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Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Notre étude interroge de manière systématique ce qu’est l'âme humaine et comment elle constitue un individu dans la pensée de Fārābī. Nous y avons établi que la triade néoplatonicienne nature, âme et intellect structure sa pensée naturelle et qu’elle correspond en l'homme à la substantialité, la vie – en tant que principe général aux êtres vivants – et la pensée. Cette triade est liée à la notion de substantification et permet de comprendre la manière par laquelle différentes fonctions, naturelles, animées et intellectives, peuvent émaner d’une substance une. La constitution de l'individu humain se présente ainsi comme une substantification progressive par ces trois principes. Elle est marquée par une forte téléologisation qui assure l’unité substantielle de l’homme, puisque, lors de la génération de ce dernier, la substance réalisée par la nature puis par l'âme est dès le départ en vue de la réalisation de l'intellect et de sa perfection ultime, comprise comme un retour à soi. Face aux lectures dualistes de son époque, Fārābī revient à une compréhension particulière de l'âme comme forme du corps, et comme principe de l'unité le plus parfait dans le monde sublunaire. Sa compréhension originale de l'hylémorphisme permet de soutenir en même temps la séparabilité de l'intellect, à travers des éléments issus de la tradition néoplatonicienne, notamment l’organisation des fonctions et principes présents en l’homme en différents rangs intermédiaires. / Our work examines in a systematic way what is the human soul and how it constitutes an individual in al-Fārābī’s thought. We have shown in it that the Neoplatonist triad of nature, soul and intellect structures his natural thought and that it corresponds in man to substantiality, life – as a principle shared with all the living creatures – and thought. This triad is linked to the notion of substantification and allows us to understand the way different functions can emanate from what is a single substance. The way man is constituted by these three principles is presented as a progressive substantification characterized by a strong teleologisation. This teleologisation insures man’s substantial unity since, in the process of his generation, the substance realized first by nature and then by soul exists for the sake of its realization by the intellect and the attainment of man’s perfection, perceived as a return to the self. Facing the dualist positions of his time, al-Fārābī upheld a particular reading of the soul as the form of a body and as the most accomplished principle of unity in the sublunary world. His original comprehension of hylemorphism asserts the separability of the intellect through his usage of neoplatonist elements, notably the organization of the principles and functions that are present in the human substance into various intermediary ranks

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Este trabalho tem como objetivo proceder ao exame da análise realizada por Averróis a respeito da natureza do intelecto material. Nosso autor procura demonstrar a certa incompletude presente nas teses lançadas a esse respeito, principalmente por Themístio e Alexandre de Afrodísia, e solucionar as antinomias que envolvem a afirmação de que o intelecto material é uma substância separada e única para toda a humanidade. As principais questões decorrentes dessa afirmação envolvem principalmente o processo de formação dos inteligíveis; a possibilidade do conhecimento individual; a relação que é estabelecida entre o homem e o intelecto; e, sobretudo, a natureza do intelecto material. Fruto de grande controvérsia, a tese da unidade do intelecto material possui grande importância no pensamento de Averróis, pois o estabelecimento dessa natureza representa a solução de diversas questões no âmbito da metafísica. Os reflexos dessa questão chegam até mesmo ao âmbito moral de sua filosofia, onde é estabelecido que o movimento natural do homem se dê por meio da relação com essa substância separada e tem seu fim exatamente aí, onde o terreno da absoluta felicidade só é alcançado nessa relação entre homem e intelecto. / The objectiveof this work is to proceed the examination of the analysis carried through Averroes regarding the nature of the material intellect. The author aims to demonstrate certain incompleteness presented in some thesis about it, mainly those of Themístius and Alexander of Aphrodisias, and to solve the antinomies wich involves the affirmation of that the material intellect as a separate and a single substance for all humankind. This affirmation rises many questions, mainly the formation process of the intelligible; the possibility of the individual knowledge; the relation established between man and intellect; and, over all, the nature of the material intellect. Originated among great controversy, the thesis for the unit of the material intellect has great importance in the thought of Averroes, therefore the establishment of this nature represents the solution of many questions in the scope of metaphysics. The consequences of this question arrive even though at the moral ground of its philosophy, where it is established that the natural movement of the man happens trought the relation with this separate substance and has its end precisely there, where the land of the absolute happiness is reached only by this relation between man and intellect.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo proceder ao exame da análise realizada por Averróis a respeito da natureza do intelecto material. Nosso autor procura demonstrar a certa incompletude presente nas teses lançadas a esse respeito, principalmente por Themístio e Alexandre de Afrodísia, e solucionar as antinomias que envolvem a afirmação de que o intelecto material é uma substância separada e única para toda a humanidade. As principais questões decorrentes dessa afirmação envolvem principalmente o processo de formação dos inteligíveis; a possibilidade do conhecimento individual; a relação que é estabelecida entre o homem e o intelecto; e, sobretudo, a natureza do intelecto material. Fruto de grande controvérsia, a tese da unidade do intelecto material possui grande importância no pensamento de Averróis, pois o estabelecimento dessa natureza representa a solução de diversas questões no âmbito da metafísica. Os reflexos dessa questão chegam até mesmo ao âmbito moral de sua filosofia, onde é estabelecido que o movimento natural do homem se dê por meio da relação com essa substância separada e tem seu fim exatamente aí, onde o terreno da absoluta felicidade só é alcançado nessa relação entre homem e intelecto. / The objectiveof this work is to proceed the examination of the analysis carried through Averroes regarding the nature of the material intellect. The author aims to demonstrate certain incompleteness presented in some thesis about it, mainly those of Themístius and Alexander of Aphrodisias, and to solve the antinomies wich involves the affirmation of that the material intellect as a separate and a single substance for all humankind. This affirmation rises many questions, mainly the formation process of the intelligible; the possibility of the individual knowledge; the relation established between man and intellect; and, over all, the nature of the material intellect. Originated among great controversy, the thesis for the unit of the material intellect has great importance in the thought of Averroes, therefore the establishment of this nature represents the solution of many questions in the scope of metaphysics. The consequences of this question arrive even though at the moral ground of its philosophy, where it is established that the natural movement of the man happens trought the relation with this separate substance and has its end precisely there, where the land of the absolute happiness is reached only by this relation between man and intellect.

