theory of adjudication : some issues of method and principle Brady, Paul January 2014 (has links) A sound theory of adjudication and of judicial duty requires or presupposes a sound theory of law and of legal argument. Jurisprudential inquiry is properly grounded not in reflections on conceptual properties of law but in reflections on human goods and needs as understood in a morally articulated theory of practical reason and compactly expressed in the normative concept of the common good. Such reflections confirm that law exists, in its central case, as a means to various types of authoritative co-ordination solutions. The underdetermined nature of (a) the positive requirements of practical reasonableness and the common good and of (b) the appropriate means of enforcing compliance and remedying non-compliance with either these requirements or the determinate negative precepts of practical reasonableness entails that a practically necessary aspect of the positive law’s role is constituting the requirements of justice, i.e. of what is due to whom generally and in particular situations (including situations where an injustice has been or is alleged to have been done). As a distinct and practically necessary mode of legal co-ordination for the common good, adjudication, in its central case, answers litigated questions of justice by applying all relevant law in accordance with the legal system’s practice of legal argument. Thus adjudication is performed by authoritative law-applying institutions precisely because it is about answering questions of justice, and not despite that fact. Theories of law developed on the assumption that it is possible to understand the ‘what’ of law without reliance on any moral judgments deny any practically necessary connection between (a) the promotion of justice and the common good and (b) the nature of law, in its central case, and, hence, the adjudicative application of the law. In the absence of this connection a judicial duty to do justice according to law is unintelligible. 340
12	On the Stephen Macedo and John Finnis Exchange: Natural Law, Liberalism, and Homosexuality: A Critical Assessment Coleman, Brian B 31 July 2006 (has links) This essay is an exploration of the debate between John Finnis and Stephen Macedo on the value of homosexuality. In “Is Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Government?” Finnis, a natural law theorist, rejects value-neutralist arguments, stating that the political community can and should make value judgments about its members’ life-choices and that such normative evaluations are compatible with liberalism. Particularly, Finnis argues that homosexuality is in its essence always harmful and degrading, thus unable to participate in the basic human goods it imitates. Furthermore, he argues that the political community in liberal democratic societies is justified in discouraging homosexual conduct as a viable way of life. Macedo, while also rejecting pure value-neutralist liberalism, carefully considers but rejects Finnis’s argument, which rests on an unrealistic description of value and ends of human sexual activity. Natural Law Theory John Finnis Stephen Macedo Homosexuality Liberalism Limited Government Value-Neutralist Basic Human Goods Philosophy
13	Kelsen and Raz on the continuity of legal systems : applying the accounts in an Australian context Spagnolo, Benjamin James January 2013 (has links) This thesis has three objectives. Its primary objective is to examine, and critically evaluate, the theoretical accounts offered by Hans Kelsen and Joseph Raz to explain the temporal continuity and discontinuity of legal systems. In particular, it evaluates the explanatory power of those accounts by combining an abstract analysis of the accounts in principle and an evaluation based on systematically applying them to one concrete, historically circumstanced instance: the legal systems of British derivation in Australia between 1788 and 2001. The thesis thus tests each account’s factual fit: how adequately it corresponds to, accords with, and persuasively makes sense of, the facts – including complex social facts, attitudes and normative standards – for which it purports to offer an account. Second, the thesis aims to demonstrate, more generally, the utility of applying theoretical accounts to a particular historical instance to complement abstract analysis. Third, the thesis aims to advance the understanding of the evolution of Australian legal systems between 1788 and 2001. These three objectives are achieved through the critical exposition and reconstruction of the accounts, their development and enrichment where refinement is appropriate, their application to the specific context of Australia and their evaluation, individually and in comparison. 340.50994
14	墨家法思想之研究---與Aquinas自然法之比較黃文聰 Unknown Date (has links) 墨家法思想與傳統中國法學所引為依據的儒家仁學是完全不同的：儒家之仁乃是以自身道德的直覺判斷作為衡量世間萬物的最高準則，並藉此與生俱來的直覺與其他萬物有了所謂''感通"之效應來評斷世上價值。但楊日然教授已在三十年前就提出這種以自身道德直覺為準的儒家哲學，將有導致個人將以其內心的道德判斷取代客觀的禮儀及法律規範的危險。依據撰著者的觀點，論文最重要在於第二章，即承襲先聖前賢思想的寶貴結晶，把墨家的兼愛思想分成兩個層次而定義為：兼愛的消極定義：透過自我否定來達到消除敵對意識的精神作用。兼愛的積極定義：所愛之人的實然性欲求(即被愛之人的期待與物質利益)，即是自我的應然性義務之內涵。換言之，在墨家法思想中，應然與實然是交互影響的，即他人實然欲望即為自己的應然義務，我的實然欲念即為他人的應然責任。此論文第二章之目的即在於以現代法學觀念對墨家法思想重新作整理，彰顯中國傳統法思想較忽視的一面，作為往後與傳統法思想對照的一塊墊腳磚，從而在價值規範的論證上可獲儒家思想以外的參考資料，故為墨家法思想所做的整理與歸納是希望可達到本文第一目標。本論文之第二目標即在於比較墨家與聖多瑪斯自然法並歸納出兩者相同之處，蓋在時間相隔長達一千七百年(墨子約是450 B.C.時代的人，而聖多瑪斯則為1250 A.D.左右的人)，空間距離超過數萬公里之遙，兩者不可能有任何的影響，若能在此絕對隔絕的環境下產生相同之思想，那這些思想的結晶或許真有其普世性的價值存在，此為本文第二目標。上帝兼愛墨家知識論墨子自然法 God Natural Law Aquinas John Finnis Mo Tze ought and is
15	Molecular Dynamics Simulations of Metallic Glass Formation and Structure Riegner, David C. January 2016 (has links) No description available. Materials Science molecular dynamics metallic glass simulation GFA coordination environment short-range order step height Aluminum Lanthanum Copper Zirconium Titanium EAM potentials Finnis-Sinclair RAMPAGE
16	Law in 3-Dimensions 2013 March 1900 (has links) This project, overall, involves a theory of law as dimensions. Throughout the history of the study of law, many different theoretical paradigms have emerged proffering different and competing ways to answer the question ‘what is law’? Traditionally, many of these paradigms have been at irreconcilable odds with one another. Notwithstanding this seeming reality, the goal of this project was to attempt to take three of the leading paradigms in legal theory and provide a way to explain how each might fit into a single coherent theory of law. I set out to accomplish this by drawing on the field of theoretical physics and that field’s use of spatial dimensions in explaining various physical phenomena. By engaging in a dimensional analysis of law, I found that I was able to place each paradigm within its own dimension with that dimension being defined by a specific element of time, and in doing so much of the conflict between the paradigms came to be ameliorated. The project has been divided into two main parts. PART I discusses the fundamentals of legal theory (Chapter 1) and the fundamentals of dimensions (Chapter 2). These fundamentals provide a foundation for a dimensional analysis of law which takes place throughout PART II. In Chapter 3, I argue that the three fundamental theses of Positivism coalesce with the 1st-dimension of law, which is defined as law as it exists at any one point in time. From there, I argue in Chapter 4 that the 2nd-dimension of law, being law as it exists between two points in time (i.e. when cases are adjudicated), is characterized by Pragmatism. I then turn, in Chapter 5, to argue that the 3rd-dimension of law, being law as it exists from the very first point in legal time to the ever changing present day, coalesces with the fundamental theses of Naturalism. Ultimately then, I argue that a theory of law as dimensions, through the vantage points of the specific elements of time, provides a more complete account of the nature of law. Legal Theory Jurisprudence Philosophy of Law Legal Positivism Positive Law Natural Law Pragmatism Inclusive Positivism Exclusive Positivism Interpretation Hart Dworkin Posner Finnis Fuller Gardner Shapiro Hume Elements of Time Dimensions Constitutional Law Morality Morals Separation Legal Reasoning Lawyers Law Necessary Connection Multiple Right Answer Best Choice Principle Practicality Judicial Adjudication Point in Time Audacity of Morality Law's True Ambition What is Law? Theoretical Physics Double Bind Multiple Bind First-Order Considerations Second-Order Considerations Penumbra Purity General Goal Incommensurable Legal System Wicked Legal System.
17	Embryo Adoption: Implications of Personhood, Marriage, and Parenthood McMillen, Brooke Marie 14 April 2008 (has links) Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / One’s personal claims regarding personhood will influence his moral belief regarding embryo adoption. In Chapter One, I consider the personhood of the human embryo. If the human embryo is a person, we are morally obligated to permit the practice of embryo adoption as an ethical means to save human persons. However, for those who do not claim that an embryo is a person at conception, embryo adoption is not a necessary practice because we have no moral obligation to protect them. There are still others who claim that personhood is gained at some point during gestation when certain mental capacities develop. I offer my own claim that consciousness and sentience as well as the potential to be self-conscious mark the beginning of personhood. Embryo adoption raises several questions surrounding the institution of marriage. Due to its untraditional method of procreation, embryo adoption calls into question the role of procreation within marriage. In Chapter Two, I explore the nature of the marriage relationship by offering Lisa Cahill’s definition of marriage which involves both a spiritual and physical dimension, and then I describe the concept of marriage from different perspectives including a social, religious, and a personal perspective. From a personal perspective, I explore the relationship between marriage and friendship. Finally, I describe how the concept of marriage is understood today and explore the advantages to being married as opposed to the advantages of being single. Embryo adoption changes the way we customarily think about procreation within a family because in embryo adoption, couples are seeking an embryo from another union to be implanted into the woman. This prompts some philosophers to argue that embryo adoption violates the marriage relationship. In Chapter Three, I further consider the impact of embryo adoption on the family as an extension of the marital relationship as well as the impact of embryo adoption on the traditional roles of motherhood and fatherhood. I examine motherhood by looking at how some philosophers define motherhood and when these philosophers claim a woman becomes a mother. After considering these issues regarding motherhood, I examine the same issues surrounding fatherhood. Peg Brand, PhD., Chair Embryo adoption Embryo rescue Embryo Adoption Rescue Motherhood Fatherhood Marriage Personhood Gestation Conception Reproductive technology Reproduction Surrogacy Conscious Consciousness Sentience Person Self-conscious Self-consciousness Procreation Conjugal union Marriage relationship Procreate Pregnancy Genetic motherhood Gestational motherhood Social motherhood Genetic father Social father Mother Motherhood Father Fatherhood IVF In vitro In vitro fertilization Pregnancy Postnatal adoption Althaus Aquinas Conee Crosby DeGrazia Finnis Ford Locke Lovering McMahan Parfit Quinn Singer Sumner Thomson Tooley Warren Cahill Moller Landau Mill Catholic Lutheran Calvinist Calvinism Aristotle Catholicism Kant Parsons Primoratz Feldman Firestone Tonti-Filippini Watt Geach Human embryo -- Transplantation Adoption -- Religious aspects Motherhood Fatherhood Marriage

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