To be able to research the chain of development and its causes within military doctrines you need to describe the change and categorize it to make it understandable. This essays intent is to categorize a phenomenon within the Swedish doctrine to make it available for further research about doctrinal development. The categories are found in two of the great theorists on guerrilla warfare due to the subjects’ resemblance to guerrilla tactics and its means. The phenomenon that is to be researched is directly translated as “the free war” which basically means the use of irregular warfare behind the enemy lines. The description of “the free war”, by whom and when it is used, are the factors that have changed during the second half of the 20th century, and have therefore been placed into different categories. Before 1982 “the free war” was planned in advance and used as a complement to the regular forces and is conducted by specially chosen or educated people. From 1982 and foreword “the free war” has been described as a last resort if you have been cut off from your own forces. In this last definition of “the free war” everyone are supposed to be able to conduct the irregular tactics used behind enemy lines. The conclusion from this essay is that there has been a change within the Swedish doctrine and is therefore a subject for further research on doctrinal development within the Swedish armed forces. In this way this paper will contribute to the debate on doctrinal development.

Det fria kriget är ett doktrinärt begrepp som beskriver hur svaga avskurna reguljära förband ska genomföra sin krigföring. Det finns ingen entydig teori som kan förklara vad som leder till framgång i denna form av krigföring då den teoretiskt ligger mellan forskningsområdena landkrigföring och små krig. Denna teoriutvecklande uppsats gör en ansats att från land- och gerillakrigföringsteorier utveckla en teori för att förklara framgångsfaktorer för det fria kriget. Teoriutvecklingen sker genom att en hypotes tas fram genom en hypotetisk-deduktiv metod. Hypotesen operationaliseras och prövas i en tvåfallstudie. Prövningen leder till en förfinad hypotes som kan anses vara en normativ teori som förklarar hur framgång i det fria kriget kan nås. Teorin för att förklara ett framgångsrikt förande av fria kriget: Genom att utsätta motståndaren för ett taktiskt dilemma med ett hot på djupet, kan tid skapas för den egna strategiska nivån genom motståndarens kraftsplittring eller kulmination. Indirekt metod används för att kompensera för asymmetrin i styrkeförhållanden. Genom att slå mot identifierade svaga delar och kommunikationer skapas möjligheter till att nå lokal överlägsenhet. Dessa svaga delar påverkar motståndarens förmåga till krigföring och därmed kan tid skapas på den strategiska nivån. Terrängens möjlighet för att ge skydd och uthållighet samt dess förutsättningar för den svage att kompensera asymmetrin är avgörande för det avskurna förbandets uthållighet. Genom att anpassa förbandet och styra med uppdragstaktik kan sannolikt leda till framgång i det fria kriget. Denna teori ger en förklaring till framgång men behöver ytterligare prövning då delar av förklaringen kan ligga i för uppsatsen avgränsade områden.

One of the least explored areas in the field of military science pertains to preparations for resistance against occupation, known as Stay-Behind operations. This study examines the potential benefits that Stay-Behind operations could bring in the High North, which is identified as a weak area by NATO. Drawing on Colin Gray's theoretical framework on the strategic utility of special operations, the study analyzes the contributions of Stay-Behind activities. The study demonstrates the potential for achieving certain advantages in economy of force and the creation of operational flexibility through prearranged Stay-Behind operations during peacetime. Additionally, it highlights the challenge posed by the lack of an open academic discussion due to the subject's confidentiality, which could hinder the planning and implementation of Stay-Behind operations. Furthermore, the study identifies the need for clearer coordination and unified command in combat operations within occupied areas to counteract direct and/or indirect fragmentation of resources.

In the 1940s, Sweden adopted a policy known as Det fria kriget (approximately translated to The Free War) which was a conceptualization of a war in which its homeland had suffered a major invasion by a malignant and far stronger opponent. Det fria kriget remains, to this day, mostly a set of instructions outlining how the military were to reorganize itself, at that point, to uphold the nations military resilience. This paper compares, contrasts, and discusses established conceptualizations of guerrilla warfare along the traditions of Sun Tzu, Lenin, Mao, and Che Guevara and concludes that Det fria kriget is in fact a conceptualization of Swedish guerrilla warfare. This paper calls to action a deeper understanding of the tradition and how it might have changed up until today, if it is to serve the nation’s interests come tomorrow as well.