L'épistémologie péripatéticienne de l’Aquinate suppose l'existence d'une distinction ontologique entre la partie sensitive et la partie intellective de l'âme. L'âme sensitive est mobile et corruptible alors que l'intellect est immobile et incorruptible. Considérant cela, il semble évident que la saisie des données de l'intellect, à savoir les espèces intelligibles, ne devrait pas être affectée par la corruption du corps. Or, la réalité est tout autre: les pertes de mémoire sensible affectent l’activité de la mémoire intellective. Étant donné que l’intellect est immuable, le fait que celui-ci puisse oublier laisse présager une dépendance structurelle de l'intellect en regard à son corps, qui serait le foyer de l’oubli. Cette recherche tente de mettre au jour la nature et la logique de cette dépendance structurelle. Plus précisément, elle tâche de répondre à la question suivante : est-ce que l’âme doit toujours se tourner vers les phantasmes lorsqu’elle pense les intelligibles et, si tel est le cas, comment le fait-elle? Les littératures premières et secondaires montrent sans équivoque que Thomas croit que l’intellect doit toujours se retourner vers les phantasmes pour penser. Or, déterminer la manière dont ce retour s’exécute est une autre paire de manches. Comme le montre Piché (2019), la conversio ad phantasmata, ou reflexio, est décrite de deux manières différentes tout au long du corpus thomasien : soit le retour aux phantasmes s’effectue par accident lorsque l’intellect agent saisit l’universel, soit la conversio est un processus d’autoréflexivité de l’intellect sur son propre acte d’intellection. Bien que les commentateurs (Gilson, Kretzmann, Lonergan et Pasnau) n’aient pas catégorisé dichotomiquement les explications de Thomas tel que l’a fait Piché, tous semblent abonder dans le sens de la première explication que fournit l’Aquinate. Nous entendons construire notre texte selon le plan qui suit : après une brève introduction, nous exposerons les traits saillants de l’épistémologie telle que développée par Thomas d’Aquin afin de révéler les liens structuraux présents entre les puissances de l’intellect et de la sensibilité. Ensuite, nous montrerons que l’intellect effectue toujours un recours aux phantasmes lors de son activité. Puis, nous confronterons les explications possibles quant à la manière dont s’exécute ce recours. Enfin, en guise d’ouverture, nous exposerons l’aporie, relative aux modalités, qui découle nécessairement du rapport existant entre la sensibilité et l’intellect. / The Peripatetic epistemology of Aquinas supposes an ontological distinction between sensitivity and the intellect within the soul. The sensitive soul is mobile and corruptible while the intellect is immobile and incorruptible. In regard to this, it seems evident that the grasp of intellectual data, the species intelligibiles, shouldn’t be affected by the body’s corruption. However, it isn’t the case : the sensible memory losses affect the intellective memory’s activity. Since the intellect is immutable, the fact that it forgets points to a structural dependency of the intellect to its body, which would be the origin of omission. This research tries to excavate the nature and the logic of this structural dependency. More precisely, it tries to answer the following question : does the soul always need to turn towards phantasms when it thinks the intelligible species and, if so, how does it do it? The first and second literature show distinctly Thomas’ belief that the soul must always turn toward phantasms to think. Nevertheless, how it happens is a whole different issue. As shown by Piché (2019), the conversio ad phantasmata, also called “reflexio”, is described in two different ways all along the Thomasian corpus : either the return toward phantasms happens by accident when the intellect grasps the universal, either the conversio is an autoreflexive process achieved by the intellect toward its own intellectual act of thinking. Although the commentators (Gilson, Kretzmann, Lonergan and Pasnau) haven’t categorized Thomas’ explanations in terms of a dichotomy as Piché did, they all seem to agree with the first explanation provided by Aquinas. We will build our text according to the following plan : after a brief introduction, we will expose the salient features of Thomas Aquinas’ epistemology to reveal the structural links in between the intellect and the sensible soul. Then, we will show that the intellect always turns toward phantasms while it’s active. Thereafter, we will confront the possible explanations relative to the way this turn occurs. Finally, we’ll expose the modality aporia, as I call it, which ensues necessarily from the relationship in between the sensible soul and intellect.

An experiment was conducted to test the hypothesis that more intelligent Ss would produce greater increases in peripheral skin temperature using autogenic feedback training. At the completion of training, the Ss were divided into two groups by IQ scores and matched with pretraining (baseline) temperatures. The hypothesis was rejected when results opposite to those predicted occurred. Large group differences, however, prompted a po4t-hoc investigation to determine the statistical significance between group performances. This analysis revealed that the less intelligent Ss experienced greater success (p<.05) in increasing skin temperature. Possible explanations for these results are discussed and considerations for future investigations with biofeedback training and intelligence are suggested.