Spelling suggestions: "subject:"langton"" "subject:"jangton""
1 |
Kant and the Nonspatiality of Things in ThemselvesWeyls, John Matthew 01 December 2016 (has links)
ABSTRACT Kant says that space has no independently real existence. What he means is that apart from the human mind, space is not real. Of course, it is real to us, he argues—in fact, space is the very condition that makes possible an experience of objects in space. However, space and time are mere forms of human sensibility, and as such: That which is not sensed is neither spatial nor temporal. With regard to space, commentators have argued that although they are inclined to accept that space is a form of human sensibility—a subjective condition of thought or mode by which representations (empirical) are manifest in intuition—nevertheless, space might be a feature of a world that exists independent of the mind. These commentators accuse Kant of having neglected two possibilities: (1) that the representation of space is both subjective and objective at once—that is, a subjective condition of human sensible intuition yet an “objective” quality of a mind-independent reality; and (2) that although the representation of space in sensible intuition is subjective, as Kant suggests, it could be the case that things as they are in themselves exist in space, independent of human sensibility. The focus of the following chapters is first to consider Kant’s subjectivity thesis in its strongest sense—the view that space and time are mere forms of human sensibility. Second, I address the alternative to the view that things in themselves are nonspatial—the alternative that Kant is alleged to have neglected. Finally, I consider responses to “neglected alternative” proponents. For the underlying question is this: What would lead us to believe that although things appear to us in space (and time), that is, side-by-side with other things, that this is not really so? I argue that Kant gives us good reason to think that this is not so, provided we accept his arguments for the subjectivity of space.
|
2 |
Sebereplikace v celulárních systémech / Self-Replication in Cellular SystemsKomenda, Tomáš Unknown Date (has links)
This thesis deals with cellular systems and their applications to self - replication data structures. The sector cellular automats is a very interesting and inspiring area which seems now as a very suitable environment for the simulation of various phenomen. One of these phenomen may be, for example, artificial life or self- replication the structure, which transmits some useful information or carry out the necessary calculations. In this thesis is detailed subscribe cellular automats and their division. It focuses on Langtons loop, Codds automata, Byls loop, Chou-Reggia loop, Tempesti loop, Perrier loop, SDSR loop, Evoloop and Sexyloop. Part of the work is to accelerate replication Byls loops through change to the rules of cellular automat and the addition of functionality to the ability to release space to the completion of replication loops. At thesis, I also dealt with the evolutionary design of the rules of cellular automata.
|
3 |
結構性宰制:反反色情到反分級 / Structural domination: from anti-antipornography to anti-censorship黃頌竹 Unknown Date (has links)
言論分級的辦法,特別是與性有關的言論分級,往往持著「保護未成年人」的立場落實於政策中。將這種對未成年人的言論限制手段,透過個人道德的論述,建構成一個對於未成年人之人格及人身安全的保護措施。然而在這個巧妙的論述之下,卻掩蓋不住底下騷動不已的權力角逐。
回顧二十世紀八○年代的反色情女性主義論述,麥金儂直接指出「色情」的問題從來就不只是一個道德問題,而是關於政治、關於權力、關於社會結構的問題。事實是,種種對於未成年人可以接觸的資訊、言論施加之限制,也從來都不只是道德問題,而是(如女性主義者尖銳而正確的見解指出的)一個關於政治、權力、結構的問題。言論不只是意見,言論是具有能動性(agency)的。麥金儂表示言論對於社會現實的建構有著莫大的影響力,藍騰更使用奧斯汀的行動(performativity)理論來說明言論的能力。而巴特勒儘管在結論上反對反色情女性主義推動言論管制,卻也是基於肯定言論的行動力,對於言論管制往往剝奪傷害性言論的受害者在言說場域裡能夠自我賦權的機會,更透過公權力對此類言論與歧視結構的肯認,而有強化這個受害者結構的危機。
我將從巴特勒對言論管制手段的批判,以及對於如何透過言說關係的再利用,來試圖顛覆既有的權力關係。現有的所謂「保護」未成年人之言論限制政策,其實一方面是鞏固成年人對未成年人之權力關係,另一方面也是將未成年人的教育視為成年人彼此爭奪權力的場域。我將論證言論的管制策略不僅無法達到「保護」的效果,更是對未成年人之主體性建立的直接傷害:如果言論有建構社會結構,以及建構主體在社會結構中的位置之能力,剝奪這項能力,就是在剝奪未成年人透過性言論與現實世界進行交互辯證的能力,並剝奪其建立以及發展自我主體性之重要工具。
|
Page generated in 0.0205 seconds