This thesis explores the intersection of freedom of expression (as protected in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter)) and copyright in Canada. In this thesis, I argue that both lower Canadian courts and the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) should reconsider their approaches to this intersection. Lower Canadian courts have consistently rejected arguments that provisions of Canada's Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression. The SCC, on the other hand, has consistently interpreted provisions of the Copyright Act in such a manner as to result in expanded protection for the expression interests of non-copyright owning parties. It has done so not by relying explicitly on the Charter right to freedom of expression, but through a process of statutory interpretation. I argue that both approaches merit reconsideration. Specifically, I argue that the approaches adopted by lower Canadian courts to the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright are based on now-invalidated approaches to both copyright and to freedom of expression, and are thus themselves invalid; that to the extent to which the SCC's approach to this intersection assumes that the Charter right to freedom of expression can be protected, in the context of copyright, through statutory interpretation alone, that it fails to adequately protect the Charter right to freedom of expression; that other leading national courts from which the SCC has previously sought assistance have explicitly engaged with this intersection, and that the SCC should follow suit; and that the SCC's own copyright and freedom of expression jurisprudence suggests that provisions of the Copyright Act may unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression. These four arguments, taken together, suggest that the time is ripe for reconsideration of this intersection.

Limits of freedom of expression in the light of case-law of the European Court of Human Rights This diploma thesis deals with the freedom of expression and its permissible limits as those declared in Article 10 od the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter referred as "Convention"). Freedom of expression is guaranteed to everyone. However freedom of expression is not absolute, restrictions on freedom of expression by the intervention of the national authorities to individual freedoms is permissable in case of existence any justifiable targets pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10. We named this procedure by test legality, legitimacy and proportionality. So, in other words, the measures used against a person must be established legal standards, must pursue achieving a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society. European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter "the Court") applies this test whenever it finds existing interference with freedom of expression. It focuses on case law precedents, set by the European Court's of Human Rights (hereinafter referred as "Court"), in cases of complaints for violation of the freedom of expression concerning the admissibility of the use of legitimate aim clauses by national authorities applying law. The structure of the contents of this thesis...

The thesis addresses primarily the conflict between the protection of personality and another constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right - the freedom of expression. These rights, that happen to be often in a conflict, are rights of an equal legal protection, one does not have a priority over the other one and so it is a challenge for the courts to decide which one to prefer in particular cases while taking the specific circumstances of the each case into account. The thesis aims to examine this conflict in detail and to analyse it. The first chapter focuses on general questions related to personality rights, addresses the term "personality", the historic development of the personality rights regulation within the area of the Czech Republic and its presence in the current legal system with the accent to the recodification of the civil law, which has taken place hand in hand with the act no. 89/2012 Coll., Civil code, entering into force, while an assessment of the changes that the new regulation of the civil law has brought is one of the partial aims of the thesis. In the second chapter is discussed the unlawful interference with the personality rights that constitutes a private law tort. In the same time this chapter addresses the circumstances excluding the unlawfulness and deals with the...

As the title suggests, this thesis is about the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and about development of its interpretation from its inception to present day. Over the years, the interpretation of the First Amendment has drastically changed, causing a shift from restrictive views on free expression towards almost absolute freedom. Today, freedom of expression and religious freedom, both of which are included in the First Amendment, play a significant role in preserving democracy while strengthening its core pillars not only in the United States, but in other modern nations as well. The inclusion of the First Amendment into the world's oldest written constitution has influenced the concept of free expression and religious freedom in the laws of many foreign countries. According to some scholars, the current level of constitutional protection guaranteed for free expression in United States is too high and does not correlate with what the framers of the constitution had intended on upon drafting the First Amendment. However, it comes as no surprise that higher standards of protection from governmental intervention regarding guaranteed freedom in the First Amendment consequently results in the betterment of society. Throughout the text, I will aim to answer every major question...

