Dans cette thèse de doctorat, je m’attache à interpréter, à systématiser et à soumettre à un examen critique la pensée politique du droit de Hannah Arendt. En effet, alors que le versant politique de cette œuvre a fait l’objet d’une attention tout à fait considérable, on n’a toujours pas pris la mesure de l’intérêt évident de la philosophe pour le droit et les institutions juridiques et judiciaires les plus essentielles. Or, selon la thèse que je défends, l’une des raisons qui expliquent l’originalité de cette pensée et son caractère stimulant est à chercher du côté du positionnement qu’elle adopte vis-à-vis de la question du droit.<p><p>Pour atteindre ces différents objectifs, ma thèse est structurée en deux grandes parties qui correspondent à deux points de vue que l’on peut adopter par rapport au droit et qui se révèlent tout à fait opératoires si l’on accède à une vision panoramique des écrits dispersés qu’Arendt a consacrés au droit. Je distingue ainsi, et ne cesse de faire dialoguer dans ma thèse, le « pôle objectif » (première partie) et le « pôle subjectif » (seconde partie) de la philosophie du droit de Hannah Arendt.<p>1/ Dans la première partie de mon étude, je montre comment la philosophe s’attache, dans ses livres les plus célèbres, à construire des modèles politiques qui ont tous pour particularité d’être aussi – et de manière indissociable – des modèles juridiques. a) Mon premier chapitre est dédié à l’intérêt manifesté par Hannah Arendt pour les sources de l’Antiquité, et vise en particulier à clarifier le rapport qu’elle entretient vis-à-vis des sources romaines. b) Dans mon deuxième chapitre, je propose une interprétation de sa réflexion consacrée aux deux grandes révolutions modernes de la fin du XVIIIe siècle, les Révolutions française et américaine. Je mets en lumière de quelle façon Arendt, en s’inspirant du précédent américain, élabore un modèle républicain et peut ainsi approfondir sa conception de l’articulation entre droit et politique. c) Dans mon troisième chapitre, je précise les contours d’un contre-modèle élaboré par Arendt dans ses premiers écrits politiques d’envergure, ceux qu’elle a consacrés au totalitarisme.<p>2/ Dans la seconde partie de mon étude, je me concentre sur le « pôle subjectif » de la philosophie de mon auteur :j’indique comment Arendt mobilise des situations existentielles limites pour penser la condition de l’homme contemporain. a) Dans mon quatrième chapitre, je montre que c’est à partir de la situation des réfugiés et des apatrides de l’entre-deux-guerres que Hannah Arendt nous invite à repenser non seulement les droits de l’homme, mais aussi leur titulaire, que j’appelle l’« homme des droits de l’homme ». b) Dans mon cinquième chapitre, je m’attache à mettre en évidence, dans toutes ses nuances, la figure du « juge » que Hannah Arendt s’attache à reconstituer après avoir assisté au procès d’Adolf Eichmann, après avoir ressenti ce que je nomme le « choc » du procès Eichmann. c) Dans mon sixième et dernier chapitre, enfin, je m’interroge sur les raisons profondes qui incitent Arendt à voir dans les grandes campagnes de désobéissance civile qui éclatent aux États-Unis durant les années 1950 et 1960, non le signe d’un déclin des institutions, mais, au contraire, la marque d’une renaissance de l’action citoyenne.<p><p>Je conclus en synthétisant l’apport de Hannah Arendt à notre pensée juridique. Dans cette œuvre, le droit n’apparaît jamais comme une simple contrainte extérieure pour la politique, ni comme son « supplément d’âme », mais comme sa condition d’existence :en conférant à la liberté politique ses limites, limites spatiales mais aussi relationnelles et temporelles, en lui offrant un cadre stable au sein duquel elle peut s’épanouir, le droit n’ampute pas la politique d’une part d’elle-même mais, au contraire, participe de sa constitution. Me fondant sur trois catégories centrales de la réflexion juridique (législation, constitution, juridiction), je souligne en outre tout l’intérêt d’une confrontation approfondie et détaillée entre l’œuvre arendtienne et les questions classiques et contemporaines qui animent le champ de la théorie et de la philosophie du droit, ce qui me permet d’ouvrir un certain nombre de perspectives de recherches futures.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

La thèse de doctorat est consacrée au principe ex injuria jus non oritur qui signifie littéralement que le droit ne naît pas du fait illicite. Alors qu’il est incidemment évoqué par la doctrine ou la jurisprudence comme un principe général du droit international public, il n’a jamais fait l’objet d’une étude systématique destinée à en vérifier l’existence, à en mesurer la portée, à en interroger les limites et à en expliciter les soubassements théoriques. C’est cette lacune que la thèse entend combler, dans une perspective relevant de la théorie du droit international. <p><p>Dans une première partie, il s’agit de se demander si ce principe a été reconnu en droit international public, et dans l’affirmative d’en déterminer la portée juridique. La maxime ex injuria jus non oritur ne pouvant être réduite à une règle juridique particulière, la question qui se pose est plutôt de savoir si on peut la qualifier de principe du droit international public qui, sans constituer une source formelle de l’ordre juridique, permet d’expliquer la logique sous-jacente à certaines règles du droit international. Les expressions de ce principe visent d’abord des situations dans lesquelles on remet en cause la validité d’un acte juridique issu de la violation du droit international (invalidité du titre de souveraineté relatif à un territoire acquis ou occupé illégalement, invalidité de l’acte juridique adopté par une autorité illégale, nullité d’un traité dont la conclusion a été obtenue par une contrainte illicite, inadmissibilité comme preuve d’une déclaration obtenue sous la torture, invalidité d’une saisie ou d’une arrestation illégale, invalidité d’un ordre illégal émis par un supérieur hiérarchique). Dans une perspective parallèle, on retrouve le principe dans la règle selon laquelle la violation du droit international ne remet pas en cause sa validité, règle valable dans le domaine du droit des traités, de la coutume ou de la responsabilité internationale. A côté de cette dimension « objective » (dans la mesure où elle recouvre un problème de validité), une dimension plus « subjective » apparaît dans les relations entre sujets du droit international. Ainsi, l’auteur d’une violation du droit international ne peut s’en prévaloir pour revendiquer des droits, et doit plutôt en effacer les conséquences. De même, les Etats tiers ne peuvent reconnaître comme licite une situation résultant de la violation grave d’une norme impérative de droit international, ni ne peuvent prêter aide ou assistance au maintien de cette situation. A l’issue de la première partie de la thèse, on peut établir un constat nuancé :le principe ex injuria jus non oritur constitue un principe général, qui peut être induit de diverses règles de droit international positif, règles qu’il permet d’interpréter en en explicitant l’objet et le but. En même temps, cette existence ne peut être comprise que moyennant une définition stricte et limitée de ce principe, lequel ne prescrit pas, comme on aurait pu s’y attendre, qu’aucun droit ne puisse jamais résulter d’une violation du droit. En premier lieu, et au travers des différents exemples qui viennent d’être mentionnés, on peut remarquer que seules des violations graves —et non des irrégularités mineures— sont de nature à empêcher la création de droits (ainsi, par exemple, dans le domaine de la récolte de preuve). En second lieu, on remarque que seuls les droits qui découleraient directement (dans le sens où ils en consacreraient juridiquement les effets) d’une violation grave du droit ne peuvent être valablement reconnus (ainsi, par exemple, des actes quotidiens d’administration posés par un occupant illégal peuvent être reconnus, ces actes n’étant pas intrinsèquement liés à ce statut d’occupant illégal). Ce n’est que dans cette double mesure que l’on peut affirmer que, en droit international positif, il existe un principe général exprimé par la maxime ex injuria jus non oritur.