The purpose of this study has been to investigate the prospects for identifying and prosecuting individuals suspected of war crimes, within the process of exclusion from refugee status under article 1F(a) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and using subsequent mechanisms for extradition or prosecution in international criminal law. A number of principles within human rights law and public international law have been advocated by the UNCHR and several human rights NGOs as necessary for a thorough application of the exclusion clauses; one that takes individual responsibility into account and upholds the aims and purposes of the exclusion clauses. There is a discussion as to whether specialised or accelerated exclusion procedures are justified for reasons of security and efficiency, or if they put the rights of the individual at risk and limit the opportunities for gathering information to support investigation and prosecution of the crime in question. Apart from the instruments of asylum law and procedure that have emerged within the EU harmonisation process, there are no general, binding rules on the procedural aspects of the exclusion clauses. One principle that regulates the consequences for the individual of exclusion from refugee status and decisions on extradition is, however, the principle of non-refoulement. Although partly contested in state practice, there is widespread consensus in international jurisprudence and doctrine that the principle, following its status as a jus cogens rule, prohibits every state from returning any individual to a territory where he or she may face torture or other cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment, irrespective of any security risks that the individual may pose to the custodial state. Extradition or prosecution of individuals suspected of crimes under article 1F(a), based on universal jurisdiction and the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, has gained increased support from international conventions, such as the 1948 Convention on Genocide and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The principles are widely upheld by human rights NGOs, and tendencies in practice and policy among the member states of the EU and the parties to the Rome Statute point towards the development of a customary rule of universal jurisdiction among these states. Continuing resistance to the Rome Statute and to universal jurisdiction among influential states such as the USA, Russia, China and India nevertheless serves to exclude these states from being bound by such an emerging customary rule of universal jurisdiction. There are compelling arguments as to why breaches of jus cogens-rules should include or give rise to erga omnes rights or obligations for all states to exercise universal jurisdiction over such breaches. Without the support of major states it is, however, difficult to establish the existence of the general state acceptance of universal jurisdiction as is required for the principle to attain jus cogens-status and become universally applicable, regardless of state consent. Future prospects for adequate and efficient identification and prosecution of suspected war criminals depend on the correct and thorough application of the exclusion clauses, in combination with the development of existing rules of universal jurisdiction, and not least on the willingness and ability of states to overcome the political, economic and institutional obstacles that presently may prevent many states from extraditing or prosecuting individuals who fall within the scope of article 1F(a) of the exclusion clauses.

This thesis examines problems concerning international standard-essential patent licensing disputes within the EU from a private international law perspective. Furthermore, it seeks to analyse the jurisdictional rules which are established by the Brussels Ia Regulation when applied to cross-border SEP licensing disputes. The backdrop for the present study is the system of international standardisation and the licensing of those patents which are essential to the implementation of a technical standard. It is primarily concerned with EU law as it relates to technical standardisation in the field of telecommunications, since it plays a significant role in today’s global information society. As a rule, SEP holders make a commitment to license their essential patents according to terms which are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND). In order to fulfil the aim of the thesis, the legal nature of such a FRAND commitment has been examined, finding that it should be characterised as an enforceable contract for the benefit of third parties. Patent rights have traditionally been thought of as territorial in nature, which raises questions regarding the possibilities for cross-border enforcement, as well as how the rules on jurisdiction should be applied by national courts in the EU when faced with international disputes where the subject matter is considered to be, to an extent, territorially bound. One of the fundamental questions that arise out of this is how, in the context of SEP licensing, the legal framework for SEP disputes affects the application of the jurisdictional rules in cross-border cases. As a consequence of the lack of harmonisation as well as legal regulation and guidance relating to SEP licensing, individual courts in Europe have developed their own distinct approaches and methodologies in SEP disputes. There is a risk that this lack of uniformity leads not only to greater legal uncertainty, but also widespread patent litigation. In particular, recent case law from Germany and the United Kingdom has been influential in creating a precedent that national courts are able to set FRAND licensing terms which are global in scope. This has led to certain courts taking a more active approach in international SEP disputes—even if they concern foreign patents—granting injunctions which in some cases seek to limit the jurisdiction of foreign courts. It seems to follow from this that a ‘race to the courthouse’ is to be expected in SEP disputes, which is further facilitated by the ample room for forum shopping that exists in the Brussels Ia Regulation. Lastly, the thesis also deals, in part, with the new unitary patent system, as well as the Unified Patent Court and the question of how the UPC may come to affect the future of SEP disputes within the EU. Appropriate solutions to the identified problems are discussed, favouring either a concentration of SEP litigation to one forum, or the development of guiding principles so as to increase legal certainty.

The EU jurisdictional scheme, known as the “Brussels Regime”, confers competence to national courts to adjudicate over international matters. The main rule in Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation sets out that the defendant should generally be sued in the courts of the Member State where he is domiciled. For certain subject matters, the scheme allows the action to be brought elsewhere. The raison d’être is to provide an adequate counterbalance to the one-sided rule of Article 4(1). Articles 7(1) and (2) enable the claimant to launch the suit, “in matters relating to a contract”, at the court of the Member State where the contractual obligation was to be fulfilled, and, in “matters relating to tort”, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred. Whether to invoke Article 7 is entirely the claimant’s choice, but the final decision on its interpretation is vested in the Court. Thereby, the manner in which the Court views the provisions will effectively decide the extent of the claimant’s choice to invoke so-called special jurisdiction. It also means that greater emphasis on special jurisdiction will reduce the importance of the main rule in Article 4. Conversely, if the Court were to interpret Article 7 narrowly, its intended effect within the system would be denied. In both cases, the balance between Articles 4 and 7 has been upset. In the former case, the claimant is favoured because of the increased possibilities to choose the forum for the dispute, while in the latter case, the defendant is favoured because he retains the advantage of litigating in his home turf. The starting point for this essay is this very idea of a purported balance between litigants’ interests in EU cross-border litigation. The thesis analyses whether the Court’s case-law on general vis-à-vis special jurisdiction has transitioned from being generally defendant-friendly to claimant-friendly. It is argued that already from the first judgments rendered on the original Brussels Convention in 1976, increasingly more disputes have been launched at special fora, which has amounted to a claimant-friendly scheme. It is also argued that this development has been at the expense of the defendant. Greater choice for the claimant means in turn that the defendant’s ability to foresee before what courts he may be sued has been largely impaired. The thesis highlights how this imbalance is the result of inherent challenges in the Brussels Regime, particularly in relation to how the relevant connecting factors are designated. It is proposed that the unwanted effects of the Court’s practice as well as the shortcomings of the scheme itself are to be considered in the Commission’s evaluationof the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which is presently in the works.