[pt] Esta dissertação observa o desenvolvimento do compromisso coletivo com a democracia representativa no âmbito da Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA). Uma descrição dos casos em que a OEA atuou na promoção e defesa da democracia a partir da aprovação da Resolução 1080 e do Compromisso de Santiago é dada e permite o acompanhamento da criação de mecanismos de ação coletiva e a instituição de práticas que constituem o que se chamou de paradigma democrático nas Américas. O instrumental teórico do institucionalismo histórico oferece uma alternativa às análises realistas, racionalistas e funcionalistas sobre o papel da variável institucional no desenvolvimento desse paradigma. / [en] This dissertation observes the development of a collective commitment with representative democracy within the Organization of American States (OAS) from the 1990`s onward. A descriptive analysis of the cases in which the OAS acted for the promotion and defense of democracy is therefore given and allows the following of the creation of collective action mechanisms as well as the institution of practices that constitute what can be called a democratic solidarity paradigm in the hemisphere. The theoretical tools of historical institutionalism offer an alternative to realist, rationalist and functionalist analysis of the role of the institutional variable on the development of this paradigm.

The Inter-American Democratic Charter (IDC) was adopted in 2001 by member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) as a renewed instrument for the defense of democracy, not only against traditional coup d´etat but also to face serious violations to horizontal accountability. The second assumption took into consideration, as a precedent, the political situation in Peru during Alberto Fujimori's administration (1995-2000), defined as a competitive authoritarian regime by Political Science and Constitutional Law scholars. However, during the last decade to the presentwe find in Latin America several countries with governments where the principle of checks and balances has been eroded as a result of measures adopted by their respective executive branch. This situation suggests the following concerns: The liberal democratic model of the IDC is in crisis? This model has been overcame by illiberal governments that privileges economic and social rights and restraints civil and political rights? Or both models a recondemned to coexist in the region? / La Carta Democrática Interamericana (CDI) fue adoptada en el año 2001 por los Estados miembros de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA)  como  un  instrumento  renovado  para  la  defensa  de la democracia, no sólo contra el golpe de Estado tradicional, sino también para hacer frente a las graves violaciones de la responsabilidad horizontal. El segundo supuesto consideró, como precedente, la situación política en el Perú durante el gobierno de Alberto Fujimori (1995-2000), el cual fue definido por los académicos de Ciencias Políticas y Derecho Constitucional como un régimen autoritario competitivo. Sin embargo, durante la última década hasta la actualidad hemos hallado en América Latina varios países con gobiernos en donde el principio de equilibrio de poderes ha erosionado como resultado de las medidas adoptadas por sus respectivas ramas ejecutivas. Esta situación sugiere las siguientes preocupaciones: ¿El modelo democrático liberal de la CDI se encuentra en crisis? ¿Este modelo ha sido vencido por los gobiernos liberales lo cuales privilegian a los derechos económicos y sociales y restringen los derechos civiles y políticos? ¿O ambos modelos están condenados a coexistir en la región?

This article describes the political process of the OAS Dialogue Table in 2000 Peru. This space, though singular and hardly replicable, was a successful experience to boost the political transition from Alberto Fujimori´s government to the transition government of Valetin Paniagua and the dismantlement of Fujimori´s legal support that affected the horizontal accountability in the country. The achieved success resulted from four factors: 1) The shortfall of internal and external legitimacy of the third government of Alberto Fujimori; 2) the international acknowl- edgement of the Dialogue Table as a space to carry out political transition and democratiza- tion; 3) the union and strengthening of the opposition; and 4) the division and weakening of parliament governing party. Likewise, this political experience, that took place in Peru, became the boost and justification for the birth of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001. / En el presente artículo se describe el proceso político de la Mesa de Diálogo de la OEA del año 2000 en el Perú. Este espacio fue una experiencia exitosa, aunque singular y difícilmente repetible, de impulso a la transición política del gobierno de Alberto Fujimori al gobierno de transición de Valentín Paniagua y de desmantelamiento del soporte jurídico fujimorista que afectaba la accountability horizontal en el país. Dicho éxito se debió a cuatro factores:1) El déficit de legitimidad interna y externa del tercer gobierno de Alberto Fujimori; 2) el reconocimiento internacional de la Mesa de Diálogo como el espacio para llevar adelante la transición política y la democratización; 3) la unión y fortalecimiento de la oposición, y 4) la división y debilitamiento del oficialismo parlamentario. Asimismo, esta experiencia política sucedida en el Perú fue el impulso y la justificación para el nacimiento de la Carta Democrática Interamericana en el año 2001. / No presente artigo descrevese o processo político da Mesa do Diálogo da OEA do ano 200no Peru. Neste espaço foi uma experiência com muito sucesso, mas excêntrica e de difícil repe- tição, de ímpeto á transição política do governo de Alberto Fujimori ao governo de transição de Valentin Paniagua e de desmontagem do apoio jurídico fujimorista que afetavam a accoun- tability horizontal no país. Esse sucesso se deve a quatro fatores: 1) O déficit de legitimidade interna e externa do terceiro governo do Alberto Fujimori; 2) O reconhecimento internacional da Mesa de dialogo como o espaço para levar adiante a transição política e a democratização;3) A união e fortalecimento da oposição; e 4) A divisão e o enfraquecimento do governo parlamentariam. Também, essa experiência política que aconteceu no Peru foi o impulso e ajustificação para o nascimento da Carta Democrática Interamericana do ano 2001.

