The purpose of this research is to understand how Trial Court Judges in state and city courts make decisions in domestic violence cases. The researcher examined the relationship between legal (e.g., evidence) and extra-legal factors (e.g., preconceived biases and behaviors related to judicial decision-making) using a qualitative research design. A case study of multiple locations in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes was used whereby a purposive sample of 17 current civil, municipal, and criminal court judges were interviewed. Judicial decision-making strategies were studied via face-to-face interviews, courtroom observations, and content analysis of courtroom communications (e.g., speech, written text, interviews, images, etc.). The researcher discusses future applications of the study as well as the application of findings to assist in exploring judicial decision-making processes. This qualitative research may be beneficial to policy planners, practitioners, and sociologists in gaining insight into the complexity of the judges’ decision-making processes.

<p>Prior to the Civil Rights Movement, fewer than 50 Black judges had been elected or appointed to the judiciary. As of August 2015, there are over 1,000 Black state and federal judges. As the number of black judges has increased, one question arises: have American courts been altered purely by this substantial increase? One expectation—and, at times, a prediction—behind the increased descriptive representation of Black judges is that their mere presence would alter the judiciary. It was supposed that these judges would substantively represent Black interests in the decisions they made. In other words, it was suspected, and predicted, that Blacks in the judiciary would enhance equality and justice by being aware of, responsive to, and advocating for African Americans. This theory about the likely role of Black judges derives from theoretical work on political representation and racial group consciousness, and empirical studies of Black elite behavior in other political institutions.</p><p>Despite such predictions, there is no corresponding scholarly consensus regarding whether Black judges possess a racial group consciousness and have racially distinctive judicial behavior. Therefore, the theory undergirding the demand for increased diversification, as a means to transform the judiciary, remains unsubstantiated. This is precisely where this project, “They’re There, Now What?: The Identities, Behavior, and Perceptions of Black Judges,” seeks to intervene in and explore, if not settle, the matter of whether black judges possess a racial group consciousness and exhibit racially-distinctive judicial behavior. It addresses a set of interrelated questions relevant to understanding whether we can view Black judges as representatives in ways that are similar to how we view other Black political officials. I examine these questions using a multi-method approach. For my analyses, I draw on diverse materials: the published biographies of every Black judge appointed to the federal bench, a survey experiment with a nationally-representative adult sample, and semi-structured interviews with 30 Black judges.</p><p>This research, which engages with scholarship on representation, group consciousness, judicial behavior, and candidate perceptions, offers new insights into the lives, perceptions, and behavior of Black judges, as well as the manifestations of Black substantive representation in the judiciary. My dissertation argues that, despite the general reluctance to use the term “representation” when referring to judges, we can consider Black judges as representatives. Black judges behave as substantive representatives by (1) sharing and understanding the experience, history, and perspectives of Black Americans, (2) challenging language, persons, policies, and laws they feel negatively affect, or violate the rights and liberties of, African Americans, (3) respecting African American litigants, and (4) ensuring the rights of African Americans are protected and the needs of black Americans are being met. </p><p>Only through research that considers the perspectives, identities, perceptions, and behavior of Black judges will we arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the importance of racial diversity in the courts. As this project finds, a link between descriptive representation and substantive representation can, and frequently does exist within the judicial context. Such a link is significant given that Blacks’ liberty and justice through the American legal system continues to be subject to those who exercise judicial power. This dissertation has implications for the discourse surrounding the need for increased descriptive and substantive representation of Blacks in the judiciary, and the factors that affect representation in the justice system.</p> / Dissertation

Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-03-23T19:02:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Orlando Faccini Neto.pdf: 1458873 bytes, checksum: ed72bb97eb6d787b6c4f66fead6a8c26 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-23T19:02:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Orlando Faccini Neto.pdf: 1458873 bytes, checksum: ed72bb97eb6d787b6c4f66fead6a8c26 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-12-14 / Faculdade Anhanguera / De que maneira se pode, a partir da hermenêutica jurídica e de uma pré-compreensão constitucional adequada, obter(em)-se resposta(s) correta(s) em Direito ? Essa a indagação por que transita o presente trabalho, pelo qual se pretende forjar uma teoria da decisão judicial. A pesquisa pretenderá apresentar, portanto, a partir da hermenêutica, os caminhos para a obtenção de resposta(s) correta(s) no Direito brasileiro, ainda envolto no paradigma positivista, do qual deriva uma forte discricionariedade judicial, que é tão mais grave quando, atualmente, faz-se exercitável a partir de princípios aleatoriamente criados pelo julgador. A partir disto, procura-se aludir a que as decisões judiciais, em última análise, revelam-se como atos de jurisdição constitucional, por isso que os juízes devem ter uma pré-compreensão constitucional adequada, sobre a qual se pretende, ademais, fazer referência, para assentar que as decisões criminais não podem olvidar que, a partir da dimensão objetiva dos direitos fundamentais, tem-se o Direito Penal como mecanismo de proteção, que, portanto, não é dado ao legislador renunciar ou tornar insuficiente; que no controle judicial da atividade administrativa, a partir da aceitação do caráter dirigente de nossa Constituição, há o juiz de evitar o reducionismo da análise à mera legalidade, no que afetados os parâmetros desse exercício, que não se limita aos meios empregados pelos entes públicos, mas atina às finalidades que lhe são constitucionalmente determinadas; que, contrariamente ao que tem alvitrado o senso comum, no Direito Privado, as denominadas cláusulas gerais não ampliam o poder discricionário dos juízes, pois os princípios, ao inserirem o mundo prático no Direito, ao revés do que se pensa, não abrem a interpretação, fecham-na; que a obtenção de respostas corretas em Direito, por isso que adequadas constitucionalmente, exige, em termos processuais, o atendimento das garantias constitucionais do processo. / In which way can we based on the juridical hermeneutic and from a proper constitutional pre comprehension, to obtain the right answer (s) in the law system ? This is the question by which the present paper goes over. And the aim of this work is to establish a theory of the judicial decision. The research will intent though, to show based on hermeneutic, the ways for the achievement of the right answer(s) on the Brazilian law system, yet wrapped on the positivist paradigm, from which derives a strong discretionary, which is so much more serious when, now a days it is made feasible based on principles created at random by the one who judges. From then on we try to allude the that the judicial decision in a last analyses, reveal themselves as constitutional jurisdiction acts, and that is why the judges must have a proper constitutional pre comprehension, about which we intent in addition, to make reference, to settle that the criminal decisions cannot forget that from the objective dimension of the constitutional rights, we have the penal right(penal code) as the protection mechanism, which is not therefore given to the legislator to renounce or to make insufficient; that on the judicial control of the administrative activity, from the acceptance of the directing character of our constitution. The judge hopefully will avoid the reductionism of the analyses to the mere legality, in which affected parameters of this exercise, that does not limits itself to the ways applied by the public entities, but guesses to the finalities that are constitutionally determined; that, in opposition to what has been advised by the common sense, on the private law, the so called general clauses do not amplify the discretionary power of the judges, because the principles when insert the practical world on the law, on the contrary of what is thought, do not open the interpretation, they close it; that the achievement of right answers in law, thats why constitutionally adequate, demands, in terms of lawsuit, the meeting of the constitutional warranties of the process.

