Civil conflict is a complex multi-layered event. As an outcome it represents a product of both the structural framework in place and decision-making between the different elite groups. From a historical neoinstitutionalist perspective, this dissertation will provide an answer as to why some illiberal democracies fall into civil conflict while others do not. It argues that horizontally unequal elites bargain for (re)distribution of political participation, economic assets and social services through formal and informal institutions in order to expand the shares of the goods distributed. The presence of cleavages and grievances amongst groups are enhanced when exclusion through inefficient redistribution takes place; therefore, a bargain failure with the potential to activate violent means, implies a disagreement amongst the elites over the allocation of resources to different societal groups. Bargain failures occur in the presence of non-credible commitments and information asymmetries. Inefficiency in the distribution can also be captured through informal institutions in the form of patronage networks, a side of the transaction spectrum which has been understudied. The contribution of this thesis to the general debate stems from this acknowledgement and alleviates this by incorporating the full spectrum of institutions which operate effectively within illiberal democratic regimes. Patronage networks despite being a fundamental part of how politics is conducted in illiberal democratic regimes have surprisingly been neglected in the contemporary study of conflict onset. By conducting two-level fsQCA along a selection of 21 cases of illiberal democracy across 1980-2012 including cases of ethnic conflict onset, the analysis will show that distribution through patronage networks does play a role in triggering conflict or in aiding to control violence depending on the efficiency of the distribution across grieved groups. Further comparative analysis of a most likely and least likely case for cases of conflict (Thailand and India Bodo conflict) and peace (Namibia and Bolivia) reveals that the effect of the patronage mechanisms when redistributive, plays a larger role as an instrument of preventing violent disputes across horizontally unequal ethnic groups.

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This thesis considers the extent to which decentralisation in the Republic of Macedonia between 2005 and 2012 has been effective in reducing ethnic inequalities that exacerbate social divisions and can lead to conflict. Guided by the concept of horizontal inequalities, it identifies the factors which influenced the decision to devolve responsibilities to the municipalities after 2001. It examines the particular institutional design that Macedonian decentralisation took, and demonstrates how its use of local power-sharing mechanisms was intended to address the concerns of the Albanian and Macedonian communities simultaneously. This thesis takes an integrative approach to studying the political, administrative, and fiscal dimensions of decentralisation's implementation, and considers whether the reform has indeed contributed to the reduction of inequalities between Macedonia's ethnic groups. Where decentralisation's potential has not been reached, obstacles to its successful implementation are identified. While decentralisation alone may be unable to address all of the grievances raised by the Albanian community prior to 2001, this thesis argues that the reform has the potential to address many of the horizontal inequalities that were responsible for raising inter-ethnic tensions during the 1990s. However, decentralisation in Macedonia between 2005 and 2012 has only been partial, and advances in the administrative and political aspects of the reform have been undermined by limited progress in its fiscal dimension. Attempts to solve self-determination conflicts through decentralisation will fail if local self-governance exists only in form but not in substance.

This thesis explores the role of early development policies on the management of horizontal inequalities in Ghana and La Cote d'Ivoire. Using the wager between the first presidents of the two countries, this study charts the manner in which Horizontal Inequalities have been managed during three time periods: Independence, Structural Adjustment and Democratization.

This thesis considers the extent to which decentralisation in the Republic of Macedonia between 2005 and 2012 has been effective in reducing ethnic inequalities that exacerbate social divisions and can lead to conflict. Guided by the concept of horizontal inequalities, it identifies the factors which influenced the decision to devolve responsibilities to the municipalities after 2001. It examines the particular institutional design that Macedonian decentralisation took, and demonstrates how its use of local power-sharing mechanisms was intended to address the concerns of the Albanian and Macedonian communities simultaneously. This thesis takes an integrative approach to studying the political, administrative, and fiscal dimensions of decentralisation¿s implementation, and considers whether the reform has indeed contributed to the reduction of inequalities between Macedonia¿s ethnic groups. Where decentralisation¿s potential has not been reached, obstacles to its successful implementation are identified. While decentralisation alone may be unable to address all of the grievances raised by the Albanian community prior to 2001, this thesis argues that the reform has the potential to address many of the horizontal inequalities that were responsible for raising inter-ethnic tensions during the 1990s. However, decentralisation in Macedonia between 2005 and 2012 has only been partial, and advances in the administrative and political aspects of the reform have been undermined by limited progress in its fiscal dimension. Attempts to solve self-determination conflicts through decentralisation will fail if local self-governance exists only in form but not in substance.

