Fred Dretske (1981) claimed that the essence of the kind of cognitive activity that gives rise to Intentional mental states is a process by which the analogue information coming from a source-object is transformed into digital form. It is this analogue-to-digital conversion of data that enables us to form concepts of things. But this achievement comes with a cost, since the conversion must involve a loss of information. The price we pay for the lost information is a proportional diminishment in our ability to discriminate the source-object from others that may be similar to it. I argue that this fact underlies an important distinction between what a mental state may be about and to what the state may be directed, Aboutness and directedness are two of four Intentional dimensions on which this project concentrates. The other two are aspectual shape and misrepresentation. The distinction between aboutness and directedness is a part of a proposed approach to Intentionality based on the script theory of Roger Schank and Robert Abelson (1977). Scripts are schemata—organized knowledge structures that guide our understanding of the world around us. Schank and Abelson's basic ideas are extended to yield four different script-types: episodic (related to situations and events), instrumental (related to procedural knowledge), personal (representing an agent's goals and plans), and definitional (involved in object-recognition). The relationship between scripts and the Intentionality of thought is the main focus of this dissertation. An important secondary concern is the viability of externalism and internalism. It is argued that neither of these attitudes is independently adequate to provide a full account of Intentional content. Rather, the proper approach is to confine externalistic influences to aboutness and then characterize directedness in a manner that captures the world-according-to-the-agent. This strategy is implemented in the following way: aboutness is construed causally-evolutionarily; directedness is constructed with the help of the notion of an equivalence class; aspectual shape is shown to be a function of the kind of information a script provides; and an account of misrepresentation is given by comparing the different extensions generated from aboutness and directedness respectively. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

The current study investigated the interpretation of an agent's actions under the influence of external forces. Participants viewed a series of videos of an agent making a varying series of decisions and forced behaviors and were asked to predict future behavior. Firstly, we found evidence that suggests that perceivers make inferences about an agent that once they have shown a preference toward an object, they will persist with those initial desires, despite, external forces leading them to a different object. Secondly, we found evidence that suggests that submitting to a coerced choice will be perceived as reflecting a conflicting combination of pragmatic behavioral choice (due to concession to external forces) and maintenance of original desires, or, simply put, perceivers infer multiple underlying intentions in others. / by Brian Vail. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2012. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2012. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Locus of an author poses questions of intentionality, how intention is discovered, expressed, hidden, revealed and interpreted. The purpose of the study is to find and apply productive interdisciplinary concepts in intentionality detection, decoding and evaluation in fictional texts. The investigation integrates traditions in literature, linguistics, cognitive science and creative writing, posing a pragmatics of intent that complements and complicates precepts in reader reception-based constructivism. Basic to a vision of pragmatic strategies: 1) situating effect and affect in an embodied mind; 2) acknowledging mutual and/or oppositional intentionalities which an embodied author and embodied reader bring to the process of fictional communication; 3) accepting language as communication that requires cognitive translation of consensually-agreed upon symbols into private representations in an embodied mind; 4) assuming that an author's fictionalizing consciousness is more discernible w hen it is navigating tensions of selection, proportion, intervention and perspective. Perceptual and close reading of J.M. Coetzee's Foe yields descriptive problematics. Analytical readings in a neglected byway of I.A. Richards' New Criticism provide pragmatic cues for detecting and evaluating intentionalities in prose. Three cross-disciplinary strategies emerge to enhance perceptual and close readings of fictional texts: 1) awareness of priming effects in form and content; 2) identification of markedness patterns; and 3) perception of tensible connections in prosaic language and artistic devices. / The study