This study's purpose is to investigate the expansion of social control efforts in American elementary and secondary school settings, particularly the use of zero-tolerance policies. These policies entail automatic punishments, such as suspensions, expulsions, and referrals to the juvenile and criminal justice systems for a host of school-based infractions. The widespread implementation of zero-tolerance policies and the application of harsh, exclusionary sanctions have intensified over the past decade. Numerous studies have documented this rise; however, there has been little effort to explore the explanation of the expansion of school-based social controls. A potential explanation is found in the application of political economic theories in relation to the increased use and evolving nature of social control in the neoliberal era of capitalism. As such, the current study employs a new theoretical approach, which utilizes neoliberal theory combined with theoretical components from existing metanarratives in the literature. By using this new approach in regard to school-based social control, the connection between the expansion of social control of the working class and marginal populations in the criminal justice process, and the retraction of the social safety nets that characterized neoliberal capitalism is extended to the explanation of trends in the social control of school-based infractions. This investigation incorporates a qualitative, empirical exploration of how these school criminalization efforts have been implemented and legitimized by the state, specifically through the authority of the courts. By engaging in textual analysis, the jurisprudential intent that informs both the relevant state appellate and Supreme Court decisions was subjected to legal exegeses to determine how and if the judicial system legitimizes the practice of zero tolerance in schools, which are consistent with neoliberal ideals. In addition, a quantitative component, to this overall study, examined nationally representative School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) data across three academic years to determine if school security measures and disciplinary actions were increasingly applied to marginal populations in elementary and secondary schools over time. Results from the qualitative inquiry revealed that in the overwhelming majority of court cases evaluated, the courts decided in a fashion that reinforces zero-tolerance policies as legitimate neoliberal social controls in schools. Several theoretically relevant themes emerged from the jurisprudential intent, which are transferable for further theory development and future research. Quantitative findings reveal that, over time, the total disciplinary actions and removals from school without continued educational services are disproportionately applied to schools with the highest percentages of minority students and students who reside in high-crime areas compared to schools with the lowest percentages of minority students and students who reside in high-crime areas. Conversely, the results also reveal that the average use of school security measures (e.g., metal detectors, access controls, security guards, etc.) are more likely to be used in schools with the lowest percentages of minority students than schools with the highest percentages of minorities over time. These results are discussed in detail, and recommendations for changes in school policies and practices are offered, while being mindful of evidence-based best practices that may serve as viable alternatives to the zero-tolerance policies currently being used. Avenues for future research and theory development are also outlined.

My dissertation examines chief justice leadership of the United States Supreme Court during the judicial decision-making process. With the office steeped in secrecy, I borrow seminal concepts from the leadership literature such as autocratic, laissez-faire, and democratic leadership and adapt them to the office in order to systematically identify dominant patterns of leadership. While chief justices use different styles, the office is chiefly democratic in both structure and operation, which makes the chief justice a “first among equals” and requires him to be just as good of a political negotiator as he is a competent legal judge. This is a unique, but under appreciated, feature of the chief justice when compared to the associate justices. / 10000-01-01

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / Este trabalho apresenta uma análise crítica à forma de se abordar casos jurídicos e proferir decisões judiciais denominada abordagem judicial pragmática, disseminada pelo magistrado e professor norte-americano Richard A. Posner. O objetivo é explicitar suas principais características e contornos, bem como sua repulsa pela teorização abstrata e pelos debates e argumentos morais na decisão judicial. A partir disso, pretende-se refutar parte dessa abordagem pragmática, por meio de argumentos levantados por filósofos morais e profissionais do direito a saber: Ronald Dworkin, Charles Fried, Anthony Kronman, John T. Noonan Jr e Martha C. Nussbaum - em defesa de uma abordagem que prega a inevitável utilização do raciocínio teórico, assim como a argumentação e reflexão moral na resolução de casos difíceis relacionados ao direito. Também será destacado como a repulsa pragmática pela teoria moral e abstrata é incompatível com a conjuntura justeórica contemporânea e como a análise de alguns casos difíceis expõe a falibilidade, ainda que parcial, desse estilo de abordagem pregado por Posner. / This paper presents a critical analysis of the way of approaching legal cases and rendering judicial decisions called Pragmatic Adjudication, disseminated by the magistrate and American professor Richard A. Posner. The aim is to explain its main features and contours, as well as his repulsion for abstract theorizing and moral debates and arguments in judicial decision. Based on that, it is intended to refute part of this pragmatic approach using arguments raised by moral philosophers and legal professionals - namely: Ronald Dworkin, Charles Fried, Anthony Kronman, John T. Noonan, Jr. and Martha C. Nussbaum - in defense of an approach that preaches the inevitable use of theoretical reasoning, as well as moral argumentation and reflection to solve hard cases. It will also be highlighted how the pragmatic rejection by moral and abstract theory is incompatible with the contemporary legal theory situation and how the analysis of some hard cases partly exposes the fallibility of this style of approach preached by Posner

