ABSTRACT Essay in Political Science, Advanced Continuation Course, 61-80 credits, by Jonas Nilsson ”The democratic islamist? - a study of three islamist movements and their potential role in a democratization process” Supervisor: Jonas Linde The purpose of this work has been to explain to what extent islamist movements can be said to be bearers of democratic values and if they have a role to play in future democratization processes. The purpose of this work is also to examine the democratic views of the different islamist movements and to compare them with each other in an effort to find a specific islamist definition of democracy. The essay is a qualitative analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Front Islamique du Salut in Algeria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The analytical framework is based on the political institutions included in Robert A. Dahl polyarchial democracy. The institutions provided by the polyarchial model is used to define the islamist movements stand on democracy which is defined by three different standpoints. The movements can either accept, decline or modify the various institutions and the results from the analysis helps us to evaluate the future role of islamist movements in the democratization process. The results also provides the opportunity to define a version of democracy specific for the islamist movements. The conclusion I have made is that the islamist movements included in the study have a part to play in a future democratization process. They have shown that their commitment to the democratic ideals defined by Dahl is quite extensive and that they as separate movements have developed a more advanced view of the relationship between islam and democracy as a social order. Though democratic at first glance there are signs that the islamists standpoint on democracy comes with certain reservations. The most significant of these reservarvations is the islamists regard of islam as an overarching ideology and the subordinate role of man made political systems such as democracy. However, the islamists have found ways to handle this problem and points out the inherent democratic values in islam and thereby tries to circumvent the problematic relationship between democracy and religion. The study also concludes that we can define the islamist version of democracy as a specific form of democracy, a value-based participatory democracy. This conclusion is based on the islamist emphasis on the importance of ethics, decency and virtue in a society, at the same time as they also emphasize the need for legitimacy provided by the people through free, fair and frequent elections.

Tag-Eldeen, Y. 2020. Hezbollah as a Reconstruction Leader: Participatory Planning in the Rebuilding of Haret Hreik, Post-War 2006. Kulturgeografiska institutionen, Uppsatser, Uppsala universitet.   This paper assesses the politicized nature of reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of the Israeli-Lebanese July War of 2006. It illustrates the factors driving the polarized nature of Lebanese politics, as well as the reasons for which a faith-based non-governmental organization such as Hezbollah was able to take the leading role in the reconstruction of Haret Hreik, a southern suburb of Beirut. Through a literature review, the study will demonstrate that the power struggle to lead post-war reconstruction can be seen as a reflection of Lebanon’s internal political and religious divisions, often along sectarian lines, as well as a lack of democratic accountability and the retreat of the state. Finally, in examining the implications for participatory planning when faith-based, non-state actors serve as reconstruction leaders in a politicized post-war context, the study contributes to the literature on citizen participation, power in urban planning and non-state actors within neoliberal urban governance.    Keywords: participatory planning, Project Wa’d, neoliberalism, Hezbollah, post-war reconstruction

This thesis examines who the Israel Defense Forces use their English languageTwitter account to construct an image of Hezbollah online during times without violent conflict. The goal is to understand how this behavior fits within Israel’sPublic Diplomacy strategy. Using Critical Discourse Analysis to analyze tweets concerning Hezbollah between May 2020 and May 2021, I identify one maindriver of the adaptation of social media into the military’s public diplomacy toolkit: mediatization. Results show that the Israel Defense Forces has adopted Twitter as a communication channel outside the gatekeeper function and control of traditional media outlets, to share their Public Diplomacy message directly with foreign audiences – including their enemies, such as Hezbollah. I identify five main categories or intentions with which the Israel Defense Forces address Hezbollah on Twitter: 1) Remembrance, 2) Current Developments and Information, 3) Iraian Proxies 4) tweets mentioning Hezbollah directly and 5)tweets Shaming, Blaming or Calling-out Hezbollah or the international community and media on their approach to the group.

Nowadays, the theory of proxy warfare receives more and more attention. However, it is not an entirely new phenomenon. Recent conflicts in Syria and Yemen got proxy warfare to the forefront of academic and public interest. This thesis aims to describe the existing proxy relationships in the area of the Middle East and analyze those relations from the perspectives of an actor's motivation to forge such a relationship and management of the proxy. The principal-agent (p-a) analysis is the approach that allows us to do that. We apply this approach to three case studies. In the first case study, we analyze the principal-agent relationship between Iran and Hezbollah. In this relationship, we can observe a high alignment of interests, and therefore it should be a textbook example of the p-a relationship. In the second case study, we focus on the relationship between Israel and Hamas. However, it may seem like there is no possibility these two actors will cooperate in any sense. We described that if "declared interests" (ideology) are put aside, both principal and agent can find a common pragmatic interest enabling them to establish the p-a relationship. The third case study analyzes Hamas as a hybrid actor, suggesting that one agent (Hamas) can be in the principal- agent relationship with two hostile...