Das Demokratieprinzip ist im Völkerrecht verankert. Seine normativen Grundlagen sind zum einen das Vertragsrecht, insbesondere der Internationale Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte, sowie die regionalen Verankerungen in Europa und in Amerika durch die Satzungen der jeweiligen internationaler Organisationen und ihrer Menschenrechtsinstrumente. Substantielle vertragliche Verpflichtungen ergeben sich auch aus den bilateralen Verträgen der EG. Zum anderen fußt es auf der Staatenpraxis, insbesondere im Rahmen der UNO. So ist die internationale Gemeinschaft auf die Errichtung demokratischer Strukturen verpflichtet, wenn sie staatliche Funktionen in failed states übernimmt oder den Wiederaufbau eines Staatswesens begleitet. Die Demokratieresolutionen der UNO lassen erkennen, daß alle Staaten verpflichtet sind, das Ziel der Demokratie anzustreben und erreichte demokratische Errungenschaften zu gewährleisten. Das Demokratieprinzip beinhaltet normativ die Legitimation staatlichen Handelns durch freie Wahlen und die Absicherung durch Menschenrechte, Gewaltenteilung und Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Staatliche Entscheidungen bedürfen daher einer legitimierenden Rückbindung an den frei geäußerten Willen des konstituierenden Staatsvolkes, wobei die Freiheit dieser Willensäußerung in dynamischer Perspektive die Freiheit der Willensänderung garantiert. Sowohl der Vertragsschluß als Akt staatlichen Handelns als auch der Inhalt des Vertrages bedürfen der Legitimation, und zwar über die Zeit hinweg. Das geltende Völkervertragsrecht berücksichtigt das Demokratieprinzip jedoch nur unzureichend. Die Verletzung innerstaatlichen Rechts beim Vertragsschluß kann nur eingeschränkt geltend gemacht werden. Es existiert auch kein Verfahren, mit dem die fortdauernde Legitimation eines Vertrages überprüft werden könnte. Angesichts der Zunahme von Verträgen, die innere Angelegenheiten der Gesellschaften regeln, bedarf das Spannungsverhältnis einer Lösung. Das Problem wird illustriert durch Frankreichs Ausstieg aus der NATO, Senegals Kündigung der Seerechtskonventionen, den Streit um den deutschen Atomausstieg, das Verfahren um den Donaustaudamm Gabcíkovo Nagymaros, die Frage der Vereinbarkeit von Drogenkonsumräumen mit den UN-Anti-Drogenkonventionen, das Schiedsverfahren zwischen Aminoil und Kuwait sowie der Kündigung des ABM-Vertrages durch die USA. Ein erster Ansatz zur Lösung kann in einer Neuinterpretation der völkervertragsrechtlichen Regeln liegen. So bietet sich der Grundsatz der "demokratiefreundlichen Interpretation" an. Internes Recht, das der Kontrolle der Exekutive dient, muß beim Vertragsschluß Berücksichtigung finden. Und Verträgen, die "innere Angelegenheiten" betreffen, kann ein implizites Kündigungsrecht zugebilligt werden. Der wesentliche Ansatz ist aber kautelarjuristischer Natur. Revisions-, Experimentier- und Kündigungsklauseln können bei der Abfassung von Verträgen die Vertragsbeziehung so ausgestalten, daß zukünftige Meinungsänderungen berücksichtigt werden können. Schließlich ist de lege ferenda ein Recht auf Revision, kombiniert mit einem subsidiären Kündigungsrecht, wünschenswert. Mit einem solchen Mechanismus könnten neue normative Lösungen eingeführt werden und die Legitimation bestehender Normen auf den Prüfstand gestellt werden. / International law provides for a democratic principle. It is based both on treaty law and customary law. The International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights as well as the regional treaties in Europe and the Americas - the statutes of the respective regional organisations and their human rights instruments - form a substantial body of treaty obligations toward democracy, which is complemented by bilateral treaties of the EC safeguarding democracy. State practice, especially within the framework of the UN, indicates an obligation to establish democratic structures whenever the international community takes upon itself the task of nation building in failed states. The democracy resolutions of the UN point out that all member states are obliged to strive for democracy and uphold democratic achievements so far. The normative democratic principle includes the legitimation of public affairs through free and fair elections and the guarantee of human rights, separation of powers and the rule of law. Acts of states therefore must be legitimised through the freely expressed will of the people. Under a dynamic perspective, the free will includes the possibility for changes of policy. The conclusion of treaties as an act of state as well as the content of the treaty as a rule of law need to be legitimised through the times. The current law of treaties does not acknowledge the democratic principle, however. Violations of internal law at the conclusion of a treaty can only be claimed to a limited extent. Nor does international law provide for a formal procedure to validate the on-going support for the content of the treaty. Facing an ever-growing expansion of the number of treaties dealing with the internal affairs of societies, solutions must be found. The problem is being illustrated by France's withdrawal from NATO, Senegal's withdrawal from the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, the dispute related to the question of the use of nuclear energy in Germany, the judgement of the ICJ in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros case, the question of the compatibility of drug consumption rooms with UN anti-drug conventions, the dispute settlement award in the Aminoil case and last not least the denunciation of the ABM treaty by the US. Realigning the interpretation of the law of treaties to the democratic principle is one way to deal with the problem. Interpretation of treaties should take into account the democratic principle. Internal law controlling the executive has to be complied with where conclusion of treaties is concerned. And treaties dealing with "internal affairs" can be considered to contain an implicit right of withdrawal or denunciation. The proper solution lies in respecting the democratic principle when drafting treaties, though. Clauses of revision, clauses allowing for experiments and clauses of denunciation or withdrawal help shaping a contractual relationship that can take into account changes of the political will. Last not least, a right of revision is recommended de lege ferenda, combined with a subsidiary right of denunciation or withdrawal. Such a mechanism allows for introducing new normative solutions and for validating the on-going legitimation of existing treaty rules. (See also the English summary at the end of the thesis.)