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / Este trabalho apresenta uma análise crítica à forma de se abordar casos jurídicos e proferir decisões judiciais denominada abordagem judicial pragmática, disseminada pelo magistrado e professor norte-americano Richard A. Posner. O objetivo é explicitar suas principais características e contornos, bem como sua repulsa pela teorização abstrata e pelos debates e argumentos morais na decisão judicial. A partir disso, pretende-se refutar parte dessa abordagem pragmática, por meio de argumentos levantados por filósofos morais e profissionais do direito a saber: Ronald Dworkin, Charles Fried, Anthony Kronman, John T. Noonan Jr e Martha C. Nussbaum - em defesa de uma abordagem que prega a inevitável utilização do raciocínio teórico, assim como a argumentação e reflexão moral na resolução de casos difíceis relacionados ao direito. Também será destacado como a repulsa pragmática pela teoria moral e abstrata é incompatível com a conjuntura justeórica contemporânea e como a análise de alguns casos difíceis expõe a falibilidade, ainda que parcial, desse estilo de abordagem pregado por Posner. / This paper presents a critical analysis of the way of approaching legal cases and rendering judicial decisions called Pragmatic Adjudication, disseminated by the magistrate and American professor Richard A. Posner. The aim is to explain its main features and contours, as well as his repulsion for abstract theorizing and moral debates and arguments in judicial decision. Based on that, it is intended to refute part of this pragmatic approach using arguments raised by moral philosophers and legal professionals - namely: Ronald Dworkin, Charles Fried, Anthony Kronman, John T. Noonan, Jr. and Martha C. Nussbaum - in defense of an approach that preaches the inevitable use of theoretical reasoning, as well as moral argumentation and reflection to solve hard cases. It will also be highlighted how the pragmatic rejection by moral and abstract theory is incompatible with the contemporary legal theory situation and how the analysis of some hard cases partly exposes the fallibility of this style of approach preached by Posner

In the present article, the authors evaluate the psychological effects of the “illicit test”. To do this, they start delimiting their concept, and then analyze if it has any influence on the judge when resolving a case. Based on psychological considerations, in particular, the so-called “motivated reasoning” theory and the “motivated justice hypothesis”, they evaluate by an empirical study if the judges take this test into account when deciding, despite being legally bound to Not do it. In addition, they propose some mechanisms that could be used, both by litigants and by legal systems, to mitigate the effects of illicit veidence. / En el presente artículo, los autores evalúan los efectos psicológicos de la “prueba ilícita”. Para ello, parten de delimitar su concepto, para luego analizar si esta tiene alguna influencia en el juez al momento de resolver un caso. Partiendo de consideraciones psicológicas, en concreto, la llamada teoría del “razonamiento motivado” y la “hipótesis de la justicia motivada”, evalúan mediante un estudio empírico si los jueces toman en cuenta dicha prueba al momento de decidir, pese a estar obligados legalmente a no hacerlo. Adicionalmente, proponen algunos mecanismos que podrían ser empleados, tanto por los litigantes como por los sistemas jurídicos, para mitigar los efectos de la prueba ilícita.

In this essay two basic legal concepts, judicial decision and adjudication, are explored in the light of the discipline of Peruvian Civil Procedure Code of 1993 (CPC). This analysis is made from an analyticdogmatic perspective, aiming to show that an adequate use of those concepts is decisive to solve practical problems, foremost in the field of the appeal. / En el presente trabajo se exploran dos conceptos jurídicos básicos, resolución judicial y decisión, a la luz de la regulación del Código Procesal Civil peruano de 1993 (CPC). Este análisis se realiza a partir de un enfoque analítico-dogmático, buscando demostrar que un adecuado trabajo con dichos conceptos es decisivo para resolver problemas prácticos, sobre todo en el ámbito de la impugnación.

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