Denna uppsats syftar till att vara ett bidrag till den samtida debatten kring teorin om rättfärdiga krig. I uppsatsen utmanas rådande föreställningar om rättfärdiga krig, i synnerhet idén om att endast suveräna stater utgör legitima auktoriteter. Uppsatsen använder Hizbollah som fallstudie och författaren argumenterar för att rörelsens enorma popularitet och de facto kontroll över stora områden gjort Hizbollah till en legitim härskare. Därmed bör Hizbollah, trots att rörelsen är en icke-statlig aktör i Libanon, betraktas som en legitim auktoritet som kan utkämpa rättfärdiga krig. / This essay aims to be a contribution to the contemporary debate on the “Just War Theory” in a way that challenges traditional concepts of the theory, especially the idea that only sovereign states constitutes legitimate authorities. Using Hezbollah as a case study, the author argues that the organization’s enormous popularity and de facto control over considerable parts of Lebanon makes Hezbollah a legitimate ruler of its territory. Consequently Hezbollah, despite being a non-state actor, should be regarded as a legitimate authority and thus capable of fighting just wars.

O modelo consociativo de democracia parlamentar reflete a necessidade de prevenção de conflitos comunais em sociedades segmentadas e visa proporcionar-lhes estabilidade democrática. O Líbano e suas 18 seitas oficiais foi considerado por Arend Lijphart como um caso de sociedade multiétnica profundamente dividida por clivagens sobrepostas, país no qual o consociativismo e a capacidade de acomodação das elites seriam viáveis. No entanto, o país tem enfrentado rupturas institucionais constantes e intensificação de tensões sectárias mesmo após o fim da guerra civil (1975-1990). As crises de governança em 2005 e 2008, o vácuo presidencial de Maio de 2014 à Outubro de 2016 e as persistentes crises de energia, água e lixo são exemplos de tais eventos. Além disso, o Líbano tem um Estado nação frágil e inoperante, abrindo uma lacuna em termos de defesa militar, promoção de serviços sociais e provisão de bens públicos. Ao mesmo tempo, contudo, as crises sugerem não demonstrações de falta de governança, mas ajustes de representação para inclusão de elites não tradicionais no poder (como é o caso da xiita e sua obtenção do poder de veto através da figura do Hezbollah em 2008). E, sobretudo, o sistema confessional teve continuidade histórica significativa ao longo dos séculos XX e XXI. Em razão desta falta de consenso na literatura, será objetivo do presente trabalho indicar e refletir sobre os limites, decorrências e contribuições do consociativismo à realidade libanesa em sua modalidade confessional. Através do estudo de caso proposto apontaremos de que modo, de forma problemática, falta na literatura consociativa o entendimento de que a institucionalização rigorosa das diferenças religiosas não promove mais democracia e representatividade, mas, ao contrário, enfraquece o Estado nacional e engendra práticas de clientelismo sectário. Os resultados obtidos reforçam a necessidade de revisão teórica do modelo de Lijphart de modo a afastar do mesmo arranjos consociativos altamente institucionalizados tais como os do tipo confessional. Na medida em que tal prescrição está ausente na teoria consociativa clássica, identificamos uma anomalia no modelo original de Lijphart que precisa ser revista e sanada. / The consociational model of parliamentary democracy reflects the need to prevent communal conflicts in segmented societies and aims to provide them with democratic stability. Lebanon and its 18 official sects was considered by Arend Lijphart as a case of multi-ethnic and deeply divided society, a country where consociationalism and elites\' compromising would be feasible. However, the country has been facing constant institutional disruption and intensification of sectarian tensions even after the end of the civil war (1975-1990). Governance crisis in 2005 and 2008, presidential vacuum from May 2014 to October 2016 and the persistent energy, water and waste disposal crisis are examples of such events. In addition, Lebanon has a fragile and ineffective nation state, deficient in terms of its military defense, promotion of social services and provision of public goods. At the same time, however, these crisis suggest not lack of governance demonstrations, but representation and power adjustments to include non-traditional elites (as it is the case for the Shia sect and its veto power obtainment through Hezbollah in 2008). Utmost, the confessional system has had significant historical continuity throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Due to the literatures lack of consensus revolving this issue, the present work intends to present and reflect over consociativisms limits, consequences and contributions to the Lebanese reality in its confessional form. Through the here proposed case study, it will be problematically pointed out that the consociational literature misses the point by not understanding that the rigorous institutionalization of religious differences does not promote more democracy and representation; but, rather, weakens the national state and engenders clientelist sectarianism. The results obtained reinforce the need for Lijpharts model theoretical revision in order to except from it highly institutionalized consociational arrangements (such as the confessional one). To the extent that such prescription is absent in classic consociational theory, we have identified an anomaly in Lijpharts original model that needs to be reviewed and amended.