Esta pesquisa investiga os sentidos, valores e discursos circulantes que emergem nas páginas da imprensa em torno da categoria \"politicamente correto\", observando suas relações com a liberdade de expressão e formas de controle da produção discursiva. A partir de matérias da Folha de S. Paulo, no período de 1991 a 2014, pesquisamos as transformações do politicamente correto no Brasil e as regulações por ele estabelecidas. Embasamo-nos, nesse percurso, nas proposições de Michel Foucault sobre a arqueologia dos discursos, de modo que as matérias jornalísticas devem ser tomadas como acontecimentos discursivos, isto é, como vestígios materiais que servem de base à \"escavação\" de plataformas culturais, saberes e regras sócio-históricas que condicionam a emergência de enunciados e discursos. Nossos resultados apontam para a emergência do politicamente correto como categoria em disputa no debate público, inserida em um contexto de reposicionamentos dos saberes sobre liberdade de expressão, e para o papel decisivo do jornalismo na introdução dessa expressão nas discussões que se travam na esfera pública brasileira. O posicionamento assumido pelo jornalismo remete a um imaginário discursivo sobre a democracia, o que também tem seu papel na consolidação da legitimidade e do lugar de fala da imprensa. De modo correlato, a discussão pública sobre o politicamente correto no Brasil mostra-se profundamente polarizada. Por fim, a emergência da categoria \"politicamente correto\" como forma de denominar processos de regulação sobre a linguagem reflete - e também determina - a centralidade e a visibilidade adquiridas por esse fenômeno em nossa cultura: centralidade da linguagem, de modo amplo, como mediadora das relações sociais; centralidade do individual na condução de ações políticas; centralidade do paradigma de circulação de ideias - e, por conseguinte, visibilidade das formas de controle da expressão, entendidas cada vez mais como intoleráveis. / This research investigates the senses, values and circulating discourses that emerge in the pages of the press around the category \"political correctness\". Our goal is to understand the relationship between such category, freedom of expression and forms of control of discursive production. From journalistic texts published by Folha de S. Paulo, in the period from 1991 to 2014, we researched the transformation of political correctness in Brazil and the regulations laid down by it. In this journey, we base ourselves on Michel Foucault\'s propositions on the archeology of speeches; so that the newspaper articles should be taken as discursive events, as material evidence underpinning the excavation of cultural platforms, knowledge and socio-historical rules that constrain the emergence of statements and speeches. Our results show the emergence of political correctness as a category in dispute in the public debate, set on a repositioning context of knowledge on freedom of expression, as well as the decisive role of journalism in the introduction of the expression \"political correctness\" in the discussions which take place in Brazilian public sphere. The position assumed by journalism refers to an imaginary discourse on democracy, which also plays a role in the consolidation of legitimacy and place of speech of the press. At the same time, the public discussion of political correctness in Brazil shows up deeply polarized. Finally, the emergence of the category \"political correctness \" as a way of giving a name to processes of language regulation reflects - and also determines - the centrality and visibility acquired by this phenomenon in our culture: the centrality of language, broadly, mediating social relationships; centrality of the individual in the conduct of policy actions; centrality of the circulation of ideas - and therefore visibility of control strategies of expression, increasingly understood as intolerable.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marilene Araujo.pdf: 1589024 bytes, checksum: 861d05eaf6a7cbf03b7ba21908afd89a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-01-26 / Summary: No pluralism there is no effective exercise of the right to freedom of expression, being the regular law such freedom via constitutional system. The law, communication and human sociality are inextricably linked. Humanity without communicational interactions can not exist. The very human dignity is only possible with the preservation of freedom and communication, and freedom of expression appears as power to act human. In social terms the various networks of conversations where emerging culture means that there is a plurality of opinion, cultures. The more free speech, more plurality and the more plurality, more freedom of expression. It is a circular and complex way. Freedom of expression currently understood is a construct and not a given post. Greece was the right to speak in the Agora. A revolution of the media does this freedom go through the emergence of the press and the revolutions of the eighteenth century. The result is positivization this freedom through international and constitutional documents. A second revolution is the technology of electromagnetic waves and the emergence of radio and television, once again the law regulates via grants system and the public service institute. Constitutions and American, French and German jurisprudence buildings bring notions of freedom of expression from the perspective of