Le Hezbollah a été, et est toujours, une organisation sectaire impliquée dans un système politique où il est contraint de s’y imposer pour avoir un poids politique fort vis-à-vis d’autres acteurs sectaires en place. Lorsque le conflit avec Israël, un ennemi clairement reconnaissable selon des critères nationaux, linguistiques, ethniques et religieux, s’est intensifié contre la nation libanaise, le Hezbollah s’est auto-prétendu être le protecteur de la nation libanaise. La guerre civile syrienne est un conflit principalement entre Arabes et embourbé par le sectarisme, a une fois de plus donné au Hezbollah un ennemi clairement défini. Cependant, contrairement à Israël, les ennemis du Hezbollah sont désormais des Arabes sunnites, qui constituent également une importante minorité au Liban. Le conflit syrien a amené le Hezbollah à modifier radicalement sa politique étrangère et sa stratégie militaire pour faire face aux menaces émergentes dans son voisinage. Comment le Hezbollah a-t-il changé idéologiquement à la suite de la guerre civile syrienne ? La théorie de la sécurisation prédit que les élites utiliseront un petit problème de sécurité et le feront apparaître comme une menace importante pour la sécurité d’une société afin de concentrer les ressources et de gagner la confiance de la population. L’auteur suppose que le Hezbollah a permis de sécuriser le pays face à la menace posée par l’État islamique, comme il l’a fait avec Israël, transformant ainsi son idéologie pour être encore plus nationaliste qu’avant la guerre civile syrienne. Afin de tester cette théorie, un travail de terrain a été effectué au Liban afin de déterminer si le Hezbollah insistait sur son rôle dans la protection de la nation libanaise contre la menace de l’État islamique. Les conclusions de l’étude qualitative suggèrent que, alors que le secrétaire général du Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, défendait le rôle du Hezbollah dans la protection de la communauté imaginée libanaise contre la menace de l’État islamique, l’implication du Hezbollah en Syrie impliquait qu’il adhère plus à une idéologie nationaliste sectaire, comparée à ce qu’il l’avait fait contre Israël avant. De plus, le discours physique du Hezbollah continue de susciter le symbolisme islamiste universaliste. / Since its creation, Hezbollah has been a sectarian organization in a political system where it has been compelled to compete for power against other sectarian actors. However, at times when conflict with Israel escalated, an enemy that was clearly distinguishable via national, linguistic, ethnic, and religious criteria, Hezbollah often claimed to be the protector of the Lebanese nation. The Syrian Civil War, a conflict mainly between Arabs that is mired by sectarianism, has once again given Hezbollah a clearly defined enemy. However, unlike Israel, Hezbollah’s enemies are now Sunni Arabs, which is also a large minority within Lebanon. The Syrian conflict caused Hezbollah to dramatically alter its foreign policy and military strategy to confront such emerging threats within its neighbourhood. How has Hezbollah ideologically changed as a result of the Syrian Civil War? Securitization theory predicts that elites will use a small security issue and make it appear as a large security threat to a society in order to concentrate resources and gain the trust of the population. From being a sectarian actor in Lebanese politics, the author hypothesises that Hezbollah securitized the threat posed by the Islamic State to the Lebanese nation, as it has done with Israel, thus transforming its ideology to be even more nationalist than prior to the Syrian Civil War. In order to test this theory, fieldwork was conducted in Lebanon to observe if Hezbollah emphasized its role in protecting the Lebanese nation against the threat of the Islamic State. Findings from the qualitative study suggest that while Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah advocates Hezbollah’s role in protecting the Lebanese imagined community from the threat of the Islamic State, Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria has meant that it engages in a more sectarianized nationalist ideology than it previously did with Israel. Furthermore, Hezbollah’s physical discourse continues to elicit universalist Islamic symbolism.