O modelo consociativo de democracia parlamentar reflete a necessidade de prevenção de conflitos comunais em sociedades segmentadas e visa proporcionar-lhes estabilidade democrática. O Líbano e suas 18 seitas oficiais foi considerado por Arend Lijphart como um caso de sociedade multiétnica profundamente dividida por clivagens sobrepostas, país no qual o consociativismo e a capacidade de acomodação das elites seriam viáveis. No entanto, o país tem enfrentado rupturas institucionais constantes e intensificação de tensões sectárias mesmo após o fim da guerra civil (1975-1990). As crises de governança em 2005 e 2008, o vácuo presidencial de Maio de 2014 à Outubro de 2016 e as persistentes crises de energia, água e lixo são exemplos de tais eventos. Além disso, o Líbano tem um Estado nação frágil e inoperante, abrindo uma lacuna em termos de defesa militar, promoção de serviços sociais e provisão de bens públicos. Ao mesmo tempo, contudo, as crises sugerem não demonstrações de falta de governança, mas ajustes de representação para inclusão de elites não tradicionais no poder (como é o caso da xiita e sua obtenção do poder de veto através da figura do Hezbollah em 2008). E, sobretudo, o sistema confessional teve continuidade histórica significativa ao longo dos séculos XX e XXI. Em razão desta falta de consenso na literatura, será objetivo do presente trabalho indicar e refletir sobre os limites, decorrências e contribuições do consociativismo à realidade libanesa em sua modalidade confessional. Através do estudo de caso proposto apontaremos de que modo, de forma problemática, falta na literatura consociativa o entendimento de que a institucionalização rigorosa das diferenças religiosas não promove mais democracia e representatividade, mas, ao contrário, enfraquece o Estado nacional e engendra práticas de clientelismo sectário. Os resultados obtidos reforçam a necessidade de revisão teórica do modelo de Lijphart de modo a afastar do mesmo arranjos consociativos altamente institucionalizados tais como os do tipo confessional. Na medida em que tal prescrição está ausente na teoria consociativa clássica, identificamos uma anomalia no modelo original de Lijphart que precisa ser revista e sanada. / The consociational model of parliamentary democracy reflects the need to prevent communal conflicts in segmented societies and aims to provide them with democratic stability. Lebanon and its 18 official sects was considered by Arend Lijphart as a case of multi-ethnic and deeply divided society, a country where consociationalism and elites\' compromising would be feasible. However, the country has been facing constant institutional disruption and intensification of sectarian tensions even after the end of the civil war (1975-1990). Governance crisis in 2005 and 2008, presidential vacuum from May 2014 to October 2016 and the persistent energy, water and waste disposal crisis are examples of such events. In addition, Lebanon has a fragile and ineffective nation state, deficient in terms of its military defense, promotion of social services and provision of public goods. At the same time, however, these crisis suggest not lack of governance demonstrations, but representation and power adjustments to include non-traditional elites (as it is the case for the Shia sect and its veto power obtainment through Hezbollah in 2008). Utmost, the confessional system has had significant historical continuity throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Due to the literatures lack of consensus revolving this issue, the present work intends to present and reflect over consociativisms limits, consequences and contributions to the Lebanese reality in its confessional form. Through the here proposed case study, it will be problematically pointed out that the consociational literature misses the point by not understanding that the rigorous institutionalization of religious differences does not promote more democracy and representation; but, rather, weakens the national state and engenders clientelist sectarianism. The results obtained reinforce the need for Lijpharts model theoretical revision in order to except from it highly institutionalized consociational arrangements (such as the confessional one). To the extent that such prescription is absent in classic consociational theory, we have identified an anomaly in Lijpharts original model that needs to be reviewed and amended.