concludes that: reading in tensible awareness of author intentionality adds productively to critical analysis and argument; acknowledging positioned voices in texts supports ethical criticism and multicultural aesthetics; reading to apprehend perceptual units (image structures sensed through story) supports and contextualizes close reading of propositional units(discourse/language) . The formal element of perspective emerges as the most intensive locus of the reader's sense of integrated consciousness and management of effect in fiction. Perspective can create the most ergative construction of authorial perspective, i.e., one in which transitive energy appears equalized and the subject and patient / writer and reader positions in syntax can pivot. / by Lois Wolfe. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2008. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2008. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-10-03T12:32:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Lucíola Maria de Sousa Brandes.pdf: 1006890 bytes, checksum: efac1c10aa9cf55e9628af6de3ad0ad0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-03T12:32:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lucíola Maria de Sousa Brandes.pdf: 1006890 bytes, checksum: efac1c10aa9cf55e9628af6de3ad0ad0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-09-18 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The present work tries to interpret the concept of intentionality treated in the Fifth Investigation of the work Logical Investigations, of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). In order to do so, it aims at three objectives: to show that intentionality is not an external relation; prove that intentionality does not presuppose the existence of two different entities; and explicit aspects necessary for the occurrence of intentionality. The development of this study is organized in three chapters. The first takes care of the conception of intentionality in Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and Kasimir Twardowski (1866-1938). In this section, questions about the structure of psychic phenomena and their classification are contemplated, including the characteristics of the representation, the represented object and the content. The second, which constitutes the core of the dissertation, exposes Husserl's concept of intentionality, elaborated in the Fifth Research, based on the central conceptual analyzes and distinctions of this author. This chapter clarifies the structure of intentional living; displays the classification of acts and their fundamental relationships; and provides the four senses of representation. The third examines Husserl's criticisms of Brentano and Twardowski's conceptions of intentional phenomena. The result of this philosophical study indicates that: intentionality, according to Husserl, is based on an inner moment of the experience itself. Husserl distinguishes consciousness from actual objects and representations of fantasy, predictions, memories, and so on; and the object intentionally visualized is neither part of consciousness and is not contained in it, i.e. intentionality is characterized by its independence from existence / O presente trabalho procura discernir o conceito de intencionalidade tratado na Quinta Investigação da obra Investigações Lógicas, de Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Para tanto, tem em vista três objetivos: mostrar que a intencionalidade não é uma relação externa; provar que a intencionalidade não pressupõe a existência de duas entidades diferentes e; explicitar aspectos necessários para a ocorrência da intencionalidade. O desenvolvimento do estudo está organizado em três capítulos. O primeiro cuida da concepção de intencionalidade em Franz Brentano (1838-1917) e Kasimir Twardowski (1866-1938). Nessa seção, estão contempladas questões sobre a estrutura dos fenômenos psíquicos e a classificação desses fenômenos psíquicos, assim como são assinaladas características da representação, do objeto representado e do conteúdo. O segundo, que constitui o núcleo da dissertação, expõe o conceito de intencionalidade de Husserl, elaborado na Quinta Investigação, alicerçado nas análises e distinções conceituais centrais desse autor. Esse capítulo clarifica a estrutura da vivência intencional; exibe a classificação dos atos e das relações de fundação entre eles e; fornece os quatros sentidos de representação. O terceiro examina as críticas de Husserl às concepções do fenômeno intencional concebidas por Brentano e Twardowski. O resultado desse estudo filosófico indica que: (1) a intencionalidade husserliana tem por fundamento um momento interior da própria vivência; Husserl distingue a consciência dos objetos efetivamente existentes e das representações da fantasia, predições, lembranças etc. (2) o objeto visado intencionalmente não é parte da consciência e nem está contido nela, ou seja, a intencionalidade é caracterizada por sua independência da existência