<p><p>Dans la seconde partie de la thèse, le principe est confronté, d’une part (volet empirique) à des précédents dans lesquels il semble avoir été mis à mal (certaines situations semblant avoir résulté de violations graves du principe impératif de l’interdiction du recours à la force) et, d’autre part (volet théorique), à des théories du droit international susceptibles d’en expliquer à la fois le fonctionnement et les limites. Le volet empirique s’appuie sur une étude de cas :la reconnaissance du Bangladesh à la suite d’une intervention militaire de l’Inde au Pakistan, la reconnaissance des gouvernements installés au Cambodge à la suite de l’intervention militaire du Vietnam, la validité des accords conclus par la Yougoslavie à la suite de l’intervention militaire de l’OTAN, la reconnaissance du Kosovo en 2008, et l’administration de l’Irak après l’intervention militaire de 2003. Si le principe ex injuria jus non oritur est sans doute malmené dans les faits, il ne l’est pas dans le discours officiel des Etats, lesquels n’assument pas une remise en cause d’un principe dont ils reconnaissent par ailleurs (comme montré dans la première partie de la thèse) la validité. On peut se demander si cette tension entre un discours légaliste et une réalité parfois caractérisée par la force des effectivités, est susceptible d’être comprise au regard de certaines doctrines qui traitent des relations entre le fait et le droit. Ce volet spécifiquement théorique de la recherche consiste à examiner deux approches, par hypothèses opposées. La première pourrait suggérer une consécration du principe par le biais de la théorie normativiste élaborée par Hans Kelsen. Selon cette théorie, le droit (international) se définirait comme un ensemble cohérent de normes, chaque norme juridique tirant sa validité d’une autre norme juridique valide, ce qui semble exclure qu’une norme puisse s’appuyer sur une violation du droit. A l’analyse, le normativisme paraît néanmoins réfractaire à une reconnaissance du principe ex injuria jus non oritur, la validité du droit ne pouvant être détachée de toute considération fondée sur l’effectivité, et celle-ci pouvant même le cas échéant aboutir à la consécration d’une situation résultant d’une violation du droit. A l’opposé, on pourrait s’attendre à ce que l’approche critique, définie par référence aux travaux de l’ « école de Reims » qui se sont développés autour de Charles Chaumont, rejette ex injuria jus non oritur comme une maxime formaliste et fictive, la force du fait, et plus spécifiquement du rapport de forces, prévalant dans la réalité sociale comme facteur générateur de la création et de l’interprétation de la règle de droit. Ici encore, on détecte une certaine ambiguïté chez les auteurs analysés, lesquels ont recours en certaines occasions au droit comme à un instrument de lutte qui s’opposerait à la force et à la puissance. Finalement, la confrontation des approches normativiste et critique laisse apparaître un fil conducteur :le principe ex injuria jus non oritur n’est que le révélateur des difficultés, non seulement en pratique (comme l’a montré le volet empirique) mais aussi en théorie, de concilier les exigences idéalistes du respect du droit avec les impératifs réalistes de prendre en compte la force du fait.<p><p>En conclusion, le principe ex injuria jus non oritur se caractérise surtout par cette tension entre le droit et le fait, qui permet également d’expliquer les ambiguïtés observées dans la première partie, le principe n’étant admis en droit positif que moyennant une définition restrictive ouvrant à une certaine souplesse. Cette tension renvoie d’ailleurs à la question de l’existence même du droit international, lequel peut être présenté comme une forme sophistiquée de discours, et non comme un corps de règles régissant effectivement la réalité sociale. Dans cette perspective, il est intéressant de constater que, au-delà des stratégies discursives des Etats qui tentent de justifier certains faits accomplis sans remettre en cause le principe de légalité, il est certains précédents (comme celui du Bangladesh) où ces Etats restent tout simplement silencieux par rapport à cette question. Ainsi, l’analyse du principe ex injuria jus non oritur à l’épreuve de la pratique internationale tendrait peut-être, non pas à reconnaître la portée du principe en toute hypothèse, mais à montrer qu’au-delà d’un certain seuil de tension, le droit disparaît dans la mesure où le discours qui s’y rapporte disparaît. En définitive, la tension entre la légalité (l’existence formelle d’un ordre juridique international) et l’effectivité (laquelle ne témoigne pas toujours de l’existence de cet ordre juridique) est aussi celle qui habite le spécialiste de droit de droit international, parfois confronté aux limites de son activité et de sa discipline.<p> / Doctorat en droit / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

General Introduction<p><p>The process of the institutionalisation of law that started at the end of the 18th century was followed by a general wave of codification throughout Europe. The French codification of 1804 was exemplary for all the others. The “law in books” was complete, certain, clear, and undisputable. From then on, the law in books had priority over the “law in action”. Law in books was a critique of law in action that preceded the French Revolution. Judicial activism was proscribed, and judges were called to apply the rules issued by the legislator.<p><p>This ideal of the French Revolution is still framing our pattern of legal thinking. It is dominant throughout the 19th century with the école de l’exégèse in France, Begriffjurisprudenz in Germany, and analytical jurisprudence in Anglo-American legal systems. Legal formalism or the deductive application of rules is the only form of judicial reasoning that is allowed. The science of law, as a consequence, was confined to a theoretical support and elaboration of this judge-centred approach to law.<p><p>This view on law and legal science persisted throughout the last century. It started being criticized in the late 1960s, a critique that paved the path for a more active role of the judge. New theories of interpretation were proposed so as to supplement the law in books with theoretically justified methodologies to determine its meaning.<p><p>The findings of legal theory are still, to a large extent, premised on the central role of the judge in the legal system. Although this evolution may be applauded for having contributed to a more dynamic attitude towards the law, the role of the legislator remains largely underexposed. Legal theory takes the law as “just there”, and limits its theoretical undertakings to law as it is. Law, so it is said, is the result of political decision-making. Once it comes into being however, it is separated from politics. Politics, that is, is thought of as impure, at least when compared to the methods of legal reasoning and decision-making. <p><p>This brings us to the theme of this book. Some of the questions I propose to explore are: Where does the law come from? What are the premises of a theory that considers law separated from politics? What does it mean for a legislator to be bound to the rules of a constitution throughout the process of legislation? Does the constitution consist of rules to be followed by the legislator or is its role merely confined to be a political programme?<p><p>These and other questions frame the main problem this book proposes to deal with. They are triggered by the fact of the exponential growth of today’s legal systems. Complaints about both the increasing volume of legislation and its decreasing quality in most European countries have raised the question as to whether collaboration between legislators and legal theory can help to articulate and to solve that problem.