<p>I uppsatsen som följer har jag använt mig av David Galulas COIN teori. Jag har sedan använt den teorin och analyserat kriget mellan Israel och Libanon 2006. Kriget blev känt som ett misslyckande ur israelisk synpunkt, då de inte lyckades att besegra Hezbollah eller stoppa deras raketskjutningar in i Israel. Detta trots att de har den mest högteknologiska armen i mellanöstern och hade luftoperativkontroll. I denna uppsats så har jag fört ett resonemang för att svara på frågeställningen: Går Galulas teorier att använda mot en organiserad motståndare som Hezbollah? Efter att ha skrivit denna uppsats så har jag inte kommit fram till ett absolut svar, men är personligen övertygad om att det går. I fallet Hezbollah är det väldigt problematiskt i och med att de var så väl förberedda på att det skulle bli krig. Det faktum att Israel dessutom hade skurit ner på sitt försvar och inte hade utbildat sina soldater och chefer inför denna typ av krig gjorde att de inte kunde strida på ett effektivt sätt. För att Israel skulle ha lyckats vinna, tror jag att en större markoperation hade varit nödvändig då Hezbollah var så väl förberedda. Detta är i linje med det första steget i Galulas COIN teori där man med truppnärvaro strävar efter att separera befolkningen från insurgenterna i detta fall Hezbollah.</p> / <p>In the essay that follows I have used David Galulas COIN theory. I have then used Galulas theory and analyzed the war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006. The war from the Israeli point of view was a failure, as they failed to defeat Hezbollah and stop their rockets from firing into Israel. Despite the facts that the Israel had the most technologically advanced army in the Middle East and that they had air superiority in the area. In this essay I have discussed the following question: Are Galulas theories usable against an opponent like Hezbollah? After having written this essay, I have not beenable to conclude a definite answer, however I am convinced that it is possible. The reason for the Israeli failure was the fact that the Hezbollah were so well prepared for war. Whereas the Israeli forces were ill-prepared because of a substantial decrease in numbers compared to earlier years, and because the Israeli soldiers and officers were not trained for this type of war. In my opinion, the Israeli forces would have needed to focus much more on ground operations because the Hezbollah were so well prepared. This is exactly what stage one in Galulas COIN theory advises, where through military presence, separate the civilian population from the insurgents.</p>

I uppsatsen som följer har jag använt mig av David Galulas COIN teori. Jag har sedan använt den teorin och analyserat kriget mellan Israel och Libanon 2006. Kriget blev känt som ett misslyckande ur israelisk synpunkt, då de inte lyckades att besegra Hezbollah eller stoppa deras raketskjutningar in i Israel. Detta trots att de har den mest högteknologiska armen i mellanöstern och hade luftoperativkontroll. I denna uppsats så har jag fört ett resonemang för att svara på frågeställningen: Går Galulas teorier att använda mot en organiserad motståndare som Hezbollah? Efter att ha skrivit denna uppsats så har jag inte kommit fram till ett absolut svar, men är personligen övertygad om att det går. I fallet Hezbollah är det väldigt problematiskt i och med att de var så väl förberedda på att det skulle bli krig. Det faktum att Israel dessutom hade skurit ner på sitt försvar och inte hade utbildat sina soldater och chefer inför denna typ av krig gjorde att de inte kunde strida på ett effektivt sätt. För att Israel skulle ha lyckats vinna, tror jag att en större markoperation hade varit nödvändig då Hezbollah var så väl förberedda. Detta är i linje med det första steget i Galulas COIN teori där man med truppnärvaro strävar efter att separera befolkningen från insurgenterna i detta fall Hezbollah. / In the essay that follows I have used David Galulas COIN theory. I have then used Galulas theory and analyzed the war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006. The war from the Israeli point of view was a failure, as they failed to defeat Hezbollah and stop their rockets from firing into Israel. Despite the facts that the Israel had the most technologically advanced army in the Middle East and that they had air superiority in the area. In this essay I have discussed the following question: Are Galulas theories usable against an opponent like Hezbollah? After having written this essay, I have not beenable to conclude a definite answer, however I am convinced that it is possible. The reason for the Israeli failure was the fact that the Hezbollah were so well prepared for war. Whereas the Israeli forces were ill-prepared because of a substantial decrease in numbers compared to earlier years, and because the Israeli soldiers and officers were not trained for this type of war. In my opinion, the Israeli forces would have needed to focus much more on ground operations because the Hezbollah were so well prepared. This is exactly what stage one in Galulas COIN theory advises, where through military presence, separate the civilian population from the insurgents.