La guerre de 33 jours qui s’est déroulée au Liban en juillet-août 2006 a donné lieu à une panoplie de questions sur la légitimité du recours à l’usage de la force dont a fait preuve Israël au nom de son droit à la légitime défense. La problématique découlait surtout du fait que l’attaque initiale ayant déclenché cette guerre, en date du 12 juillet 2006, avait été menée par le Hezbollah, un groupe armé dont le statut étatique ou non étatique demeure difficile à cerner. Cette étude propose d’analyser si le Liban doit être tenu responsable pour le comportement du Hezbollah. Un survol de l’histoire du Liban et de la création du Hezbollah illustrera que la relation existant entre ces deux acteurs est d’une rare complexité, faisant en sorte que le rôle du Hezbollah au Liban est contesté de toutes parts. Ce débat aura une incidence certaine sur la question à savoir si le comportement du Hezbollah est attribuable à l’État libanais. Une étude approfondie des règles internationales régissant l’acte « d’attribution », notion centrale au droit de la responsabilité internationale des États, démontrera que la détermination de la nature du lien existant entre un État et une entité dont le comportement est contesté est d’une importance fondamentale. Dans une ère où les acteurs non étatiques sont devenus omniprésents sur la scène internationale et dans le cas du Hezbollah au Liban – une milice armée opérant au sein d’un État particulièrement à souveraineté limitée – le concept de l’attribution lui-même deviendra peut-être obsolète. / The 33 days of war that took place in Lebanon in the months of July and August 2006 have given rise to a wide range of questions about the legality of Israel’s use of force on behalf of its so-called right to self-defence. The issue at stake is mostly the result of the fact that the attack which provoked the beginning of the hostilities, on 12 July 2006, was performed by Hezbollah, an armed group whose status as a State or non-State actor remains difficult to pinpoint. This study puts forward the analysis of whether Lebanon must be held accountable for Hezbollah’s actions. A review of the history of Lebanon and of Hezbollah’s creation illustrates that the relationship between these two actors is particularly complex and that Hezbollah’s status is still widely contested. This will directly influence the answer to the question of the attribution of Hezbollah’s actions to the Lebanese State. An in-depth study of the international principles regulating the act of « attribution », a pivotal concept in the international law on the responsibility of States, will reveal that discerning the nature of the link between a State and an entity whose actions are contested is extremely important. In today’s world, where non-State actors have a major role on the international scene, and in the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon – an armed militia operating from within a State with limited sovereignty – the notion of attribution itself might lose much of its significance.

Depuis la révolution iranienne de 1979, la diplomatie du régime en place semble marquer une rupture avec un anti-occidentalisme affiché –l’affrontement sous forme de guerre asymétrique avec les USA-, un antisionisme déclaré-les déclarations du Président Ahmadinejad- et le réveil de la vieille rivalité arabo-musulmane –Guerre Iran/Irak et perturbations par des fidèles iraniens du pèlerinage de la Mecque. Des moyens conventionnels et non conventionnel sont employés, du terrorisme avec de nombreux attentats, au pan chiisme avec l’utilisation à des fins politiques de communautés chiites dans les pays du Golfe, en passant par le chantage de la fermeture du détroit d’Ormuz où transitent près de 40 % du pétrole de la planète. Pourtant, cette attitude, si ambiguë et si violente par certains égards, semble n’est que le reflet de la continuité diplomatique, au regard de l’histoire de cette antique civilisation. La peur de l’éclatement interne, comme d’ailleurs celle des pays limitrophes, ont poussé ce pays depuis des millénaires à adopter une diplomatie de l’équilibre, dans une sorte de diplomatie des 4 points cardinaux. De plus, la Perse puis l’Iran a toujours possédé un désir hégémonique régional au niveau du Golfe persique, désir qui s’est traduit par de nombreuses guerres avec ses voisins, notamment avec l’ex Mésopotamie- L’Irak. Cela s’est traduit par la recherche d’une armée puissante, le nucléaire n’étant qu’un moyen pour affirmer sa grandeur ou diplomatie de la synthèse. Les négociations actuelles placent la République islamique d’Iran au centre du grand jeu asiatique où s’affrontent deux supers puissance en devenir, l’Inde et la Chine. Offrir la possibilité à l’Iran d’être reconnu comme un acteur civil du nucléaire la positionne comme une référence vis-à-vis des pays arabes : l’Iran devient , de facto , hégémonique Les ruptures ne sont en fait que des continuités liées aux valeurs perses, fondées sur l’indépendance, le désir de briller et de dominer. L’histoire, la religion, et l’Iranité sont la source de ces valeurs identitaires, terreau et fondement de la diplomatie de la République islamique d’Iran / Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, the diplomacy of the regime seems to mark a break with an anti-Westernism -l'affrontement displayed in the form of asymmetric war with the USA-a-Zionism declared presidential statements and waking Ahmadinejad- the old Arab-Muslim rivalry -Guerre Iran / Iraq and disturbances by Iranian faithful pilgrimage to Mecca. Conventional and non-conventional means are employed, with many terrorist attacks in Shia pan with the use for political purposes Shiite communities in the Gulf, through blackmail closing the Strait of Hormuz where handling approximately 40% of the oil on the planet. Yet this attitude, so ambiguous and so violent in some ways seem is but a reflection of the diplomatic continuity, in terms of the history of this ancient civilization. Fear of the internal breakdown, as also that of neighboring countries has driven this country