published_or_final_version / Educational Psychology / Master / Master of Social Sciences

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2005. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 256-273). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-07-05T11:50:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1459949 bytes, checksum: 8265ed7ee9fe7c988a0c7970ae31d488 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-05T11:50:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1459949 bytes, checksum: 8265ed7ee9fe7c988a0c7970ae31d488 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-08 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This study it constitutes in a dissertation based on a bibliographic background in which was used as the main source the philosophy’s title ‘Phenomenology of Perception’ by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Its aim is to analyze the concept of one’s own body and its related spatiality discussed in the mentioned work of the philosopher. At first, it is presented an issue concerning what is the concept of body perceived by physiology as a juxtaposed structure. On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty points to a new understanding of the body, not as constituted bodies, but as one’s own body that is able to recognize its very existence as a living subject, as it is situated in space and not just positioned into it. Trailing the sense of spatiality, Merleau-Ponty discusses about it not in the same wayas addressed by Geography, in which it is possible to think of locations, but still as a point in space where the subject can notice his own body, as perceiver subject. It is the experienced world, lived, in which the subject can recognize his own existence. The notion of space can’t be understood as isolated parts, but with modalities that are associated to the subject. Considering these concepts, it explores also other topics such as intentionality and motricity. The first as a tendency of the one’s own body "to go further" because of its intention to do so and the second as an extension of the body to be able to appropriate the phenomena perceived in order to understand them. It also discusses the concept of perceived world in which the perceiver subject perceives the phenomena and the world in perspective. In addition, he is not alone, as there are other perceiver subjects that carry a peculiarity of ‘I myself’ responsible for the redefinition of the world and the phenomena appropriation through perspectives. There is ‘I myself’ in others, but this can’t be broken into, what is known of it is just what is expressed, communicated. Hence, the importance of the language that is present throughout the discussion not only as verbal language, but as body grammar. / O presente estudo constitui-se em uma dissertação de mestrado fundada em um referencial bibliográfico em que foi utilizada como principal fonte a obra Fenomenologia da Percepção do filósofo Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Seu principal objetivo é analisar o conceito de corpo próprio e sua espacialidade discutida na citada obra do filósofo. A princípio, é apresentado um problema que é o conceito de corpo analisado pela fisiologia como uma estrutura justaposta. Em contrapartida, Merleau-Ponty aponta para uma nova compreensão de corpo, não como constituído de órgãos, mas como corpo próprio, ou seja, que é capaz de reconhecer sua própria existência como um sujeito vivo, pois ele é situado no espaço e não apenas posicionado nele. Tomando como fio condutor o sentido de espacialidade, Merleau-Ponty discorre sobre o mesmo não como um espaço abordado pela Geografia, em que é possível pensar em localizações, mas como um espaço de situação em que o sujeito possa perceber o seu próprio corpo, como sujeito perceptivo. É o mundo experimentado, vivido, no qual o sujeito consegue reconhecer sua própria existência. A noção de espaço não pode ser compreendida como partes isoladas, mas como situação, pois o corpo próprio habita o espaço de seu corpo. Considerando estes conceitos, adentra-se também em outros temas como: a intencionalidade e a motricidade. O primeiro como uma tendência do corpo próprio de se “dirigir para”, porque tem a intenção de fazê-lo, e o segundo como uma extensão do corpo de poder se apropriar dos fenômenos percebidos a fim de compreendê-los. Também é discutido neste trabalho o conceito de mundo percebido em que o sujeito perceptivo percebe os fenômenos e o mundo em perspectivas. Além disso, ele não está sozinho, pois existem outros sujeitos que carregam consigo uma particularidade de Eu segundo a qual este é responsável pela ressignificação do mundo e da apropriação dos fenômenos através de perspectivas. Existe o Eu de outrem, mas este não pode ser invadido, o que se sabe dele é apenas o que é expresso, comunicado. Eis a importância da linguagem que se faz presente em toda a discussão não apenas como linguagem verbal, mas como gramática corporal.

