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The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers
to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is
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Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
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Showing 11 to 15 of 15 (0.016 seconds)| 11 |
結構型債券不當銷售爭議與投資人保護之法律問題 / The improper-selling of structured notes and the legal issues for structured notes investors protection.謝巧君, Hsieh, Chiao Chun Unknown Date (has links)
自2008年5月起，國內發生了向銀行購買號稱保本或條件式保本的結構型債券的投資人，因所購買之結構債觸及下限，導致本金大賠，而這些投資人無法承受損失，組成自救會要向銀行討回投資本金的事件；同年9月美國雷曼兄弟公司倒閉，購買連結該公司股票，或購買由該公司及其子公司發行或保證之結構債之受害投資人要求銀行全額買回不當銷售之結構債，另外投資人亦多向銀行主管機關行政院金融監督管理委員會、民意代表等提出陳情，指稱銀行在販售結構債時，並沒有善盡事前告知的義務，加上用詐欺或誘導等方式進行不當行銷勸誘，並對應告知投資人的重要事項僅為選擇性的說明，且更有理專在簽約書面文件中偽造其已告知投資人相關風險及資訊，因此造成銀行不當銷售結構債等金融商品的議題受到重視及討論。
我國傳統上面對金融商品係針對個別商品之架構（例如有價證券或期貨）而採不同的監理規範，惟此種立法係以商品得以明確定性為前提，然在財務工程技術不斷推陳出新，金融創新成為趨勢的現在，混合傳統商品所推出的新型態金融商品就應如何定性及適用法律，即為監理及投資人保護法制上的新課題。
此外，從民眾經由銀行推介而投資結構型債券而生的糾紛可發現，銀行在向民眾推介購買金融商品時，常發生糾紛的類型多可歸類為未推薦符合客戶風險屬性商品的商品適合性（suitability）不符，以及銷售時未確實對於該項商品可能產生的風險完整告知。故有關商品適合性及告知義務在我國法上的規範及內容，及對於違反商品適合性及告知義務時，受害投資人若要提起相關訴訟時，應該如何主張自身的權益，亦為本文研究的重心。
本文於第壹章提出本文研究動機及研究方法，第貳章則介紹結構型債券的種類及風險，並嘗試替結構債進行法律定性，第參章分析銀行辦理財富管理業務時，應遵守之法規範，同時介紹國內銀行受投資人委託投資結構債之規定，並附論主管機關因結構債銷售爭議事件發生，而對結構型商品所增訂的管制規範，以及我國統一管理金融服務業銷售行為規範的金融服務業法。第肆章為分析國內銀行不當銷售結構債予一般投資人之法律爭議，並介紹國外實務案例，以及國外有關違反忠實義務及注意義務的判斷標準；另從我國現行法制下檢討受到銀行不當銷售之投資人可能得主張銀行損害賠償之請求權基礎，並觀察與分析我國目前利用銀行公會評議機制處理投資人申訴之情形；第伍章介紹英國2000年金融服務暨市場法中，關於消費者遇到金融商品服務相關糾紛時得採用的申訴機制，並介紹日本金融商品販賣法及金融商品交易法中對銷售行為管制相關規定；另附論該國實務界對於金融機構不當銷售時，對投資人應負的責任，以及該國實務界調節損害賠償責任的方式；第陸章為結論及建議，將提出我國目前法制對不當銷售之問題面臨的挑戰，尤其是於金融商品交易資訊不對稱的情形下，投資人提起商品適合性與金融機構未盡告知義務訴訟時產生的難題，並提供相關建議。
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Aspects of money laundering in South African lawVan Jaarsveld, Izelde Louise 04 1900 (has links)
Money laundering involves activities which are aimed at concealing benefits that were acquired
through criminal means for the purpose of making them appear legitimately acquired. Money
laundering promotes criminal activities in South Africa because it allows criminals to keep the
benefits that they acquired through their criminal activities. It takes place through a variety of
schemes which include the use of banks. In this sense money laundering control is based on the
premise that banks must be protected from providing criminals with the means to launder the
benefits of their criminal activities.