<p><p>As a matter of fact, although the complaints are made with an ever-stronger voice, solutions are by no means obvious. Legislation as a matter of politics is not rational. Politics is a power game, resulting in compromises that are framed into a legislative or statutory structure. This power game seems to have its own logic, the results of which most of the time outweigh any other form of logic.<p><p> Legal theory for its part is considered, from the perspective of politics at least, to be a “theoretical” approach to legal problems. It contributes to the description and systematisation of existing valid law. It shows up, like Minerva’s owl, after the sunset of legislative activity. From that perspective, there is not much hope that legal theory can usefully intervene in the process of legislation or regulation, i.e. before or during the creation of rules. Legal theory then is confined to “legal science” or “legal dogmatics”.<p><p>I propose to consider the problem of legislation from another angle. The premises of the problem are that, although legislation and regulation is the result of a political process, they can be the object of a theoretical study. Using an approach analogous to e.g. Hans Kelsen in legal theory ,the main idea is not to primarily focus on the content of rules and concepts, but rather on the structure and function of legal systems. <p><p>In the approach of this book, the focal point is on problems that are common to most legal systems and not on the characteristics, viz. the content of concepts that are specific for one or more legal systems. The creation of law, so is my claim, has become a problem. <p><p>Kelsen’s approach leaves legislation and regulation – apart from their formal validity aspects – outside the scope of study. The creation of rules relies on value judgments that are according to him not fit for theoretical study. In short, the creation of legal rules is a matter of politics and politics is not fit for scientific study.<p><p>This position is an understandable one, though it is only partially acceptable. Rule creation is a matter of choice. The legitimation of this choice is found in the democratic character of the regulating process and not in some science of values. In other words, would one try to mould legislation into the frame of a science, we would face something like “scientific politics”, as Marxism propagated, and which is, for several reasons, unacceptable.<p><p>A different standpoint is to study legislative problems from the angle of legal theory. This approach I propose to call legisprudence. The object of study of legisprudence is the rational creation of legislation and regulation. As to its method, it makes use of the theoretical insights and tools of current legal theory. Whereas the latter has been dealing most of the time dealing with problems of the application of law by the judge, legisprudence explores the possibilities of the enlargement of the field of study as to include the creation of law by the legislator.<p><p>Within this new approach, a variety of new question and problems – e.g. the validity of norms, their meaning, the structure of the legal system, etc. - are raised. They are traditionally dealt with from the perspective of the judge or are taken for granted by classical legal theory. However, when shifting our attention from the judge to the legislator, the same questions arise: In what sense does the legislator have to take the systematicity of the legal order into account? What counts as a valid norm? What meanings can be created and how? to mention but a few.<p><p>Traditional legal science or legal dogmatics covers many of these questions with the cloak of sovereignty. Legislators are sovereign, they decide what will count as a valid norm, and its meaning. Whether and how a rule and its meaning fit with the legal system, is then a matter of interpretation – and this is the task of the judge and the legal scientist.<p><p>On this view, the process of legislation seems to be inappropriate for theoretical inquiry. After long decades of legalism in legal reasoning, it can be said that the dominant views in legal theory resulting from that, have precisely barred the way for inquiring into the position of the legislator. Everything happens behind the veil of sovereignty as far as legislation properly so called is concerned, and behind the veil of legality when it comes to the execution of legislative acts. These veils conceal a great part of ignorance related to the possibilities of an alternative theoretical reflection on rule making. Sovereignty itself, so one can say, creates silence about this alternative, so that it becomes “sovereignty in silence” .<p><p>Sovereignty of the ruler prevents his rules from being questioned in any other than binary terms. Validity is a good example of that. The only question that is worthwhile putting is: Is this propositional content a valid rule yes or no? As a consequence, questions on its efficacy, effectivity, efficiency, or acceptability are not in order.<p><p>The claim of legisprudence is that these questions, like others, are important ones, and that they can be analysed with the help of legal theory.<p><p>The book is divided into three parts.<p><p>In the first part, I propose to explore the three basic tenets of the Modern philosophical project as Descartes inaugurated it. These three tenets are: rationality, the individuality of the subject, and freedom. A brief sketch of what is meant by them is offered in the first chapter.<p>Rationality as it is dealt with in the Modern philosophical project means that what is rational is self-evident. Self-evidence is certainty and certainty is the mark of truth. The question for whom something is certain is however left out of view. The subject, that is, has himself immediate access to reason and truth upon the use of his rational capacities. The latter are presumed to be identical in and for all. The subject’s reflection on himself leads to the true insight that he is a res cogitans.<p><p>The subject thinks of himself as an ”I”, that is, as an individual. Others are not thought of as others, but rather as representations or ideas. The subject as an individual is a product of thought, that is, upon the Modern approach of rationality, a theoretical idea. <p><p>As a result of rationality as self-evidence and the subject as an individual, practical reason is confined to free will. Freedom as the third basic tenet of the Modern philosophical project is limited to following the commands of God and the rules of the country. These commands and rules are found “out there”, without questioning either their origin or their purpose.<p><p>The main critique of the Modern philosophical project as it is briefly set out in the first chapter is that it is based on the so-called "scholastic fallacy”. This fallacy involves that rationality is presupposed identical in everyone’s head. On the supposition that all subjects are ontologically rational as Descartes suggests, their use of their rational capacities would result in an identical outcome that is truth. The universality of reason is, however, a hidden premise of the Modern philosophical project. It unfolds from a “view from nowhere”. This view of rationality is challenged as an unreflected one, and the methodological device of this book is to avoid this type of fallacies.