pluralism. Similarly, the European and American human rights protection system does. The Brazil supported in its constitution and in international treaties have a protection system which includes the freedom of expression and pluralism, but still faces problems for the realization of this right. The challenges are many, because now comes a third revolution of the medium with the arrival of the internet, the market players. But any proposal must pass the non divisibility of social and individual sphere. The law can regulate and carry out increasingly setting such freedom, punishing, rewarding and offering subsidies for realization of freedom of expression / Sem pluralismo não há efetivo exercício do direito a liberdade de expressão, cabendo ao Direito regular tal liberdade via sistema constitucional. O Direito, a comunicação e a socialidade humana são indissociável. A humanidade sem interações comunicacionais não pode existir. A própria dignidade humana só é possível com a preservação da liberdade e da comunicação, sendo que a liberdade de expressão aparece como potência de agir do humano. No plano social as várias redes de conversações onde emergem a cultura faz com que haja a pluralidade de opinião, culturas. Quanto mais liberdade de expressão, mais pluralidade e quanto mais pluralidade, mais liberdade de expressão. É um caminho circular e complexo. A liberdade de expressão atualmente entendida é um construir e não um dado posto. Na Grécia era o direito à palavra na Ágora. A revolução dos meios de comunicação faz essa liberdade passar pelo surgimento da imprensa escrita e as revoluções do século XVIII. O resultado é a positivação desta liberdade por meio de documentos internacionais e constitucionais. Uma segunda revolução é a tecnologia das ondas eletromagnética e o surgimento do rádio e a televisão, mais uma vez o Direito regula via sistema de outorgas e o instituto do serviço público. Constituições e construções jurisprudências americana, francesa e alemã trazem noções da liberdade de expressão sob a perspectiva do pluralismo. Na mesma linha, o sistema de proteção de direitos humanos europeu e americano o faz. O Brasil apoiado em sua constituição e em tratados internacionais tem um sistema de proteção que contempla a liberdade de expressão e o pluralismo, porém ainda convive com problemáticas para a efetivação deste direito. Os desafios são muitos, porque agora surge uma terceira revolução do meio com a chegada da internet, os agentes do mercado. Mas qualquer proposta deve passar pela não divisibilidade da esfera social e individual. O Direito pode regular e efetivar cada vez mais tal liberdade configurando, sancionando, premiando e ofertando subsídios para efetivação da liberdade de expressão

Le blasphème est, depuis ses origines, un concept politique qui n’intéresse le religieux que marginalement. Jérusalem, Athènes, Rome, les morts fondatrices de Socrate et de Jésus-Christ, tous deux condamnés à la peine capitale, le premier pour impiété, le second pour blasphème, ainsi que la Torah, l’Évangile et le Coran témoignent que l’histoire de l’interdiction du blasphème est avant tout celle de sa fonction politique, qui est d’éliminer celui qui nuit à la communauté. Avec l’apparition de la modernité, l’invention de la tolérance et la proclamation de la liberté d’expression comme droit fondamental, le blasphème aurait dû disparaître. Il s’est en fait transformé. De Salman Rushdie à Charlie Hebdo, il est même devenu l’enjeu de crises planétaires répétées. Dans le monde musulman, son interdiction est aujourd’hui un outil redoutable de répression des minorités au niveau national et d’accélération de choc des civilisations au niveau international. À ce défi, l’Europe prétend répondre par la liberté d’expression, bien que la majorité des pays occidentaux continue à condamner le blasphème, compris non plus comme une offense à Dieu, mais aux croyants, signe d’une sécularisation dévoyée. C’est particulièrement le cas en France où la prolifération des lois venant limiter la liberté d’expression a fini par réinstaurer un délit de blasphème tout en multipliant les délits d’opinion. / Blasphemy is since the beginning of its recorded history not only a religious but also a political concept. Jerusalem, Athens, Rome, the founding deaths of Socrates and Jesus Christ, both sentenced to death, the first for impiety, the second for blasphemy, but also the Torah, the Gospel and the Quran show that the prohibition of blasphemy has above all a political function, which is to eliminate whoever harms the community. With modernity, the invention of tolerance and the proclamation of freedom of expression as a fundamental right, blasphemy should have disappeared. Instead, it metamorphosed. From Salman Rushdie to Charlie Hebdo, it became a worldwide issue. In the Muslim world, its prohibition has become a fearsome tool of repression of religious minorities on a national level and of acceleration of a clash of civilizations on an international level. To face this challenge, Europe pretends to answer with freedom of expression, but the majority of European countries still forbid blasphemy, understood no more as an offense to God but an offense to the believers, which is the sign of a rogue secularization. This is especially true in France where the proliferation of laws limiting freedom of expression ended up in a re-introduction of the prohibition of blasphemy and more generally of crimes of opinion.