The aim of this dissertation is to provide a non-reductive account of cognitive phenomenology and the experience of thinking. The nature of conscious thought is an issue that has occupied philosophers since ancient times, and still many questions in this domain remain unanswered. One of them is the relation between thought and experience or phenomenal consciousness, in the particular way explored in this thesis: when we undergo a certain cognitive mental episode, should we recognize an experience like our other sensory, perceptual, or emotional experiences or should we rather recognize a very different sort of experience? Experiences are usually characterized by a phenomenal character or what-it-is-likeness for the subject to undergo them, which is usually taken as the mark of phenomenal consciousness and which, for mainstream contemporary philosophy of mind, has been limited to sensory and perceptual experiences, or even to emotional experiences. My general thesis is that conscious thought should be included in the domain of phenomenal consciousness and that there is an experience of thinking or conscious thought with a specific phenomenal character, namely, a phenomenal character that cannot be reduced to other non-cognitive kinds of phenomenologies. The thesis has three main parts, which are divided in several chapters. In the first part, Introduction, I present the basic elements to be able to start the investigation. I firstly clarify the relevant issues involved in the debate (Chapter 1), I justify the terminology chosen and I present the main views and a brief history of the problem. I then propose a way to approach the experience of thinking from a methodological point of view (Chapter 2), through a study of some methodological problems in philosophy and psychology, mainly related to introspection and introspective evidence. In the second part of the thesis, Main Arguments in Cognitive Phenomenology, I defend my non-reductive view with several arguments. I present the obvious argument (Chapter 3) for the conclusion that conscious thoughts have phenomenal properties and I resist some putative cases against the argument. I then present my version of the phenomenal argument (Chapter 4), which shows that there is a phenomenal change between two cognitive experiences contrasted and that this change cannot be explained by appealing to the sensory/emotional elements that by hypothesis remain constant. My presentation of this argument is complemented by a defense against some restrictivist views (Chapter 5). I then present the epistemic argument, which claims that we have introspective immediate knowledge of the kind of mental episode we are in (and of different cognitive atittudes), and that this would not be possible unless cognitive episodes have a specific cognitive phenomenology (Chapter 6). I finally consider another argument, the ontological argument, that might support the reductionist view , but I argue that it does not succeed (Chapter 7). In the third part of the thesis, The Specification of Cognitive Phenomenology, and as a further step in the discussion, I propose a specification of cognitive phenomenology in relation to intentionality and its two main components in conscious thought, cognitive content (Chapter 8) and cognitive attitude (Chapter 9). This proposal provides us with a way of determining similarities and differences in cognitive phenomenology that result in different experiential kinds and different types of conscious thought in virtue of their phenomenology. Moreover, it offers an answer to the question of the relation of determination between both components and their phenomenal character. This dissertation questions well some well-established assumptions in philosophy of mind and consciousness studies: (i) it implies a comprehension of phenomenal consciousness as including cognition, (ii) it rejects the assymetry between sensory/perceptual experience and cognitive one (regarding temporal structure and specification attempts) and (iii) it questions separatist positions between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. It also opens new research in relation to other philosophical topics and empirical studies and it contributes to the examination of two research fields (consciousness and cognition) that have normally been investigated separately. / L’objectiu d’aquesta tesi és presentar una teoria no reductivista de la fenomenologia cognitiva i de l’experiència del pensament. La naturalesa del pensament conscient és una qüestió que ha preocupat als filòsofs des de l’antiguitat i un àmbit on encara trobem moltes qüestions que no tenen resposta. Una d’elles és la relació entre el pensament i l’experiència o la consciencia fenomènica, en el sentit particular que exploro en aquesta tesi: quan tenim una experiència d’un cert episodi mental cognitiu, es tracta d’una experiència com les altres experiències sensorials, perceptives o emocionals, o bé es tracta d’un tipus molt diferent d’experiència? Les experiències normalment es caracteritzen per tenir un caràcter fenomènic o un “com a què és” (what it is like) pel subjecte tenir aquestes experiències, que es prèn com la marca de la consciència fenomènica i que, en filosofia contemporània de la ment, generalment es restringeix a les experiències sensorials, perceptives o, fins i tot, emocionals. La tesi general que defenso és que el pensament conscient ha de ser inclòs en l’extensió de la consciència fenomènica i que existeix una experiència de pensament conscient amb un caràcter fenomènic específic, és a dir, un caràcter fenomènic que no es pot reduir a altres tipus de fenomenologies. Aquesta conclusió general qüestiona alguns supòsits ben establerts en filosofia de la ment i estudis sobre consciència, i així obre la porta a noves investigacions en aquesta direcció. Per tal de defensar aquesta teoria no reductivista, primerament clarifico les qüestions rellevants en el debat i examino com hem d’aproximar-nos a l’experiència del pensament (Capítols 1 i 2). En segon lloc, presento una sèrie d’arguments a favor de la meva tesi (Capítols 3, 4 i 6) i argumento en contra d’estratègies restrictivistes (Capítols 5 i 7). Finalment, com a un pas més en la discussió, proposo una especificació de la fenomenologia cognitiva en relació a la intencionalitat i els seus dos components principals en el pensament conscient, el contingut cognitiu (Capítol 8) i l’actitud cognitiva (Capítol 9), oferint respostes a la qüestió de la relació de determinació entre ambdós components i el seu caràcter fenomènic.