<p><p>Chapter 2 focuses on the idea of science as it comes up with the Modern philosophical project. The infinite universe is substituted for the Aristotelian closed world. Mathematics becomes the appropriate method of the scientia nova that Descartes and Galileï initiate. As Descartes’ method aims at being a mathesis universalis it is believed to include the aptitude to deal with any problem, theoretical as well as practical. <p><p>The subsequent epistemologization of philosophy tacitly presupposes that mathematics belongs to the very nature of reality. From there, it follows that philosophy is thought of as a theory of reality. On an alternative view, mainly advocated by, e.g. Heidegger, it is claimed that mathematics as a method of science is a matter of choice. If the method is a matter of choice, the scientia nova can be articulated as a liberation from the shackles of ecclesiastical authority, and hence as a matter of freedom. Another consequence is that the scientia nova can articulate true propositions about reality, without having direct access to it. The distinction between a theory of reality and a theory about reality is illustrated with the help of the conflict between Galileï and the Church.<p><p>Chapter 3 concentrates on the subject and rationality. Both the subject and rationality are put in context, that is, a context of participation. With this approach, I propose to challenge the self-evidentiary character of rationality as well as the idea of the isolated and ontologically anchored Cartesian subject. Relying on George Herbert Mead’s theory of the subject, I argue that the subject is first and foremost an “intersubject”. <p><p>The subject, it is argued, is a social subject whose self emerges through interaction with others. The substitution of a subject of meaning for a subject of truth concretises the critique of the Cartesian subject in the first chapter. Both the subject and meaning, so it is argued, emerge from interaction in a context of participation. The subject’s self includes a social as well as an individual pole. These two poles and the interaction between them have been neglected throughout the Modern philosophical project. By articulating them, an attempt is made to take the subject qua subject seriously.<p><p>A similar contextualisation is operated with rationality. Rationality, even in its rationalistic appearance, is not self-revealing. The idealisation of rationality in the Modern philosophical project, that is, its decontextualisation, obscures the fact that it is historically situated. This situatedness refers to its emergence and operation in a specific context. This recontextualisation shows it as one conception of rationality among others. The Modern philosophical project held its conception of rationality to be a reflection of reality, upon its belief in the direct access to the latter.<p><p>The distinction between conceptions on the one hand and a concept on the other is the methodological device that serves to further articulate the concept of freedom. This is the theme of chapter 4. Freedom is related to the emergence of science in the 17th century. While the subject and rationality were connected to a context of participation in the foregoing chapters, attention will be drawn to the characteristics of the concept of freedom in this chapter. <p><p>The basic premise of the theory of freedom proposed in this chapter comes to saying that in the absence of any external limitation, subjects are free to act as they please. If they want to act, however, freedom unlimited as it is called must be determined. This means that from the infinite range of possibilities, a choice has to be made. Without a choice, everything remains possible though no action can occur. To make a choice implies that the concept of freedom is concretised. This concretisation is called a conception. Action is possible, so it is argued further, on two types of conceptions. One is a conception of freedom, the other a conception about freedom. A conception of freedom is a conception of the subject himself; a conception about freedom on the contrary is a conception of someone else.<p><p>On the basic premise of the theory of freedom advocated throughout the book, freedom is unlimited. This includes a priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom. Therefore, his acting on conceptions about freedom must be justified. This requirement of justification is connected to the idea of freedom as principium. A principium has a twofold meaning. The first is a starting point; the second is that a principle is also a leitmotiv. <p><p>Freedom unlimited is the starting point of political philosophy as it is found in Hobbes and Rousseau. They will be our main discussion partners throughout the book. Their theory of the social contract as the basis of the construction of political space is premised by the idea of freedom unlimited. They do neglect though the second aspect of freedom as principium, that is, freedom as the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. This aspect is briefly elaborated in chapter 4 where Hobbes’ theory is diagnosed as a theory about freedom, while it purports to be a theory of freedom.<p><p>Freedom as principium and the priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom that it involves is identified as the basic principle of legisprudence. It holds, summarizing, that law can only be legitimate if it is legitimated to operate as an alternative for failing social interaction. The idea of freedom as principium will be elaborated in chapter 8 where I proceed to the identification of the principles of legisprudence.<p><p>The second part of the book is dedicated to the problem of legalism and legitimation.<p><p>Chapter 5 explores the reason for the absence of a theory of legislation until now. The main reason is that law, from the very beginning of the Modern philosophical project, is unfolded as a reflection of reality. The obscuration of the embedment of law in the realm of politics is explained as a strategy of practical reason. This strategy is at the basis of what is identified as strong legalism. Strong legalism is the dominant pattern of thought in legal thinking. It holds that normativity is a matter of rule following, irrespective of where the rules come from. It easily fits the idea of the provisional morality Descartes has sketched, but that never came to a real end.<p><p>The main characteristics of strong legalism are pointed from a reading of Hobbes and Rousseau. The characteristics identified are: representationalism, universality or the neglect of the time dimension, concealed instrumentalism, and etatism. These characteristics of the legalistic thought pattern are supported and corroborated by a type of legal science that finds its roots in the Modern philosophical project.<p><p>Over against this form of legalism that is labelled “strong legalism” chapter 6 explores the contours of a different brand of legalism that I propose to mark as “weak legalism”. <p><p>Weak legalism or “legalism with a human face” comprises a critique of strong legalism in that the latter neglects the position of the subject qua subject. As it will be discussed in the first part of the book, the Modern philosophical project makes the subject the preponderant actor in reality. He is, however, an actor in a play written in advance by others and not an auctor or an agent.<p><p>To take the subject qua subject seriously, as weak legalism purports, entails placing him in a context with others. This part of chapter 6 joins the insights articulated in the first part of the book, more specifically in chapter 2. Others, and not just “otherness” as a representation of the subject, belong to the subject’s context. If it is in this context that the self and meaning emerge, this process is not necessarily conflict-free. Hobbes and Rousseau conclude from this fact that social interaction leads to war. It provides them with an argument to substitute interaction based on legal rules from social interaction based on conceptions of freedom. The former are issued by the sovereign and can be qualified as conceptions about freedom.<p><p>Hobbes and Rousseau hold that this substitution is ipso facto legitimate. On the theory of freedom that was sketched out in chapter 4, this substitution however needs to be legitimated.