Pendant près d’un siècle, le problème récurant du Nigeria a été comment protéger et promouvoir les intérêts des communautés qui y sont représentées. Pour cela, plusieurs mécanismes ont été introduits. Cela inclut le Principe du Caractère Fédéral, qui constitue le fondement du système fédéral consociatif du Nigeria. Pourtant, son efficacité a constamment été remise en question par les inégalités régionales et les effets pervers qui découlent de son application. On constate les mêmes contraintes dans d’autres pays pratiquant d’autres variantes du traitement préférentiel. Malgré les différences culturelles, idéologiques ou institutionnelles, il semble que le renforcement de la politique éducative aux niveaux primaire et secondaire en faveur des bénéficiaires potentiels des politiques de traitement préférentiel soit la pièce maitresse pour assurer la réduction des inégalités horizontales. / For close to a century, the perennial problem that has bedeviled Nigeria has been how to ensure the protection and the promotion of the interests of its various communities. Successive governments have introduced several mechanisms to this end. They include the Federal Character Principle, which constitutes the bedrock of the Nigerian consociative federal arrangement. Nevertheless, persistent regional inequalities and the pervasive side effects of the various strategies have constantly cast a doubt on the efficacy the Federal Character Principle. A similar trend is visible in other countries that are practicing other versions of preferential treatment policies. It appears that to achieve a meaningful reduction of horizontal inequalities, irrespective of cultural, ideological or institutional settings, the most viable option remains sound educational policies at the primary and secondary school levels in favour of potential beneficiaries of preferential treatments.

This thesis examines the relationship between ethnicity and violent group mobilisation in Liberia’s civil war (1989-2003). It focuses on Gio, Mano and Mandingo mobilisation to investigate how and why internal dynamics about moral norms and expectations motivated leadership calls for violence and ethnic support. Much of the existing literature interprets popular involvement in violent group mobilisation on the Upper Guinea Coast as a youth rebellion against gerontocracy. I argue that such an approach is incomplete in the Liberian case, and does not account for questions of ethnic mobilisation and the participation of groups such as the Gio, Mano and Mandingo. At the onset of hostilities, civilians in Liberia were not primarily mobilised to fight based on their age, but rather as members of ethnic communities whose membership included different age groups. I explore constructivist approaches to ethnicity to analyse mobilisation for war as the collective 'self-defence' of ethnic groups qua moral communities. In the prelude to the outbreak of civil war, inter-ethnic inequalities of access to the state and economic resources became reconfigured. Ethnic groups—as moral communities—experienced external 'victimisation' and a sense of internal dissolution, or threatened dissolution. In particular, the understanding of internal reciprocal relations between patrons and clients within ethnic groups was undermined. Internal arguments about morality, personal responsibility, social accountability/justice, increased the pressure on excluded elites and thus incentivised them to pursue violent political strategies. Mobilisation took on an ethnic form mainly because individuals believed that they were fighting to protect the moral communities that generate esteem and ground understandings of good citizenship. Therefore, ethnic participation in the Liberian countryside differed from the model peasant rebellion that seeks to overthrow the feudal elites. Rather than a revolution of the social order, individuals regarded themselves as protecting an extant ethnic order that provided rights and distributed resources. Even though some individuals fought for political power and resources, and external actors facilitated group organisation through the provision of logistical support, the violence was also an expression of bottom-up moral community crisis and an attempt by politico-military elites to keep their reputation and enforce unity.

Alors que la fin de la bipolarité s’est accompagnée du déclin de la guerre au niveau mondial, l’Afrique subsaharienne connaît depuis le début des années 1990, une résurgence de la violence armée dont la forme la plus courante est la guerre civile. L’Afrique Occidentale est l’une des régions les plus touchées par cette multiplication de conflits armés infraétatiques dont les trois plus importants ont été les guerres civiles libérienne, sierra-léonaise et ivoirienne. Cette conflictualité a donné lieu à l’émergence d’acteurs non étatiques qui, dans un contexte de mondialisation accrue, ont adopté le warlordism comme mode opératoire. Ces guerres internes, parfois qualifiées de « nouvelles guerres », sont à la fois le produit de la crise de l’Etat, de profondes inégalités horizontales, et de l’instrumentalisation des différences identitaires par certaines élites. Elles se sont développées au-delà du cadre national, avec l’implication de différents acteurs transnationaux, et ont favorisé l’émergence d’un véritable « système de guerre » ouest-africain. Elles sont également l’expression d’une remise en cause du modèle étatique westphalien. La conflictualité régionale qui est apparue en Afrique Occidentale post-Guerre froide invite donc à accorder davantage d’attention aux communautés de destin imbriquées qui de plus en plus, occupent une place centrale dans les dynamiques qui façonnent l’Afrique au sud du Sahara. / Whereas the end of bipolarity occurred along with the decline of war at the world level, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a surge of armed violence since the early 1990s, in the most common form of civil wars. West Africa is one of the areas mostly affected by the proliferation of intra-state armed conflicts, including three major civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast. Such conflicts, sometimes called « new wars », have led to the emergence of non-state actors who act as warlords, in a context of spreading globalisation. These domestic wars are the result of state crisis, deep horizontal inequalities, and political instrumentalisation by some elites of identity-based differences. Through the involvement of various transnational actors, these armed conflicts have extended beyond the national framework and built an actual West-African « system of war ». They also challenge the Westphalian state-model. Post-Cold war regional conflicts in West Africa hence suggest an increased focus on overlapping communities of fate, which play a key-role in the dynamics shaping Sub-Saharan Africa.

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