As the title indicates, this three-essay dissertation explores the relations between value pluralism and liberal democracy. The first essay, “Negative versus Positive Freedom: Making Sense of the Dichotomy,” starts with the puzzling appeal of the negative-versus-positive-freedom dichotomy. Why has this distinction, despite forceful criticisms against it, continued to dominate mainstream discourses on freedom in contemporary political theory? Does it grasp something fundamental about the phenomenology of freedom? In this essay I examine four main approaches to making sense of the appeal of this dichotomy, and the challenges they each face. Both the conventional, naive contrast between “freedom from” and “freedom to,” and the revisionist strategy to distinguish between the “opportunity-concept” and the “exercise-concept” of freedom, upon close scrutiny, fail to survive MacCallum’s triadic argument against all dichotomous views on the concept of freedom. The third account, which reduce the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom to the divide between “phenomenal” and “nounemal” conceptions of the self, or of the range of preventing conditions, is both interpretively misleading and conceptually uninformative, as I illustrate by using Berlin’s discussion on self-abnegation as an example. In the fourth place, I analyze why both the historical bifurcation account that take the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom as merely genealogical, on the one hand, and the republican critique of it based on the presumably sublating conception of non-domination, on the other hand, are unsatisfying. Finally, I argue that grounding the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom on the idea of value pluralism avoids the pitfalls of those approaches examined. According to this account, the dichotomized instantiation of freedom is necessary insofar as we live not in isolation but with other moral agents. The “negative” freedom instantiated in the access to an extensive sphere of permissible choices and actions, and the “positive” freedom instantiated in the access to collective decision-making and democratic self-government, reflect two equally genuine yet incommensurable modes of freedom as a basic value. Many believe that value pluralism and liberalism are ultimately incompatible, however, since liberalism implies the prioritization of liberal values over other basic values, which is contradictory to the value pluralist idea that all basic values are equally genuine and incommensurable. The next two essays take up this challenge, arguing on the contrary that a persuasively elaborated version of value pluralism is not only compatible with liberal commitments, but can also provide distinctive grounds for liberal democracy and have significant political implications. In the second essay, “Value Pluralism and Its Compatibility with Liberalism,” I explain the methodology of my argument, elaborate three key concepts underlying value pluralism – value objectivity, value incompatibility, and value incommensurability – and then develop an account of modal heterogeneity of value instantiation, as opposed to valuative hierarchy. Whereas valuative hierarchy is in tension with value incommensurability, the idea of modal heterogeneity allows that different values have different modes of instantiation that warrant differentiated prioritization of certain values in relevant practical contexts, without implying anything about the comparative moral worth of relevant values. I use a mathematical analogy to illustrate the modal heterogeneity of value instantiation, as well as how we may accord freedom a special institutional role on the basis of its modal specialty vis-à-vis other basic values, rendering liberalism compatible with value pluralism. The argument is completed in the third essay, “Value Pluralism, Liberal Democracy, and Political Judgment,” where I compare my account based on the idea of modal heterogeneity, developed in the second essay, with three existing versions of liberal pluralism. Whereas Berlin’s argument from choice, Crowder’s proposal of pluralist virtues, and Galston’s presumption of expressive liberty all fail to pass either the Jump Test or the Trump Test, my modal account overcomes these two basic difficulties faced by liberal pluralism. The rest of the essay discusses three main political implications of the modal account of liberal pluralism. First, it helps us better understand the nature of demarcating and overstepping the so-called “frontiers” of a “negative” area of permissible choices and actions free from interference, or put another way, of balancing the protection of civil liberties and rights, on the one hand, with the procurement of certain important social goods through policies, on the other hand. Second, the modal account entails the dichotomization argument for democracy, and as a consequence supports not only liberalism, but liberal democracy. Recognizing the tension between negative and positive modes of freedom as immanent to the dynamic of liberal democracy, value pluralists nonetheless have reason to cherish, rather than to decry, such dynamic. Third, the modal account also suggests we appreciate the contentious yet indispensible role of political judgment in democratic life, and attend to the normative theorizing of its implications. On the one hand, it recommends institutional designs that diversify forms of political decision-making, such as by introducing adequate mechanisms of checks and balances and establishing relevant sites of expertise. On the other hand, it calls for the appreciation of the ideal of statespersonship, even in a liberal democratic society.