<p><p>Chapter 7 deals with the issue of legitimation. I distinguish to begin with between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories of legitimation. On the former, law is legitimated if it corresponds to at least one transcendent true norm. On the latter, no transcendent content is available. This is proper to a democratic theory of legitimation upon which the demos determines the ends of action as well as the means to realise them.<p><p>Apart from this difference between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation process they embrace is the same. This dynamic refers to the direction of the legitimation chain. In jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation chain runs from a transcendent norm to a rule of the sovereign. In non-jusnaturalistic theories exemplified by Hobbes and Rousseau the dynamics of the chain runs from an initial consent to the social contract to the set of rules issued by the sovereign.<p><p>The dynamic of the chain in both type of theories, so it is argued, is irreversible. The operationalisation of political space ensuing from the social contract is what legislation is about according to the Modern philosophical project. Taken as it stands, the initial consent of the subjects to the social contract or their proxy to the sovereign is an action on a conception of freedom. They do give, though, a proxy to the sovereign to issue subsequent limitations of their freedom that are yet unknown when subscribing the contract .From the “moment” of the contract, the sovereign is legitimated in substituting conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom. The initial proxy contained in the contract covers any of his limitations of freedom. As both Hobbes and Rousseau argue, the rules of the sovereign are always morally correct. As a consequence, they cannot be criticized for whatever reason. Would this be possible then the chain of legitimation initiated by the social contract would be reversed. <p><p>On strong legalism, however the chain is unidirectional. The sovereign transforms any propositional content into a true norm, which allows for the qualification of sovereignty as a black box.<p><p>Chapter 7 ends with the articulation of some possibilities of reversing the chain of legitimation in what is called the proxy model. On this idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain, a more general approach is initiated. This approach leads to the claim that a legislator’s limitations of freedom are to be justified. They are deemed legitimate and legitimated on a general proxy. The latter however affects he reflexive character of freedom of the subject. On the idea of a general proxy, any of his conceptions of freedom can a priori be replaced by conceptions about freedom. The general approach to the idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain comes to say that this substitution must be justified. Sovereigns, that is, should give reasons for their rules.<p><p>This is basically what legisprudence as a theory of rational legislation comes to. Its more concrete articulation is the topic of the third part of the book.<p><p>Chapter 8 starts with the exploration of an alternative for the proxy model of legitimation that was investigated in the previous chapters. The alternative is labelled the trade-off model. On this model, the subjects trade off conceptions of freedom for conceptions about freedom. This comes to saying that the substitution of conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom must be justified. No rule can be held legitimate if this justification or legitimation is lacking.<p><p>The trade off model is based on freedom as principium in its twofold meaning. Freedom unlimited as was argued in chapter 4 is both the starting point and the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. It follows from there that subjects are primarily to act on conceptions of freedom. A substitution of a conception about freedom for conceptions of freedom can only be legitimate if it is legitimated or justified as an alternative for failing social interaction. This is the first principle of legisprudence that is called the “principle of alternativity”. The second principle is the principle of necessity of the normative density. Rules should not automatically contain sanctions. If sanctions are included, this requires a specific justification. Rules with a sanction embrace a double reduction of freedom. First, the pattern of behaviour is imposed and second its realisation is enforced. Before realising a rule with the help of force alternative means of achievement of its goals are to be outweighed.<p><p>The third principle of legisprudence is the principle of temporality. The limitation of freedom on a conception about freedom must be justified as “on time”. Any justification is embedded in a context. This means that if it is successful it will only be temporarily so. The principle of temporality then requires a justification over time, and not only on the moment that a rule is issued.<p><p>The principle of coherence is the fourth principle of legisprudence. It requires that rules, both judicial and legislative make sense as a whole. The principle of coherence thus identified is elaborated in a theory that I propose to call the “level theory of coherence”, and that makes part of legisprudence.<p><p>At the end of the chapter, the principles of legisprudence are focused on from the position of the legislator before they are further explored in chapter 9. This chapter concretises the operationalisation of the principles of legisprudence. The principles of legisprudence, so it is argued, are to be read within the context of one another. Upon weighing and balancing their relative weight in the process of legislation, the ruling of the sovereign can be said to be legisprudentially optimal.<p><p>Legisprudential optimality on its turn is further concretised in chapter 10. The sovereign has to discharge of his duties throughout the legislative process while taking the circumstances of legislation into account. These circumstances are the fact that subjects interact with each other on the basis of conceptions of freedom. These circumstances result from the theory of freedom that was set out in chapter 4 and further elaborated in the subsequent chapters. <p><p>The duties of the sovereign throughout the process of legislation amount to a duty of fact finding, problem formulation, weighing and balancing of alternatives, prognosis, retrospection, taking future circumstances into account and finally a duty to correction.<p><p>Finally, a brief sketch is offered of the concept of validity according to legisprudence. Apart from the necessity of formal validity, both efficacy and axiological validity are briefly commented upon. From the diagnosis of some theories of validity that mainly focus on only one of the aspects of validity, the concept of validity according to legisprudence is called “network validity”.<p><p>Projects like this book would never begin, let alone come to an end, without the help of a large number of people. I will not enter into a detailed description of their contribution. Suffice to mention their names with the hope that they will recognize some of their thoughts, reflections, critiques and encouragements somewhere in the book.