for thousands of years to adopt a diplomacy of balance, in a kind of diplomacy 4 cardinal points. Furthermore, Persia and Iran has always had a regional hegemonic desire in the Persian Gulf, a desire that has led many wars with its neighbors, including the former Mésopotamie- Iraq. This was reflected by the search of a powerful army, nuclear being a means to assert its size or diplomacy synthesis. The current negotiations put the Islamic Republic of Iran at the center of the great Asian game where two great power clash in the making, India and China. Provide an opportunity for Iran to be recognized as a civil nuclear player in the position as vis-à-vis the reference of Arab countries: Iran becomes de facto hegemonic Ruptures are in fact only continuities related to Persian values, based on independence, the desire to shine and dominate. The history, religion, and Iranianness are the source of these identity values, soil and foundation of the diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Depuis 2004 et la résolution 1559 appelant au retrait syrien, le Liban est l’objet d’une action internationale extrêmement intense. En effet, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies (CSNU), face à la nouvelle configuration libanaise et levantine, a déployé des mécanismes issus de la sécurité collective afin de renforcer les attributs régaliens de l’État libanais. Le maintien de la paix, à travers le renforcement de la Force intérimaire des Nations unies au Liban (Finul), et la justice internationale, à travers la création du Tribunal spécial pour le Liban (TSL), sont les deux principaux outils visant à maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales par le prisme libanais. Dans les deux cas, la France, que ce soit militairement ou diplomatiquement, a été singulièrement active.Partant de ce constat, notre thèse vise, dans un premier temps, à déconstruire les mécanismes onusiens mis en oeuvre dans le cas libanais. Il s’agira, plus précisément,d’appréhender les différentes logiques qui sont constitutives de l’action du CSNU au Liban.Que ce soit en matière de maintien de la paix ou de justice internationale, les résolutions onusiennes et les organes qui en découlent font face à la souveraineté nationale et reflètent ainsi l’éternelle opposition entre les chapitres VI et VII de la Charte des Nations unies. Or,nous verrons que dans le cas libanais, le CSNU met en oeuvre une action hybride oscillant entre une logique coercitive et une logique consensuelle.Dans un second temps, notre thèse analysera la tension permanente de l’État libanais,qualifié de quasi-État, entre des dynamiques supra-étatiques traduites par les résolutions onusiennes et des dynamiques infra-étatiques incarnées par des acteurs communautaires et confessionnels, parfois transfrontaliers, et propres au système consociatif libanais. Nous tenterons alors de mesurer le degré de consolidation de deux des attributs régaliens du quasi-État libanais : la défense et la justice. Plus largement, il s’agira de s’interroger sur la possibilité pour l’action internationale, héritière du système westphalien, de remplir ses objectifs dans un environnement national et régional qui questionne plus que jamais la possibilité de maintenir et de conforter des États-nations.À l’aune de la régionalisation des conflits depuis 2004, et particulièrement depuis2011 au Levant, nous conclurons à la difficulté pour le CSNU de faire face à des États déliquescents ainsi qu’à des conflictualités d’interface qui non seulement sont en plein essor,mais qui sont par ailleurs de plus en plus liées les unes aux autres. / Since 2004 and Resolution 1559 demanding Syrian withdrawal, Lebanon has been subjected to an exceptionally intense international action. Facing a new configuration both in Lebanon and the Levant, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has indeed implemented mechanisms of collective security aimed at strengthening national sovereignty.Peace-keeping through United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) enhancement and international justice through the creation of the Special tribunal for Lebanon (STL) are the main tools for maintaining international peace and security in a Lebanese perspective. In both cases, France has been particularly active, be it militarily or diplomatically. Setting out from this premise, our thesis, to begin with, will aim at deconstructing the UN mechanisms implemented in the Lebanese case. More precisely, we shall try to apprehend the constitutive logics of the Security Council’s action in Lebanon. Whether in peace-keeping or in international justice, UN resolutions and the bodies created by them are faced with national sovereignty and, therefore, reflect the eternal opposition between chapters VI andVII of the United Nations Charter. Nevertheless, it will be shown that, in the Lebanese case,the UNSC has developed a hybrid action, fluctuating between coercion and consensus.Then, our thesis will show how the Lebanese State, which we will describe as a “quasi-State”, has to face an ongoing tension between supra-State dynamics expressed by UN resolutions and sub-State dynamics embodied by communitarian and religious representatives, sometimes cross-border, which are specific to the Lebanese consociationalist system. We shall later determine the extent to which two of the Lebanese quasi-State’s attributes, defense and security, have been consolidated by international action. More broadly, we will wonder whether international action, as an heir to the Westphalian system,can achieve its goal in a national and regional environment that challenges, today more than ever, the possibility to maintain and support nation-States. In a context of regionalization of conflicts since 2004, and especially since 2011 in the Levant, we shall come to the conclusion that the Security Council still has problems indealing with deliquescent States and with what we will call “interface conflicts”, which not only are booming, but also are more and more inextricably connected to one another.