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (‘FICA’) in aggregate with the
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (‘POCA’) form the backbone of South Africa’s
anti-money laundering regime. Like its international counterparts FICA imposes onerous duties
on banks seeing that they are most often used by criminals as conduits to launder the benefits of
crime. In turn, POCA criminalises activities in relation to the benefits of crime and delineates
civil proceedings aimed at forfeiting the benefits of crime to the state. This study identifies the
idiosyncrasies of the South African anti-money laundering regime and forwards
recommendations aimed at improving its structure.
To this end nine issues in relation to money laundering control and banks are investigated.
The investigation fundamentally reveals that money laundering control holds unforeseen
consequences for banks. In particular, a bank that receives the benefits of crimes such as fraud
or theft faces prosecution if it fails to heed FICA’s money laundering control duties, for example,
the filing of a suspicious transaction report. However, if the bank files a suspicious transaction
report, it may be sued in civil court by the customer for breach of contract. In addition, if the bank
parted with the benefits of fraud or theft whilst suspecting that the account holder may not be
entitled to payment thereof, it may be sued by the victim of fraud or theft who seeks to recover
loss suffered at the hand of the fraudster or thief from the bank.
Ultimately, this study illustrates that amendment of some of the provisions of South
Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation should enable banks to manage the aforementioned
and other unforeseen consequences of money laundering control whilst at the same time
contribute to the South African anti-money laundering effort. / Criminal and Procedural Law / Mercantile Law / LL.D.
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| 13 |
Aspects of money laundering in South African lawVan Jaarsveld, Izelde Louise 04 1900 (has links)
Money laundering involves activities which are aimed at concealing benefits that were acquired
through criminal means for the purpose of making them appear legitimately acquired. Money
laundering promotes criminal activities in South Africa because it allows criminals to keep the
benefits that they acquired through their criminal activities. It takes place through a variety of
schemes which include the use of banks. In this sense money laundering control is based on the
premise that banks must be protected from providing criminals with the means to launder the
benefits of their criminal activities.
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (‘FICA’) in aggregate with the
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (‘POCA’) form the backbone of South Africa’s
anti-money laundering regime. Like its international counterparts FICA imposes onerous duties
on banks seeing that they are most often used by criminals as conduits to launder the benefits of
crime. In turn, POCA criminalises activities in relation to the benefits of crime and delineates
civil proceedings aimed at forfeiting the benefits of crime to the state. This study identifies the
idiosyncrasies of the South African anti-money laundering regime and forwards
recommendations aimed at improving its structure.
To this end nine issues in relation to money laundering control and banks are investigated.
The investigation fundamentally reveals that money laundering control holds unforeseen
consequences for banks. In particular, a bank that receives the benefits of crimes such as fraud
or theft faces prosecution if it fails to heed FICA’s money laundering control duties, for example,
the filing of a suspicious transaction report. However, if the bank files a suspicious transaction
report, it may be sued in civil court by the customer for breach of contract. In addition, if the bank
parted with the benefits of fraud or theft whilst suspecting that the account holder may not be
entitled to payment thereof, it may be sued by the victim of fraud or theft who seeks to recover
loss suffered at the hand of the fraudster or thief from the bank.
Ultimately, this study illustrates that amendment of some of the provisions of South
Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation should enable banks to manage the aforementioned
and other unforeseen consequences of money laundering control whilst at the same time
contribute to the South African anti-money laundering effort. / Criminal and Procedural Law / Mercantile Law / LL.D.
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| 14 |
Legal and regulatory aspects of mobile financial servicesPerlman, Leon Joseph 11 1900 (has links)
The thesis deals with the emergence of bank and non-bank entities that provide a range of unique
transaction-based payment services broadly called Mobile Financial Services (MFS) to unbanked,
underserved and underbanked persons via mobile phones.
Models of MFS from Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), banks, combinations of MNOs and banks, and
independent Mobile Financial Services Providers are covered. Provision by non-banks of ‘bank-type’
services via mobile phones has been termed ‘transformational banking’ versus the ‘additive banking’
services from banks. All involve the concept of ‘branchless banking’ whereby ‘cash-in/cash out’ services
are provided through ‘agents.’
Funds for MFS payments may available through a Stored Value Product (SVP), particularly through a
Stored Value Account SVP variant offered by MNOs where value is stored as a redeemable fiat- or mobile
‘airtime’-based Store of Value.
The competitive, legal, technical and regulatory nature of non-bank versus bank MFS models is discussed,
in particular the impact of banking, payments, money laundering, telecommunications, e-commerce and
consumer protection laws. Whether funding mechanisms for SVPs may amount to deposit-taking such that
entities could be engaged in the ‘business of banking’ is discussed. The continued use of ‘deposit’ as the
traditional trigger for the ‘business of banking’ is investigated, alongside whether transaction and paymentcentric
MFS rises to the ‘business of banking.’
An extensive evaluation of ‘money’ based on the Orthodox and Claim School economic theories is
undertaken in relation to SVPs used in MFS, their legal associations and import, and whether they may be
deemed ‘money’ in law.
Consumer protection for MFS and payments generally through current statute, contract, and payment law
and common law condictiones are found to be wanting. Possible regulatory arbitrage in relation to MFS in
South African law is discussed.
The legal and regulatory regimes in the European Union, Kenya and the United States of America are
compared with South Africa. The need for a coordinated payments-specific law that has consumer
protections, enables proportional risk-based licensing of new non-bank providers of MFS, and allows for a
regulator for retail payments is recommended. The use of trust companies and trust accounts is
recommended for protection of user funds.
| vi / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LLD
|
| 15 |
Legal and regulatory aspects of mobile financial servicesPerlman, Leon Joseph 11 1900 (has links)
The thesis deals with the emergence of bank and non-bank entities that provide a range of unique
transaction-based payment services broadly called Mobile Financial Services (MFS) to unbanked,
underserved and underbanked persons via mobile phones.
Models of MFS from Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), banks, combinations of MNOs and banks, and
independent Mobile Financial Services Providers are covered. Provision by non-banks of ‘bank-type’
services via mobile phones has been termed ‘transformational banking’ versus the ‘additive banking’
services from banks. All involve the concept of ‘branchless banking’ whereby ‘cash-in/cash out’ services
are provided through ‘agents.’
Funds for MFS payments may available through a Stored Value Product (SVP), particularly through a
Stored Value Account SVP variant offered by MNOs where value is stored as a redeemable fiat- or mobile
‘airtime’-based Store of Value.
The competitive, legal, technical and regulatory nature of non-bank versus bank MFS models is discussed,
in particular the impact of banking, payments, money laundering, telecommunications, e-commerce and
consumer protection laws. Whether funding mechanisms for SVPs may amount to deposit-taking such that
entities could be engaged in the ‘business of banking’ is discussed. The continued use of ‘deposit’ as the
traditional trigger for the ‘business of banking’ is investigated, alongside whether transaction and paymentcentric
MFS rises to the ‘business of banking.’
An extensive evaluation of ‘money’ based on the Orthodox and Claim School economic theories is
undertaken in relation to SVPs used in MFS, their legal associations and import, and whether they may be
deemed ‘money’ in law.
Consumer protection for MFS and payments generally through current statute, contract, and payment law
and common law condictiones are found to be wanting. Possible regulatory arbitrage in relation to MFS in
South African law is discussed.
The legal and regulatory regimes in the European Union, Kenya and the United States of America are
compared with South Africa. The need for a coordinated payments-specific law that has consumer
protections, enables proportional risk-based licensing of new non-bank providers of MFS, and allows for a
regulator for retail payments is recommended. The use of trust companies and trust accounts is
recommended for protection of user funds.
| vi / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LL. D.
|
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