<p><p>The persons that come to my mind are Aulis Aarnio, Maurice Adams, Manuel Atienza, John Bell, Samantha Besson, Guido Calabresi, Tom Campbell, Carine Caunes, Emilios Christodoulidis, Wochiech and Aga Cyrul, Martine de Clerq, Pieter Dehon, Erwin Depue, Johan Desmet, David Dhooge, Guillaume Drago, Hugues Dumont, Philip Eijlander, Michiel Elst, René Foqué, Benoit Frydman, Tito Gallas, Philippe Gérard, René Gonzalez, Guy Haarscher, Mark Hunyadi, Sheldon Leader, Maria-Isabelle Köpke-Tinturé, Neil MacCormick, Francesco Laporte, Luzius Mader, Frank Michelman, Charles-Albert Morand, Dwight Newman, François Ost, Juliane Ottmann, Richard Parker, Trinie Parker, Aleksander Peczenik, Chaïm Perelman, Vlad Perju, Kauko Pietillä, Juha Pöhöynen, Daniel Priel, Pekka Riekinen, Thomas Roberts, Eric Rossiaux, Geoffrey Samuel, Jerzy Stelmach, Andreas Takis, Benoît Timmermans, Philippe Thion, Hannu Tolonen, Michel Troper, François Tulkens, Stamatios Tzitzis, François Vallançon, Koen Van Aeken, Wibren Van der Burg, Mark Van Hoecke, Michiel Vandekerckhove, Frederik Vandendriesche, Rob van Gestel, Scott Veatch, Roger Vergauwen, Amaryllis Verhoeven, Michel Villey, Jeremy Waldron, Kenneth Winston, Willem Witteveen, Wochiech Zadurski and Marek Zyrk-Zadurski.<p><p>Thomas Roberts helped me with the linguistic corrections of the text.<p><p>I have a special debt to Mark Van Bellingen and Lilly De Vooght for their views on the context of participation, the idea of a hermeneutical point of view and their critique on the “view from nowhere”.<p> <p><p> <p>1\ / Doctorat en philosophie et lettres, Orientation philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This thesis aims to critique the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth and its underlying moral justification in order to provide a stronger and improved version of both. In Chapter 1 I explore what sort of moral justification is necessary to establish the Universal Declaration on firm grounds and explore its relation to environmental ethics and rights discourse. I argue that a non-anthropocentric perspective is necessary to justify the Universal Declaration’s rights. In Chapter 2 I explore the underlying justification of the Universal Declaration as discovered in the works of Cormac Cullinan and Father Thomas Berry. I argue that their ethical framework is indeterminate, has many ambiguities and uncertainties, and, among other problems, it does not provide a clear action-guiding framework. In Chapter 3 I develop an alternative justification for the Universal Declaration. I argue against many predominant moral theories, that in light of our best scientific and moral understanding we should expand the realm of moral concern to include all living beings, a moral theory I call Life’s Imperative. In Chapter 4 I illustrate that Life’s Imperative is a much stronger, more coherent justification for the Universal Declaration, one that coheres with both our best understanding of the natural world and our relation to it, and to an environmental ethic reflective of that relationship. Unfortunately many of the weaknesses in the current implicit justification of the Universal Declaration have also led to it enshrining rights that are themselves problematic. In order to address these issues, I revise its rights to accord with the stronger justification that I established in Chapter 3. The end result of doing so is a revised version of the Universal Declaration

No description available.

Text in Afrikaans / Die basiese tese voortspruitend uit hierdie ondersoek is dat wetenskapsbeoefening binne bepaalde terreine van die regswetenskap ondemeem word ooreenkomstig 'n verswee staatlike paradigma wat deurlopend streef na die instandhouding van die politieke status quo. Die territoriale staat is die hoeksteen van die bestaande politieke orde en terselfdertyd die meester-konsep van die staatlike paradigma. Wetenskapsbeoefening volgens hierdie paradigma is gemik op die instandhouding van die territoriale staat en funksioneer dus as 'n defensief-konserwatiewe politieke projek. Uitsluitsel oor welke vrae en antwoorde as wetenskaplik ter sake kwalifiseer, word gegee aan die hand van die behoeftes van die bestaande territoriaalstaatlike orde. Antwoorde kwalifiseer as wetenskaplik houdbaar alleenlik indien dit met die belange van die bestaande territoriale staat vereenselwigbaar is en nie die staatlike status quo sal ontwrig nie. Intellektuele aktiwiteit wat nie die staatlike gebaseerde status quo ter wille is nie en dit moontlik mag ontwrig, haal in terme van hierdie paradigma moeilik die drumpel van wetenskaplikheid. In die ondersoek word die vestiging van die staatlike paradigma histories nagegaan en daama word die hoofmomente van die paradigma blootgele. Die belangrikste produkte van wetenskapsbeoefening kragtens die staatlike paradigma word daama uitgepluis. Benewens die feit dat die produkte deurlopend die staatlike orde onderskraag, vervul dit ook die strategiese funksie om uitdagers van die staatlike orde te domestiseer en in die diens van die staatlike orde te plaas. Die prominentste produkte van wetenskapsbeoefening volgens die staatlike paradigma word ontleed: - staatsbou, dikwels verkeerdelik voorgehou as nasiebou; - demokrasie wat onderhewig aan die dissipline van die staatlike paradigma tot staatlike demokrasie omvorm is; - menseregte wat burgerlike afhanklikheid van die staat bevorder en die staat sodoende teen opposisie vrywaar; - die misdaad, hoogverraad en die intemasionaalregtelike figuur van selfbeskikking wat deur die staatlike paradigma tot 'n staatsdienende staatlike selfbeskikking omvorm is. Die staatlike paradigma word egter onder toenemende spanning geplaas en daar bestaan die moontlikheid van 'n rewolusionere herwaardering van verskeie sleutel-konsepte wat deur die staatlike paradigma gevange gehou en in diens van die bestaande staatlike status quo gedomestiseer is. Die rewolusionere vrystel van hierdie konsepte kan die weg baan na 'n nuwe politokrasie anderkant die staatlike orde. / The basic thesis emanating from this research holds that scientific enterprises within certain fields of the legal science are undertaken in pursuance of a tacit statist paradigm which consistently preserve the political status quo. The territorial state is both the keystone of the existing political order and the master concept of the statist paradigm. Scientific activity according to this paradigm seeks to protect the territorial state and functions as a defensive conservative political project. The scientific relevance of questions and answers is determined by the exigencies of the existing order composed of territorial states. Answers are viewed as scientifically authentic only if they are compatible with the interests of the prevailing territorial state and when they do not pose a threat of disruption to the existing statist status quo. Intellectual activity that does not affirm the statist predicated status quo and which poses the risk of disruption of the this order would seldom qualify as scientific in terms of this paradigm. This study examines the historical establishment of the statist paradigm and debunks the main pillars of the paradigm. The foremost products of scientific activity in accordance with the statist paradigm are then analyzed. These products invariably safeguard the statist order and also succeed in domesticating the challengers of the statist order and placing them in the service of this order. The most outstanding developments of the scientific endeavour in pursuance of the statist paradigm are analyzed, which are: - state building, often inaccurately portrayed as nation building; -democracy which, subjected to the discipline of the statist paradigm, had been transformed into statist democracy; - human rights which cultivate civic dependence upon the state, thus safeguarding the state against opposition; -the crime ofhigh treason and the international law concept of self-determination which was transfigured by the statist paradigm into a state serving statist self-determination. The statist paradigm is however placed under increasing tension and there is a possibility of a revolutionary reappraisal of several key concepts which the statist paradigm has kept in captivity and which have been domesticated and placed in the service of the statist status quo. By releasing these revolutionary concepts, the way to a new politocracy, beyond the statist order, may be paved. / Jurisprudence / LL.D.