<p>ABSTRACT</p><p>Essay in Political Science, Advanced Continuation Course, 61-80 credits, by Jonas Nilsson</p><p>”The democratic islamist? - a study of three islamist movements and their potential role in a</p><p>democratization process”</p><p>Supervisor: Jonas Linde</p><p>The purpose of this work has been to explain to what extent islamist movements can be said to be</p><p>bearers of democratic values and if they have a role to play in future democratization processes. The</p><p>purpose of this work is also to examine the democratic views of the different islamist movements and</p><p>to compare them with each other in an effort to find a specific islamist definition of democracy.</p><p>The essay is a qualitative analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Front Islamique du Salut in</p><p>Algeria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The analytical framework is based on the political institutions</p><p>included in Robert A. Dahl polyarchial democracy. The institutions provided by the polyarchial</p><p>model is used to define the islamist movements stand on democracy which is defined by three different</p><p>standpoints. The movements can either accept, decline or modify the various institutions and the</p><p>results from the analysis helps us to evaluate the future role of islamist movements in the</p><p>democratization process. The results also provides the opportunity to define a version of democracy</p><p>specific for the islamist movements. The conclusion I have made is that the islamist movements</p><p>included in the study have a part to play in a future democratization process. They have shown that</p><p>their commitment to the democratic ideals defined by Dahl is quite extensive and that they as</p><p>separate movements have developed a more advanced view of the relationship between islam and</p><p>democracy as a social order. Though democratic at first glance there are signs that the islamists</p><p>standpoint on democracy comes with certain reservations. The most significant of these</p><p>reservarvations is the islamists regard of islam as an overarching ideology and the subordinate role</p><p>of man made political systems such as democracy. However, the islamists have found ways to handle</p><p>this problem and points out the inherent democratic values in islam and thereby tries to circumvent</p><p>the problematic relationship between democracy and religion. The study also concludes that we can</p><p>define the islamist version of democracy as a specific form of democracy, a value-based participatory</p><p>democracy. This conclusion is based on the islamist emphasis on the importance of ethics, decency</p><p>and virtue in a society, at the same time as they also emphasize the need for legitimacy provided by</p><p>the people through free, fair and frequent elections.</p>

Depuis les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, le galvaudage intensif du concept d’« islamisme » par les sphères médiatiques et politiques a eu pour effet de catégoriser de manière simpliste et illusoire des phénomènes sociaux très différents de par le monde, dans le registre du terrorisme. Dans ce contexte, le Hezbollah libanais -pourtant chiite et farouchement opposé à Al-Qaïda- a acquis un statut particulier dans la mesure où le Secrétariat d’Etat américain l’a désigné comme la principale menace terroriste dès 2002. Nous proposons ici une recherche casuistique sur le « Parti de Dieu ». Etude longitudinale retraçant l’évolution de ce mouvement milicien devenu parti politique, notre travail vise à mieux cerner ce « fait social » et à situer celui-ci au sein du vaste spectre des islams politiques. Nous synthétisons ici les phases de maturation idéologique que celui-ci a connues depuis son émergence et retraçons l’évolution structurelle de ce parti politique avant tout caractérisé par son projet de « société résistante ». Chacun de ces deux volets (idéologique et structurel) laisse entrevoir les interactions bilatérales qui se sont créées, dans la diachronie, entre le religieux et le politique au sein du Hezbollah, mais illustre surtout la soumission polymorphe de l’un comme de l’autre à la cause inébranlable de la résistance face à Israël. L’élément fondamentalement nouveau que nous apportons à la littérature scientifique spécialisée est une grille d’interprétation du cheminement global d’une grande partie de la communauté chiite du Liban. Celle-ci a pour point de départ le concept -initialement psychologique- de « résilience », et propose la transposition de ce dernier dans le champ sociopolitique. L’analyse qui en découle met en perspective l’« idéologie résiliente » et la « structure résiliente » que le Hezbollah a progressivement développées dans une optique stratégique.

Hur ska resultatet av ett krig mätas, på vilket sätt är det möjligt att opartiskt bedöma vem som vunnit eller förlorat. I många fall är resultatet uppenbart, ingen tvivlar t.ex. på att Storbritannien vann Falklandskriget, utfallet på slagfältet motsvarar uppfattning av vem som vann kriget. Men i många moderna krig är situationen en annan, utgången kan vara omtvistad, eller så är det svårt att uppfatta om kriget överhuvudtaget har avslutats. I uppsatsen används score-keeping teorin som är ett sätt att analysera resultatet av ett krig, vilken aktör vann? Fallet som analyseras är Libanonkri-get 2006 som utkämpades mellan Israel och Hizbollah och är intressant då resultatet dels är om-tvistat samt att det skedde mellan en stat och en organisation som är grupperad inom och verkar ifrån en annan stat. Uppsatsens syfte är därför att utifrån score-keeping teorin analysera Libanonkriget 2006. Den vetenskapliga frågan som skall besvaras är: Vilken aktör kan sägas ha vunnit Libanonkriget 2006 utifrån score-keeping teorin. Designen för undersökningen är en teorikonsumerande studie av Libanonkriget 2006 där av teorin givna variabler operationaliseras för att kunna ställas mot ett urval ur empirin. Undersökningens resultat visar att utifrån score-keeping teorin kan Hizbollah anses vara vinnare i Libanonkriget 2006. Vidare visar undersökningen på ett antal utmaningar med att tillämpa score-keeping teorin på Libanonkriget 2006 med hänsyn till den asymmetri som rådde mellan aktörerna. / How can the outcome of a war be measured, in what way is it possible to impartially determine who won or lost. In many cases the result is obvious, as there is no doubt that Great Britain won the Falklands war, the outcome on the battlefield was equivalent of the perception of who won the war. But in many modern wars the situation can be different, the outcome may be disputed, or it is even hard to understand if the war has finished at all. This essay is using score-keeping theory, which is a way to analyze the outcome of a war, who won? The case analyzed in this essay is the Lebanon war in 2006 which was fought between Israel and Hezbollah and is interesting because the result is both much-disputed and it was fought between a government and an organization that was deployed within and acting from another state. The purpose of this essay is therefore to analyze the 2006 Lebanon war by applying the score-keeping theory. The scientific question to be answered is: Which participant can be stated to have won the 2006 Lebanon war on the basis of score-keeping theory. The design of the study is a theory-consuming survey of the 2006 Lebanon war, where the given variables from the theory are operationalized to be set against a selection from the empirics. The survey´s result shows that according to the score-keeping theory Hezbollah is considered to have won in the 2006 Lebanon war. Furthermore, the survey shows a number of challenges in applying the score-keeping theory in the 2006 Lebanon war, given the asymmetry that prevailed between the participants.

This thesis analyses how Hezbollah has perceived Israel since its establishment. In this study it is argued that Israel is the main enemy of and source of hatred for Hezbollah. The references of this overall statement are the ideology and political, social and military history of Hezbollah. The armed struggle of Hezbollah against Israel started with the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon evolved into both a political participation with the continued armed militia in the period between 1982 to today. During this period, in addition to its armed conflict with Israel, Hezbollah came on the stage with social services for Lebanese society and political propaganda in Lebanese elections. The intersection point of these three identities is the endless encouragement of Hezbollah for a determined resistance against Israel. While on the one hand Hezbollah defines Israel to be the most dangerous threat for the world, in addition to being a prominent enemy for the Arab and Muslim community / on the other hand Israel regards Hezbollah to be the highest impact menace. Consequently, the thesis is finalized with outputs and predictions taking all historical and ideological aspects into concern.

This research identifies the conditions that contribute to the rise of durable state rivals that persist over time and do not attempt to overthrow the state. I use a case study of Hezbollah in Lebanon and find that a weak state, foreign state sponsorship, and local support contribute to the rise of durable state rivals. The same conditions that enable the rise of a durable state rival make it more difficult for a durable state rival to overthrow the state. Durable state rivals exist within state borders, possess a high level of social control over a community within the state, and challenge the authority and legitimacy of the state, but they do not attempt to overthrow the state.