Avaliar a forma como interagem o chamado poder diretivo do empregador e a liberdade de expressão do empregado é o desafio que se empreende neste trabalho. Em certa medida, a eleição do tema já revela a adesão deste mestrando à corrente doutrinária que concebe existência de direitos fundamentais trabalhistas, específicos e inespecíficos, no âmbito e no universo das relações de trabalho, no caso do presente estudo, na relação de emprego. Para atingir o escopo proposto quando da escolha do tema, optamos pelo desenvolvimento de um trabalho em 6 capítulos, com análises e estudos, alguns de menor extensão, dado o caráter de coadjuvância com o tema principal, outros de maior extensão, dada a centralidade com a tarefa abraçada. Iniciamos nosso estudo com breves considerações históricas acerca do fenômeno do poder, cuidando do enquadramento conceitual e com abordagem de sua evolução a partir da antiguidade até o sistema capitalista, berço do direito do trabalho (1º Capítulo). Superada a abordagem do poder, genericamente considerado, debruçamos nossa atenção para a análise do poder diretivo de modo mais particular. E aqui tratamos das questões do conceito, fundamento legal e doutrinário, formas de expressão e limitações incidentes (2º Capítulo). O trabalho prossegue e com o propósito de estabelecer uma conexão com o trecho anterior do estudo, dirigimos a análise para a verificação dos direitos e deveres de empregado e empregador para que assim se evidencie potencialidades e limites tanto do poder diretivo do empregador, quanto dos direitos fundamentais do empregado, dentre os quais a liberdade de expressão (3º Capítulo). A sequencia do trabalho contém os esforços para o correto posicionamento da liberdade de expressão dentro do universo dos direitos humanos ou do homem, direitos fundamentais e direitos da personalidade. E com o intuito de melhor posicionar a liberdade de expressão, fazemos uma avaliação dentro do contexto do direito nacional e internacional, bem como abordamos, ainda que com pouca profundidade, a questão das gerações ou dimensões dos direitos fundamentais (4º Capítulo). O trato da liberdade de expressão tematiza o penúltimo capitulo e nele envidamos esforços para localizar em que esfera da existência do trabalhador subordinado, íntima, privada ou pessoal, ou no âmbito de todas estas, está a liberdade de expressão. Neste mesmo capítulo, devotamos nossa análise para a questão do plano de eficácia do direito fundamental à liberdade de expressão inclusive com o debate com a abordagem das formas, objeções, limites da liberdade de expressão e sobretudo com uma análise do direito em debate no contexto da relação de emprego, inclusive no que toca ao chamado direito de crítica. Encerramos esse capitulo com considerações acerca de medidas de proteção em caso de dispensa discriminatória. Na conclusão registramos nossas ponderações. / Assess how named steering power of the employer interacts and the employee\'s freedom of expression is the challenge that this work is undertaken. To some extent, the election theme already reveals the accession of the current Master\'s doctrinal conceives existence of fundamental labor, specific and nonspecific, and within the universe of labor relations in the case of this study, the employment relationship. To achieve the proposed scope when choosing the theme, we opted for the development of a work in 6 chapters, with analyzes and studies, some less extensive, given the character of co-acting with the main subject, other larger extent, given the centrality and embraced the task. We begin our study with brief historical considerations about the phenomenon of power, taking care of the conceptual framework and approach of its evolution from antiquity to the capitalist system, the cradle of labor law (Chapter 1). Approach to overcome the power, generally considered, worked through our attention to the analysis of power steering more particular. And here we treat the issues of concept, doctrinal and legal basis, forms of expression and limitations incidents (Chapter 2). The work continues in order to establish a connection with the earliest part of the study, headed analysis to verify the rights and duties of employee and employer so that if evidence of both potential and limits of the directive power of the employer, as rights key employee, among which the freedom of expression (Chapter 3). The sequence of this work includes efforts to the correct positioning of freedom of expression within the universe of human rights or of man, fundamental rights and personality rights. And in order to better position the freedom of speech, we make an assessment within the context of national and international law, as well as approach, albeit with little depth, the issue of generational dimensions or fundamental rights (Chapter 4). The tract of freedom of expression lead the penultimate chapter and we strive to find it in that sphere of existence of subordinate worker, intimate, private or personal, or under all these, is the freedom of expression. In this same chapter, we devote our analysis to the question of plan effectiveness of the fundamental right to freedom of expression and ended the debate with the approach of the ways, objections, limits of freedom of expression and especially the analysis of law in the context of the debate employment relationship, including with regard to the so-called right of criticism. In conclusion we recorded our weightings.

Under the auspices of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights the right to freedom of expression is said to be held by everyone and to include the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority, subject to the limitation clauses outlined in Article 10(2). Whilst the text of Article 10 therefore makes no explicit reference to specifically artistic expression, the European Court of Human Rights has, in its interpretation of ‘information and ideas’, nevertheless accepted that artistic expression does indeed fall within the ambit of Article 10’s protection of freedom of expression. However, despite the Court recognising artistic expression as a form of expression within the framework of Article 10, conclusions reached in the early case law concerning the issue of controversial artworks would appear to suggest the judicial creation of an implicit hierarchy of expression under which artistic expression is seen to enjoy a relatively low level of protection. Given the non-differentiated articulation of the right to freedom of expression enounced in the text of Article 10, the creation of such a hierarchy of expression is therefore a cause for doctrinal concern. In seeking to assess this misnomer the thesis’ analysis of the treatment of artistic expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights may be distilled in to two component parts. Firstly, a theoretical basis will be established from which artistic expression may be located within the context of the discourse pertaining to freedom of expression more generally. Having confirmed that, whilst of a distinctive, sui generis nature, artistic expression may indeed constitute ‘expression’ for the purposes of freedom of expression doctrine the second part of the thesis will examine the particular question of artistic expression’s treatment under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.