In this doctoral thesis, Kant's distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is examined. The thesis begins with an exploration of how the distinction originates and evolves in the writings of three of Kant's most prominent natural law predecessors: Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, and Christian Wolff. The thesis then moves on to Kant's own writings. It is argued that Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction in as many as twelve different ways, that these ways are not entirely consistent with one another, and that many of them, even taken by themselves, do not hold up to scrutiny. Furthermore, it is argued that Kant's claim that perfect duties always trump imperfect duties - which can be referred to as "the priority claim" - is not actually supported by any one of the ways in which Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction. After this critical reading of Kant's writings, the thesis then switches gears and a more "positive" project is attempted. It is argued that the perfect-imperfect distinction, even though it does not support the priority claim, is not altogether normatively neutral or uninteresting. In particular, for some of the ways in which the distinction is drawn, it is shown that the distinction yields the following normative implication: Sometimes perfect duties override imperfect duties and all other times there is no priority one way or the other. Finally, it is explained that this normative implication - which can be referred to as the "privilege claim" - translates into the following practical directive: When there is a conflict between a perfect duty and an imperfect duty, sometimes one must act in conformity with the former duty and all other times one is free to choose which of the two duties to act in conformity with. This practical directive represents the ultimate finding of this thesis.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:27:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Roberto Soriano de Amorim.pdf: 220567 bytes, checksum: 7de2ec0e4731584912a1e5b1ebb105f1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-06-25 / The purpose of this investigation is to create a reference in the interpretation of the argumentative discourse that intends to sustain the legitimacy of the national tax system. Thus, it is believed that, while highlighting the convincing terms, the understanding of the convincing process is made possible. In the form of a draft, the procedure aims at comparing the Aristotelian discourse as far as the meaning of the term justice is concerned, its support social living and its consequence equality converted, in our modern society, to the term contributive capacity , for the amendment to the modern rational juridical tax system . In order to reach this goal, preserved the drafting nature, it is highlighted in its originality (clearly, with the recognition of the fact that the interpretation of the old has a misleading factor because of the meaning of the values nowadays), the essential terms built in the Aristotelian theory happiness- justice virtue and equality). Because it is fundamental to build the theoretical model to make a description of the object of the tax analysis and its nature in the modern society according to its juridical configuration and also its sustaining, in the form of making tax fundaments legitimate, this means, tax justice. Finally in the form of preliminary studies (because this is the intention of this study), attempts to get closer and to differentiate between justice, Aristotelian and contemporary justice, this in the tax form. It is important to highlight that because the pretension is to identify the convincing resources, the exam of the economic - socio cultural and politic reality will not be done because this will be the objective of another step the authorizing methodological resource in the reading of the convincing rhetoric of the legal text, in the tax area, in modern society / O interesse da investigação é operar a construção de referencial para interpretar o discurso argumentador que pretende sustentar a legitimidade do sistema tributário nacional. Desta forma, acredita-se que, destacados os termos convencedores, fica viabilizado o entendimento do processo de convencimento. Na forma de ensaio, o procedimento objetiva comparar o discurso aristotélico no que respeita ao significado do termo justiça , seu suporte convívio social e seu conseqüente igualdade , convertidos, na sociedade moderna, no termo capacidade contributiva , para ajuste ao sistema jurídico racional moderno . Para realização do propósito, preservada a natureza ensaistica, pontuam-se, na sua originalidade (evidentemente com reconhecimento de que a interpretação do antigo contém viés decorrente do significado dos valores atualidade), os termos essenciais, construídos na teoria aristotélica felicidade virtude justiça equidade. Porque fundamental para a construção do modelo teórico, faz-se a descrição do objeto de análise tributo e sua natureza na sociedade moderna, conforme sua configuração jurídica e também de sua sustentação, na forma dos fundamentos legitimadores do tributo, isto é, justiça tributária. Finalmente, na forma de estudos preliminares (porque esta é a intenção deste), tentativas de aproximações e de distinções entre a justiça, aristotélica e contemporânea, esta na forma tributária. Importante ressaltar que, porque a pretensão é de identificar os recursos convencedores, não se fará o exame da realidade socio-cultura-econômica e política porque este será o objetivo de outra etapa o recurso metodológico autorizante da leitura do caráter retórico convencedor do texto legal, na área da tributação, na sociedade moderna

Text in Afrikaans / Die basiese tese voortspruitend uit hierdie ondersoek is dat wetenskapsbeoefening binne bepaalde terreine van die regswetenskap ondemeem word ooreenkomstig 'n verswee staatlike paradigma wat deurlopend streef na die instandhouding van die politieke status quo. Die territoriale staat is die hoeksteen van die bestaande politieke orde en terselfdertyd die meester-konsep van die staatlike paradigma. Wetenskapsbeoefening volgens hierdie paradigma is gemik op die instandhouding van die territoriale staat en funksioneer dus as 'n defensief-konserwatiewe politieke projek. Uitsluitsel oor welke vrae en antwoorde as wetenskaplik ter sake kwalifiseer, word gegee aan die hand van die behoeftes van die bestaande territoriaalstaatlike orde. Antwoorde kwalifiseer as wetenskaplik houdbaar alleenlik indien dit met die belange van die bestaande territoriale staat vereenselwigbaar is en nie die staatlike status quo sal ontwrig nie. Intellektuele aktiwiteit wat nie die staatlike gebaseerde status quo ter wille is nie en dit moontlik mag ontwrig, haal in terme van hierdie paradigma moeilik die drumpel van wetenskaplikheid. In die ondersoek word die vestiging van die staatlike paradigma histories nagegaan en daama word die hoofmomente van die paradigma blootgele. Die belangrikste produkte van wetenskapsbeoefening kragtens die staatlike paradigma word daama uitgepluis. Benewens die feit dat die produkte deurlopend die staatlike orde onderskraag, vervul dit ook die strategiese funksie om uitdagers van die staatlike orde te domestiseer en in die diens van die staatlike orde te plaas. Die prominentste produkte van wetenskapsbeoefening volgens die