La guerre de 33 jours qui s’est déroulée au Liban en juillet-août 2006 a donné lieu à une panoplie de questions sur la légitimité du recours à l’usage de la force dont a fait preuve Israël au nom de son droit à la légitime défense. La problématique découlait surtout du fait que l’attaque initiale ayant déclenché cette guerre, en date du 12 juillet 2006, avait été menée par le Hezbollah, un groupe armé dont le statut étatique ou non étatique demeure difficile à cerner. Cette étude propose d’analyser si le Liban doit être tenu responsable pour le comportement du Hezbollah. Un survol de l’histoire du Liban et de la création du Hezbollah illustrera que la relation existant entre ces deux acteurs est d’une rare complexité, faisant en sorte que le rôle du Hezbollah au Liban est contesté de toutes parts. Ce débat aura une incidence certaine sur la question à savoir si le comportement du Hezbollah est attribuable à l’État libanais. Une étude approfondie des règles internationales régissant l’acte « d’attribution », notion centrale au droit de la responsabilité internationale des États, démontrera que la détermination de la nature du lien existant entre un État et une entité dont le comportement est contesté est d’une importance fondamentale. Dans une ère où les acteurs non étatiques sont devenus omniprésents sur la scène internationale et dans le cas du Hezbollah au Liban – une milice armée opérant au sein d’un État particulièrement à souveraineté limitée – le concept de l’attribution lui-même deviendra peut-être obsolète. / The 33 days of war that took place in Lebanon in the months of July and August 2006 have given rise to a wide range of questions about the legality of Israel’s use of force on behalf of its so-called right to self-defence. The issue at stake is mostly the result of the fact that the attack which provoked the beginning of the hostilities, on 12 July 2006, was performed by Hezbollah, an armed group whose status as a State or non-State actor remains difficult to pinpoint. This study puts forward the analysis of whether Lebanon must be held accountable for Hezbollah’s actions. A review of the history of Lebanon and of Hezbollah’s creation illustrates that the relationship between these two actors is particularly complex and that Hezbollah’s status is still widely contested. This will directly influence the answer to the question of the attribution of Hezbollah’s actions to the Lebanese State. An in-depth study of the international principles regulating the act of « attribution », a pivotal concept in the international law on the responsibility of States, will reveal that discerning the nature of the link between a State and an entity whose actions are contested is extremely important. In today’s world, where non-State actors have a major role on the international scene, and in the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon – an armed militia operating from within a State with limited sovereignty – the notion of attribution itself might lose much of its significance.

This Master Thesis aims to present the current existential threats to Israeli security. Israel is a Jewish country in the middle of the Muslim region and her demise is wished by many involved parties. The Author describes sophisticated security systems of Israel, their efficiency and its unofficial nuclear program. From the state actors, it is Iran that has become the number one perceived threat in Israel thanks to its officials' rhetoric, its support towards terrorist organizations and its nuclear program. Israel is often involved in asymmetrical conflicts against non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah. The new extremist group Islamic State can also potentially pose a threat. Has Israel got reasons to worry about her existence? Has the Arab Spring brought about positives, negatives, or new possibilities? The Author aims to answer these questions.