staatlike paradigma word ontleed: - staatsbou, dikwels verkeerdelik voorgehou as nasiebou; - demokrasie wat onderhewig aan die dissipline van die staatlike paradigma tot staatlike demokrasie omvorm is; - menseregte wat burgerlike afhanklikheid van die staat bevorder en die staat sodoende teen opposisie vrywaar; - die misdaad, hoogverraad en die intemasionaalregtelike figuur van selfbeskikking wat deur die staatlike paradigma tot 'n staatsdienende staatlike selfbeskikking omvorm is. Die staatlike paradigma word egter onder toenemende spanning geplaas en daar bestaan die moontlikheid van 'n rewolusionere herwaardering van verskeie sleutel-konsepte wat deur die staatlike paradigma gevange gehou en in diens van die bestaande staatlike status quo gedomestiseer is. Die rewolusionere vrystel van hierdie konsepte kan die weg baan na 'n nuwe politokrasie anderkant die staatlike orde. / The basic thesis emanating from this research holds that scientific enterprises within certain fields of the legal science are undertaken in pursuance of a tacit statist paradigm which consistently preserve the political status quo. The territorial state is both the keystone of the existing political order and the master concept of the statist paradigm. Scientific activity according to this paradigm seeks to protect the territorial state and functions as a defensive conservative political project. The scientific relevance of questions and answers is determined by the exigencies of the existing order composed of territorial states. Answers are viewed as scientifically authentic only if they are compatible with the interests of the prevailing territorial state and when they do not pose a threat of disruption to the existing statist status quo. Intellectual activity that does not affirm the statist predicated status quo and which poses the risk of disruption of the this order would seldom qualify as scientific in terms of this paradigm. This study examines the historical establishment of the statist paradigm and debunks the main pillars of the paradigm. The foremost products of scientific activity in accordance with the statist paradigm are then analyzed. These products invariably safeguard the statist order and also succeed in domesticating the challengers of the statist order and placing them in the service of this order. The most outstanding developments of the scientific endeavour in pursuance of the statist paradigm are analyzed, which are: - state building, often inaccurately portrayed as nation building; -democracy which, subjected to the discipline of the statist paradigm, had been transformed into statist democracy; - human rights which cultivate civic dependence upon the state, thus safeguarding the state against opposition; -the crime ofhigh treason and the international law concept of self-determination which was transfigured by the statist paradigm into a state serving statist self-determination. The statist paradigm is however placed under increasing tension and there is a possibility of a revolutionary reappraisal of several key concepts which the statist paradigm has kept in captivity and which have been domesticated and placed in the service of the statist status quo. By releasing these revolutionary concepts, the way to a new politocracy, beyond the statist order, may be paved. / Jurisprudence / LL.D.

Dans notre thèse de doctorat, nous avons cherché à tester l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’enjeu européen constituerait, en France, l’épicentre d’une "actualisation" — pour partie assumée, pour partie occultée — de la pensée du juriste allemand Carl Schmitt. Les réflexions politico-philosophiques de Schmitt représentent en soi un assemblage rhétorique et systématique puissant, aisément mobilisable dans le cadre des débats théoriques sur la construction européenne, afin de battre en brèche les affirmations néo-cosmopolitiques, que l’on soit de droite ou de gauche. Il s’est agi, pour nous, de vérifier jusqu’à quel point la pensée politique du juriste se retrouvait "recyclée" dans le débat français contemporain relatif à l’idée d’Europe. Était ainsi ouverte l’opportunité d’évaluer, de manière systématique, la facticité ou la pertinence d’une antinomie :une Europe schmittienne contre une Europe kantienne. Dans un premier temps, nous avons tâché de reconstruire ce que fut la position schmittienne concernant la gestion de l’espace européen, avant d’évaluer, dans un second temps, l’impact causé par une telle pensée sur les réflexions qui animent le débat français contemporain.<p>La première partie de la thèse visait à rendre compte de la vision schmittienne de l’Europe. Schmitt a pensé la décision politique en des termes statonationaux :l’ordre juridique étatique serait modelé sur la base de la nature axiologique et culturelle de l’amitié politique, de la communauté des citoyens soudés par un seul et même critère d’appartenance, souvent religieux ;critère qui précéderait la nationalité et la réalisation "politique". Il s’ensuit que l’ordre mondial ne peut se présenter que sous la forme d’un pluriversum d’États, animés dans leurs relations mutuelles par la dynamique de l’ami et de l’ennemi. Le libéralisme et le pluralisme provoqueraient des regroupements fonctionnels, dont le pan-européisme serait l’une des manifestations les plus visibles, à l’origine d’un sapement du politique et de l’unité souveraine de l’État. Quatre points analytiques permettent d’expliquer l’appréhension schmittienne de la gestion juridico-politique du Vieux Continent :l’indissociabilité du couple conceptuel État-politique, l’idée que la nation demeure l’horizon indépassable de la démocratie, la critique de la notion d’humanité et de toute morale universelle, et l’idée que le droit serait nécessairement d’origine politique, donc particulariste.<p>En France, l’intérêt pour l’œuvre de Schmitt s’est largement accru ces dernières années. Le débat théorique actuel autour du problème de la construction européenne offre d’ailleurs une place particulière à la réactivation de l’argumentaire schmittien statocentré, antilibéral et culturaliste. À gauche comme à droite de l’échiquier politique, intellectuels et philosophes mobilisent raisonnements et schémas discursifs, tantôt réclamés de Schmitt, tantôt très proches des arguments du juriste de Plettenberg. En passant en revue les réflexions d’auteurs aussi différents qu’Étienne Balibar et Pierre Manent, Alain de Benoist et Marcel Gauchet, Daniel Bensaïd et Pierre-André Taguieff, nous avons tenté d’approcher et de rendre compte de la pluralité des emprunts à la pensée de Schmitt et à son appréhension de l’ordre européen, dans le cadre des discussions françaises relatives à l’intégration régionale européenne. Chez certains de ces auteurs, la construction européenne apparaît comme la manifestation avancée d’un phénomène général de dilution du politique. Autrement dit, elle incarnerait un idéal de société qui ramène le politique au niveau du marché. Pour d’autres, Carl Schmitt aurait diagnostiqué mieux que quiconque la mort du droit des gens européen et les travers de l’universalisme abstrait que brandirait l’Union européenne en expansion. Par ailleurs, la théorisation schmittienne de la souveraineté constituerait une référence incontournable pour éclairer les thématiques actuelles relatives à une mutation des niveaux de pouvoir.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished